CHAPTER I

Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this

file which includes the original illustration.

See 65693-h.htm or 65693-h.zip:

(https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/65693/pg65693-images.html)

or

(https://www.gutenberg.org/files/65693/65693-h.zip)

Images of the original pages are available through

Internet Archive. See

https://archive.org/details/forgottenmanothe00sumn

Transcriber’s note:

Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).

Text in heavy tyoe is enclosed by equal signs (=heavy type=).

[Illustration:

_William Graham Sumner_

[1907]]

THE FORGOTTEN MAN AND OTHER ESSAYS

by

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER

Edited by Albert Galloway Keller

[Illustration]

New Haven

Yale University Press

London: Humphrey Milford

Oxford University Press

MDCCCCXVIII

Copyright, 1919,

by Yale University Press

PREFACE

With the present collection the publication of Sumner’s Essays comes to

an end. The original project of publishers and editor contemplated but

a single volume--“War and Other Essays”--and they accordingly equipped

that volume with a bibliography which was as complete as they then

could make it. But when, later on, other materials came to be known

about, and especially after the discovery of a number of unpublished

manuscripts, the encouraging reception accorded to the first venture

led us to publish a second, and then a third collection: “Earth Hunger

and Other Essays” and “The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays.” It was

during the preparation of the latter of these, now some five years ago,

that the late Professor Callender deplored to the editor the omission

of certain of Sumner’s essays in political economy--in particular those

dealing with free trade and sound money. And the reviewers of preceding

collections had reminded us, rightly enough, that there should be a

fuller bibliography and also an index covering all the essays.

In this last volume we have striven to meet these several suggestions

and criticisms. And it is now the purpose of the publishers to form

of these singly issued volumes a set of four, numbered in the order

of their issue. Since the series could not have been planned as such

at the outset, this purpose is in the nature of an after-thought;

and there is therefore no general organization or systematic

classification by volumes. In so far as classification is possible,

under the circumstances, it is made by way of the index. This and the

bibliography are the work of Dr. M. R. Davie; and are but a part of the

service he has performed in the interest of an intellectual master whom

he could know only through the printed word and the medium of another

man.

Sumner’s dominant interest in political economy, as revealed in his

teaching and writing, issued in a doughty advocacy of “free trade and

hard money,” and involved the relentless exposure of protectionism

and of schemes of currency-debasement. As conveying his estimate of

protectionism, it is only fitting that his little book on “The -Ism

which teaches that Waste makes Wealth” should be recalled from an

obscurity that it does not deserve; it is typical of the author’s most

vigorous period and witnesses to the acerbity of a former issue that

may recur. In default of a single, comprehensive companion-piece in the

field of finance, and one making as interesting reading, it has been

necessary to confine selection to several rather brief articles, most

of them dating from the campaign of 1896. In the choice of all economic

essays I have been guided by the advice of my colleague, Professor F.

R. Fairchild, a fellow-student under Sumner and a fellow-admirer of his

character and career. Professor S. L. Mims also has been generous in

his aid. I do not need to thank either of these men, for what they did

was a labor of gratitude and love.

The title essay will be found at the end of the volume. It is the

once-famous lecture on “The Forgotten Man,” and is here printed for

the first time. When “War and Other Essays” was being prepared, we

had no knowledge of the existence of this manuscript lecture; and, in

order to bring into what we supposed was to be a one-volume collection

this character-creation of Sumner’s, one often alluded to in modern

writings, we reprinted two chapters from “What Social Classes Owe to

Each Other.” It has been found impracticable in later reprintings of

Vol. I to replace those chapters with the more complete essay; and we

have therefore decided to reproduce the latter, despite the certain

degree of repetition involved, rather than leave it out of the series.

In view of the fact that Sumner has been more widely known, perhaps, as

the creator and advocate of the “Forgotten Man,” than as the author of

any other of his works, we entitle this volume “The Forgotten Man and

Other Essays.”

Several essays not of an economic order have been included because they

have come to my knowledge within the last few years and have seemed to

me to call for preservation. It is almost impossible to fix the dates

of such manuscript essays, for I have not been able in all cases to

secure information from persons who might be able to identify times and

occasions. And there remain a good number of articles and manuscripts,

published or unpublished, which can receive no more than mention, with

a word of characterization, in the bibliography.

Some mention ought to be made here of a large body of hand-written

manuscript left by Sumner and representing the work of several

years--1899 to 1905 or thereabouts--upon a systematic treatise on “The

Science of Society.” Printed as it was left, partially and unevenly

completed and with many small and some wide hiatuses, this manuscript

would make several substantial volumes. It is a monument of industry,

involving, as it did, the collection over many years of thousands of

notes and memoranda, and the extraction from the same, by a sort of

_tour de force_, of generalizations intended to be set forth, with the

support of copious evidence, in the form of a survey of the evolution

and life of human society. These manuscripts, as left, represent no

more than a preliminary survey of a wide field, together with more

elaborately worked out chartings of sections of that field. The

author planned to re-write the whole in the light of “Folkways.” The

continuation, modification, and completion of this enterprise, in

something approaching the form contemplated by its author, must needs

be, if at all possible, a long task.

As one surveys, through these volumes of essays, the various phases

of scholarly and literary activity of their author, and then recalls

the teaching, both extensive and intensive, done by him with such

unremitting devotion to what he regarded as his first duty--and when

one thinks, yet again, of his labors in connection with college

and university administration, with the Connecticut State Board of

Education, and in other lines--it is hard to understand where one man

got the time, with all his ability and energy, to accomplish all this.

In the presence of evidence of such incessant and unswerving industry,

scarcely interrupted by the ill-health that overtook Sumner at about

the age of fifty, an ordinary person feels a sense of oppression and of

bewilderment, and is almost willing to subscribe to the old, hopeless

tradition that “there were giants in those days.”

In the preparation of this set of books the editor has been constantly

sustained and encouraged by the interest and sympathy of the woman who

stood by the author’s side through life, and to whom anything that had

to do with the preservation of his memory was thereby just, perfect,

and altogether praiseworthy. The completion of this editorial task

would be the more satisfying if she were still among us to receive the

final offering.

A. G. KELLER.

WEST BOOTHBAY HARBOR, ME.,

September 1, 1918.

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE 3

PROTECTIONISM, THE -ISM WHICH TEACHES THAT WASTE MAKES

WEALTH (1885) 9

TARIFF REFORM (1888) 115

WHAT IS FREE TRADE? (1886) 123

PROTECTIONISM TWENTY YEARS AFTER (1906) 131

PROSPERITY STRANGLED BY GOLD (1896) 141

CAUSE AND CURE OF HARD TIMES (1896) 149

THE FREE-COINAGE SCHEME IS IMPRACTICABLE AT EVERY POINT

(1896) 157

THE DELUSION OF THE DEBTORS (1896) 165

THE CRIME OF 1873 (1896) 173

A CONCURRENT CIRCULATION OF GOLD AND SILVER (1878) 183

THE INFLUENCE OF COMMERCIAL CRISES ON OPINIONS ABOUT ECONOMIC

DOCTRINES (1879) 213

THE PHILOSOPHY OF STRIKES (1883) 239

STRIKES AND THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1887) 249

TRUSTS AND TRADES-UNIONS (1888) 257

AN OLD “TRUST” (1889) 265

SHALL AMERICANS OWN SHIPS? (1881) 273

POLITICS IN AMERICA, 1776–1876 (1876) 285

THE ADMINISTRATION OF ANDREW JACKSON (1880) 337

THE COMMERCIAL CRISIS OF 1837 (1877 OR 1878) 371

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY (1882) 401

INTEGRITY IN EDUCATION 409

DISCIPLINE 423

THE COÖPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH 441

THE FORGOTTEN MAN (1883) 465

BIBLIOGRAPHY 499

INDEX 521

PROTECTIONISM

THE -ISM WHICH TEACHES THAT WASTE MAKES WEALTH

[1885]

PREFACE

During the last fifteen years we have had two great questions to

discuss: the restoration of the currency and civil-service reform.

Neither of these questions has yet reached a satisfactory solution,

but both are on the way toward such a result. The next great effort to

strip off the evils entailed on us by the Civil War will consist in the

repeal of those taxes which one man was enabled to levy on another,

under cover of the taxes which the government had to lay to carry on

the war. I have taken my share in the discussion of the first two

questions, and I expect to take my share in the discussion of the third.

I have written this book as a contribution to a popular agitation.

I have not troubled myself to keep or to throw off scientific or

professional dignity. I have tried to make my point as directly and

effectively as I could for the readers whom I address, _viz._, the

intelligent voters of all degrees of general culture, who need to

have it explained to them what protectionism is and how it works. I

have therefore pushed the controversy just as hard as I could, and

have used plain language, just as I have always done before in what I

have written on this subject. I must therefore forego the hope that

I have given any more pleasure now than formerly to the advocates of

protectionism.

Protectionism seems to me to deserve only contempt and scorn, satire

and ridicule. It is such an arrant piece of economic quackery, and it

masquerades under such an affectation of learning and philosophy, that

it ought to be treated as other quackeries are treated. Still, out of

deference to its strength in the traditions and lack of information of

many people, I have here undertaken a patient and serious exposition of

it. Satire and derision remain reserved for the dogmatic protectionists

and the sentimental protectionists; the Philistine protectionists and

those who hold the key of all knowledge; the protectionists of stupid

good faith and those who know their dogma is a humbug and are therefore

irritated at the exposure of it; the protectionists by birth and

those by adoption; the protectionists for hire and those by election;

the protectionists by party platform and those by pet newspaper;

the protectionists by “invincible ignorance” and those by vows and

ordination; the protectionists who run colleges and those who want to

burn colleges down; the protectionists by investment and those who sin

against light; the hopeless ones who really believe in British gold and

dread the Cobden Club, and the dishonest ones who storm about those

things without believing in them; those who may not be answered when

they come into debate, because they are “great” men, or because they

are “old” men, or because they have stock in certain newspapers, or are

trustees of certain colleges. All these have honored me personally,

in this controversy, with more or less of their particular attention.

I confess that it has cost me something to leave their cases out of

account, but to deal with them would have been a work of entertainment,

not of utility.

Protectionism arouses my moral indignation. It is a subtle, cruel, and

unjust invasion of one man’s rights by another. It is done by force

of law. It is at the same time a social abuse, an economic blunder,

and a political evil. The moral indignation which it causes is the

motive which draws me away from the scientific pursuits which form my

real occupation, and forces me to take part in a popular agitation.

The doctrine of a “call” applies in such a case, and every man is

bound to take just so great a share as falls in his way. That is why I

have given more time than I could afford to popular lectures on this

subject, and it is why I have now put the substance of those lectures

into this book.

W. G. S.

CHAPTER I

DEFINITIONS: STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION TO BE INVESTIGATED

(_A_) THE SYSTEM OF WHICH PROTECTION IS A SURVIVAL.

1. The statesmen of the eighteenth century supposed that their business

was the art of national prosperity. Their procedure was to form ideals

of political greatness and civil prosperity on the one hand, and to

evolve out of their own consciousness grand dogmas of human happiness

and social welfare on the other hand. Then they tried to devise

specific means for connecting these two notions with each other. Their

ideals of political greatness contained, as predominant elements, a

brilliant court, a refined and elegant aristocracy, well-developed fine

arts and _belles lettres_, a powerful army and navy, and a peaceful,

obedient, and hard-working peasantry and artisan class to pay the taxes

and support the other part of the political structure. In this ideal

the lower ranks paid upward, and the upper ranks blessed downward, and

all were happy together. The great political and social dogmas of the

period were exotic and incongruous. They were borrowed or accepted from

the classical authorities. Of course the dogmas were chiefly held and

taught by the philosophers, but, as the century ran its course, they

penetrated the statesman class. The statesman who had had no purpose

save to serve the “grandeur” of the king, or to perpetuate a dynasty,

gave way to statesmen who had strong national feeling and national

ideals, and who eagerly sought means to realize their ideals. Having as

yet no definite notion, based on facts of observation and experience,

of what a human society or a nation is, and no adequate knowledge

of the nature and operation of social forces, they were driven to

empirical processes which they could not test, or measure, or verify.

They piled device upon device and failure upon failure. When one

device failed of its intended purpose and produced an unforeseen evil,

they invented a new device to prevent the new evil. The new device

again failed to prevent, and became a cause of a new harm, and so on

indefinitely.

2. Among their devices for industrial prosperity were (1) export taxes

on raw materials, to make raw materials abundant and cheap at home; (2)

bounties on the export of finished products, to make the exports large;

(3) taxes on imported commodities to make the imports small, and thus,

with No. 2, to make the “balance of trade” favorable, and to secure

an importation of specie; (4) taxes or prohibition on the export of

machinery, so as not to let foreigners have the advantage of domestic

inventions; (5) prohibition on the emigration of skilled laborers,

lest they should carry to foreign rivals knowledge of domestic arts;

(6) monopolies to encourage enterprise; (7) navigation laws to foster

ship-building or the carrying trade, and to provide sailors for the

navy; (8) a colonial system to bring about by political force the very

trade which the other devices had destroyed by economic interference;

(9) laws for fixing wages and prices to repress the struggle of the

non-capitalist class to save themselves in the social press; (10)

poor-laws to lessen the struggle by another outlet; (11) extravagant

criminal laws to try to suppress another development of this struggle

by terror; and so on, and so on.

(_B_) OLD AND NEW CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE.

3. Here we have a complete illustration of one mode of looking at human

society, or at a state. Such society is, on this view, an artificial

or mechanical product. It is an object to be molded, made, produced

by contrivance. Like every product which is brought out by working up

to an ideal instead of working out from antecedent truth and fact,

the product here is haphazard, grotesque, false. Like every other

product which is brought out by working on lines fixed by _a priori_

assumptions, it is a satire on human foresight and on what we call

common sense. Such a state is like a house of cards, built up anxiously

one upon another, ready to fall at a breath, to be credited at most

with naïve hope and silly confidence; or, it is like the long and

tedious contrivance of a mischievous schoolboy, for an end which has

been entirely misappreciated and was thought desirable when it should

have been thought a folly; or, it is like the museum of an alchemist,

filled with specimens of his failures, monuments of mistaken industry

and testimony of an erroneous method; or, it is like the clumsy product

of an untrained inventor, who, instead of asking: “what means have

I, and to what will they serve?” asks: “what do I wish that I could

accomplish?” and seeks to win steps by putting in more levers and cogs,

increasing friction and putting the solution ever farther off.

4. Of course such a notion of a state is at war with the conception

of a state as a seat of original forces which must be reckoned with

all the time; as an organism whose life will go on anyhow, perverted,

distorted, diseased, vitiated as it may be by obstructions or

coercions; as a seat of life in which nothing is ever lost, but every

antecedent combines with every other and has its share in the immediate

resultant, and again in the next resultant, and so on indefinitely;

as the domain of activities so great that they should appall any

one who dares to interfere with them; of instincts so delicate and

self-preservative that it should be only infinite delight to the wisest

man to see them come into play, and his sufficient glory to give them a

little intelligent assistance. If a state well performed its functions

of providing peace, order, and security, as _conditions_ under which

the people could live and work, it would be the proudest proof of its

triumphant success that it had nothing to do--that all went so smoothly

that it had only to look on and was never called to interfere; just

as it is the test of a good business man that his business runs on

smoothly and prosperously while he is not harassed or hurried. The

people who think that it is proof of enterprise to meddle and “fuss”

may believe that a good state will constantly interfere and regulate,

and they may regard the other type of state as “non-government.” The

state can do a great deal more than to discharge police functions. If

it will _follow_ custom, and the growth of social structure to provide

for new social needs, it can powerfully aid the production of structure

by laying down lines of common action, where nothing is needed but

_some_ common action on conventional lines; or, it can systematize a

number of arrangements which are not at their maximum utility for want

of concord; or, it can give sanction to new rights which are constantly

created by new relations under new social organizations, and so on.

5. The latter idea of the state has only begun to win way. All history

and sociology bear witness to its comparative truth, at least when

compared with the former. Under the new conception of the state, of

course liberty means breaking off the fetters and trammels which the

“wisdom” of the past has forged, and _laissez-faire_, or “let alone,”

becomes a cardinal maxim of statesmanship, because it means: “Cease

the empirical process. Institute the scientific process. Let the state

come back to normal health and activity, so that you can study it,

learn something about it from an observation of its phenomena, and

then regulate your action in regard to it by intelligent knowledge.”

Statesmen suited to this latter type of state have not yet come forward

in any great number. The new radical statesmen show no disposition to

let their neighbors alone. They think that they have come into power

just because they know what their neighbors need to have done to them.

Statesmen of the old type, who told people that they knew how to make

everybody happy, and that they were going to do it, were always far

better paid than any of the new type ever will be, and their failures

never cost them public confidence either. We have got tired of kings,

priests, nobles and soldiers, not because they failed to make us all

happy, but because our _a priori_ dogmas have changed fashion. We have

put the administration of the state in the hands of lawyers, editors,

_littérateurs_, and professional politicians, and they are by no means

disposed to abdicate the functions of their predecessors, or to abandon

the practice of the art of national prosperity. The chief difference is

that, whereas the old statesmen used to temper the practice of their

art with care for the interests of the kings and aristocracies which

put them in power, the new statesmen feel bound to serve those sections

of the population which have put them where they are.

6. Some of the old devices above enumerated (§ 2) are, however, out

of date, or are becoming obsolete.[1] Number 3, taxes on imports for

other than fiscal purposes, is not among this number. Just now such

taxes seem to be coming back into fashion, or to be enjoying a certain

revival. It is a sign of the deficiency of our sociology as compared

with our other sciences that such a phenomenon could be presented in

the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as a certain revival of

faith in the efficiency of taxes on imports as a device for producing

national prosperity. There is not a single one of the eleven devices

mentioned above, including taxes on the exportation of machinery and

prohibitions on emigration, which is not quite as rational and sound as

taxes on imports.

I now propose to analyze and criticize protectionism.

(_C_) DEFINITION OF PROTECTIONISM--DEFINITION OF “THEORY.”

7. By protection_ism_ I mean the doctrine of protective taxes as

a device to be employed in the art of national prosperity. The

protectionists are fond of representing themselves as “practical”

and the free traders as “theorists.” “Theory” is indeed one of the

most abused words in the language, and the scientists are partly

to blame for it. They have allowed the word to come into use, even

among themselves, for _a conjectural explanation_, or _a speculative

conjecture_, or _a working hypothesis_, or _a project which has not

yet been tested by experiment_, or _a plausible and harmless theorem

about transcendental relations_, or _about the way in which men will

act under certain motives_. The newspapers seem often to use the word

“theoretical” as if they meant by it imaginary or fictitious. I use the

word “theory,” however, not in distinction from fact, but, in what I

understand to be the correct scientific use of the word, to denote _a

rational description of a group of coördinated facts in their sequence

and relations_. A theory may, for a special purpose, describe only

certain features of facts and disregard others. Hence “in practice,”

where facts present themselves in all their complexity, he who has

carelessly neglected the limits of his theory may be astonished at

phenomena which present themselves; but his astonishment will be due to

a blunder on his part, and will not be an imputation on the theory.

8. Now free trade is not a theory in any sense of the word. _It is

only a mode of liberty_; one form of the assault (and therefore

negative) which the expanding intelligence of the present is making on

the trammels which it has inherited from the past. Inside the United

States, absolute free trade exists over a continent. No one thinks

of it or realizes it. No one “feels” it. We feel only constraint

and oppression. If we get liberty we reflect on it only so long as

the memory of constraint endures. I have again and again seen the

astonishment with which people realized the fact when presented to them

that they have been living under free trade all their lives and never

thought of it. When the whole world shall obtain and enjoy free trade

there will be nothing more to be said about it; it will disappear from

discussion and reflection; it will disappear from the text-books on

political economy as the chapters on slavery are disappearing; it will

be as strange for men to think that they might _not_ have free trade as

it would be now for an American to think that he might not travel in

this country without a passport, or that there ever was a chance that

the soil of our western states might be slave soil and not free soil.

It would be as reasonable to apply the word “theory” to the protestant

reformation, or to law reform, or to anti-slavery, or to the separation

of church and state, or to popular rights, or to any other campaign in

the great struggle which we call liberty and progress, as to apply it

to free trade. The pro-slavery men formerly did apply it to abolition,

and with excellent reason, if the use of it which I have criticized

ever was correct; for it required great power of realizing in

imagination the results of social change, and great power to follow and

trust abstract reasoning, for any man bred under slavery to realize, in

advance of experiment, the social and economic gain to be won--_most

of all for the whites_--by emancipation. It now requires great power

of “theoretical conception” for people who have no experience of the

separation of church and state to realize its benefits and justice.

Similar observations would hold true of all similar reforms. Free trade

is a revolt, a conflict, a reform, a reaction and recuperation of the

body politic, just as free conscience, free worship, free speech, free

press, and free soil have been. It is in no sense a theory.

9. Protectionism is not a theory in the correct sense of the term, but

it comes under some of the popular and incorrect uses of the word. It

is purely dogmatic and _a priori_. It is desired to attain a certain

object--wealth and national prosperity. Protective taxes are proposed

as a means. It must be assumed that there is some connection between

protective taxes and national prosperity, some relation of cause and

effect, some sequence of expended energy and realized product, between

protective taxes and national wealth. If then by theory we mean a

speculative conjecture as to occult relations which have not been and

cannot be traced in experience, protection would be a capital example.

Another and parallel example was furnished by astrology, which assumed

a causal relation between the movements of the planets and the fate

of men, and built up quite an art of soothsaying on this assumption.

Another example, paralleling protectionism in another feature, was

alchemy, which, accepting as unquestionable the notion that we want

to transmute lead into gold if we can, assumed that there was a

philosopher’s stone, and set to work to find it through centuries of

repetition of the method of “trial and failure.”

10. _Protectionism, then, is an_ ISM; that is, it is a doctrine

or system of doctrine which offers no demonstration, and rests

upon no facts, but appeals to faith on grounds of its _a priori_

reasonableness, or the plausibility with which it can be set forth.

Of course, if a man should say: “I am in favor of protective taxes

because they bring gain to me. That is all I care to know about them,

and I shall get them retained as long as I can”--there is no trouble

in understanding him, and there is no use in arguing with him. So far

as he is concerned, the only thing to do is to find his victims and

explain the matter to them. The only thing which can be discussed is

the doctrine of national wealth by protective taxes. This doctrine

has the forms of an economic theory. It vies with the doctrine of

labor and capital as a part of the science of production. Its avowed

purpose is impersonal and disinterested--the same, in fact, as that

of political economy. It is not, like free trade, a mere negative

position against an inherited system, to which one is led by a study of

political economy. It is a species of political economy, and aims at

the throne of the science itself. If it is true, it is not a corollary,

but a postulate, on which, and by which, all political economy must be

constructed.

11. But then, lo! if the dogma which constitutes

protectionism--_national wealth can be produced by protective taxes

and cannot be produced without them_--is enunciated, instead of going

on to a science of political economy based upon it, the science falls

dead on the spot. What can be said about production, population, land,

money, exchange, labor and all the rest? What can the economist learn

or do? What function is there for the university or school? There is

nothing to do but to go over to the art of legislation, and get the

legislator to put on the taxes. The only questions which can arise are

as to the number, variety, size, and proportion of the taxes. As to

these questions the economist can offer no light. He has no method of

investigating them. He can deduce no principles, lay down no laws in

regard to them. The legislator must go on in the dark and experiment.

If his taxes do not produce the required result, if there turn out to

be “snakes” in the tariff which he has adopted, he has to change it. If

the result still fails, change it again. Protectionism bars the science

of political economy with a dogma, and the only process of the art

of statesmanship to which it leads is eternal trial and failure--the

process of the alchemist and of the inventor of perpetual motion.

(_D_) DEFINITION OF FREE TRADE AND OF A PROTECTIVE DUTY.

12. What then is a protective tax? In order to join issue as directly

as possible, I will quote the definitions given by a leading

protectionist journal,[2] of both free trade and protection. “The term

‘free trade,’ although much discussed, is seldom rightly defined.

It does not mean the abolition of custom houses. Nor does it mean

the substitution of direct for indirect taxation, as a few American

disciples of the school have supposed. It means such an adjustment

of taxes on imports as will cause no diversion of capital, from any

channel into which it would otherwise flow, into any channel opened

or favored by the legislation which enacts the customs. A country

may collect its entire revenue by duties on imports, and yet be an

entirely free trade country, so long as it does not lay those duties

in such a way as to lead any one to undertake any employment, or make

any investment he would avoid in the absence of such duties: thus, the

customs duties levied by England--with a very few exceptions--are not

inconsistent with her profession of being a country which believes

in free trade. They either are duties on articles not produced in

England, or they are exactly equivalent to the excise duties levied

on the same articles if made at home. They do not lead any one to put

his money into the home production of an article, because they do not

discriminate in favor of the home producer.”

13. “A protective duty, on the other hand, has for its object to effect

the diversion of a part of the capital and labor of the people out of

the channels in which it would run otherwise, into channels favored or

created by law.”

I know of no definitions of these two things which have ever been made

by anybody which are more correct than these. I accept them and join

issue on them.

(_E_) PROTECTIONISM RAISES A PURELY DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY.

14. It will be noticed that this definition of a protective duty

says nothing about foreigners or about imports. According to

this definition, a protective duty is a device for effecting a

transformation in our own industry. If a tax is levied at the port

of entry on a foreign commodity which is actually imported, the tax

is paid to the treasury and produces revenue. A protective tax is

one which is laid to act as a bar to importation, in order to keep a

foreign commodity out. It does not act protectively unless it does act

as a bar, and is not a tax on imports but an obstruction to imports.

Hence a protective duty is a wall to inclose the domestic producer and

consumer, and to prevent the latter from having access to any other

source of supply for his needs, in exchange for his products, than

that one which the domestic producer controls. The purpose and plan of

the device is to enable the domestic producer to levy on the domestic

consumer the taxes which the government has set up as a barrier,

but has not collected at the port of entry. Under this device the

government says: “I do not want the revenue, but I will lay the tax so

that you, the selected and favored producer, may collect it.” “I do not

need to tax the consumer for myself, but I will hold him for you while

you tax him.”

(_F_) “A PROTECTIVE DUTY IS NOT A TAX.”

15. There are some who say that “a tariff is not a tax,” or as one of

them said before a Congressional Committee: “We do not like to call it

so!” That certainly is the most humorous of all the funny things in

the tariff controversy. If a tariff is not a tax, what is it? In what

category does it belong? No protectionist has ever yet told. They seem

to think of it as a thing by itself, a Power, a Force, a sort of Mumbo

Jumbo whose special function it is to produce national prosperity. They

do not appear to have analyzed it, or given themselves an account of

it, sufficiently to know what kind of a thing it is or how it acts. Any

one who says that it is not a tax must suppose that it costs nothing,

that it produces an effect without an expenditure of energy. They do

seem to think that if Congress will say: “Let a tax of ---- per cent

be laid on article A,” and if none is imported, and therefore no tax

is paid at the custom house, national industry will be benefited and

wealth secured, and that there will be no cost or outgo. If that is so,

then the tariff is magic. We have found the philosopher’s stone. Our

congressmen wave a magic wand over the country and say: “Not otherwise

provided for, one hundred and fifty per cent,” and, presto! there we

have wealth. Again they say: “Fifty cents a yard and fifty per cent

_ad valorem_”; and there we have prosperity! If we should build a wall

along the coast to keep foreigners and their goods out, it would cost

something. If we maintained a navy to blockade our own coast for the

same purpose, it would cost something. Yet it is imagined that if we

do the same by a tax it costs nothing.

16. This is the fundamental fallacy of protection to which the analysis

will bring us back again and again. Scientifically stated, it is that

_protectionism sins against the conservation of energy_. More simply

stated, it is that _the protectionist either never sees or does not

tell the other side of the account, the cost, the outlay for the gains

which he alleges from protection, and that when these are examined and

weighed they are sure vastly to exceed the gains, if the gains were

real_, even taking no account of the harm to national growth which is

done by restriction and interference.

17. There are only three ways in which a man can part with his product,

and different kinds of taxes fall under different modes of alienating

one’s goods. First, he may exchange his product for the product of

others. Then he parts with his property voluntarily, and for an

equivalent. Taxes which are paid for peace, order, and security, fall

under this head. Secondly, he may give his product away. Then he parts

with it voluntarily without an equivalent. Taxes which are voluntarily

paid for schools, libraries, parks, etc., fall under this head.

Thirdly, he may be robbed of it. Then he parts with it involuntarily

and without an equivalent. Taxes which are protective fall under this

head. The analysis is exhaustive, and there is no other place for them.

Protective taxes are those which a man pays to his neighbor to hire

him (the neighbor) to carry on his own business. The first man gets

no equivalent (§ 108). Hence any one who says that a tariff is not a

tax would have to put it in some such category as tribute, plunder, or

robbery. In order, then, that we may not give any occasion for even an

unjust charge of using hard words, let us go back and call it a tax.

18. In any case it is plain that _we have before us the case of two

Americans_. The protectionists who try to discuss the subject always

go off to talk English politics and history, or Ireland, or India,

or Turkey. I shall not follow them. I shall discuss the case between

two Americans, which is the only case there is. Whether Englishmen

like our tariff or not is of no consequence. As a matter of fact,

Englishmen seem to have come to the opinion that if Americans will take

their own home market as their share, and will keep out of the world’s

market, they (the Englishmen) will agree to the arrangement; but it is

immaterial whether they agree, or are angry. The only question for us

is: What kind of an arrangement is it for one American to tax another

American? How does it work? Who gains by it? How does it affect our

national prosperity? These and these only are the questions which I

intend to discuss.

19. I shall adopt _two different lines of investigation_. First,

I shall examine protectionism on its own claims and pretensions,

taking its doctrines and claims for true, and following them out to

see whether they will produce the promised results; and secondly, I

shall attack protectionism adversely, and controversially. If any

one proposes a device for the public good, he is entitled to candid

and patient attention, but he is also under obligation to show

how he expects his scheme to work, what forces it will bring into

play, how it will use them, etc. The joint stock principle, credit

institutions, coöperation, and all similar devices must be analyzed

and the explanation of their advantage, if they offer any, must be

sought in the principles which they embody, the forces they employ,

the suitableness of their apparatus. We ought not to put faith in any

device (_e.g._, bi-metalism, socialism) unless the proposers offer an

explanation of it which will bear rigid and pitiless examination; for,

if it is a sound device, such examination will only produce more and

more thorough conviction of its merits. I shall therefore first take

up protectionism just as it is offered, and test it, as any candid

inquirer might do, to see whether, as it is presented by its advocates,

it has any claims to confidence.

The Forgotten Man, and Other Essays · 第 1 / 11 章