[8] See Additional Notes, [a].
[9] The universe could not be generated together with all things, for the
principle of it must be unbegotten; since everything that is generated,
is generated from a cause; and if this cause was also generated, there
must be a progression of causes ad infinitum, unless the unbegotten is
admitted to be the principle of the universe. Neither, therefore, can
the universe be corrupted together with all things; for the principle of
it being unbegotten is also incorruptible; that only being corruptible,
which was once generated.
[10] Critolaus, the Peripatetic, employs nearly the same arguments as
those contained in this paragraph, in proof of the perpetuity of the
world, as is evident from the following passage, preserved by Philo,
in his Treatise Περι Αφθαρσιας Κοσμου, “On the Incorruptibility of the
World”: το αιτιον αυτῳ του υγιαινειν, ανοσον εστι· αλλα και το αιτιον
αυτῳ του αγρυπνειν, αγρυπνον εστιν. ει δε τουτο, και το αιτιον αυτῳ του
υπαρχειν, αϊδιον εστιν. αιτιος δε ο κοσμος αυτῳ του υπαρχειν, ειγε και
τοις αλλοις απασιν. αϊδιος ο κοσμος εστιν. i. e. “That which is the cause
to itself of good health, is without disease. But, also, that which is
the cause to itself of a vigilant energy, is sleepless. But if this
be the case, that also which is the cause to itself of existence, is
perpetual. The world, however, is the cause to itself of existence, since
it is the cause of existence to all other things. The world, therefore,
is perpetual.” Everything divine, according to the philosophy of
Pythagoras and Plato, being a self-perfect essence, begins its own energy
from itself, and is therefore primarily the cause to itself of that
which it imparts to others. Hence, since the world, being a divine and
self-subsistent essence, imparts to itself existence, it must be without
non-existence, and therefore must be perpetual.
[11] i. e. It is not true that the universe can contain anything greater
and more powerful than itself.
[12] Philo Judæus, in his before-mentioned Treatise Περι Αφθαρσιας
Κοσμου, has adopted the arguments of Ocellus in this paragraph, but not
with the conciseness of his original.
[13] This four-fold mutation of ages in the human race, consists of the
infant, the lad, the man, and the old man, as is well observed by Theo of
Smyrna. See my Theoretic Arithmetic, p. 189.
[14] In the original, το τε απαθες μερος του κοσμου και το ακινητον,
which is obviously erroneous. Nogarola, in his note on this passage,
says, “Melius arbitror si legatur το τε αειπαθες μερος, και αεικινητον,
ut sit sensus, semper patibilem, et semper mobilem partem distinguunt ac
separant.” But though he is right in reading αεικινητον for ακινητον,
he is wrong in substituting αειπαθες for απαθες; for Ocellus is here
speaking of the distinction between the celestial and sublunary region,
the former of which is _impassive_, because not subject to generation and
corruption, but the latter being subject to both these is _perpetually
mutable_.
[15] Aristotle, in his treatise on Generation and Corruption, has
borrowed what Ocellus here says about the three things necessary to
generation. See my translation of that work.
[16] In the original, και ψοφος προς σιγην, instead of which it is
necessary to read και σιγη προς ψοφον, conformably to the above
translation. See the Notes to my translation of the First Book of
Aristotle’s Physics, p. 73, &c., in which the reader will find a treasury
of information from Simplicius concerning matter. But as matter is devoid
of all quality, and is a privation of all form, the necessity of the
above emendation is immediately obvious.
[17] Thus also Aristotle, in his Treatise on Generation and Corruption,
θερμον δε και ψυχρον, και ὑγρον, τα μεν τῳ ποιητικα ειναι, τα δε τῳ
παθητικα λερεται, i. e. “With respect to heat and cold, dryness and
moisture, the two former of these are said to be effective, but the two
latter passive powers.”
[18] The substance of nearly the whole of what Ocellus here says, and
also of the two following paragraphs, is given by Aristotle, in his
Treatise on Generation and Corruption.
[19] In the original, επειτα δε και την αυτην τῳ ανθρωπῳ συνταξιν προς
το ὁλον, ὁτι μερος ὑπαρχων οικου τε και πολεως, και το μεγιστον κοσμου,
συμπληρουν οφειλει το απογενομενον τουτων ἑκαστον, κ. τ. λ. Here, for
και το μεγιστον κοσμου, συμπληρουν, κ. τ. λ., it is requisite to read,
conformably to the above translation, και το μεγιστον, κοσμου συμπληρουν,
κ. τ. λ. Nogarola, in his version, from not perceiving the necessity of
this emendation, has made Ocellus say that man is the greatest part of
the universe; for his translation is as follows: “Mox eandem hominis
constitutionem ad universam referendam, quippe qui non solum domûs et
civitatis, verum etiam mundi maxima habetur pars,” &c.
[20] This observation applies only to well regulated cities, but in
London and other large cities, where the population is not restricted to
a definite number, this abundant propagation of the species is, to the
greater part of the community, attended with extreme misery and want.
Plato and Aristotle, who rank among the wisest men that ever lived, were
decidedly of opinion, that the population of a city should be limited.
Hence, the former of these philosophers says, “that in a city where the
inhabitants do not know each other, there is no light, but profound
darkness;” and the latter, “that as 10,000 inhabitants are too few for a
city, so 100,000 are too many.”
[21] For _whole_, according to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Plato,
has a triple subsistence; since it is either prior to parts, or consists
of parts, or exists in each of the parts of a thing. But a _whole_, prior
to parts, contains in itself parts causally. The universe is a whole of
wholes, the wholes which it comprehends in itself (viz. the inerratic
sphere, and the spheres of the planets and elements) being its parts. And
in the whole which is in each part of a thing, every part according to
participation becomes a whole, i. e. a partial whole.
[22] In the original, ὡς δει, και εξ ὡν δει, και ὁτε δει, a mode of
diction which frequently occurs in Aristotle, and from him in Platonic
writers.