CHAPTER I.

THE

SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS

The Platonic Successor,

ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;

TO WHICH

A SEVENTH BOOK IS ADDED,

IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OF ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT,

WHICH WAS WRITTEN BY PROCLUS, BUT SINCE LOST.

ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM THE GREEK OF

PROCLUS’ ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS,

On Providence and Fate;

A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED,

TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE;

AND

A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE

ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL;

_As preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius_.

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

Αλλ’ εστιν, εστι, χαν τις εγγελᾳ λογῳ,

Zευς, χαι θεοι, βροτεια λευσσοντες παθη. _Euripides._

There are, there are, though laugh the scoffer may,

Jove and the Gods, who mortal ills survey.

ωσπερ εισι θεοι πολλοι, χαι χυριοι πολλοι.

Corinth. I. Cap. 8. v. 5.

As there be GODS many, and LORDS many.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,

_By A. J. Valpy, Tooke’s Court, Chancery Lane_.

AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND Co.;

AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS.

1816.

To

WILLIAM MEREDITH, ESQUIRE,

WHO WITH A FIRMNESS AND MUNIFICENCE,

UNPARALLELED IN MODERN TIMES,

HAS PATRONIZED

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,

AND ITS ENGLISH PROMULGATOR;

AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NO COMMON ESTEEM FOR HIS CHARACTER,

AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR HIS PATRONAGE,

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED

BY THE TRANSLATOR,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

INTRODUCTION.

I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of presenting the

_truly_ philosophic reader, in the present work, with a treasure

of Grecian theology; of a theology, which was first mystically

and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated

enigmatically through images by Pythagoras, and in the last place

scientifically unfolded by Plato and his genuine disciples. The

peculiarity indeed, of this theology is, that it is no less scientific

than sublime; and that by a geometrical series of reasoning originating

from the most self-evident truths, it developes all the deified

progressions from the ineffable principle of things, and accurately

exhibits to our view all the links of that golden chain of which deity

is the one extreme, and body the other.

That also which is most admirable and laudable in this theology is,

that it produces in the mind properly prepared for its reception the

most pure, holy, venerable, and exalted conceptions of the great cause

of all. For it celebrates this immense principle as something superior

even to being itself; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it

is nevertheless ineffably the source, and does not therefore think

fit to connumerate it with any triad, or order of beings. Indeed, it

even apologises for attempting to give an appropriate name to this

principle, which is in reality ineffable, and ascribes the attempt to

the imbecility of human nature, which striving intently to behold it,

gives the appellation of the most simple of its conceptions to that

which is beyond all knowledge and all conception. Hence it denominates

it _the one_, and _the good_; by the former of these names indicating

its transcendent simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the

object of desire to all beings. For all things desire good. At the same

time however, it asserts that these appellations are in reality nothing

more than the parturitions of the soul which standing as it were in the

vestibules of the adytum of deity, announce nothing pertaining to the

ineffable, but only indicate her spontaneous tendencies towards it, and

belong rather to the immediate offspring of the first God, than to the

first itself.

Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the supreme,

when it ventures not only to denominate the ineffable, but also to

assert something of its relation to other things, it considers this as

pre-eminently its peculiarity, that it is the principle of principles;

it being necessary that the characteristic property of principle, after

the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude,

but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is

the principle of all principles. Conformably to this, Proclus, in

the second book of this work[1] says, with matchless magnificence

of diction: “Let us as it were celebrate the first God, not as

establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to

souls, and the generation of all animals; for he produced these indeed,

but among the last of things; but prior to these, let us celebrate

him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual

genus of Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane

divinities----as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and

beyond the first adyta,[2]--as more ineffable than all silence, and

more unknown than all essence,--as holy among the holies, and concealed

in the intelligible Gods.”

The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is deduced is the

following: As the principle of all things is _the one_, it is

necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and

that no vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal

natures. It is also necessary that every thing which has a natural

progression should proceed through similitude. In consequence of

this, it is likewise necessary that every producing principle should

generate a number of the same order with itself, viz. _nature_,

a natural number; _soul_, one that is psychical (i.e. belonging

to soul); and _intellect_, an intellectual number. For if

whatever possesses a power of generating, generates similars prior to

dissimilars, every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic

peculiarity to its progeny; and before it generates that which gives

subsistence to progressions far distant and separate from its nature,

it must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and

conjoined with it through similitude. It is therefore necessary from

these premises, since there is one unity the principle of the universe,

that this unity should produce from itself, prior to every thing else,

a multitude of natures characterized by unity, and a number the most of

all things allied to its cause; and these natures are no other than the

Gods.

According to this theology therefore, from the immense principle

of principles, in which all things causally subsist, absorbed

in superessential light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a

beauteous progeny of principles proceed, all largely partaking of

the ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of deity, all

possessing an overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling summits,

these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, being, life,

intellect, soul, nature, and body depend; _monads_ suspended

from _unities_, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of

these monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself

to the last of things, and which while it proceeds from, at the same

time abides in, and returns to its leader. And all these principles

and all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits

in the first great all-comprehending one. Thus all beings proceed

from, and are comprehended in the first being; all intellects emanate

from one first intellect; all souls from one first soul; all natures

blossom from one first nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital

and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all these great monads

are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their

depending series are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly

the unity of unities, the monad of monads, the principle of principles,

the God of Gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.

No objections of any weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical,

can be urged against this most sublime theory which is so congenial

to the unperverted conceptions of the human mind, that it can only be

treated with ridicule and contempt in degraded, barren, and barbarous

ages. Ignorance and priestcraft, however, have hitherto conspired to

defame those inestimable works,[3] in which this and many other grand

and important dogmas can alone be found; and the theology of the Greeks

has been attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical zeal, and

all the imbecil flashes of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on

the subject, like those of a man between sleeping and waking, have been

_turbid and wild_, _phantastic and confused_, _preposterous

and vain_.

Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of all, a divine

multitude subsists, co-operating with this cause in the production and

government of the universe, has always been, and is still admitted by

all nations, and all religions, however much they may differ in their

opinions respecting the nature of the subordinate deities, and the

veneration which is to be paid to them by man; and however barbarous

the conceptions of some nations on this subject may be when compared

with those of others. Hence, says the elegant Maximus Tyrius, “You

will see one according law and assertion in all the earth, that there

is one God, the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of

God, ruling together with him. This the Greek says, and the Barbarian

says, the inhabitant of the Continent, and he who dwells near the

sea, the wise and the unwise. And if you proceed as far as to the

utmost shores of the ocean, there also there are Gods, rising very

near to some, and setting very near to others.”[4] This dogma, too,

is so far from being opposed by either the Old or New Testament, that

it is admitted by both, though it forbids the religious veneration of

the inferior deities, and enjoins the worship of one God alone, whose

portion is Jacob, and Israel the line of his inheritance. The following

testimonies will, I doubt not, convince the liberal reader of the truth

of this assertion.

In the first place it appears from the 32d chapter of Deuteronomy, v.

8. in the Septuagint version, that “_the division of the nations

was made according to the number of the angels of God_,” and not

according to the number of the children of Israel, as the present

Hebrew text asserts. This reading was adopted by the most celebrated

fathers of the Christian church, such as, among the Greeks, Origen,

Basil, and Chrysostom, and among the Latins, Jerom and Gregory. That

this too, is the genuine reading, is evident from the 4th chapter of

the same book and the 19th verse, in which it is said, “And lest thou

lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun and the

moon, and the stars, _even_ all the host of heaven, shouldst be

driven to worship them, and serve them, _which the Lord thy God hath

divided unto all nations under the whole heaven_.” Here it is said

that the stars are divided to all the nations, which is equivalent

to saying that the nations were divided according to the number of

the stars; the Jewish legislator at the same time, considering his

own nation as an exception, and as being under the government of the

God of Israel alone. For in the following verse it is added, “But the

Lord hath taken you (i.e. the Jews), and brought you forth out of

the iron furnace, _even_ out of Egypt, to be unto him a people

of inheritance, as _ye_ are to this day.” By the angels of God

therefore (in Deuteron. 32. v. 8.) the stars are signified; and these

in the same book (chapter 17. v. 3.) are expressly called Gods; “And

hath gone and served other Gods, and worshipped them, _either the sun

or moon, or any of the host of heaven, which I have not commanded_.”

In the 3d chapter also, and the 24th verse, it is implied in the

question which is there asked, that the God of the Jews is superior

to all the celestial and terrestrial Gods: “For what God is there

_in heaven, or in earth_, that can do according to thy works,

and according to thy might?” As the attention of the Jews was solely

confined to the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they

but little regarded the powers whom they conceived to be subordinate to

this God, and considering all of them as merely the messengers of their

God, they gave them the general appellation of _angels_; though as

we shall shortly prove from the testimony of the Apostle Paul, they

were not consistent in confounding _angels_ properly so called

with _Gods_.

But that the stars are not called Gods by the Jewish legislator as

things inanimate like statues fashioned of wood or stone, is evident

from what is said in the book of Job, and the Psalms: “Behold even the

moon and it shineth not, yea the stars are not pure in his sight. How

much less man that is a worm, and the son of man which is a worm?”

(Job. xxv. v. 5. and 6.) And, “When I consider thy heavens, the work

of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what

is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou

visitest him.” (Psalm viii. v. 3. and 4.) It is evident therefore from

these passages, that the heavens and the stars are more excellent than

man; but nothing inanimate can be more excellent than that which is

animated. To which may be added, that in the following verse David

says, that God has made man a little lower than the angels. But the

stars, as we have shown, were considered by Moses as angels and Gods;

and consequently, they are animated beings, and superior to man.

Farther still, in the Septuagint version of verse the 4th of the 19th

Psalm, God is said _to have placed his tabernacle in the sun_, (εν

τῳ ηλιῳ εθετο το σκηνωμα αυτου) which is doubtless the genuine reading,

and not that of the vulgar translation, “In them (i.e. the heavens)

hath he set a tabernacle for the sun.” For this is saying nothing

more of the sun than what may be said of any of the other stars, and

produces in us no exalted conception of the artificer of the universe.

But to say that God dwells in the sun, gives us a magnificent idea both

of that glorious luminary, and the deity who dwells enshrined, as it

were, in dazzling splendor. To which we may add in confirmation of this

version of the Septuagint, that in Psalm xi. v. 4. it is said, “The

Lord’s _throne_ is in _heaven_.” And again in Isaiah lxvi. v.

1. “Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my

footstool.” If therefore the heavens are the throne, and the sun the

tabernacle of deity, they must evidently be deified. For nothing can

come into immediate contact with divinity without being divine. Hence,

says Simplicius,[5] “That it is connascent with the human soul to think

the celestial bodies are divine, is especially evident from those, (the

Jews) who look to these bodies through preconceptions about divine

natures. For they also say that the heavens are the habitation of God,

and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and

excellence of God to those who are worthy; than which assertions what

can be more venerable?”

Indeed, that the heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence

of deity, is also evident from the assertion in the 19th Psalm, “That

the heavens _declare_ the glory of God.” For R. Moses, a very

learned Jew, says,[6] “that the word _saphar_, to _declare_

or _set forth_, is never attributed to things inanimate.” Hence

he concludes, “that the heavens are not without some soul, which, says

he, is no other than that of those blessed intelligences, who govern

the stars, and dispose them into such letters as God has ordained;

declaring unto us men by means of this writing, what events we are to

expect. And hence, this same writing is called by all the ancients

_chetab hamelachim_, that is to say, _the writing of the

angels_.”

The Gods therefore, which were distributed to all the nations but the

Jews, were the sun and moon, and the other celestial bodies, yet not so

far as they are bodies, but so far as they are animated beings. Hence

the Hebrew prophets never reprobate and prohibit the worship of the

stars as things which neither see, nor hear, nor understand, as they

do the worship of statues. Thus in Deuteron. iv. and 28. “And there

ye shall serve Gods the work of men’s hands, wood and stone, which

neither see nor hear, nor eat, nor smell.” And the Psalmist, “They have

a mouth but speak not, &c.” These, and many other things of the like

kind are said by the prophets of the Jews against the worship of images

and statues, but never of the sun and moon, and the other stars. But

when they blame the worship of the heavenly bodies, they assign as the

cause that the people of Israel are not attributed to them as other

nations are, in consequence of being the inheritance of the God that

brought them out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house of bondage.

This is evident from the before cited passage in the 4th chapter of

Deuteronomy, in which it is said that the stars are divided unto all

nations under the whole heaven but the Jews.

Indeed, as the emperor Julian[7] justly observes, “unless a certain

ethnarchic God presides over every nation, and under this God there

is an angel, a dæmon, and a peculiar genus of souls, subservient and

ministrant to more excellent natures, from which the difference in laws

and manners arises,--unless this is admitted, let it be shown by any

other how this difference is produced. For it is not sufficient to say,

“God said, and it was done,” but it is requisite that the natures of

things which are produced should accord with the mandates of divinity.

But I will explain more clearly what I mean. God, for instance,

commanded that fire should tend upward, and earthly masses downward;

is it not therefore requisite, in order that the mandate of God may be

accomplished; that the former should be light, and the latter heavy?

Thus also in a similar manner in other things. Thus too, in divine

concerns. But the reason of this is, because the human race is frail

and corruptible. Hence also, the works of man are corruptible and

mutable, and subject to all various revolutions. But God being eternal,

it is also fit that His mandates should be eternal. And being such,

they are either the natures of things, or conformable to the natures of

things. For how can nature contend with the mandate of divinity? How

can it fall off from this concord? If, therefore, as he ordered that

there should be a confusion of tongues, and that they should not accord

with each other, so likewise he ordered that the political concerns

of nations should be discordant; he has not only effected this by his

mandate, but has rendered us naturally adapted to this dissonance.

For to effect this, it would be requisite, in the first place, that

the natures of those should be different, whose political concerns

among nations are to be different. This, indeed, is seen in bodies,

if any one directs his attention to the Germans and Scythians, and

considers how much the bodies of these differ from those of the Lybians

and Ethiopians. Is this therefore, a mere mandate, and does the air

contribute nothing, nor the relation and position of the region with

respect to the celestial bodies?”

Julian adds, “Moses, however, though he knew the truth of this,

concealed it; nor does he ascribe the confusion of tongues to God

alone. For he says, that not only God descended, nor one alone with

him, but many, though he does not say who they were. But it is very

evident, that he conceived those who descended with God to be similar

to him. If, therefore, not the Lord only, but those who were with him

contributed to this confusion of tongues, they may justly be considered

as the causes of this dissonance.”

In short, that the heavens and the celestial bodies are animated by

certain divine souls, was not only the opinion of the ancient poets and

philosophers, but also of the most celebrated fathers of the church,

and the most learned and acute of the schoolmen. Thus for instance,

this is asserted by Jerom in his exposition of the 6th verse of the

first chapter of Ecclesiastes. And by Origen in his book On Principles,

who says that the heavenly bodies must be animated, because they are

said to receive the mandates of God, which is only consentaneous to a

rational nature. This too is asserted by Eusebius in his Theological

Solutions, and by Augustine in his Enchiridion. Among the schoolmen

too, this was the opinion of Albertus Magnus in his book De quatuor

Coæquævis; of Thomas Aquinas in his treatise De Spiritualibus

Creaturis; and of Johannes Scotus Super Secundo Sententiarum. To these

likewise may be added, the most learned Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus.

Aureolus indeed strenuously contends for the truth of this opinion,

and does not even think it improper to venerate the celestial bodies

with outward worship (duliæ cultu) and to implore their favour and

assistance. And Thomas Aquinas says, that he has no other objection

to this than that it might be the occasion of idolatry. Hence, though

it may seem ridiculous to most of the present time, that divine souls

should be placed in the stars, and preside over regions and cities,

tribes and people, nations and tongues, yet it did not appear so to the

more intelligent Christians of former times.

I had almost forgotten however the wisest of the ancient Christians,

but as he was the best of them, I have done well in reserving him to

the last; and this is no other than the Platonic bishop Synesius. This

father of the church therefore, in his third hymn, sings as follows:

Σε, πατερ κοσμων,

πατερ αιωνων,

αυτουργε θεων,

ευαγες αινειν.

σε μεν οι νοεροι

μελπουσιν, αναξ,

σε δε κοσμαγοι,

ομματολαμπεις,

νοες αστεριοι,

υμνουσι μακαρ,

ους περι κλεινον

σωμα χορευει.

πασα σε μελπει

γενεα μακαρων.

οι περι κοσμον,

οι κατα κοσμον,

οι ζωναιοι,

οι τ’ αζωνοι

κοσμου μοιρας

εφεπουσι, σοφοι

αμφιβατηρες,

οι παρα κλεινους

οιηκοφορους.

ους αγγελικα

προχεει σειρα

το, τε χυδηεν

γενορ ηρωων,

εργα τα θνητων

χρυφιαισιν οδοις

διανισσομενον,

εργα βροτεια.

ψυχα τ’ ακλινης,

και κλινομενα

ες μελαναυγεις

χθονιους ογκους.

viz. “Thee, father of the worlds, father of the æones,[8] artificer of

the _Gods_, it is holy to praise. Thee, O king, the intellectual

Gods sing, thee, O blessed God, the _Cosmagi_, those fulgid eyes,

and starry intellects, celebrate, round which the illustrious body [of

the world] dances. All the race of the blessed sing thy praise, those

that are about, and those that are in the world, the zonic Gods, and

also the azonic,[9] who govern the parts of the world, wise itinerants,

stationed about the illustrious pilots [of the universe,] and which

the angelic series pours forth. Thee too, the renowned genus of heroes

celebrates, which by occult paths pervades the works of mortals, and

likewise the soul which does not incline to the regions of mortality,

and the soul which descends into dark terrestrial masses.”

In another part also of the same hymn, he informs us that he adored the

powers that preside over Thrace and Chalcedon.

Ικετευσα Θεους,

δρηστηρας οσοι

γονιμον θρῃκης

κατεχουσι πεδον,

οι τ’ αντιπεραν

χαλκηδονιας

εφεπουσι γυιας.

i.e. “I have supplicated the ministrant Gods that possess the Thracian

soil, and also those that, in an opposite direction, govern the

Chalcedonian land.”

And in the last place he says (in Hymn I.)

Νοος αφθιτος, τοκηων

Θεοκοιρανων απορρωξ,

ολιγα μεν, αλλ’ εκεινων

ολος ουτος, εις τε παντη

ολος εις ολον δεδυκως,

κυτος ουρανων ελισσει·

το δ’ ολον τουτο φυλασσων,

νενεμημεναισι μορφαι,

μεμερισμένος παρεστη·

ο μεν, αστερων διφρειαις,

ο δ’ ες ἀγγελῶν χορειας,

ο δε και ρεποντι δεσμῳ,

χθονιαν ευρετο μορφαν.

The substance of which is, “that incorruptible intellect which is

wholly an emanation of divinity, is totally diffused through the whole

world, convolves the heavens, and preserves the universe with which

it is present distributed in various forms. That one part of this

intellect is distributed among the stars, and becomes, as it were,

their charioteer; but another part among the angelic choirs; and

another part is bound in a terrestrial form.”

I confess I am wholly at a loss to conceive what could induce the

moderns to controvert the dogma, that the stars and the whole world are

animated, as it is an opinion of infinite antiquity, and is friendly

to the most unperverted, spontaneous, and accurate conceptions of the

human mind. Indeed, the rejection of it appears to me to be just as

absurd as it would be in a maggot, if it were capable of syllogizing,

to infer that man is a machine impelled by some external force when he

walks, because it never saw any animated reptile so large.

The sagacious Kepler, for so he is called even by the most modern

writers,[10] appears to have had a conception of this great truth; but

as he was more an astronomer than a philosopher, he saw this truth

only partially, and he rather embraced it as subservient to his own

astronomical opinions, than as forming an essential part of the true

theory of the universe. But from what I have of the writings of Kepler,

I have no doubt, if he had lived in the time of the Greeks, or if he

had made the study of the works of Plato and Aristotle the business

of his life, he would have become an adept in, and an illustrious

and zealous champion of their philosophy. Kepler then (in Harmonices

Mundi, lib. 4, p. 158) says, “That he does not oppose the dogma, that

there is a soul of the universe, though he shall say nothing about it

in that book. He adds, that if there is such a soul, it must reside

in the centre of the world, which, according to him, is the sun, and

from thence by the communication of the rays of light, which are in

the place of spirits in an animated body, is propagated into all

the amplitude of the world.”[11] In the following passages also he

confidently asserts that the earth has a soul. For he says, “That the

globe of the earth is a body such as is that of some animal; and that

what its own soul is to an animal, that the sublunary nature which he

investigates will be to the earth.”[12] He adds, “That he sees for

the most part every thing which proceeding from the body of an animal

testifies that there is a soul in it, proceeds also from the body of

the earth. For as the animated body produces in the superficies of

the skin hairs, thus also the earth produces [on its surface] plants

and trees; and as in the former lice are generated, so in the latter

the worms called erucæ, grasshoppers, and various insects and marine

monsters are produced. As the animated body likewise produces tears,

mucus, and the recrement of the ears, and sometimes gum from the

pustules of the face, thus also the earth produces amber and bitumen.

As the bladder too produces urine, thus likewise mountains pour forth

rivers. And as the body produces excrement of a sulphureous odour, and

crepitus which may also be inflamed, so the earth produces sulphur,

subterranean fires, thunder, and lightning. And as in the veins of an

animal blood is generated, and together with it sweat which is ejected

out of the body, so in the veins of the earth, metals, and fossils,

and a rainy vapour are generated.”[13] And in cap. 7, p. 162, after

having shown that there is in the earth the sense of touching, that it

respires, and is subject in certain parts to languors, and internal

vicissitudes of the viscera, and that subterranean heat proceeds from

the soul of the earth, he adds, “That a certain image of the zodiac is

resplendent in this soul, and therefore of the whole firmament, and is

the bond of the sympathy of things celestial and terrestrial.”[14]

Bishop Berkeley also was by no means hostile to this opinion, that the

world is one great animal, as is evident from the following extract

from his Siris, (p. 131).

“Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the same thing, and

one no more intelligible then the other. Such is the mutual relation,

connection, motion, and sympathy of the parts of this world, that they

seem, as it were, animated and held together by one soul: and such

is their harmony, order, and regular course, as shows the soul to be

governed and directed by a mind. It was an opinion of remote antiquity

that the world was an animal. If we may trust the Hermaic writings,

the Ægyptians thought all things did partake of life. This opinion was

also so general and current among the Greeks, that Plutarch asserts

all others held the world to be an animal, and governed by providence,

except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal

containing all bodies within itself, could not be touched or sensibly

affected from without; yet it is plain they attributed to it an inward

sense and feeling, as well as appetites and aversions; and that from

all the various tones, actions, and passions of the universe, they

supposed one symphony, one animal act and life to result.

“Iamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in which the

parts, however distant each from other, are nevertheless related

and connected by one common nature. And he teaches, what is also

a received notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonics, that there is

no chasm in nature, but a chain or scale of beings rising by gentle

uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the highest, each nature

being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. As air

becomes igneous, so the purest fire becomes animal, and the animal soul

becomes intellectual, which is to be understood, not of the change of

one nature into another, but of the connection of different natures,

each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, as it were, a

receptacle or subject for the next above it to reside and act in.

“It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that intellect

is the very life of living things, the first principle and exemplar

of all, from whence, by different degrees, are derived the inferior

classes of life; first the rational, then the sensitive, after that the

vegetable, but so as in the rational animal there is still somewhat

intellectual, again in the sensitive there is somewhat rational, and

in the vegetable somewhat sensitive, and lastly in mixed bodies, as

metals and minerals, somewhat of vegetation. By which means the whole

is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doctrine implies that

all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their

several respective subordinotions, are derived from, and depend upon

intellect.

“Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive, though

sometimes it be mentioned as a sentient animal, sometimes as a plant

or vegetable. _But in this, notwithstanding what has been surmised

by some learned men, there seems to be no atheism. For so long as the

world is supposed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which

is itself animated by soul, and directed by understanding, it follows

that all parts thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced unto,

the same indivisible stem or principle, to wit, a supreme mind; which

is the concurrent doctrine of Pythagoreans, Platonics, and Stoics._”

Compare now the Newtonian with this theory, that the heavenly bodies

are vitalized by their informing souls, that their orderly motion is

the result of this vitality, and that the planets move harmonically

round the sun, not as if urged by a centripetal force, but from an

animated tendency to the principle and fountain of their light, and

from a desire of partaking as largely as possible of his influence and

power. In the former theory all the celestial motions are the effect of

violence, in the latter they are all natural. The former is attended

with insuperable difficulties, the latter, when the principle on which

it is founded is admitted, with none. And the former is unscientific

and merely hypothetical; but the latter is the progeny of the most

accurate science, and is founded on the most genuine and unperverted

conceptions of the human mind.

I have said that I should prove from the testimony of the Apostle

Paul, that the Jews were not consistent in confounding _angels_

properly so called with Gods. And this appears to me to be evident in

the first place from the following passage in Hebrews ii. v. 3. πιστει

νοουμεν κατηρτισθαι τους αιωνας ρηματι θεου, εις το μη εκ φαινομενων

τα βλεπομενα γεγονεναι. This in the English version is erroneously

rendered; “Through faith we understand, that the worlds were framed by

the word of God, so that things which are seen, were not made of things

which do appear.” I say this is erroneously translated, because in the

first place, _the worlds_ is evidently a forced interpretation

of αιωνας; and even admitting it is not, leaves the passage very

ambiguous, from the uncertainty to what worlds Paul alludes. If we

adopt _ages_, which is the general sense of the word in the New

Testament, we shall indeed avoid a forced and ambiguous interpretation,

but we shall render the meaning of the Apostle trifling in the extreme.

For as he has elsewhere said, “that all things were framed by the word

of God,” what particular faith does it require to believe, that by the

same word he framed the ages?

In the second place, from the definition of faith, given in the first

verse of this chapter, that it is “the evidence of _things not seen_,”

it is clear, that Paul is speaking in this passage of something

_invisible_. Since then αιωνας is neither _worlds_ nor _ages_, what

shall we say it is? I answer, the _æones_ of the Valentinians. And

agreeably to this, the whole passage should be translated as follows:

“By faith we understand, that the _æones_ were framed by the word of

God, in order that things which are seen, might be generated from such

as do not appear (i.e. from things _invisible_).” Every one who is much

conversant with Greek authors, must certainly be convinced that εις το

means _in order that_; and Bishop Pearson translates as I have done the

latter part of this verse.

Now we learn from the second book of Irenæus against the heretics,

that according to the Valentinians, all created things are the images

of the _æones_, resident in the _pleroma_, or _fulness_ of deity. And

does it not clearly follow from the above version, that according to

Paul too, the æones are the exemplars of visible or created things? To

which we may add, that this sense of the passage clearly accords with

the assertion that “faith is the evidence of things not seen.” For here

the things which do not appear are the _æones_; these, according to

the Valentinians, subsisting in deity. So that from our version, Paul

might say with great propriety, that “we understand by faith, that the

_æones_ were framed by the word of God, in order that things which

are seen, might be generated from such as do not appear,” for this

naturally follows from his definition of faith.

I farther add, that among these _æones_ of the Valentinians were

νους, βυθος, σιγη, αληθεια, σοφια, i.e. _intellect, a profundity,

silence, truth, and wisdom_, which as Gale well observes in his

notes on Iamblichus de Mysteriis, &c. prove their dogmas to be of

Chaldaic origin. For these words perpetually occur in the fragments

of the Chaldaic oracles. And the middle of the Chaldean intelligible

triad is denominated αιων _æon_,[15] i.e. _eternity_, and

is also perfectly conformable to the theology of Plato, as is very

satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of the following

work. According to the Chaldeans therefore, the æones are Gods; and

considered as the exemplars of the visible universe, they are analogous

to the ideas of Plato, which also are Gods, as is evident from the

Parmenides of that philosopher.[16] According to Paul too, as the

_æones_ are the fabricators of the visible world, they must be

beings of a much higher order than angels, and consequently must be

Gods; productive power being one of the great characteristics of a

divine nature.

Again, in the Epistle to the Ephesians, chap. i. v. 21. Paul says that

God has exalted Christ “far above every principality, and power, and

might, and dominion,” υπερανω πασης αρχης και εξουσιας, και δυναμεως

και κυριοτητος. And in the 6th chapter and 12th verse he conjoins with

principalities and powers, _the rulers of the world_, i.e. the seven

planets, προς τας αρχας, προς τας εξουσιας, προς τας κοσμοκρατορας.

Augustin[17] confesses that he is ignorant what the difference is

between those four words, (principality, power, might, and dominion,)

in which the Apostle Paul seems to comprehend all the celestial

society. “Quid inter se distent quatuor illa vocabula, quibus universam

ipsam cœlestem societatem videtur Apostolus esse complexus, dicant qui

possunt, si tamen possunt probare quod dicunt; ego me ista ignorare

fateor.” Ignatius also (in Epist. ad Trallianos) speaks of the angelic

orders, the diversities of archangels and armies, the differences of

the orders characterised by might and dominion, of thrones and powers,

_the magnificence of the æones_,[18] and the transcendency of Cherubim

and Seraphim,” και γαρ εγω ου καθ’ ο, τι δεδεμαι, και δυναμαι νοειν

τα επουρανια, και τας αγγελικας ταξεις, και τας των αρχαγγελων και

στρατιων εξαλλαγας, δυναμεων τε και κυριστητων διαφορας, θρονων τε και

εξουσιων παραλλαγας, αιωνων δε μεγαλοτητας, των τε χερουβιμ και σεραφιμ

τας υπεροχας.

The opinion of Grotius[19] therefore, is highly probable, that the Jews

obtained the names of Powers, Dominations, and Principalities, from

their Babylonic captivity; and Gale in his notes on Iamblichus[20]

says, that certain passages of Zoroaster and Ostanes cited by the

author of Arithm. Theolog. confirm this opinion of Grotius. Indeed,

the appellation of αρχαι _principles_, which are the first of the

four powers mentioned by Paul, was given by the Chaldeans to that

order of Gods called by the Grecian theologists _supermundane_ and

_assimilative_, the nature of which is unfolded by Proclus in the

sixth book of the following work; and Proclus in the fourth book of

his MS. Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato shows that the order of

Gods denominated νοητος και νοερος, _intelligible and at the same time

intellectual_, is according to the Chaldean oracles[21] principally

characterized by _domination_. In proof of this, the two following

oracles are cited by him, the first, concerning the empyrean, and the

second concerning the material Synoches.[22]

Τοις δε πυρος νοερου νοεροις πρηστηρσιν απαντα

Εικαθε δουλευοντα, πατρος πειθηνιδι βουλῃ.

i.e. “All things yield ministrant to the intellectual presters of

intellectual fire, through the persuasive will of the father.” And

αλλα και υλαιοις οσα δουλευει Συνοχευσι.

i.e. “But likewise such as are in subjection to the material Synoches.”

Farther still, Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, chap. viii. v. 38,

says, “For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor _angels_,

nor _principalities_, nor _powers_, nor things present, nor things

to come, nor _height_, nor _depth_, nor any other creature, shall be

able to separate us from the love of God, &c.” From this arrangement

therefore, it is evident that principalities and powers are not the

same with angels; and as according to Paul they are beings so exalted,

that in his Epistle to the Ephesians, he could not find any thing

more magnificent to say of Christ, than that he is raised even above

them, it follows that they must be Gods, since they are superior to the

angelic order. It is remarkable too, that he coarranges _height_ and

_depth_ (υψωμα και βάθος) with principalities and powers; and βυθός is

one of the _æones_ according to the Valentinians.

In the first Epistle to the Corinthians likewise, chap. viii. v. 5.

Paul expressly asserts that there is a divine multitude. For he says,

“Though there be that are called Gods, whether in heaven or in earth,

(as there be Gods many and Lords many;)” in the parenthesis of which

verse, it is incontrovertibly evident that he admits the existence of

a plurality of Gods, though as well as the heathens he believed that

one God only was supreme and the father of _all_ things. Nor

am I singular in asserting that this was admitted by Paul. For the

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the second chapter of his treatise

On the Divine Names observes concerning what is here said by Paul as

follows: “Again, from the deific energy of God, by which every thing

according to its ability becomes deiform, many Gods are generated; in

consequence of which there appears and is said to be a separation and

multiplication of the one [supreme] God. Nevertheless, God himself,

who is the chief deity, and is superessentially the supreme, is still

one God, remaining impartible in the Gods distributed from him, united

to himself, unmingled with the many, and void of multitude.” And he

afterwards adds, “that this was in a transcendent manner understood

by Paul, who was the leader both of him and his preceptor, to divine

illumination,” in the above cited verse. And, “that in divine natures,

unions vanquish and precede separations, and yet nevertheless they

are united, after the separation which does not in proceeding depart

from _the one_, and is unical.”[23] Paul therefore, according

to this Dionysius, considered the Gods, conformably to Plato and the

best of his disciples, as deiform processions from _the one_, and

which at the same time that they have a distinct subsistence from,

are profoundly united to their great producing cause. Dionysius also

employs the very same expression which Proclus continually uses when

speaking of the separation of the Gods from their source; for he says

that the divine multitude ανεκφοιτητος του ενος, i.e. does not depart

from, but abides in _the one_. Hence Proclus in the fifth book

of his MS. Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato, speaking of the

divine unities says, “Whichever among these you assume, it is the

same with the others, because all of them are in each other, and are

rooted in _the one_. For as trees by their summits (i.e. their

roots) are fixed in the earth, and through these are earthly, after the

same manner also divine natures are rooted by their summits in _the

one_, and each of them is unity and one, through unconfused union

with _the one itself_.” Ην γαρ αν τουτων λαβῃς, την αυτην ταις

αλλαις λαμβανεις, διοτι δη πασαι και εν αλληλαις εισι, και ενερριζονται

τῳ ενι. Καθαπερ γαρ τα δενδρα ταις εαυτων κορυφαις ενιδρυνται τῃ γῃ,

και εστι γηινα κατ’ εκεινας, τον αυτον τροπον και τα θεια ταις εαυτων

ακροτησιν ενερριζωνται τῳ ενι, και εκαστον αυτων ενας εστι, και εν, δια

την προς το εν ασυγχυτον ενωσιν.

This Dionysius, who certainly lived posterior to Proclus, because

he continually borrows from his works, barbarously confounding

that scientific arrangement of these deiform processions from _the

one_, which is so admirably unfolded by Proclus in the following

work, classes them as follows. The first order, according to him,

consists of Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. The second of the divine

essences characterized by dominion, might, and power. And the third

of Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. Hence he has transferred

the characteristics of the intelligible triad of Gods to Seraphim,

Cherubim, and Thrones. For symmetry, truth, and beauty, which

characterize this triad, are said by Plato in the Philebus to subsist

_in the vestibule of the good_; (επι μεν τοις του αγαθου νυν ηδη

προθυροις εφεσταναι) and Dionysius says[24] of his first order that

“_it is as it were arranged in the vestibules of deity_.” Goodness,

wisdom, and beauty also, are shown by Proclus in the third book of the

following work to belong to the intelligible triad; _goodness_ to its

summit, _wisdom_ to the middle of it, and _beauty_ to its extremity.

And Dionysius says, that according to the Hebrews, the word Cherubim

signifies _a multitude of knowledge, or an effusion of wisdom_, την δε

χερουβιμ εμφαινειν, πληθος γνωσεως, η χυσιν σοφιας. The characteristics

of the Gods called νοητοι και νοεροι _intelligible and at the same

time intellectual_, and of the Gods that are νοεροι _intellectual_

alone, he appears to have transferred to his middle triad which is

characterized by _dominion, might, and power_. And he has adapted his

third triad consisting of _Principalities_, _Archangels_, and _Angels_,

to the _supermundane_, _liberated_, and _mundane_ orders of Gods.

For the supermundane Gods are called by Proclus in the sixth book of

the following work αρχαι _Principalities_, or _rulers_, which is the

word employed by Dionysius and Paul. And the mundane Gods are said by

Proclus (in Parmenid.) to be the sources of a _winged_ life, and angels

are celebrated by Dionysius as having _wings_. Hence it is evident that

Dionysius has accommodated the peculiarities of the different orders

of Gods to the nine orders which he denominates _celestial powers_;

and his arrangement has been adopted by all succeeding Christian

theologists.

Vestiges therefore of the theology of Plato may be seen both in the

Jewish and Christian religion; and in a similar manner, a resemblance

in the religions of all other nations to it might be easily pointed

out, and its universality be clearly demonstrated. Omitting however,

a discussion of this kind for the present, I shall farther observe

respecting this theology, that the deification of dead men, and the

worshipping men as Gods form no part of it when it is considered

according to its genuine purity. Numerous instances of the truth

of this might be adduced, but I shall mention for this purpose, as

unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric

verses,[25] and the treatise of Plutarch On Isis and Osiris. All the

works of Plato indeed, evince the truth of this position, but this is

particularly manifest from his Laws. The Golden verses order, that the

immortal Gods be honoured first as they are disposed by law; afterwards

the illustrious Heroes, under which appellation, the author of the

verses comprehends also angels and dæmons properly so called: and in

the last place the terrestrial dæmons, i.e. such good men as transcend

in virtue the rest of mankind. But to honour the Gods as they are

disposed by law, is, as Hierocles observes, to reverence them as they

are arranged by their fabricator and father; and this is to honour them

as beings superior to man. Hence, to honour men, however excellent

they may be, as Gods, is not to honour the Gods according to the rank

in which they are placed by their Creator, for it is confounding the

divine with the human nature, and is thus acting directly contrary to

the Pythagoric precept. Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise

most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety of worshipping men as Gods,

as is evident from the following extract:

“Those therefore, who think that things of this kind [i.e.

fabulous stories of the Gods as if they were men] are but so

many commemorations of the actions and disasters of kings

and tyrants, who through transcendency in virtue or power,

inscribed the title of divinity on their renown, and afterwards

fell into great calamities and misfortunes, these employ the

most easy method indeed of eluding the story, and not badly

transfer things of evil report, from the Gods to men; and they

are assisted in so doing by the narrations themselves. For the

Egyptians relate, that Hermes was as to his body, with one

arm longer than the other; that Typhon was in his complexion

red; but Orus white, and Osiris black, as if they had been by

nature men. Farther still, they also call Osiris a commander,

and Canopus a pilot, from whom they say the star of that name

was denominated. The ship likewise, which the Greeks call Argo,

being the image of the ark of Osiris, and which therefore in

honour of it is become a constellation, they make to ride not

far from Orion and the Dog; of which they consider the one as

sacred to Orus, but the other to Isis.

“I fear, however, that this [according to the proverb] would

be to move things immoveable, and to declare war, not only,

as Simonides says, against a great length of time, but also

against many nations and families of mankind who are under the

influence of divine inspiration through piety to these Gods;

and would not in any respect fall short of transferring from

heaven to earth, such great and venerable names, and of thereby

shaking and dissolving that worship and belief, which has been

implanted in almost all men from their very birth, would be

opening great doors to the tribe of atheists, who convert divine

into human concerns; and would likewise afford a large license

to the impostures of Euemerus of Messina, who devised certain

memoirs of an incredible and fictitious mythology,[26] and

_thereby spread every kind of atheism through the globe, by

inscribing all the received Gods, without any discrimination,

by the names of generals, naval-captains, and kings, who

lived in remote periods of time_. He further adds, that

they are recorded in golden characters, in a certain country

called Panchoa, at which neither any Barbarian or Grecian ever

arrived, except Euemerus alone, who, as it seems, sailed to the

Panchoans and Triphyllians, that neither have, nor ever had a

being. And though the great actions of Semiramis are celebrated

by the Assyrians, and those of Sesostris in Egypt; and though

the Phrygians even to the present time, call all splendid and

admirable actions Manic, because a certain person named Manis

who was one of their ancient kings, whom some call Masdes, was

a brave and powerful man; and farther still, though Cyrus among

the Persians, and Alexander among the Macedonians, proceeded

in their victories, almost as far as to the boundaries of the

earth, yet they only retain the name of good kings, and are

remembered as such, [and not as Gods.]

“But if certain persons, inflated by ostentation, as Plato says,

having their soul at one and the same time inflamed with youth

and ignorance, have insolently assumed the appellation of Gods,

and had temples erected in their honour, yet this opinion of

them flourished but for a short time, and afterwards they were

charged with vanity and arrogance, in conjunction with impiety

and lawless conduct; and thus,

Like smoke they flew away with swift-pac’d fate.

And being dragged from temples and altars like fugitive slaves,

they have now nothing left them, but their monuments and tombs.

Hence Antigonus the elder said to one Hermodotus, who had

celebrated him in his poems as the offspring of the sun and a

God, ‘he who empties my close-stool-pan knows no such thing

of me.’ Very properly also, did Lysippus the sculptor blame

Apelles the painter, for drawing the picture of Alexander with

a thunder-bolt in his hand, whereas he had represented him with

a spear, the glory of which, as being true and proper, no time

would take away.”

In another part of the same work also, he admirably reprobates the

impiety of making the Gods to be things inanimate, which was very

common with Latin writers of the Augustan age, and of the ages that

accompanied the decline and fall of the Roman empire. But what he says

on this subject is as follows:

“In the second place, which is of still greater consequence, men

should be careful, and very much afraid, lest before they are

aware, they tear in pieces and dissolve divine natures, into

blasts of wind, streams of water, seminations, earings of land,

accidents of the earth, and mutations of the seasons, as those

do who make Bacchus to be wine, and Vulcan flame. Cleanthes also

somewhere says, that Persephone or Proserpine is the spirit or

air that _passes through_ (φερομενον) the fruits of the

earth, and is then _slain_, (φονευομενον.) And a certain

poet says of reapers,

Then when the youth the limbs of Ceres cut.

For these men do not in any respect differ from those who

conceive the sails, the cables, and the anchor of a ship, to

be the pilot, the yarn and the web to be the weaver, and the

bowl, or the mead, or the ptisan, to be the physician. But

they also produce dire and atheistical opinions, by giving the

names of Gods to natures and things deprived of sense and soul,

and that are necessarily destroyed by men, who are in want of

and use them. For it is not possible to conceive that these

things are Gods; since, neither can any thing be a God to men,

which is deprived of soul, or is subject to human power. From

these things however, we are led to conceive those beings to be

Gods, who both use them and impart them to us, and supply them

perpetually and without ceasing. Nor do we conceive that the

Gods who bestow these, are different in different countries, nor

that some of them are peculiar to the Barbarians, but others to

the Grecians, nor that some are southern, and others northern;

but as the sun and moon, the heavens, the land, and the sea, are

common to all men, yet are differently denominated by different

nations; so the one reason that adorns these things, and the

one providence that administers them, and the ministrant powers

that preside over all nations, have different appellations and

honours assigned them according to law by different countries.

Of those also that have been consecrated to their service, some

employ obscure, but others clearer symbols, not without danger

thus conducting our intellectual conceptions to the apprehension

of divine natures. For some, deviating from the true meaning of

these symbols, have entirely slipt into superstition; and others

again flying from superstition as a quagmire, have unaware

fallen upon atheism as on a precipice. Hence, in order to avoid

these dangers, it is especially necessary that resuming the

reasoning of Philosophy as our guide to mystic knowledge, we

should conceive piously of every thing that is said or done in

religion; lest that, as Theodorus said, while he extended his

arguments with his right hand, some of his auditors received

them with their left, so we should fall into dangerous errors,

by receiving what the laws have well instituted about sacrifices

and festivals in a manner different from their original

intention.”

The Emperor Julian, as well as Plutarch appears to have been perfectly

aware of this confusion in the religion of the Heathens arising from

the deification of men, and in the fragments of his treatise against

the Christians, preserved by Cyril, he speaks of it as follows: “If any

one wishes to consider the truth respecting you [Christians,] he will

find that your impiety is composed of the Judaic audacity, and _the

indolence and confusion of the Heathens_. For deriving from both,

not that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated

a web of evils. With the Hebrews indeed, there are accurate and

venerable laws pertaining to religion, and innumerable precepts which

require a must holy life and deliberate choice. But when the Jewish

legislator forbids the serving all the Gods, and enjoins the worship

of one alone, whose portion is Jacob, and Israel the line of his

inheritance, and not only says this, but also omits to add, I think,

you shall not revile the Gods, the detestable wickedness and audacity

of those in after times, wishing to take away all religious reverence

from the multitude, thought that not to worship should be followed by

blaspheming the Gods. This you have alone thence derived; but there

is no similitude in any thing else between you and them. Hence, from

the innovation of the Hebrews, you have seized blasphemy towards the

venerable Gods; _but from our religion you have cast aside reverence

to every nature more excellent than man, and the love of paternal

institutes_.”

“So great an apprehension indeed, says Dr. Stillingfleet,[27] had the

Heathens of the necessity of _appropriate acts of divine worship_,

that some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them to what

they did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable story to this

purpose in Arrian and Curtius[28] concerning Callisthenes. Alexander

arriving at that degree of vanity, as to desire to have divine worship

given him, and the matter being started out of design among the

courtiers, either by Anaxarchus, as Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as

Curtius says; and the way of doing it proposed, viz. by incense and

prostration; Callisthenes vehemently opposed it, _as that which would

confound the difference of human and divine worship, which had been

preserved inviolable among them_. The worship of the Gods had been

kept up in temples, with altars, and images, and sacrifices, and hymns,

and prostrations, and such like; _but it is by no means fitting_,

says he, _for us to confound these things, either by lifting up men

to the honours of the Gods, or depressing the Gods to the honours

of men_. For neither would Alexander suffer any man to usurp his

royal dignity by the votes of men; how much more justly may the Gods

disdain for any man to take their honours to himself. And it appears by

Plutarch,[29] that the Greeks thought it a mean and base thing for any

of them, when sent on an embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate

themselves before them, because this was only allowed among them in

divine adoration. Therefore, says he, when Pelopidas and Ismenias were

sent to Artaxerxes, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but Ismenias let

fall his ring to the ground, and stooping for that was thought to make

his adoration; which was altogether as good a shift as the Jesuits

advising the crucifix to be held in the Mandarins’ hands while they

made their adorations in the Heathen temples in China.

“Conon[30] also _refused to make his adoration, as a disgrace to

his city_; and Isocrates[31] accuses the Persians for doing it,

_because herein they shewed, that they despised the Gods rather than

men, by prostituting their honours to their princes_. Herodotus

mentions Sperchius and Bulis, who could not with the greatest violence

be brought to give adoration to Xerxes, _because it was against

the law of their country to give divine honour to men_.[32] And

Valerius Maximus[33] says, _the Athenians put Timagoras to death for

doing it_; so strong an apprehension had possessed them, that the

manner of worship which they used to their Gods, should be preserved

sacred and inviolable.” The philosopher Sallust also in his treatise

On the Gods and the World says, “It is not unreasonable to suppose

that impiety is a species of punishment, and that those who have had a

knowledge of the Gods, and yet despised them, will in another life be

deprived of this knowledge. And it is requisite to make the punishment

of those who have honoured their kings as Gods to consist in being

expelled from the Gods.”[34]

When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, which was considered

as the grand principle in the Heathen theology, by its most ancient

promulgators Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was forgotten, this

oblivion was doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified

by the Pagans. Had they properly directed their attention to this

transcendency they would have perceived it to be so immense as to

surpass eternity, infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself,

and that these in reality belong to those venerable natures which are

as it were first unfolded into light from the unfathomable depths of

that truly mystic unknown, about which all knowledge is refunded into

ignorance. For as Simplicius justly observes, “It is requisite that he

who ascends to the principle of things should investigate whether it

is possible there can be any thing better than the supposed principle;

and if something more excellent is found, the same enquiry should again

be made respecting that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions,

than which we have no longer any more venerable. Nor should we stop in

our ascent till we find this to be the case. For there is no occasion

to fear that our progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by

conceiving something about the first principles which is greater and

more transcendent than their nature. For it is not possible for our

conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to

pass beyond the dignity of the first principles of things.” He adds,

“This therefore is one and the best extension [of the soul] to [the

highest] God, and is as much as possible irreprehensible; viz. to know

firmly, that by ascribing to him the most venerable excellencies we can

conceive, and the most holy and primary names and things, we ascribe

nothing to him which is suitable to his dignity. It is sufficient

however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that we can attribute

to him nothing superior.”[35] If it is not possible therefore to

form any ideas equal to the dignity of the immediate progeny of the

ineffable, i.e. of the first principles of things, how much less can

our conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkness, in the reverential

language of the Egyptians,[36] which is even beyond these? Had the

Heathens therefore considered as they ought this transcendency of the

supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with

the divine nature, and consequently would never have worshipped men as

Gods. Their theology, however, is not to be accused as the cause of

this impiety, but their forgetfulness of the sublimest of its dogmas,

and the confusion with which this oblivion was necessarily attended.

In the last place, I wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to

prove that statues were not considered nor worshipped by any of the

intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblances of the Gods, as

auxiliaries to the recollection of a divine nature, and the means of

procuring its assistance and favour. For this purpose, I shall first

present the reader with what the philosopher Sallust says concerning

sacrifices and the honours which were paid to the divinities, in his

golden treatise On the Gods and the World. “The honours, says he, which

we pay to the Gods are performed for the sake of our advantage; and

since the providence of the Gods is every where extended, a certain

habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive

their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through

imitation and similitude. Hence temples imitate the heavens, but altars

the earth; statues resemble life, and on this account they are similar

to animals; prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters

superior ineffable powers; herbs and stones resemble matter; and

animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of our souls. But from

all these nothing happens to the Gods beyond what they already possess;

for what accession can be made to a divine nature? But a conjunction

with our souls and the Gods is by these means produced.

“I think however, it will be proper to add a few things concerning

sacrifices. And in the first place, since we possess every thing from

the Gods, and it is but just to offer the first fruits of gifts to the

givers; hence, of our possessions we offer the first fruits through

consecrated gifts; of our bodies through ornaments; and of our life

through sacrifices. Besides, without sacrifices, prayers are words

only; but accompanied with sacrifices they become animated words; the

words indeed corroborating life, but life animating the words. Add too,

that the felicity of every thing is its proper perfection; but the

proper perfection of every thing consists in a conjunction with its

cause. And on this account we pray that we may be conjoined with the

Gods. Since therefore life primarily subsists in the Gods, and there is

also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be united to the

former, a medium is required; for natures much distant from each other

cannot be conjoined without a medium. And it is necessary that the

medium should be similar to the connected natures. Life therefore must

necessarily be the medium of life; and hence men of the present day

that are happy, and all the ancients, have sacrificed animals. And this

indeed not rashly, but in a manner accommodated to every God, with many

other ceremonies respecting the cultivation of divinity.”[37]

In the next place, the elegant Maximus Tyrius admirably observes

concerning the worship of statues[38] as follows: “It appears to me

that as external discourse has no need, in order to its composition,

of certain Phœnician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian

characters, but human imbecility devised these marks, in which

inserting its dulness, it recovers from them its memory; in like manner

a divine nature has no need of statues or altars; but human nature

being very imbecile, and as much distant from divinity as earth from

heaven, devised these symbols, in which it inserted the names and the

renown of the Gods. Those, therefore, whose memory is robust, and who

are able, by directly extending their soul to heaven, to meet with

divinity, have, _perhaps_,[39] no need of statues. This race

is, however, rare among men, and in a whole nation you will not find

one who recollects divinity, and who is not in want of this kind of

assistance, which resembles that devised by writing masters for boys,

who give them obscure marks as copies; by writing over which, their

hand being guided by that of the master, they become, through memory,

accustomed to the art. It appears to me therefore, that legislators

devised these statues for men, as if for a certain kind of boys, as

tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, and a certain

manuduction as it were and path to reminiscence.

“Of statues however, there is neither one law, nor one mode, nor one

art, nor one matter. For the Greeks think it fit to honour the Gods

from things the most beautiful in the earth, from a pure matter, the

human form, and accurate art: and their opinion is not irrational who

fashion statues in the human resemblance. For if the human soul is most

near and most similar to divinity, it is not reasonable to suppose

that divinity would invest that which is most similar to himself with

a most deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy

vehicle to immortal souls, light, and adapted to motion. For this

alone, of all the bodies on the earth, raises its summit on high, is

magnificent, superb, and full of symmetry, neither astonishing through

its magnitude, nor terrible through its strength, nor moved with

difficulty through its weight, nor slippery through its smoothness, nor

repercussive through its hardness, nor groveling through its coldness,

nor precipitate through its heat, nor inclined to swim through its

laxity, nor feeding on raw flesh through its ferocity, nor on grass

through its imbecility; but is harmonically composed for its proper

works, and is dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as are brave,

It is also adapted to walk by nature, but winged by reason, capable of

swimming by art, feeds on corn and fruits, and cultivates the earth,

is of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a

graceful beard, In the resemblance of such a body, the Greeks think fit

to honour the Gods.”

He then observes, “that with respect to the Barbarians, all of them in

like manner admit the subsistence of divinity, but different nations

among these adopt different symbols.” After which he adds, “O many and

all-various statues! of which some are fashioned by art, and others

are embraced through indigence: some are honoured through utility,

and others are venerated through the astonishment which they excite;

some are considered as divine through their magnitude, and others are

celebrated for their beauty! There is not indeed any race of men,

neither Barbarian nor Grecian, neither maritime nor continental,

neither living a pastoral life, nor dwelling in cities, which can

endure to be without some symbols of the honour of the Gods. How,

therefore, shall any one discuss the question whether it is proper

that statues of the Gods should be fabricated or not? For if we were

to give laws to other men recently sprung from the earth, and dwelling

beyond our boundaries and our air, or who were fashioned by a certain

Prometheus, ignorant of life, and law, and reason, it might perhaps

demand consideration, whether this race should be permitted to adore

these spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or

gold, and which are neither oaks nor cedars, nor rivers, nor birds,

but the rising sun, the splendid moon, the variegated heaven, the earth

itself and the air, all fire and all water; or shall we constrain these

men also to the necessity of honouring wood, or stones or images? If,

however, this is the common law of all men, let us make no innovations,

let us admit the conceptions concerning the Gods, and preserve their

symbols as well as their names.

“For divinity indeed, the father and fabricator of all things, is more

ancient than the sun and the heavens, more excellent than time and

eternity, and every flowing nature, and is a legislator without law,

ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes. Not being able, however,

to comprehend his essence, we apply for assistance to words and names,

to animals, and figures of gold and ivory and silver, to plants and

rivers, to the summits of mountains, and to streams of water; desiring

indeed to understand his nature, but through imbecility calling him

by the names of such things as appear to us to be beautiful. And in

thus acting, we are affected in the same manner as lovers, who are

delighted with surveying the images of the objects of their love, and

with recollecting the lyre, the dart, and the seat of these, the circus

in which they ran, and every thing in short, which excites the memory

of the beloved object. What then remains for me to investigate and

determine respecting statues? only to admit the subsistence of deity.

But if the art of Phidias excites the Greeks to the recollection of

divinity, honour to animals the Egyptians, a river others, and fire

others, I do not condemn the dissonance: let them only know, let them

only love, let them only be mindful of the object they adore.”

With respect to the worship of animals, Plutarch apologizes for it in

the following excellent manner in his treatise On Isis and Osiris.

“It now remains that we should speak of the utility of these animals to

man, and of their symbolical meaning; some of them partaking of one of

these only, but many of them of both. It is evident therefore that the

Egyptians worshipped the ox, the sheep, and the ichneumon, on account

of their use and benefit, as the Lemnians did larks, for discovering

the eggs of caterpillars and breaking them; and the Thessalians

storks, because, as their land produced abundance of serpents, the

storks destroyed all of them as soon as they appeared. Hence also they

enacted a law, that whoever killed a stork should be banished. But the

Egyptians honoured the asp, the weezle, and the beetle, in consequence

of observing in them certain dark resemblances of the power of the

Gods, like that of the sun in drops of water. For at present, many

believe and assert that the weezle engenders by the ear, and brings

forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the generation of reason,

[or the productive principle of things.] But the genus of beetles has

no female; and all the males emit their sperm into a spherical piece

of earth, which they roll about thrusting it backwards with their hind

feet, while they themselves move forward; just as the sun appears to

revolve in a direction contrary to that of the heavens, in consequence

of moving from west to east. They also assimilated the asp to a star,

as being exempt from old age, and performing its motions unassisted by

organs with agility and ease. Nor was the crocodile honoured by them

without a probable cause; but is said to have been considered by them

as a resemblance of divinity, as being the only animal that is without

a tongue. For the divine reason is unindigent of voice, and proceeding

through a silent path, and accompanied with[40] justice, conducts

mortal affairs according to it. They also say it is the only animal

living in water that has the sight of its eyes covered with a thin and

transparent film, which descends from his forehead, so that he sees

without being seen, which is likewise the case with the first God. But

in whatever place the female crocodile may lay her eggs, this may with

certainty be concluded to be the boundary of the increase of the Nile.

For not being able to lay their eggs in the water, and fearing to lay

them far from it, they have such an accurate pre-sensation of futurity,

that though they enjoy the benefit of the river in its access, during

the time of their laying and hatching, yet they preserve their eggs

dry and untouched by the water. They also lay sixty eggs, are the same

number of days in hatching them, and those that are the longest lived

among them, live just so many years; which number is the first of the

measures employed by those who are conversant with the heavenly bodies.

“Moreover, of those animals that were honoured for both reasons, we

have before spoken of the dog. But the ibis, killing indeed all deadly

reptiles, was the first that taught men the use of medical evacuation,

in consequence of observing that she is after this manner washed and

purified by herself. Those priests also, that are most attentive to

the laws of sacred rites, when they consecrate water for lustration,

fetch it from that place where the ibis had been drinking; for she

will neither drink nor come near unwholesome or infected water; but

with the distance of her feet from each other, and her bill she makes

an equilateral triangle. Farther still, the variety and mixture of her

black wings about the white represents the moon when she is gibbous.

“We ought not, however, to wonder if the Egyptians love such slender

similitudes, since the Greeks also, both in their pictures and statues,

employ many such like resemblances of the Gods. Thus in Crete, there

was a statue of Jupiter without ears. For it is fit that he who is the

ruler and lord of all things, should hear no one.[41] Phidias also

placed a dragon by the statue of Minerva, and a snail by that of Venus

at Elis, to show that virgins require a guard, and that keeping at

home and silence become married women. But the trident of Neptune is

a symbol of the third region of the world, which the sea possesses,

having an arrangement after the heavens and the air. Hence also,

they thus denominated Amphitrite and the Tritons. The Pythagoreans

likewise adored numbers and figures with the appellations of the

Gods. For they called the equilateral triangle Minerva Coryphagenes,

or begotten from the summit, and Tritogeneia, because it is divided

by three perpendiculars drawn from the three angles. But they called

the _one_ Apollo, being persuaded to this by the obvious meaning

of the word Apollo [which signifies a privation of multitude] and by

the simplicity of the monad.[42] The duad they denominated strife and

audacity; and the triad justice. For since injuring and being injured

are two extremes subsisting according to excess and defect, justice

through equality has a situation in the middle. But what is called the

tetractys, being the number 36, was, as is reported, their greatest

oath, and was denominated the world. For this number is formed from the

composition of the four first even, and the four first odd numbers,

collected into one sum.[43] If therefore the most approved of the

philosophers did not think it proper to neglect or despise any occult

signification of a divine nature when they perceived it even in things

which are inanimate and incorporeal, it appears to me, that they in

a still greater degree venerated those peculiarities depending on

manners which they saw in such natures as had sense, and were endued

with soul, with passion, and ethical habits. We must embrace therefore,

not those who honor these kings, but those who reverence divinity

through these, as through most clear mirrors, and which are produced by

nature, in a becoming manner, conceiving them to be the instruments or

the art of the God by whom all things are perpetually adorned. But we

ought to think that no inanimate being can be more excellent than one

that is animated, nor an insensible than a sensitive being, not even

though some one should collect together all the gold and emeralds in

the universe. For the divinity is not ingenerated either in colours,

or figures, or smoothness; but such things as neither ever did, nor

are naturally adapted to participate of life, have an allotment more

ignoble than that of dead bodies. But the nature which lives and sees,

and has the principle of motion from itself, and a knowledge of things

appropriate and foreign to its being, has certainly derived an efflux

and portion of that wisdom, which, as Heraclitus says, considers how

both itself, and the universe is governed. Hence the divinity is not

worse represented in these animals, than in the workmanships of copper

and stone, which in a similar manner suffer corruption and decay, but

are naturally deprived of all sense and consciousness. This then I

consider as the best defence that can be given of the adoration of

animals by the Egyptians.

“With respect however to the sacred vestments, those of Isis are of

various hues; for her power is about matter, which becomes and receives

all things, as light and darkness, day and night, fire and water, life

and death, beginning and end; but those of Osiris are without a shade

and have no variety of colours, but have one only which is simple and

luciform. Hence when the latter have been once used, they are laid

aside and preserved; for the intelligible is invisible and intangible.

But the vestments of Isis are used frequently. For sensible things

being in daily use and at hand, present us with many developements and

views of their different mutations: but the intellectual perception

of that which is intelligible, genuine, and holy, luminously darting

through the soul like a coruscation, is attended with a simultaneous

contact and vision of its object. Hence Plato and Aristotle call this

part of philosophy epoptic or intuitive, indicating that those who

have through the exercise of the reasoning power, soared beyond these

doxastic, mingled and all-various natures, raise themselves to that

first, simple, and immaterial principle, and passing into contact with

the pure truth which subsists about it, they consider themselves as

having at length obtained the end of philosophy.[44] And that which

the present devoted and veiled priests obscurely manifest with great

reverence and caution is that this God is the ruler and prince of

the dead, and is not different from that divinity who is called by

the Greeks Hades and Pluto, the truth of which assertion not being

understood, disturbs the multitude, who suspect that the truly sacred

and holy Osiris dwells in and under the earth, where the bodies of

those are concealed who appear to have obtained an end of their being.

But he indeed himself is at the remotest distance from the earth,

unstained, unpolluted, and pure from every essence that receives

corruption and death. The souls of men however, being here encompassed

with bodies and passions, cannot participate of divinity except as

of an obscure dream by intellectual contact through philosophy. But

when they are liberated from the body, and pass into the invisible,

impassive, and pure region, this God is then their leader and king,

from whom they depend, insatiably beholding him, and desiring to survey

that beauty which cannot be expressed or uttered by men; and which

Isis, as the ancient discourse evinces, always loving, pursuing, and

enjoying fills such things in these lower regions as participate of

generation with every thing beautiful and good.”

And lastly, the Emperor Julian, in a fragment of an Oration or Epistle

on the duties of a priest, has the following remarks on religiously

venerating statues: “Statues and altars, and the preservation of

unextinguished fire, and in short, all such particulars, have been

established by our fathers as symbols of the presence of the Gods;

_not that we should believe that these symbols are Gods, but that

through these we should worship the Gods_. For since we are

connected with body, it is also necessary that our worship of the Gods

should be performed in a corporeal manner; but they are incorporeal.

And they indeed have exhibited to us as the first of statues, that

which ranks as the second genus of Gods from the first, and which

circularly revolves round the whole of heaven.[45] Since, however,

a corporeal worship cannot even be paid to these, because they are

naturally unindigent, a third kind of statues was devised on the

earth, by the worship of which we render the Gods propitious to us.

For as those who reverence the images of kings, who are not in want

of any such reverence, at the same time attract to themselves their

benevolence; thus also those who venerate the statues of the Gods, who

are not in want of any thing, persuade the Gods by this veneration

to assist and be favourable to them. For alacrity in the performance

of things in our power is a document of true sanctity; and it is

very evident that he who accomplishes the former, will in a greater

degree possess the latter. But he who despises things in his power,

and afterwards pretends to desire impossibilities, evidently does not

pursue the latter, and overlooks the former. For though divinity is not

in want of any thing, it does not follow that on this account nothing

is to be offered to him. For neither is he in want of celebration

through the ministry of _words_. What then? Is it therefore

reasonable that he should be deprived of this? By no means. Neither

therefore is he to be deprived of the honour which is paid him through

_works_; which honour has been legally established, not for three,

or for three thousand years, but in all preceding ages, among all

nations of the earth.

“But [the Galilæans will say,] O! you who have admitted into your soul

every multitude of dæmons, whom, though according to you they are

formless and unfigured, you have fashioned in a corporeal resemblance,

it is not fit that honour should be paid to divinity through such

works. _How, then, do not we [heathens] consider as wood and stones

those statues which are fashioned by the hands of men? O more stupid

than even stones themselves! Do you fancy that all men are to be drawn

by the nose as you are drawn by execrable dæmons, so as to think that

the artificial resemblances of the Gods are the Gods themselves?_

Looking therefore to the resemblances of the Gods, we do not think them

to be either stones or wood; for neither do we think that the Gods

are these resemblances; since neither do we say that royal images are

wood, or stone, or brass, nor that they are the kings themselves, but

the images of kings. Whoever, therefore, loves his king, beholds with

pleasure the image of his king; whoever loves his child is delighted

with his image; and whoever loves his father surveys his image with

delight.[46] Hence also, he who is a lover of divinity gladly surveys

the statues and images of the Gods; at the same time venerating and

fearing with a holy dread the Gods who invisibly behold him.[47]

The Catholics have employed arguments similar to these, in defence of

the reverence which they pay to the images of their saints. Indeed,

it is the doctrine of the Church of England,[48] that the Catholics

form the same opinions of the saints whose images they worship as

the Heathens did of their Gods; and employ the same outward rites in

honouring their images, as the Heathens did in the religious veneration

of their statues. Thus as the Heathens had their _tutelar Gods_,

such as were Belus to the Babylonians and Assyrians, Osiris and Isis

to the Egyptians, and Vulcan to the Lemnians, thus also the Catholics

attribute the defence of certain countries to certain saints. Have

not the saints also to whom the safeguard of particular cities is

committed, the same office as the _Dii Præsides_ of the Heathens?

Such as were at Delphi, Apollo; at Athens, Minerva; at Carthage, Juno;

and at Rome, Quirinus. And do not the saints to whom churches are built

and altars erected correspond to the Dii Patroni of the Heathens? Such

as were in the Capitol, Jupiter, in the temple at Paphos, Venus, in the

temple of Ephesus, Diana. Are not likewise, our Lady of Walsingham, our

Lady of Ipswich, our Lady of Wilsdon, and the like, imitations of Diana

Agrotera, Diana Coriphea, Diana Ephesia, Venus Cypria, Venus Paphia,

Venus Gnidia, and the like? The Catholics too, have substituted for the

marine deities Neptune, Triton, Nereus, Castor and Pollux, Venus, &c.

Saint Christopher, Saint Clement, and others, and especially our Lady,

as she is called by them, to whom seamen sing _Ave Maris stella_.

Neither has the fire escaped their imitation of the Pagans. For instead

of Vulcan and Vesta, the inspective guardians of fire according to

the Heathens, the Catholics have substituted Saint Agatha, on the day

of whose nativity they make letters for the purpose of extinguishing

fire. Every artificer likewise and profession has a special saint in

the place of a presiding God. Thus scholars have Saint Nicholas and

Saint Gregory; painters Saint Luke; nor are soldiers in want of a saint

corresponding to Mars, nor lovers of one who is a substitute for Venus.

All diseases too have their special saints instead of Gods, who are

invoked as possessing a healing power. Thus the venereal disease has

Saint Roche; the falling sickness Saint Cornelius, the tooth-ach Saint

Apollin, &c. Beasts and cattle also have their presiding saints: for

Saint Loy (says the Homily) is the horse-leach, and Saint Antony the

swineherd, &c. The Homily adds,[49] “that in many points the Papists

exceed the Gentiles in idolatry, and particularly in honouring and

worshipping the relics and bones of saints, which prove that they be

mortal men and dead, and therefore no Gods to be worshipped, which the

Gentiles would never confess of their Gods for very shame.” And after

enumerating many ridiculous practices of the Catholics in reference to

these relics, the Homily concludes with observing, “that they are not

only more wicked than the Gentile idolaters, but also no wiser than

asses, horses, and mules, which have no understanding.”

In the second place the Homilies shew[50] that the rites and ceremonies

of the Papists in honouring and worshipping their images or saints,

are the same with the rites of the Pagans. “This, say they, is evident

in their pilgrimages to visit images which had more holiness and

virtue in them than others. In their candle-religion, burning incense,

offering up gold to images, hanging up crutches, chairs, and ships,

legs, arms, and whole men and women of war, before images, as though

by them, or saints (as they say) they were delivered from lameness,

sickness, captivity, or shipwrack.” In spreading abroad after the

manner of the Heathens, the miracles that have accompanied images.

“Such an image was sent from heaven, like the Palladium, or Diana of

the Ephesians. Such an image was brought by angels. Such a one came

itself far from the east to the west, as Dame Fortune fled to Rome.

Some images though they were hard and stony, yet for tender-heart and

pity wept. Some spake more monstrously than ever did Balaam’s ass, who

had life and breath in him. Such a cripple came and saluted this saint

of oak, and by and by he was made whole, and here hangeth his crutch.

Such a one in a tempest vowed to Saint Christopher, and scaped, and

behold here is his ship of war. Such a one, by Saint Leonard’s help,

brake out of prison, and see where his fetters hang. And infinite

thousands more miracles by like, or more shameless lies were reported.”

After all this, I appeal to every intelligent reader, whether the

religion of the Heathens, according to its genuine purity as delineated

in this Introduction, and as professed and promulgated by the best

and wisest men of antiquity, is not infinitely preferable to that of

the Catholics? And whether it is not more holy to reverence beings

the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of all things, and

which are eternally centered and rooted in him; and to believe that in

reverencing these, we at the same time reverence _the ineffable_,

because they partake of his nature, and that through these as media we

become united with him,[51] than to reverence men, and the images of

men, many of whom when living, were the disgrace of human nature? The

Church of England as we see prefers the Pagans to the Papists; and I

trust that every other sect of Protestant Christians will unanimously

subscribe to her decision. And thus much in defence of the theology of

Plato, and the religious worship of the Heathens.

It now remains that I should speak of the following work, of its

author, and the translation. The work itself then is a scientific

developement of the deiform processions from the ineffable principle

of things, and this, as it appears to me in the greatest perfection

possible to man. For the reasoning is every where consummately

accurate, and deduced from self-evident principles; and the conclusions

are the result of what Plato powerfully calls geometrical necessities.

To the reader of this work indeed, who has not been properly

disciplined in Eleatic and Academic studies, and who has not a genius

naturally adapted to such abstruse speculations, it will doubtless

appear to be perfectly unintelligible, and in the language of critical

cant, nothing but jargon and revery. This, however, is what Plato the

great hierophant of this theology predicted would be the case, if ever

it was unfolded to the multitude at large. “_For as it appears to me,

says he, there are scarcely any particulars which will be considered

by the multitude more ridiculous than these; nor again, any which will

appear more wonderful and enthusiastic to those who are naturally

adapted to perceive them._”[52]

In his seventh epistle also he observes as follows: “Thus much,

however, I shall say respecting all those who either have written

or shall write, affirming that they know those things which are the

objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from

others, or whether they have discovered them themselves) that they have

not heard any thing about these things conformable to my opinion: for

I never have written nor ever shall write about them.[53] For a thing

of this kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but

by long familiarity, and living in conjunction with the thing itself, a

light[54] as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled

in the soul, and there itself nourish itself.” And shortly after he

adds; “But if it appeared to me that the particulars of which I am

speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the _multitude_ by

writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than

to impart a mighty benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature

into light, so as to be obvious to all men? I think, however, that an

attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some

small vestiges previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover

these abstruse particulars. But with respect to the rest of mankind,

some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and others with

a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain venerable

things.”[55]

The prediction of Plato therefore, has been but too truly fulfilled in

the fate which has attended the writings of the best of his disciples,

among whom Proclus certainly maintains the most distinguished rank.

This indeed, these disciples well knew would be the case; but

perceiving that the hand of Barbaric and despotic power was about

to destroy the schools of the philosophers, and foreseeing that

dreadful night of ignorance and folly which succeeded so nefarious

an undertaking, they benevolently disclosed in as luminous a manner

as the subject would permit, the arcana of their master’s doctrines,

thereby, as Plato expresses it, giving assistance to Philosophy, and

also preserving it as a paternal and immortal inheritance, to the

latest posterity. Proclus in the first book of this work has enumerated

the requisites which a student of it ought to possess; and it is most

certain that he who does not possess them, will never fathom the depths

of this theology, or perceive his mind irradiated with that admirable

light, mentioned by Plato in the foregoing extract, and which is only

to be seen by that eye of the soul which is better worth saving than

ten thousand corporeal eyes.

With respect to the diction of Proclus in this work, its general

character is that of purity, clearness, copiousness, and magnificence;

so that even the fastidious critic, who considers every Greek writer as

partially barbarous who lived after the fall of the Macedonian empire,

must, however unwillingly, be forced to acknowledge that Proclus is

a splendid exception. The sagacious Kepler, whose decision on this

subject, outweighs in my opinion, that of a swarm of modern critics,

after having made a long extract from the commentaries of Proclus on

Euclid, gives the following animated encomium of his diction. “Oratio

fluit ipsi torrentis instar, ripas inundans, et cœca dubitationum

vada gurgitesque occultans, dum mens plena majestatis tantarum rerum,

luctatur in angustiis linguæ, et conclusio nunquam sibi ipsi verborum

copiâ satisfaciens, propositionum simplicitatem excedit.” i.e. “His

language flows like a torrent, inundating its banks, and hiding the

dark fords and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind full of the majesty

of things of such a magnitude, struggles in the straits of language,

and the conclusion never satisfying him, exceeds by the copia of

words, the simplicity of the propositions.” If we omit what Kepler

here says about the struggle of the mind of Proclus, and his never

being satisfied with the conclusion, the rest of his eulogy is equally

applicable to the style of the present work, so far as it is possible

for the beauties of diction to be combined with the rigid accuracy of

geometrical reasoning.

With respect to the life of Proclus, it has been written with great

elegance by his disciple Marinus; and a translation of it by me

prefixed to my version of the commentaries of Proclus was published

in 1788. From the edition of that life therefore, by Fabricius,

the following particulars relative to this very extraordinary man

are extracted, for the information of the reader who may not have

the translation of it in his possession. According to the accurate

chronology then of Fabricius, Proclus was born at Byzantium in the year

of Christ 412, on the 6th of the Ides of February, and died in the one

hundred and twenty-fourth year after the reign of the emperor Julian,

on the seventeenth day of the Attic Munichion, or the April of the

Romans, Nicagoras the junior, being at that time the Athenian archon.

His father Patricius, and his mother Marcella, were both of them of

the Lycian nation, and were no less illustrious for their virtue

than their birth. As soon as he was born, his parents brought him to

their native country Xanthus, which was sacred to Apollo. And this,

says Marinus, happened to him by a certain divine allotment. “For, he

adds, I think it was necessary that he who was to be the leader of all

sciences, should be nourished and educated under the presiding deity of

the Muses.” The person of Proclus was uncommonly beautiful; and he not

only possessed all the moral and intellectual virtues in the highest

perfection, but the vestigies of them also, which are denominated the

physical virtues, were clearly seen, says Marinus, in his last and

shelly vestment the body. Hence he possessed a remarkable acuteness

of sensation, and particularly in the most honourable of the senses,

sight and hearing, which, as Plato says, were imparted by the Gods to

men for the purpose of philosophizing, and for the well being of the

animal life. In the second place, he possessed so great a strength

of body, that it was neither injured by cold, nor any endurance of

labours, though these were extreme, both by night and day. In the third

place, he was, as we have before observed, very beautiful. “For not

only, says Marinus, did his body possess great symmetry, but a living

light as it were beaming from his soul was efflorescent in his body,

and shone forth with an admirable splendor, which it is impossible to

describe.” Marinus adds, “Indeed he was so beautiful, that no painter

could accurately exhibit his resemblance; and all the pictures of him

which were circulated, though very beautiful, were very inferior to the

beauty of the original.” And in the fourth place, he possessed health

in such perfection, that he was not ill above twice or thrice in the

course of so long a life as seventy-five years.

Such then were the corporeal prerogatives which Proclus possessed, and

which may be called the forerunners of the forms of perfect virtue.

But he possessed in a wonderful manner what Plato calls the elements

of a philosophic genius.[56] For he had an excellent memory, learned

with facility, was magnificent and graceful, and the friend and ally of

truth, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Having for a short space

of time applied himself in Lycia to grammar, he went to Alexandria

in Egypt, and was there instructed in rhetoric by Leonas who derived

his lineage from Isaurus, and in grammar by Orion, whose ancestors

discharged the sacerdotal office among the Egyptians, and who composed

elaborate treatises on that art. A certain good fortune however, says

Marinus, brought him back to the place of his nativity. For on his

return his tutelar Goddess exhorted him to philosophy, and to visit the

Athenian schools. Having therefore, first returned to Alexandria and

bade farewell to rhetoric, and the other arts which he had formerly

studied, he gave himself up to the discourses of the philosophers then

resident at Alexandria. Here, he became an auditor of Olympiodorus,[57]

the most illustrious of philosophers, for the sake of imbibing

the doctrine of Aristotle; and was instructed in the mathematical

disciplines by Hero, a religious man, and eminently skilful in

teaching those sciences. Proclus however, not being satisfied with

the Alexandrian schools, went to Athens, “with a certain splendid

procession, says Marinus, of all eloquence and elegance, and attended

by the Gods that preside over philosophy, and by beneficent dæmons.

For that the succession of philosophy, might be preserved legitimate

and genuine, the Gods led him to the city over which its inspective

guardian presides.” Hence Proclus was called κατ’ εξοχην _by way

of eminence_, the _Platonic Successor_. At Athens therefore,

Proclus fortunately met with the first of philosophers, Syrianus,[58]

the son of Philoxenus, who not only much assisted him in his studies,

but made him his domestic as to other concerns, and the companion of

his philosophic life, having found him such an auditor and successor as

he had a long time sought for, and one who was capable of receiving a

multitude of disciplines and divine dogmas.

In less than two whole years therefore, Proclus read with Syrianus all

the works of Aristotle, viz. his logic, ethics, politics, physics,

and theological science. And being sufficiently instructed in these

as in certain _proteleia_, or things preparatory to initiation,

and lesser mysteries, Syrianus led him to the mystic discipline of

Plato, in an orderly progression, and not according to the Chaldean

oracle with a transcendent foot. He likewise enabled Proclus to survey

in conjunction with him, says Marinus, truly divine mysteries, with

the eyes of his soul free from material darkness, and with undefiled

intellectual vision. But Proclus employing sleepless exercise and

attention, both by night and by day, and synoptically and judiciously

committing to writing what he heard from Syrianus, made so great a

progress in a little time, that by then he was twenty-eight years

of age, he had composed a multitude of works and among the rest his

commentaries on the Timæus which are truly elegant and full of science.

But from such a discipline as this, his manners became more adorned;

and as he advanced in science he increased in virtue.

Marinus after this, shows how Proclus possessed all the virtues in the

greatest possible perfection; and how he proceeded from the exercise

of the political virtues, which are produced by reason adorning the

irrational part as its instrument, to the cathartic virtues which

pertain to reason alone, withdrawing from other things to itself,

throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also

the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul

from the bonds of generation. He then adds, “Proclus having made a

proficiency, through these virtues, as it were by certain mystic steps,

recurred from these to such as are greater and more telestic, being

conducted to them by a prosperous nature and scientific discipline.

For being now purified, rising above generation, and despising its

thyrsus-bearers,[59] he was agitated with a divinely inspired fury,

about the first essences, and became an inspector of the truly blessed

spectacles which they contain. No longer collecting discursively and

demonstratively the science of them, but surveying them as it were

by simple intuition, and beholding through intellectual energies the

paradigms in a divine intellect, assuming a virtue which can no longer

be denominated prudence, but which ought rather to be called wisdom,

or something still more venerable than this. The philosopher therefore

energizing according to this virtue, easily comprehended all the

theology of the Greeks and Barbarians, and that which is adumbrated

in mythological fictions, and brought it into light, to those who are

willing and able to understand it. He explained likewise every thing

in a more enthusiastic manner, and brought the different theologies

to an harmonious agreement. At the same time also, investigating

the writings of the ancients, whatever he found in them genuine, he

judiciously adopted; but if he found any thing of a spurious nature,

this, he entirely rejected as erroneous. He also strenuously subverted

by a diligent examination such doctrines as were contrary to truth.

In his associations too with others, he employed no less force and

perspicuity. For he was a man laborious beyond measure; as, in one day,

he gave five, and sometimes more lectures, and wrote as many as seven

hundred verses. Besides this, he went to other philosophers, and spent

the evening in conversation with them. And all these employments he

executed in such a manner as not to neglect his nocturnal and vigilant

piety to the Gods, and assiduously supplicating the sun when rising,

when at his meridian altitude, and when he sets.”

Marinus farther observes of this most extraordinary man, “that he did

not seem to be without divine inspiration. For words similar to the

most white and thick-falling snow[60] proceeded from his wise mouth,

his eyes appeared to be filled with a fulgid splendor, and the rest of

his face to participate of divine illumination. Hence Rufinus, a man

illustrious in the Republic, and who was also a man of veracity, and

in other respects venerable, happening to be present with him when he

was lecturing, perceived that his head was surrounded with a light. And

when Proclus had finished his lecture, Rufinus rising, adored him, and

testified by an oath the truth of the divine vision which he had seen.”

Marinus also informs us, “that Proclus being purified in an orderly

manner by the Chaldean purifications, was an inspector of the

lucid Hecatic visions, as he himself somewhere mentions in one of

his writings. By opportunely moving likewise a certain Hecatic

sphærula,[61] he procured showers of rain, and freed Athens from an

unseasonable heat. Besides this, by certain phylacteria or charms,

he stopt an earthquake, and had made trial of the divining energy of

the tripod, having been instructed by certain verses respecting its

failure. For when he was in his fortieth year, he appeared in a dream

to utter the following verses:

High above æther there with radiance bright,

A pure immortal splendor wings its flight;[62]

Whose beams divine with vivid force aspire,

And leap resounding from a fount of fire.

And in the beginning of his forty-second year he appeared to himself to

pronounce with a loud voice these verses:

Lo! on my soul a sacred fire descends,

Whose vivid power the intellect extends;

From whence far beaming thro’ dull body’s night,

It soars to æther deck’d with starry light;

And with soft murmurs thro’ the azure round,

The lucid regions of the Gods resound.

Besides, he clearly perceived that he belonged to the Mercurial

series; and was persuaded from a dream, that he possessed the soul of

Nicomachus the Pythagorean.”[63]

In the last place, Marinus adds, “that the lovers of more elegant

studies may be able to conjecture from the position of the stars under

which he was born, that the condition of his life, was by no means

among the last or middle, but among the first orders, we have thought

fit to expose in this place the following scheme of his nativity.”

☉ 16° 26′ ♒

☽ 17 29 ♊

♄ 24 23 ♉

♃ 24 41 ♉

♂ 29 50 ♐

♀ -- 23 ♓

☿ 4 42 ♒

Horos. 8 19 ♈

Mid. } 4 42 ♑

Heaven. }

☋ or the head of the dragon

24 33 ♏︎

The new moon preceding his birth

8 51 ♒︎

And thus much for the life of Proclus.

With respect to the translation of the following work, On the Theology

of Plato, I can only say that I have endeavoured to render it as

faithful as possible, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter

of the author; this being indispensably necessary, both from the

importance of the subject, and the scientific accuracy of the reasoning

with which it is discussed. I have added a seventh book in order to

render the work complete; for without the developement of the mundane

Gods, and the more excellent genera their perpetual attendants, it

would obviously be incomplete. From the catalogue of the manuscripts

in the late French king’s library, it is evident that Proclus had

written a seventh book,[64] as some chapters of it are there said

to be extant in that library. These I have endeavoured, but without

success, to obtain. The want of this seventh book by Proclus, will

doubtless be considered by all the friends of Greek literature, and

particularly by all who are lovers of the doctrines of Plato, as a

loss of no common magnitude. It is, however, a fortunate circumstance,

that in the composition of the seventh book I have been able to supply

the deficiency arising from the want of that which was written by

Proclus, in a great measure from other works of Proclus himself, and

particularly from his very elegant and scientific commentaries on the

Timæus of Plato. So that I trust the loss is in some measure supplied;

though I am sensible, very inadequately, could it be compared with the

book which was written by a man of such gigantic powers of mind as

Proclus, and who had also sources of information on the subject, which

at the present period, it is impossible to obtain.

A translation of the Elements of Theology is added in order to render

the treatise On the Theology of Plato, more complete, and to assist

the reader who wishes to penetrate the depths of that most abstruse

and sublime work; for the former elucidates, and is elucidated by the

latter.

In translating the treatise of Proclus On Providence and Fate, I had

great difficulties to encounter, as the original Greek is lost, and

nothing but a Latin translation, which Fabricius observes, is _all

but barbarous_, remains. If the reader compares that translation

with mine, he will at once acknowledge the truth of my remark. Indeed,

_that_ translation is in some parts so barbarous, that nothing

but an intimate acquaintance with the writings of Proclus, and the

philosophy of Plato could enable any one to render them intelligible in

another language. The same observation is partially applicable to the

translation of the Extracts from two other treatises of Proclus.

The Greek text of Proclus abounds with errors, so that the emendations

which I have made, and the deficiencies which I have supplied in this

volume, amount to more than four hundred. And the Latin translation

of Portus is so very faulty, as to be almost beyond example bad.

Having discovered this to be the case, and having in so many places

corrected the original, I scarcely think that any of my critical

enemies will be hardy enough to say, that any part of this volume was

translated from the Latin, where the Greek could be obtained. As I am

conscious however, that in what is now offered to the public, I had no

other view than to benefit those who are capable of being benefited

by such sublime speculations; that wishing well to all mankind,

and particularly to my country, I have laboured to disseminate the

philosophy and theology of Plato, as highly favourable to the interests

of piety and good government, and most hostile to lawless conduct and

revolutionary principles; and that I have done my best to deserve the

esteem of the wise and worthy part of mankind, I am wholly unconcerned

as to the reception it may meet with from the malevolent, though I wish

for the approbation of the candid critics of the day. For in all my

labours I have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept:

“Do those things which you judge to be beautiful, though in doing them

you should be without renown; for the rabble is a bad judge of a good

thing.”[65]

CONTENTS

of

THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

The Preface, in which the scope of the treatise is unfolded,

together with the praise of Plato himself, and of those that

received the philosophy from him.

CHAPTER II.

What the mode of the discussion is in the present treatise, and

what preparation of the auditors of it is previously necessary.

CHAPTER III.

What a theologist is according to Plato, whence he begins, as far

as to what hypostases he ascends, and according to what power of

the soul he particularly energizes.

CHAPTER IV.

The theological types or forms according to all which Plato

disposes the doctrine concerning the Gods.

CHAPTER V.

What the dialogues are from which the theology of Plato may

especially be assumed; and to what orders of Gods each of these

dialogues refers us.

CHAPTER VI.

An objection against collecting the Platonic theology from many

dialogues, in consequence of its being partial, and distributed

into minute parts.

CHAPTER VII.

A solution of the before mentioned objection, referring to one

dialogue, the Parmenides, the whole truth concerning the Gods

according to Plato.

CHAPTER VIII.

An enumeration of the different opinions concerning the

Parmenides, and a division of the objections to them.

CHAPTER IX.

A confutation of those who assert that the Parmenides is a

logical dialogue, and who admit that the discussion in it is

argumentative, proceeding through subjects of opinion.

CHAPTER X.

How far they are right who assert that the hypotheses of the

Parmenides are concerning the principles of things, and what is

to be added to what they say from the doctrine of our preceptor

[Syrianus.]

CHAPTER XI.

Many demonstrations concerning the conclusions of the second

hypothesis, and of the division of it according to the divine

orders.

CHAPTER XII.

The intention of the hypotheses, demonstrating their connexion

with each other, and their consent with the things themselves.[66]

CHAPTER XIII.

What the common rules concerning the Gods are, which Plato

delivers in the Laws. And also concerning the hyparxis of the

Gods, their providence, and their immutable perfection.

CHAPTER XIV.

How the hyparxis of the Gods is delivered in the Laws, and through

what media the discourse recurs to the truly existing Gods.----How

the providence of the Gods is demonstrated in the Laws, and what

the mode of their providence is according to Plato.[67]

CHAPTER XV.

Through what arguments in the same treatise [the Laws] it is

demonstrated that the Gods provide [for all things,] immutably.

CHAPTER XVI.

What the axioms are concerning the Gods which are delivered in the

Republic, and what order they have with respect to each other.

CHAPTER XVII.

What the goodness of the Gods is, and how they are said to be the

causes of all good; and that evil according to every hypostasis is

itself adorned and arranged by the Gods.

CHAPTER XVIII.

What the immutability is of the Gods; where also it is shown

what their self-sufficiency, and firm impassivity are; and how

we are to understand their possessing an invariable sameness of

subsistence.

CHAPTER XIX.

What the simplicity is of the Gods; and how that which is simple

in them appears to be various in secondary natures.

CHAPTER XX.

What the truth is in the Gods; and whence falsehood is introduced

in the participations of the Gods by secondary natures.

CHAPTER XXI.

From the axioms in the Phædrus concerning every thing divine [it

follows] that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good.

CHAPTER XXII.

A discussion of the dogmas concerning the goodness [of the Gods,]

and an investigation of the elements of the good in the Philebus.

CHAPTER XXIII.

What the wisdom of the Gods is, and what elements of it may be

assumed from Plato.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Concerning divine beauty, and the elements of it, as delivered

by Plato.

CHAPTER XXV.

What the triad is which is conjoined with the good, the wise, and

the beautiful, and what auxiliaries to the theory of it, Plato

affords us.[68]

CHAPTER XXVI.

Concerning the axioms delivered in the Phædo,[69] respecting an

invisible nature. What the divine nature is. What the immortal,

and the intelligible[70] are; and what order these possess with

reference to each other.

CHAPTER XXVII.

What the uniform and indissoluble are, and how sameness of

subsistence [and the unbegotten are] to be assumed in divine

natures.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

How paternal, and how maternal causes are to be assumed in the

Gods.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Concerning divine names, and the rectitude of them as delivered in

the Cratylus.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

A method leading to the superessential principle of all things,

according to the intellectual conception of _the one_ and

multitude.

CHAPTER II.

A second method unfolding the hypostasis of _the one_, and

demonstrating it to be exempt from all corporeal and incorporeal

essences.

CHAPTER III.

Many arguments in confirmation of the same thing, and evincing the

irreprehensible hypothesis of _the one_.

CHAPTER IV.

A confutation of those who say that the first principle is not

according to Plato above intellect, and demonstrations from the

Republic, the Sophista, the Philebus, and the Parmenides, of the

superessential hypostasis[71] of _the one_.

CHAPTER V.

What the modes are of ascent to _the one_ according to Plato; and

that the modes are two, through analogy, and through negations.

Likewise, where Plato treats of each of these, and through what

cause.

CHAPTER VI.

By what, and by how many names Plato unfolds the ineffable

principle, and why he unfolds it by such and by so many names. And

how these names accord with the modes of ascent to it.

CHAPTER VII.

What the assertions are in the Republic concerning the first

principle, through its analogy to the sun; where also it is

shown, how it is celebrated as the good, and as the most splendid

of being. How the sun is the offspring of the good; and that

according to each order of divine natures, there is a monad

analogous to the first principle. And how the first principle is

the cause of all beings, and is itself prior to power and energy.

CHAPTER VIII.

What Plato in his Epistle to Dionysius says the first king is. And

admonitions, that the first God is discussed in that Epistle.

CHAPTER IX.

What the three conceptions are which are delivered [in that

Epistle] concerning the first king. How all things are about

him. How all things are for his sake. How he is the cause of all

beautiful things. What the order is of these conceptions. And from

what hypotheses they are assumed.

CHAPTER X.

How in the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, Plato delivers

the doctrine concerning _the one_, employing for this purpose

negations. And on what account the negations are such and so many.

CHAPTER XI.

How it is necessary to enter on the theory concerning _the one_,

through negations. And what disposition of the soul is most

adapted to discussions of this kind.

CHAPTER XII.

A celebration of _the one_, demonstrating through negative

conclusions that it is exempt from all the orders of beings,

according to the order delivered in the Parmenides.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK III.

CHAPTER I.

That after the discussion in common of the one principle of

things, it is requisite to treat of the divine orders, and to show

how many they are, and how they are divided from each other.

CHAPTER II.

That the multitude of unities according to which the Gods have

their hypostasis, subsists after _the one_.

CHAPTER III.

How many the particulars are which ought to be demonstrated

previous to the discovery of the multitude of the divine orders,

and an uninterrupted narration of the doctrine of these.

CHAPTER IV.

That all the unities are participable. And that there is only one

_truly_ superessential one; but that all the other unities are

participated by essences.[72]

CHAPTER V.

That the participations of the unities which are nearer to _the

one_, proceed into more simple hypostases; but the participations

of those that are remote from the one, proceed into more composite

hypostases.

CHAPTER VI.

What the natures are which participate of the divine unities, and

what the order of them is with respect to each other. And that

being indeed, is the most ancient of these; life, the second;

intellect, the third; soul, the fourth; and body, the last. And

that there are also as many orders of the divine unities.[73]

CHAPTER VII.

A resumption of the doctrine concerning _the one_, and a

discussion of the biformed principles posterior to _the one_.

CHAPTER VIII.

What the two principles are of all things posterior to _the one_;

how Socrates the Philebus calls them bound and infinity; and of

what things they are the causes[74] to beings.[75]

CHAPTER IX.

What the third thing is which is produced from the two principles.

Why Socrates in the Philebus calls it that which is mixed. That it

is nothing else than that which is primarily being.[76] And how

this proceeds from the two principles, and from _the one_.

CHAPTER X.

How from images also, it may be inferred, that the first thing

which subsists from bound and infinity is being. How this may be

demonstrated. And how bound and infinity are twofold; one order

of these subsisting in being, but the other existing prior to

being.[77]

CHAPTER XI.

What the triad is, which Socrates in the Philebus says is inherent

in every thing that is mixed.[78]

CHAPTER XII.

Concerning the first intelligible triad in common; and how the

second triad proceeds analogous to this.[79]

CHAPTER XIII.

What the second intelligible triad is. A more accurate account of

it, as subsisting from that which predominates, from that which is

participated, and from that which characterizes the mixture.

CHAPTER XIV.

What the third intelligible triad is; what that is which

predominates, and is participated in this. And at the end, a

discourse in common concerning the distinction of the three triads.

CHAPTER XV.

How the intelligible triads are delivered in the Timæus. And many

admonitions concerning animal itself, [evincing] that it has the

third order in intelligibles.

CHAPTER XVI.

Many demonstrations that eternity subsists according to the middle

order of intelligibles.

CHAPTER XVII.

That the one in which eternity abides is the summit of

intelligibles.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Concerning all the intelligible orders in common, according

to the doctrine of Timæus. And a more accurate account of the

peculiarities in the intelligible triads.

CHAPTER XIX.

Concerning intelligible forms, and the doctrine unfolding the

peculiarity of them. How likewise they are four, and from what

causes they subsist.

CHAPTER XX.

That also from what is said in the Sophista, it is possible to

discover the three intelligible orders; viz. in that part of the

Sophista, in which it is shown what _the one being_, what _whole_,

and what _all_ are.

CHAPTER XXI.

A summary account of what has been said concerning the

intelligible triads. And admonitions from Plato that it is

possible to divide them into father, power, and intellect.

CHAPTER XXII.

How in the Phædrus it is said that every thing divine is

beautiful, wise, and good. What triple elements of each of these

Plato delivers. And how from these it is possible to accede to the

union and separation of the intelligible triads.

CHAPTER XXIII.

How Parmenides delivers the multitude of Gods in the second

hypothesis. And how we should discourse about each order of them,

employing for this purpose the conclusions of that hypothesis.

CHAPTER XXIV.

What the first intelligible triad is according to Parmenides.

Whence he begins, and how far he proceeds, teaching concerning it.

CHAPTER XXV.

What the second intelligible triad is. How it is delivered by

Parmenides in continuity with the triad prior to it. And how far

he produces the discourse concerning it.

CHAPTER XXVI.

What the third intelligible triad is. And how Parmenides unfolds

it through the third conclusion.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Concerning the three conclusions in common, through which the

three orders of intelligibles are characterized. And how through

these it is possible to dissolve the most difficult of theological

doubts.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

A celebration of the intelligible Gods, unfolding at the same time

the union of intelligibles themselves with the good, and their

exempt hyparxis.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK IV.

CHAPTER I.

What the peculiarity is of the intelligible and intellectual Gods.

How they illuminate imparticipable life, and are in continuity

with the intelligible Gods.

CHAPTER II.

How the intelligible and intellectual Gods subsist from the

intelligible Gods. And how they communicate with the intelligible

Gods.

CHAPTER III.

What the division is of the intelligible and intellectual Gods

according to triads. And what the difference is of these triads

with respect to the intelligible triads.

CHAPTER IV.

How Socrates in the Phædrus leads us to this order of Gods.

CHAPTER V.

That it is not proper to understand the Heaven, and celestial

circulation [celebrated in the Phædrus] as pertaining to

sensibles; and many admonitions from the Platonic words

themselves, that these are to be referred to the first order of

Heaven.

CHAPTER VI.

That the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible; but

demonstrations from what is delivered about it [in the Phædrus,]

that it is allotted an intelligible order as in intellectuals.

CHAPTER VII.

That the subcelestial arch is the boundary of the intelligible and

intellectual Gods, evinced from the peculiarities of it.

CHAPTER VIII.

Why Plato characterizes this order of Gods from the middle which

it contains, and delivers the names of the extremes according to

the habitude to this middle.

CHAPTER IX.

That Plato delivers the same mode of ascent to the intelligible,

as is delivered by initiators into the mysteries.

CHAPTER X.

What the supercelestial place is. How it proceeds from the first

intelligibles. How it is supreme in intellectuals. And how Plato

demonstrates its prolific power.

CHAPTER XI.

How Plato has indicated the unknown peculiarity of the summit of

intelligibles and intellectuals, and why he celebrates it at one

and the same time affirmatively and negatively.

CHAPTER XII.

What the negations are of the supercelestial place. That they

are produced from the divine orders. What kind of negations also

designate the uncoloured, what, the unfigured, and what, the

privation of contact.

CHAPTER XIII.

What the things are which Plato affirms of the supercelestial

place, and from what intelligible peculiarities, he ascribes to it

affirmative signs.

CHAPTER XIV.

What the three deities of the virtues, viz. science, temperance,

and justice, are in the supercelestial place; what order they

have with respect to each other; and what perfection each of them

imparts to the Gods.

CHAPTER XV.

What the plain of Truth, and what the meadow are. What the unical

form of intelligible nutriment is. What the twofold nutriment of

the Gods is which is distributed from this intelligible food.

CHAPTER XVI.

Many admonitions that the supercelestial place is triadic. And

what the signs are of the three hypostases in it.

CHAPTER XVII.

Who Adrastia is. What the sacred law of Adrastia is. That she

ranks in the supercelestial place. And on what account she does so.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A summary account of what is said about the supercelestial place,

unfolding the peculiarities of it.

CHAPTER XIX.

Demonstrations that the connectedly-containing order is in the

intelligible and intellectual Gods. And that it is necessary there

should be three connective causes of wholes.

CHAPTER XX.

That according to Plato the celestial circulation is the same with

the connective order.

CHAPTER XXI.

How we may obtain auxiliaries from what is said by Plato of the

triadic division in the connective deity. And why he especially

venerates the union in this triad.

CHAPTER XXII.

What the theology in the Cratylus is concerning Heaven. And how it

is possible to collect from it by a reasoning process the middle

of the intelligible and intellectual Gods.

CHAPTER XXIII.

That the most divinely-inspired of the interpreters have defined

the subcelestial arch to be a certain peculiar order. And that our

preceptor has unfolded it in the most perfect manner.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Many admonitions that the peculiarity of the subcelestial arch is

perfective, from what Plato has delivered concerning it, and from

the souls that are elevated to it.

CHAPTER XXV.

What the triadic division is of the perfective order, which Plato

has delivered in the subcelestial arch.

CHAPTER XXVI.

What the elevation is of souls separate from bodies to the

intelligible and intellectual triads. What the most blessed

_telete_ is. What _muesis_, and _epopteia_ are. What the entire,

simple, and unmoved visions are. And what the end is of all this

elevation.

CHAPTER XXVII.

How Plato unfolds in the Parmenides, from intelligibles the

intelligible and intellectual orders. And what that which

is common, and that which is different are, in the theology

concerning these.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

How the intelligible and intellectual number proceeds from

intelligibles. And in what it differs from intelligible multitude.

CHAPTER XXIX.

How divine number adorns all beings. And what the powers in it are

which are symbolically delivered from the division of number.

CHAPTER XXX.

How Parmenides has delivered the feminine and generative

peculiarity [of first number] in what he says concerning number.

CHAPTER XXXI.

How we may discover in what is delivered concerning number, the

triadic division of the summit of intelligibles and intellectuals.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Whether it is proper to place number prior to animal itself, or in

animal itself, or posterior to it.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Whence Parmenides begins to speak about number. How far he

proceeds in what he says about it. And how he unfolds the

different orders in it.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

What the unknown is in divine numbers. What the generative is in

them. And admonitions of these things from what is elsewhere said

by Plato concerning numbers.

CHAPTER XXXV.

How Parmenides delivers the middle order of intelligibles and

intellectuals through _the one_, _whole_, and _finite_. And what

the peculiarities are of these.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Whence Parmenides begins to speak about this order. And how far

he proceeds in what he says about it. How he likewise unfolds the

three monads in it conformably to what is said in the Phædrus

concerning them.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

How Parmenides delivers the third order of intelligibles and

intellectuals. And how he unfolds the perfective peculiarity, and

triadic division of it.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

An admonition what the union is of the three intelligible and

intellectual triads, from the conclusions of Parmenides.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

How many theological dogmas we may assume, through the order

of the conclusions delivered by Parmenides in his discourse

concerning the intelligible and intellectual Gods.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

How the intellectual orders proceed from the intelligible and

intellectual Gods. And according to what peculiarities they

subsist.

CHAPTER II.

What the division is of the intellectual Gods. And the progression

according to hebdomads in this order of Gods.

CHAPTER III.

Who the three intellectual fathers are according to Plato. What

the three undefiled monads are. And who the seventh deity is, that

is co-arranged with the two triads.

CHAPTER IV.

How from the writings of Plato, the procession of the intellectual

Gods into seven hebdomads may be collected by a reasoning process.

CHAPTER V.

Who the mighty Saturn is, according to the theology in the

Cratylus. And how he is in a certain respect intelligible, and

in a certain respect intellectual. In which also, the dogmas are

discussed concerning the union of intellect with the intelligible,

and its separation from it.

CHAPTER VI.

What the kingdom of Saturn is. In what manner it is delivered by

Plato in the Politicus. And of what it is the cause to the world,

to the mundane Gods, and to partial souls.

CHAPTER VII.

What the Saturnian life of souls is. And what peculiarities of

this circulation the Elean Guest delivers.

CHAPTER VIII.

How souls are said to be nourished by intelligibles. And what

the difference is of the nutriment derived from different

intelligibles.

CHAPTER IX.

What the orders are which the mighty Saturn causes to preside over

wholes. In which also, who the Saturnian intellect is that is

delivered in the Gorgias is unfolded.

CHAPTER X.

How this God [Saturn] is peculiarly called by theologists

insenescible, or free from old age. And how Plato has delivered

this peculiarity of him.

CHAPTER XI.

Who the vivific Goddess is. How she is the collector of the

Saturnian and Jovian kingdoms. And what orders she possesses

conjoined with both these kingdoms.

CHAPTER XII.

Who the third father in intellectuals is. How he proceeds from the

causes prior to him. And that he is the demiurgus of the universe.

CHAPTER XIII.

Demonstrations that the whole demiurgus of the universe, is the

third father of the intellectual Gods.

CHAPTER XIV.

An answer to those who say that there are three demiurgi according

to Plato, demonstrating through many arguments that the demiurgic

monad is arranged prior to the [demiurgic] triad, in the third

order of intellectuals.

CHAPTER XV.

That Timæus especially delivers the peculiarity of the demiurgus,

by calling him intellect. And that this pertains to the third of

the intellectual fathers.

CHAPTER XVI.

How according to another method it is requisite to discover the

peculiarity of the demiurgus. And how the demiurgus is called

in the Timæus effector and father. In which also, it is clearly

shown, where the paternal, where the paternal and at the same

time effective, where the effective and paternal, and where the

effective only are, according to Plato. And in short, in what

effector and father differ.

CHAPTER XVII.

How following Timæus, according to a third method, we may purify

our conceptions concerning the demiurgic monad.

CHAPTER XVIII.

A theological explanation of the speech of the demiurgus in the

Timæus, distinctly evolving our conceptions about the demiurgic

energy.

CHAPTER XIX.

What the second speech of the demiurgus is to divisible souls. In

what it differs from the former. And how in this all the measures

of the life of souls are defined.

CHAPTER XX.

A summary of all that is said about the demiurgus, following the

doctrine of Timæus.

CHAPTER XXI.

Admonitions from what is said in the Cratylus, that Plato

attributes fabrication to Jupiter.

CHAPTER XXII.

Admonitions from what is said in the Cratylus of the fabrication

of Jupiter. In which also the concord is demonstrated of the

theology from names, with the arrangement of the demiurgus in the

Timæus.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Admonitions of the fabrication of Jupiter from what is

demonstrated in the Philebus. In which also it is shown, what the

royal soul, and the royal intellect are.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Demonstrations of the same thing, from what is said in the

Protagoras about the political science.

CHAPTER XXV.

An argument shewing that Jupiter is the demiurgus and father of

the universe[80] according to Plato, from what is said in the

Politicus concerning the twofold circulation [of the universe.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

Admonitions of the same things, from what is said in the Laws

concerning analogy, viz. that it is the judgment of Jupiter.

CHAPTER XXVII.

How Jupiter subsists according to cause in animal itself, and how

animal itself is in Jupiter.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

How Timæus attributes to the demiurgus the unknown and ineffable.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Why Timæus thinks fit to denominate animal itself, and is of

opinion that it may be known, but leaves the demiurgus unknown and

ineffable.

CHAPTER XXX.

Concerning the Crater in the Timæus, a theology teaching what the

genera are that are mingled in it, and how it is the cause of the

essence of souls.

CHAPTER XXXI.

That the Crater in the Timæus is fontal. And admonitions from the

writings of Plato, concerning the principle and fountain of souls.

CHAPTER XXXII.

That the three vivific fountains co-arranged with the demiurgus,

may be assumed from what is said in the Timæus, viz. the fountain

of souls, the fountain of the virtues, and the fountain of natures.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Admonitions concerning the undefiled Gods; that there are such

Gods according to Plato; and what the peculiarity is of their

essence.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

More manifest demonstrations of the hypostasis of the undefiled

Gods, according to Plato.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Admonitions through many arguments how it is proper to denominate

the undefiled Gods according to Plato. In which also, the union of

them, what their separation, and what their peculiarity are, is

delivered.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

How from what is mystically asserted by Plato, auxiliaries may be

obtained, concerning the seventh monad of intellectuals.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

How Plato delivers in the Parmenides the summit of the

intellectual Gods.[81]

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

How Parmenides unfolds the middle order of the intellectual

breadth, and through what signs.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

How Parmenides defines the third order of intellectuals, and

through what peculiarities.

CHAPTER XL.

A common theory of the intellectual hebdomad, from the conclusions

of Parmenides.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VI.

CHAPTER I.

That the ruling order of Gods is in continuity with the

intellectual Gods. And that the division into fountains and

principles may be assumed from the writings of Plato, through the

theory about souls.

CHAPTER II.

How the ruling Gods proceed. And that the supermundane peculiarity

pertains to these Gods alone.

CHAPTER III.

What the peculiarity is of the ruling Gods. That the assimilative

is especially characteristic of them. And how the causes of

assimilation are antecedently assumed in the demiurgus; and how in

the intelligible paradigm.

CHAPTER IV.

What the powers are of the assimilative Gods. What their energies.

And how many goods are imparted by them to the world, and to all

mundane natures.

CHAPTER V.

What the divisions are of the assimilative Gods. And that the

greatest part of the discourse about them is concerning the middle

orders in them.

CHAPTER VI.

Many demonstrations, that both according to Plato and other

theologists, there is one demiurgus prior to the three demiurgi.

CHAPTER VII.

That Jupiter is twofold; one indeed, being prior to the three sons

of Saturn, [but the other being one of them.] And how the three

proceed from Saturn, and the one Jupiter.

CHAPTER VIII.

That according to Plato also, the demiurgic monad subsists prior

to the three sons of Saturn. Demonstrations of this from what is

said in the Politicus, and in the Laws.

CHAPTER IX.

More manifest admonitions of the same things from what is said in

the Gorgias, and in the Cratylus.

CHAPTER X.

Who the three demiurgi are, and what order they have with

reference to each other. Likewise what their progressions are, and

their divisions about the world.

CHAPTER XI.

What the vivific triad is among the ruling Gods. And whence we may

derive auxiliaries from the writings of Plato concerning the union

and division of this triad.

CHAPTER XII.

What the convertive triad of the ruling Gods is; and what the

monad which it contains. In which also, the union of Apollo with

the sun is demonstrated; and it is shewn, how from what is said

about Apollo we may be led to the theory of the solar orders.

CHAPTER XIII.

What the undefiled order is of the ruling Gods. And how from the

writings of Plato conceptions about it may be obtained.

CHAPTER XIV.

How Parmenides forms his conclusions about the ruling Gods, in

continuity with the demiurgic order. And that he characterizes the

whole order of them, through similitude and dissimilitude.

CHAPTER XV.

What the supermundane and at the same time mundane genus of Gods

is. And how through their own medium they preserve the continuity

of the Gods that proceed from the demiurgus.

CHAPTER XVI.

How the liberated Gods are characterized. And how from their

liberated peculiarity they are exempt from the universe, and are

co-arranged with the mundane Gods.

CHAPTER XVII.

What the common powers, and what the common energies are of the

liberated Gods, according with the essence that has been delivered

of them.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Concerning the twelve leaders or rulers mentioned in the Phædrus,

and that they have a liberated order.

CHAPTER XIX.

Many and clearer demonstrations that the great leader Jupiter, and

all the dodecad of leaders, are liberated.

CHAPTER XX.

An explanation from precedaneous causes whence the number of the

dodecad in the liberated Gods is derived.

CHAPTER XXI.

What the division of the liberated leaders is into two monads and

one decad. And what the one division of them is.

CHAPTER XXII.

The theology concerning each of the twelve Gods, unfolding the

peculiarities of them from the subjects of their government.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Concerning the mother of the Fates mentioned in the Republic.

Likewise concerning the triad of the Fates. What orders they have

with reference to each other. What powers of them are delivered

through divine symbols. What their energies are. And how Plato

characterizes the liberated peculiarity.

CHAPTER XXIV.

How Parmenides forms his conclusions concerning the liberated Gods

immediately after the assimilative Gods. And how he characterizes

the order of them by _touching_ and _not touching_.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VII.

CHAPTER I.

On the mundane Gods in general,--the source of their

progression,--their orders, powers, and spheres.