CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST BATTALION.

1900-1902.

SOUTH AFRICA (_continued_).

SLABBERT’S NEK: THE BRANDWATER BASIN: BERGENDAL: MONUMENT HILL:

LYDENBURG: THE MOUNTED INFANTRY OF THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT.

Two days after Bethlehem was taken, General Hunter’s column entered

the town, and Clements fell back towards Senekal to obtain the

supplies of which his men were much in need. After a week’s halt at

Biddulphsberg, the 12th brigade was recalled by General Hunter, now

in command of the whole of the troops in the eastern Free State,

to take part in a great combined movement against the burghers who

had retired into the hilly region drained by the river Brandwater,

and locally known as the Brandwater Basin. It is bounded on the

south by the river Caledon, the frontier of the native state of

Basutoland, whose savage warriors, longing for a pretext to attack

their hereditary enemies the Boers, stood ready to resist any

violation of their territory, and thus forbade the passage of the

stream. To the west, north, and east the basin is enclosed by high,

almost continuous ranges, which, springing from the right bank of

the Caledon, form a huge horse-shoe, whose northern foot-hills sink

into the plain a few miles south of Bethlehem. This mountain wall is

about seventy miles in perimeter, and is crossed at five places by

roads fit for wheeled traffic: the western face (the Wittebergen)

is pierced by Commando Nek, the northern by Slabbert’s and Retief’s

Neks, the eastern (the Roodebergen) by Naauwpoort Nek and the Golden

Gate. Very soon after Hunter arrived at Bethlehem, he decided to

fight his way with part of his force into the Brandwater Basin from

the north and west, and to drive the burghers into the arms of

detachments posted at the mouths of Naauwpoort Nek and Golden Gate:

but before this plan could be carried into effect he had to wait for

supplies of food and ammunition, and it was not until a fortnight

after the occupation of Bethlehem that his troops were ready to

begin work. On July 21st, his army was thus distributed: Rundle with

the 8th and Colonial divisions stretched from Ficksburg to Senekal;

the brigades of Clements and Paget lay at Wit Kop and Witnek, a few

miles north-west of Slabbert’s Nek; the Highland brigade (the 3rd,

under Major-General MacDonald), stood at Bethlehem ready to march

on Retief’s Nek; and Major-General Bruce-Hamilton with the 12th

brigade, to which part of the Royal Irish mounted infantry had been

attached, commanded the exit from Naauwpoort Nek. Next day orders

were issued for a general attack along the whole of the western and

northern line; Rundle was to bombard Commando Nek, while Clements and

MacDonald assaulted Slabbert’s Nek and Retief’s Nek respectively.

Clements advanced on the 22nd to Bester’s Kop, the enemy’s outposts

retiring before him towards Slabbert’s Nek. He had only two of his

four battalions at that moment with him, for the Worcestershire had

been temporarily detached, and the Bedfordshire had not rejoined from

Lindley.

During the night, the draft of ninety-eight non-commissioned officers

and men, with whom Major Lysaght had joined the battalion on the

18th, had a rough introduction to the joys of campaigning in South

Africa: there was a great storm; rain fell in torrents; many of

the horses broke loose and stampeded in every direction, and when

the Royal Irish fell in after a hurried meal of sodden biscuit and

bully beef, they were wet to the skin, and longed for the excitement

of a fight to get their blood once more in circulation. But the

General’s plans had been kept secret, and the Royal Irish, who were

in advance-guard, had no idea that an action was imminent, and

trudged wearily over the rough surface of the rolling down, scarcely

glancing at the curious line of isolated kopjes which, at intervals

of a mile or more, rose like watch towers across their path. Suddenly

distant firing was heard; at the sound of the guns the XVIIIth

stepped out vigorously, and soon discovered that Brabant’s Horse, the

cavalry screen to the column, were being shelled by the defenders of

Slabbert’s Nek. As Clements reconnoitred this formidable position,

he found that its difficulties had not been exaggerated by his

guides--loyal Britons settled in the Free State, who at the outbreak

of the war had placed their local knowledge at the disposal of the

Intelligence department. The Nek, or pass, ran through a defile

about half a mile in width, overhung by steep, almost precipitous

mountains, and its entrance was partially barred by a low rounded

knoll, with smooth glacis-like sides, seamed with trenches which

swept the ground to the front and flanks. To the left of the defile,

as he looked at it, was a long square-topped kopje, with cliff-like

walls that only a goat could climb: to the right stretched another

kopje, higher, longer, and more irregular in shape, with five great

spurs projecting from its rugged flank. Above these spurs rose

a series of ledges, like the steps of a gigantic staircase; the

hillside was strewn with boulders and honeycombed with caves, and

the topmost peak raised its snowy crest nearly two thousand feet

above the plain. The greater part of this kopje was held by the left

wing of the enemy, and Clements realised that until he had taken it

he could not hope to force the pass; therefore, as soon as his flanks

were covered by mounted troops, and his artillery had begun to shell

the trenches on the Nek, he directed Lieutenant-Colonel Grenfell,

with part of his corps (the 1st Brabant’s Horse) and a few Imperial

Yeomanry, to seize one of the projecting spurs. This mission the

irregulars fulfilled, but when they began to scale the ledges they

were brought to a standstill by a furious burst of musketry; the

General at once ordered two companies of the Wiltshire to occupy a

spur on the right of that ascended by Brabant’s Horse, and directed

the Colonel of the Royal Irish, who were then about five thousand

yards from Grenfell’s spur, to send two companies to reinforce

the dismounted troopers. The choice fell on G (Captain Gloster)

and H (Captain Daniell), the former being in command of the whole

detachment.

After a stiff climb, H company joined Grenfell on one of the ledges

or steps in the kopje, where they found Brabant’s Horse hotly engaged

with the burghers, who held two tiers of rocks, the lower four or

five hundred yards up the hillside, the higher about two hundred

yards farther off; another body of the enemy enfiladed the ledge

from a donga. In an hour or two Gloster joined Daniell, prolonging

the line to the left, where, to quote from a letter of Lieutenant

Kelly, a subaltern in G company, “we fired wildly at where we thought

the enemy were, for we could not see a man, but had a good idea, as

they were shooting uncommonly straight. Brabant’s were on the same

ledge with us, and a real cheery lot they were--quite delighted

with everything and full of jokes.” Just after the Royal Irish had

snatched a mouthful of food, a message arrived from the General, “as

soon as you have occupied the spur, send two companies to the top of

the hill.” Gloster and Daniell reconnoitred the ground, and decided

to “rush” the next belt of rocks, Gloster working up to them from

the right, while Daniell made a dash across the open. After sending

for ammunition and filling the men’s pouches, Gloster moved forward

with half his company, leaving Kelly with the remainder of G company

to support his advance with musketry. Following the plan made by the

two captains, Daniell gave Gloster about ten minutes’ start, and

then pushed on from both flanks, but though Kelly kept up a vigorous

fusilade upon the ridge of rocks, the immediate object of the

combined attack, the enemy was unshaken, and the bullets fell like

hail among the men of H company as they ran up the slope. Suddenly

Gloster’s half company began to appear on the right, moving in such

a way as to come under the musketry of Kelly’s party, who from their

position could not see Gloster’s men; the danger was so imminent that

Daniell himself ran back across the fire-swept zone and ordered

Kelly to follow him to the ridge, now held by the leading troops.

When they reached the front line they found that Gloster, mortally

wounded, was sinking rapidly. Again to quote his subaltern: “he had

reached the top quite under cover, and in his usual dashing manner

was pushing forward in front. He climbed up and looked over a rock;

and seeing some Dutchmen quite close, raised his rifle, and as he did

so was shot, as was another man in exactly the same way. The bullet

passed through the right fore-arm and chest. He was a really gallant

fellow, and died nobly.” When Daniell thus succeeded to the command

of the detachment, the situation was very unpleasant. The ledge upon

which the men crouched was so commanded by the enemy’s fire that

every time a soldier peered over it he drew a storm of bullets: and

on the left front the burghers seemed to be in force within twenty

or thirty yards of our position. The men were anxious to avenge

Gloster’s death with the bayonet, but a charge was impossible, for

it could only have been delivered on a very narrow front and under

converging fire. There was nothing for it but to lie under the crest

of the ridge, to keep the men on the alert by shooting at the rocks

behind which the Boers were ensconced, and to report by signal

that any farther advance would be attended by very serious risk.

Fortunately, cartridges never ran short, as the ammunition carriers

were able to reach the firing line under cover from the left rear,

where Lieutenant Panter-Downes with a few men showed so determined

a front that he kept the burghers at a respectful distance, and

prevented them from enfilading Daniell’s party.

While Gloster’s detachment was struggling for foothold on the hill

the battalion marched towards the foot of Grenfell’s spur; on the

way two companies (D under Captain Milner and F under Captain

White) were diverted to the left front to watch the burghers in the

trenches on the pass. The plain that these companies had to cross

looked perfectly level from a distance, but in reality was a series

of undulations over which without a landmark it was difficult to

move in the right direction. Such a landmark was found in a cluster

of Kaffir huts, but the Boers had taken the range accurately, and

when D company passed between the kraals it was greeted by a storm

of bullets, by one of which Captain Milner was dangerously wounded.

Neither company halted until it was about nine hundred yards from the

works on Slabbert’s Nek, with whose defenders for the rest of the

day they exchanged a slow but steady fire; and from the right of D’s

line the Boers who were facing Gloster’s party could be plainly seen;

“but,” writes an eye-witness, “we did not dare to shoot much at them,

as they were too much mixed up with our men.”

As two companies were acting as escort to the guns, the main body of

the XVIIIth was now reduced to two companies of regular soldiers and

one of volunteers. This skeleton battalion was finally halted about

eighteen hundred yards to the left rear of Grenfell’s spur, and in

widely extended lines, lay for many hours exposed to the shots of

marksmen, who were so well concealed that they offered a very poor

target in return. The headquarter companies of the Royal Irish had

nothing to do except to fire an occasional round in the direction

from which the enemy’s bullets came; to listen to the bursts of

musketry from the hill, and to wonder how long the shells of a

pom-pom playing on them from the Nek would continue to fall among the

regiment without doing any harm. Happily only one of these horrible

little projectiles found a billet: it shattered the big drum, greatly

to the amusement of every one, except the drummer, who was fast

asleep beside it. The damage to the drum was soon avenged by a 5-in.

shell, which smashed the pom-pom and blew several Boer gunners to

pieces.

When darkness put an end to the combat, the result of the day’s

operations seemed meagre in the extreme. Brabant’s Horse and

Gloster’s detachment of the Royal Irish had doubtless made a

lodgment on the hill to the right of the pass; but they could do no

more than hold their ground, and could expect no help from the two

companies of the Wiltshire, who had failed to establish themselves

on the spur which they had been ordered to seize. The works on the

Nek had been vigorously bombarded, but their defenders appeared

to be unshaken by the shells of the artillery and the threatening

presence of Paget’s brigade on the left of the guns. But the General

was in no way dispirited, for excellent news had reached him in the

afternoon. An officer of Brabant’s Horse, who with a small party of

mounted men was watching the outer flank of the big kopje, heard that

Grenfell and Gloster were “held-up” on the ledges, and determined to

ascertain if there was no other way to the top of the hill. By “a

most daring and successful reconnaissance” on foot, he discovered a

track leading to the summit, running well to the right of the ledges,

through ground apparently unoccupied by the enemy. When Clements

received this report he saw that once he had gained possession of

the top, he could outflank the burghers facing Brabant’s Horse and

the Royal Irish, drive them before him into the Nek, and then rake

its defences with rifle-fire. As it was then too late to attempt any

important movement, he ordered a squadron of Brabant’s (dismounted)

to be at the summit by daybreak next morning, promising them the

support of four companies of the Royal Irish and two of the Wiltshire

regiment, who were not to follow the path discovered by the officer

of Brabant’s, but to ascend by a ridge still farther to the right.

While most of the infantry bivouacked on the ground they stood on,

four companies of the Royal Irish were assembled, and moved to the

farmhouse fixed as the rendezvous of the little column. At 4 A.M.

on the 24th Lieutenant-Colonel Guinness, who commanded the combined

force, began to ascend the kopje, described by General Clements

as “an almost unclimbable hill”; four hours’ desperate scrambling

brought the Royal Irish, breathless and exhausted, to its highest

crest, where they found the dismounted troopers of Brabant’s Horse,

who moving by a shorter and easier route had gained the summit some

little time before their comrades of the XVIIIth. Hitherto the march

had been unopposed, but now a few shots were fired by burghers who

appeared more anxious to retire than to fight. Part of the infantry

then joined hands with G and H companies whose adventures during the

night will be told later; the remainder drove the enemy before them,

turned the works upon the Nek, and swept them with musketry from the

left rear. A great burst of cheering greeted the appearance of the

Royal Irish on the top of the hill; a general advance was ordered;

the Boer resistance suddenly collapsed, and by 11 A.M. Clements was

master of Slabbert’s Nek.

An officer has supplied the author with a very spirited account

of the proceedings of the headquarter companies, from which the

following extracts have been taken:--

“We arrived at the farm about 7 or 8 P.M. on the 23rd, without

transport, and consequently without blankets or food, on the

coldest night I remember having spent during the war. After

seeing the men settled and giving them leave to break open their

emergency rations, we went into the farm building. Here the

Wiltshire officers who had arrived before us, had already made

themselves comfortable before a fire in the kitchen, and had

a chicken roasting for their breakfast. There were six of us,

and we had had nothing inside us since dawn--hence lowering of

the moral sense and theft! We had only two emergency rations

among us: we ate them: they were excellent, but not enough,

and we eyed that bird hungrily until the Wilts nodded: then

some one suggested the eating of that chicken. We needed very

little persuasion to tear it limb from limb, and we devoured it

hastily, like house-breakers at supper in a burgled house! The

anger of the Wilts was great when a couple of hours later they

awoke; they did not suspect us at the time, thinking we had been

all asleep, and their wrath was directed against the men. So

warped had our sense of right and wrong become that it was not

until we had dined them next day in camp that we gave ourselves

away.... After a few hours’ sleep we--_i.e._, A, D, F, and the

volunteers, and two companies of the Wiltshire, started on our

night march, led by Colonel Guinness and a guide, and a more

miserable time we never had. It was bitterly cold, with a Scotch

mist blowing sharply down from the hill above us. The necessity

for secrecy forbade our smoking, and the effort to keep from

coughing, kicking down stones, and otherwise making a noise was

very trying. The track lay up a ‘razor-edge’ sort of ridge, very

slippery and strewn with boulders. The higher we climbed the

more difficult it became, until finally we were ‘clawing up’ on

hands and knees, and the last bit, just as there was a glimmer of

light, was the worst of all: we had to pull each other up by our

rifles, yet, with precipitous ground all around us, we lost not

a man.”

The column had now reached the shoulder of the kopje, and rested on

the snow-covered ground for a short time while Colonel Guinness and

the guide looked for a path towards the top. The path, when found,

proved to be a mere goat-track, on a narrow ledge with a wall of rock

on the right hand and a precipice on the left. On this track there

was only room to walk in Indian file, and

“we were about half-way across this bit when the fog lifted a

little and showed us what a giddy path we were following. It also

showed us a few slouch-hatted figures on a spur below us. I can

tell you we company officers were fairly alarmed, caught as we

were in a place where movement of any sort, except fore or aft,

was impossible, so it was to our great relief that we discovered

these men to be a handful of Brabant’s scouts. A few shots were

fired at us at about 8 A.M. when we got to the real top of the

hill, by a few Boers, some on a knoll below us and others to our

front, but these men soon cleared out. The fog was now lifting

rapidly and the sun came out as we advanced down into position

on the knoll overlooking the Nek itself and the Boer line of

retreat. Heavy firing had been going on since dawn, down where

the rest of the brigade was, and across the valley where Paget’s

brigade was also trying to force the pass. For some time we saw

nothing, then a few small mounted parties of Boers were seen

riding off towards Fouriesberg. We opened fire, the range I think

being about a thousand yards. This was the signal for a regular

bolt of the whole Boer force. We fired rapidly on them, but I

don’t know if we did much execution firing at such a steep angle

downwards. Our right was hurried forward down the hill, but the

steepness and difficulty of the ground prevented our getting much

closer. By the time we had got well down, practically all the

Boers had cleared out. It was wonderful to see how the men bucked

up. Before the firing began they were moving about like a lot

of cripples, ‘dead to the world,’ and anxious only to get a few

minutes to sit down and sleep in. The moment they realised what

was going on, all this was thrown off and they were as happy and

as energetic as a parcel of schoolboys.”

While the headquarter companies of the battalion were doing this

fine piece of rock climbing, G and H were clinging to their ground

with the utmost determination. As soon as it became dark Daniell

had posted the men with him, about a hundred of all ranks, along

the ridge in little detachments of three or four; in front of each

post lay a sentry, flat on his stomach, peering over the rocks to

watch the movements of the enemy. Up to midnight the Boers “sniped”

assiduously; then the fire died away, and Daniell and Kelly moved

constantly up and down the line to make sure that the soldiers,

lulled by the sudden silence and exhausted by hunger and fatigue, had

not fallen asleep. About 4 A.M. on the 24th, Panter-Downes brought

up the remainder of H company: while this welcome reinforcement was

being posted there was an alarm, caused by the approach of a number

of Kaffirs whom the Boers had sent to reconnoitre the position:

the men promptly lined the top of the ridge, and speedily gave

the burghers to understand that the Royal Irish were quite ready

to receive them! When day broke, says one of the officers who was

present--

“we quickly found out that the enemy were still there, but

they had left the rocks on our left, so we occupied them. They

‘hotted’ us for a bit, but as soon as the companies appeared

on the top of the mountain they began to disperse. The guns

kept up a hot bombardment, and very soon we could see the enemy

beating a retreat all round. We sent down for water and food,

made ourselves comfortable, and watched the enemy retire.

Brabant’s brought up our gun and the Hotchkiss, and made some

splendid practice among the Boers as they left a hill, and we

saw a good many of them knocked over.... We received tremendous

congratulations for our part in the battle, especially the charge

up the hill.... We buried poor Gloster and five men by a tree at

the foot of the hill.”[302]

The capture of Slabbert’s Nek cost only forty-four casualties, of

which many occurred among the Royal Irish. Captain W. Gloster was

killed; Captain E. F. Milner was dangerously wounded; six of the

other ranks were killed, and ten wounded, three of whom died of their

injuries.[303]

In General Clements’ report of July 26, he gave high praise to the

1st battalion, Royal Irish regiment, in these terms--

“Lieutenant-Colonel H. W. N. Guinness has again proved himself

a commanding officer of the first class. His battalion has

throughout proved itself to be all that could be desired on

service. His leading of a force on the 24th of July over an

almost unclimbable hill, and by this means turning the enemy’s

position at Slabbert’s Nek, is deserving of special mention.

“Captain W. Gloster, who I regret to say was killed while leading

his company at Slabbert’s Nek on the 23rd of July, was an officer

of great promise. By his death the Service loses a most valuable

company leader.

“Captain E. H. Daniell has proved himself a first-rate company

leader in difficult circumstances by the handling of his men on

the 23rd and 24th of July, on both of which dates he showed great

gallantry.

“Lieutenant J. A. M. J. P. Kelly did particularly good service

on the night of the 23rd of July, in leading his men over an

open space, 300 yards wide, swept by a heavy cross-fire, and

maintaining his position all night at close quarters (20 yards)

from the enemy who were holding the rocks and caves in his front.”

In the same report General Clements stated that Major K. P. Apthorp,

who was temporarily employed as an intelligence officer on his staff,

had afforded him “very great help until taken prisoner on June 6.”

The following non-commissioned officers and private soldiers were

also mentioned:--

No. 4512, Lance-Corporal P. Doyle;[304] No. 4248, Lance-Corporal M.

Tytherleigh; No. 4868, Lance-Corporal J. Rathbone; No. 1408, Private

---- Baker; No. 4129, Private ---- Ryan; and No. 5024, Private P.

Dumphy, particularly distinguished themselves on the night of July

23. No. 4506, Private J. Kavanagh, who showed remarkable courage and

coolness on the same occasion, was wounded while carrying a message

across ground heavily swept by fire.

As soon as General Clements learned that the Highland brigade had

driven the Boers from Retief’s Nek, he marched two or three miles

along the road to Fouriesburg, the chief town in the Brandwater

Basin, and then encamped. The halt was very welcome; an officer

writes, “we were all very much done up, especially those who had been

in Colonel Guinness’s night march, and after a good ‘square’ meal and

a double issue of rum (Reger, our Quartermaster, surpassed himself

on this occasion) there were few of us awake that afternoon.” Next

day the whole of Hunter’s army was in motion. MacDonald was sent to

help Bruce Hamilton in the task of sealing the mouths of Naauwpoort

Nek and the Golden Gate, the passes by which the Boers might dash

eastward into the open country round Harrismith, the principal town

in that part of the Free State. Clements and Paget marched through a

fertile country, well watered and full of prosperous farms, towards

Fouriesburg, whither Rundle, who had dislodged the burghers from

Commando Nek, was also hastening. As the advance-guard of the 8th

division was the first to reach the goal, Clements’ and Paget’s

brigades were halted a few miles from Fouriesburg, and did not move

again until the 27th, when they entered the place after a feeble

opposition from a few snipers dropped by the main body of the enemy

who, still ignorant that British troops awaited them at the eastern

passes, were retreating at speed towards Naauwpoort Nek and the

Golden Gate. But though most of the burghers were hurrying eastward,

it was necessary to ensure that no detachments should break out

through Slabbert’s, Retief’s, or Commando Neks, and so heavy was the

call upon the infantry to garrison these defiles that Hunter could

only muster five battalions to drive the Boers into the net spread

by MacDonald and Bruce Hamilton. One of these was the 1st battalion,

Royal Irish regiment, which with part of the Wiltshire formed the

advance-guard under Clements on the 28th, when the burghers fought

a rear-guard action near Slaap Kranz ridge with great tenacity and

cunning. The position proved to be a very strong one, and Clements

was unable to oust the enemy from it, though his artillery and

infantry were engaged throughout the day. Colonel Guinness was

anxious to be allowed to seize a commanding knoll in front of the

left of the Boer line, which seemed to offer a good base for an

assault upon the pass itself, but General Clements considered that

the Royal Irish had done enough for the day, and ordered a battalion

of the Scots Guards, recently arrived on the field, to occupy it. At

midnight they advanced on the main position and found it undefended,

for the Boers, after checking the whole column for many hours, had

silently disappeared when they saw that the odds had become too heavy

for them to face. The casualties of the day amounted to thirty-four

killed and wounded, the Royal Irish losing one man killed and five

wounded.[305]

With the encounter at Slaap Kranz the campaign in the Brandwater

Basin came to an end. De Wet had always opposed the policy of

retreating into the mountains of Fouriesburg, but his views had

been over-ridden, and, as mentioned on page 330, he had fought

Clements at Bethlehem to gain time for the main body to complete

its concentration in the valley of the Brandwater. When he arrived

there with his rear-guard, he set himself to convince the members of

his very unruly army that the fastnesses to which they had betaken

themselves would prove not a sanctuary but a trap, and urged them to

follow him in a bold dash into the open veld. His rough eloquence

appeared to convince the majority; his scheme for breaking out of

the mountains was accepted, and on the night of July 15, he made

his way with two thousand six hundred men across Slabbert’s Nek,

and headed northwards, in the full belief that within twenty-four

hours the remainder of the burghers would follow him. But as soon as

De Wet’s commanding personality was removed the Free Staters fell

into confusion; instead of carrying out the plan to which they had

agreed they began to quarrel among themselves; they lost precious

days in wrangling over the choice of another leader, and by the time

that Hunter’s columns were advancing upon the passes they had become

demoralised, suspicious of their chiefs and of each other. Dry rot

spread so rapidly among them that on the 30th, Prinsloo, who claimed

to have been elected General-in-Chief, surrendered with 4140 men,

three guns (two of which had been lost by the Royal Horse artillery

at Sannah’s Post), 4000 horses and ponies, many waggons, a large

number of rifles, and a million rounds of small-arm ammunition.

The Royal Irish saw enough of the prisoners to form an idea of the

manner of men with whom they had been fighting since the beginning

of the year. The first impression was one of utter astonishment.

Was it possible that this motley crowd of civilians formed part of

the burgher levies which for many months had constantly opposed and

frequently defeated the British army? Some were old men with long

white beards; others were in the prime of life; others, again,

were lads not half-way through their teens; none wore a vestige

of uniform, and the majority were dressed in clothes so badly cut

that no self-respecting peasant in Europe would have condescended

to wear them. Yet among the captives every grade of society in the

Free State republic was represented: there were land-owners, who

possessed tens of thousands of acres and great wealth of flocks and

herds; members of Parliament; civil servants; merchants; lawyers;

doctors; and last, but by no means least in numbers, “bywohners,”

or poor Boers, who, as they had no land of their own, were allowed

to squat on the estates of their richer neighbours. The land-owning

class, as a rule, were magnificent men, well-grown, sturdy, and

inured to hardships; constant hunting on their farms had made them

good rifle shots and excellent judges of distance,[306] and, as has

already been mentioned, many of them had served in campaigns against

the Kaffirs. In character they much resembled the British yeomen of

two hundred years ago, for although brave, patriotic, and hospitable,

they were ignorant, obstinate, and deeply distrustful of new men and

new ideas. A certain number of the professional classes had been

sent in their youth to Europe to complete their education; their

travels had greatly widened their intellectual horizon, and as they

did not stay away long enough to lose their sporting tastes or their

hereditary instinct for irregular warfare, they proved a valuable

asset in the Boer army. In dress as well as education these younger

men presented a curious contrast to their fellow-citizens, who were

still as uncouth in speech and manners as the original pioneers of

the Free State, while the Europeanised burghers were dressed in

well-cut Norfolk jackets, boots, and breeches, and spoke English

admirably with accents acquired at the Universities of Oxford,

Edinburgh, or Glasgow. The very baggage owned by the prisoners when

they surrendered showed how wide a difference there was between the

old school and the new. The old-fashioned burghers, however rich they

were, had gone on active service with their few belongings packed in

old and shapeless carpet-bags; the youngsters took the field with

kit-bags or suit-cases imported from England.

General Hunter’s success in the Brandwater Basin, to which the Royal

Irish contributed not a little, was far-reaching in its results;

in the words of the official historian “it removed in a moment the

possibility of attack in force from the west, which had kept Sir

Redvers Buller’s army chained fast to the railway from Heidelberg

down to Ladysmith. True, De Wet, Olivier, and other guerillas were

still at large, but, vagrant and weakened, they were unlikely

seriously to raid Natal across the Drakensberg, an eventuality which

had never been absent, and with reason, from Sir R. Buller’s mind.

None had known better than he how vulnerable still that many-gated

colony was to incursions which would have undone in a few hours the

heavy work of months.”[307] Now General Buller was able to organise

a mobile force to march northwards against the Pretoria-Komati Poort

railway in order to co-operate with Lord Roberts in the invasion of

the Eastern Transvaal, where the remnants of the Boer army still

kept the field. In this great movement the Royal Irish were destined

to play their part, for on the 1st of August Clements’ brigade left

Hunter’s army; on the 9th it marched into Kroonstad, and after

many halts and delays on the railway reached Pretoria on the 18th.

It was one of the peculiarities of the war in South Africa that

no General could hope to keep his brigade intact for any length

of time; so far Clements had been fortunate, but now his turn for

dismemberment arrived, and after bidding farewell to the commander

whom they admired and respected deeply, the Royal Irish were sent

off to Belfast, a station on the Komati Poort line, where they

joined Major-General Smith-Dorrien’s brigade (the 19th) in a column

commanded by Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton.[308]

The battalion was not actively engaged on the 27th of August in

the battle of Bergendal, though some of the companies on outpost

came under long-range artillery fire from the formidable position

astride of the railway, which Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller

attacked respectively in front and flank. When the Boers fell back

from their carefully prepared entrenchments they retired at first

along the railway; but under the dispiriting influences of this,

its latest defeat, the burgher army soon began to fall to pieces.

One column struck southward; a second hurried eastward towards the

Portuguese frontier; while a third, commanded by General L. Botha,

turned northwards and headed for the maze of hills by which the town

of Lydenburg is surrounded. This detachment made so firm a stand

at Badfontein that Sir Redvers Buller, who had been entrusted with

its pursuit, asked for reinforcements, and General Ian Hamilton was

sent to his help with the greater part of his column. Starting from

Belfast on September 3, Hamilton, after two days’ hard marching and

continuous skirmishing, succeeded in placing himself on the right

rear of Botha’s entrenched line at Badfontein; the Boers thereupon

drew off eastward to Paardeplaatz, a huge mountain within distant

cannon-shot of Lydenburg. As a preliminary to dislodging the burghers

from this new position, the British troops occupied Lydenburg during

the morning of the 7th; in the afternoon, after the bivouacs had

been formed, the soldiers were allowed to bathe in the creeks; they

were splashing about in the water, when suddenly two 6-in. guns

began to fire from Paardeplaatz, ten or eleven thousand yards off,

and an unlucky shell killed two men of the battalion and dangerously

wounded another.[309] The Royal Irish were at once moved to a place

of safety, and for the rest of the day had the satisfaction of

watching the Boer gunners waste invaluable ammunition upon the empty

shelters of the bivouac. Next day (the 8th) Paardeplaatz was carried

by the British troops. The Boers held a precipitous hill, 1500 feet

in height, and shaped exactly like a horse-shoe: the only track ran

to the farthest point of the shoe up an ever-narrowing ridge, cleft

asunder in various places by deep dongas, almost impassable even by

infantry. Two 6-in. guns commanded the path, and lighter guns and

pom-poms were posted on various points along the crest. Hamilton

was ordered to attack in front and to turn the left flank, while

Buller worked round the right of Botha’s line. Although the turning

movements involved several hours of hard marching and scrambling,

the frontal and flank attacks were delivered simultaneously, and

carried the position with a rush. A wing of the Royal Irish (F, G, H

companies, and the volunteers) under Major Hatchell were the first

troops to reach the topmost ridge, which commanded the enemy’s only

line of retreat, a natural causeway a few yards wide, with deep

precipices on either side of it. This road was crowded with Boers,

who, after saving their guns, were now in full retreat; the mass

presented a splendid target for musketry, but just as the men were

bringing their rifles into play down fell a mountain mist, completely

veiling the burghers from their view. To pursue amidst the precipices

in such a fog was impossible; the only thing left to do was to fire

volleys in the direction taken by the enemy, who is said to have

suffered some loss from these unaimed bullets. The British casualties

were small; and in the Royal Irish only one man was wounded.[310]

Hamilton now returned to the railway, and then moved eastwards

towards Komati Poort, over country in places so difficult as to be

almost impassable. For instance, part of his route lay over hills

so steep that in the ten miles between Godwaan station and Kaapsche

Hoop the track rose 2200 feet. To lighten the loads, the wooden cases

enclosing the biscuit tins were removed, and the soldiers were made

to carry their second blankets, usually transported in the waggons.

As the column toiled up the steep inclines, the troops hauled the

vehicles after them by main force, and when the descent began, each

waggon was held back by ten men, who steadied it with drag-ropes down

the worst places on the road. Though Hamilton encountered none of the

enemy, the march was in many ways an exciting one. A company of the

battalion was crossing a railway bridge only wide enough to carry a

train, when the sound of an engine was heard in a cutting hard by,

and an officer who was present wrote--

“I know my hair stood on end. A scramble ensued, which is rather

amusing to _look back upon_. Some of us just slipped over the

edge and hung on by the sleepers, with the torrent, thirty or

forty feet below, to fall into, and rocks to land on if you

missed the water. The train was, however, pulled up before

getting on to the bridge, and all got safely over. I believe the

rear-guard saw a lion on the last march down the Kaap valley into

Kaapmuiden. One of the men in my company woke up one fine morning

to find a snake asleep beside him. It was with some difficulty he

was able to persuade his fellows he was not a de Rougemont, and

when at last they carefully pulled off the blankets--the wretched

fellow was sweating at every pore with fright--they discovered a

particularly venomous-looking puff adder coiled up between his

legs! The snake was duly killed, but I imagine that man will

never forget the horrible five minutes he must have spent before

persuading those around he was not blarneying them.”

On September 25, Hamilton caught up the advance-guard of the army at

Komati Poort, where an amazing amount of stores and railway plant had

been found, but no enemy. On the approach of the British the burghers

had broken into small bands and disappeared along the Portuguese

frontier; some returned to their homes and either took no further

part in the war or joined our side; others, to whom all honour as

brave and determined enemies is due, reassembled to form the guerilla

bands which kept the war alive for twenty-one weary months after the

Boer army had ceased to exist as a formed and organised body of men.

The troops composing Hamilton’s column received his thanks for their

exertions in a general order, dated October 1, 1900--

“General Ian Hamilton wishes to congratulate his force on the

fine work which has been performed by them since they marched

out of Belfast on September 3rd, 1900. During this period they

have driven the enemy out of his most formidable selected

positions--first on the main Lydenburg road, where they barred

the progress of the Natal arms; and secondly, on the height

overlooking Lydenburg itself. They have also encountered and

overcome every sort of natural obstacle, and have carried the

British flag through tracts of waterless bush, and over ranges

of lofty mountains to the most remote frontier of the enemy. All

this has been done with so much spirit, and so cheerfully, as to

excite the G.O.C.’s greatest admiration, who will take the first

opportunity of informing Lord Roberts of the splendid work done

by all ranks under his command.”

In an unofficial letter, written after the war was over, General

Smith-Dorrien stated that of all the troops which came under his

orders in South Africa, “none served me more loyally or gave me

less trouble than the Royal Irish; I have nothing but pleasant

associations to remember with regard to the time I had the honour of

having the battalion under my command.”

The Royal Irish spent a few days in clearing the railway and in

attending a review of the British troops, held in honour of the

birthday of the King of Portugal, and then were ordered to entrain

for Belfast; the journey, by no means an uneventful one, is vividly

described by Captain Dease.

“The regiment returned from Komati Poort in several trains, as

there was an excess of rolling stock on the line which wanted

moving up towards Pretoria. The Boers had made quite a mess of

things on the railway. They had fired great numbers of trucks

and disabled a good many engines. The big bridge across the Kaap

at Kaapmuiden had also been destroyed, and rather cleverly too.

They had blown down the upper part of one of the piers, got

steam up in one of the heavier ‘Free State Railway’ engines, set

it going from Kaapmuiden station, and succeeded in absolutely

smashing up the damaged pier, as well as the spans on either

side. The volunteers and C company did most of the work on the

building of a deviation and temporary bridge, which was taken in

hand immediately. We left Kaapmuiden at about 5 P.M. on the 30th

September. As I had had some mechanical training as a boy, I took

on the driving of the second train, in which were most of our

officers. The first train was given five minutes’ grace before I

was told to start. My fireman was a corporal in the Royal Scots,

I think, who had ‘been on’ a traction engine at home, while the

second man was also a soldier from some other regiment, with an

equal recommendation for his present job! I myself had a fair

knowledge of locomotive work, but (at that time) little of the

vacuum brake: anyway, I certainly had not sufficient knowledge

of the work for the job in hand. All went well till we got to

the deviation and bridge we had made over the Kaap. Here the fun

began. The road up the other side was at so steep a gradient

that I couldn’t get my train up it. We stopped and rolled back

over the bridge. A second try met with as little success. It

then occurred to my fireman and myself that if we ‘backed’ up

the grade behind the bridge, and then rushed forward down on to

the bridge the momentum would carry us over. This it did, but

the train must have had a narrow escape of wrecking that frail,

temporary structure. After this we proceeded ‘with caution,’

going not more than about 10 miles an hour. Darkness fell about

three or four miles beyond the Kaap bridge. The ‘road’ here runs

along the sides of hills, with a steep slope to the Krokodil

Valley, a couple of hundred feet below. Naturally the curves are

very sharp, and cuttings numerous. I was very ‘jumpy’ at the

time, not knowing the road and uncertain of myself as a driver,

and kept the speed down. It was fortunate I did so, for as we

rounded a corner a group of men on the hillside shouted to me to

‘stop,’ ‘danger,’ &c. I jammed down the air-brake hard and shut

off steam, bringing the train up with a terrific jerk, to find

the buffer of my engine within a few yards of the rear of the

train in front. The sudden pull up had caused quite an upset in

the trucks behind, as the jerk was hard enough to roll everyone

and everything in the trucks over. We found that the driver

of the first train’s engine (also an amateur like myself) had

allowed the water to run too low in his boiler, melting the plug

over his fire-box, and rendering the engine totally useless.

We were still talking about our narrow escape when suddenly

round the curve behind us were seen the front lights of a third

train. We happened to have no ‘tail lights,’ and before warning

could be given our train had been run into with a terrific smash

from behind. For a few minutes the confusion was indescribable.

Then things straightened themselves out. A piquet was sent

some distance down the line to prevent another train colliding

with the third train, and parties went to work extricating the

injured. The extraordinary thing was that although quite a

number of trucks had been ‘piled up’ in our train, nobody was

killed, and only about thirty or forty hurt. One of the latter

was Deane-Morgan: he had been standing on the edge of a culvert

when the crash came, and, without thinking, he involuntarily

took a step backwards, and dropped about thirty feet or so into

the bed of a nullah. He hurt his knee badly, but no bones were

broken--another extraordinary escape.

“We spent that night and part of the next morning clearing away

the wreck, and at last arrived at Krokodil Poort, the next

station, in the afternoon. The journey thence to Waterval Onder

was exciting only to me on the engine, as it was performed

through the night, but peaceful to everyone else.”

After these adventures the Royal Irish reached Belfast on the

4th of October, and at once relieved the troops then holding the

outposts round the town, where the duty was so heavy that when the

Commander-in-Chief ordered the battalion to Pretoria to represent

Ireland at the formal annexation of the Transvaal to the British

Crown, only three companies could be spared to take part in the

ceremony. Along the whole of the Pretoria-Komati Poort railway, as

indeed on all the lines throughout the theatre of war, every station

was held as a fortress; every train was guarded by soldiers;[311]

every bridge and almost every culvert absorbed a detachment, great or

small, for its defence; while flying columns were often required to

disperse the guerilla bands which threatened weak points on the line

of communication. Until December, the Boers in the eastern Transvaal

occupied themselves chiefly in train-wrecking; but on the 28th of

that month they stormed a strongly entrenched post at Helvetia,

captured a large number of men, and carried away in triumph a 4.7-in.

gun. Encouraged by this success, they determined to attack the posts

along eighty miles of railway; the stations at Pan, Wildfontein,

Wonderfontein, Belfast, Dalmanutha, Machadodorp, and Nooitgedacht

were to be assailed simultaneously, though the main effort was to be

against Belfast, where a great depôt of stores and much ammunition

formed a prize worth striving for. Though the headquarters of three

battalions were stationed at Belfast, the Colonels of the Royal

Irish, the Shropshire Light Infantry, and the Gordon Highlanders

could muster between them no more than 1300 men--a small number of

foot soldiers with which to furnish outposts, guard the town and

guns, and reinforce threatened points on the enormous perimeter of

fifteen miles rendered necessary by the formation of the ground

around the place. The remainder of the garrison consisted of two

hundred and eighty of the 5th Lancers, a hundred and eighty mounted

infantry, a battery of field artillery, and two 4.7-in. guns.

Belfast was defended by three main groups of works, more of the

nature of detached posts than of outposts in the ordinary acceptation

of the term. South of the railway the Gordon Highlanders were in

charge of a long stretch of rising ground; on the other side of

the line the Shropshire Light Infantry held Colliery Hill, to the

north-west of the town; while the Royal Irish were responsible for

Monument Hill, a kopje two miles north-east of the centre of Belfast,

and for one of the 4.7-in. guns, which was posted upon it. These

hills, three miles apart, were linked by a party of mounted infantry

at a drift half-way between them. Early on the 7th of January, 1901,

Major Orr’s detachment at Monument Hill was relieved by Captain

Fosbery, who was in command of his own company, A, and of D company

(Captain Milner); Lieutenant Dease was the only subaltern with the

party, which consisted of ninety-three officers, non-commissioned

officers and men. Fosbery at once began to improve and complete the

partially finished defences he had taken over from his predecessor,

but the number of workers at his disposal was not great, for D

company had just returned from an exhausting spell of train-escort

duty, and as he wished to allow Captain Milner’s men time to rest, he

kept them in reserve and gave them little to do. By sundown, however,

much had been accomplished, and when General Smith-Dorrien came to

visit the post he was satisfied with the progress made, though he

disapproved of the loopholes, which he directed should be altered,

but owing to the darkness it became impossible to carry out this

order, and its execution was postponed till the morrow.

The top of the hill is a plateau about eight hundred yards long, and

less than a quarter of a mile in width: at the northern end a rough

stone sangar, four feet high, enclosed the 4.7-in. gun: farther

to the south a semicircular trench partly surrounded the tents

occupied by D company: a short way down the south-western slope of

the hill a blockhouse of stone and sods was virtually completed,

and scattered along the perimeter of the plateau were eight small

trenches, two of which were not yet fit for use. By the scheme of

fortification the whole of the post should have been ringed with

a strong barbed-wire fence, but at nightfall this portion of the

defences was not completely finished. After Fosbery had sent two

sections to a subsidiary post connecting Monument Hill with the left

of the Gordon Highlanders, there remained in hand six sections, which

he thus disposed for the night. Two sections of A company were to man

the perimeter trenches, with a sentry posted a few yards in front

of each; the remaining section of A with the maxim was to act as a

support in the sangar, from which, as will be seen, the 4.7-in. gun

had been withdrawn; the three sections of D company were to sleep in

their tents, but to be ready at a moment’s notice to line the trench

near their little camp. In the course of the evening a mist settled

down upon the country round Belfast, so heavy that in the town itself

the range of vision was limited to twenty yards; on Monument Hill it

was like a London fog, and effectually prevented patrolling to the

north-east, east, and south-east, where the precipitous sides of the

kopje fell into broken ground, difficult even by day to search with

any degree of thoroughness. Thus the safety of the post was entirely

dependent on the vigilance and sharp hearing of the sentries in front

of the trenches.

Nothing occurred to disturb the garrison of Belfast until midnight,

when heavy firing, beginning at Monument Hill, then spreading to

Colliery Hill, and finally raging at the Gordons’ posts, showed that

the burghers had surrounded the town and were assailing it vigorously

on every side. From information obtained by the British officers

captured during the engagement, it is known that General L. Botha,

who had under him about two thousand men, had allotted to the Ermelo

commando the task of driving the Gordon Highlanders from the southern

works: the Middelburg commando was to engage the Shropshire Light

Infantry at the Colliery, but not to press home the attack until

General B. Viljoen, with seven hundred and fifty of the Johannesburg

and Bocksburg commandos, had made himself master of Monument Hill--a

post which was to be carried at all cost, not only on account of its

tactical importance, but also because the burghers were determined

to capture the big gun which they thought was left at night on the

top of the kopje. Fortunately, during the 7th, General Smith-Dorrien

had decided that it should be dragged down the hill and back into the

artillery lines at nightfall; and thus the gun was preserved from the

fate which overtook the defenders of the sangar in which the Boers

expected to find the piece of ordnance they coveted so earnestly.

Owing to the fact that of the three officers on Monument Hill one

was killed and the others wounded and carried away by the enemy,

the official report of the part played by the Royal Irish is

necessarily somewhat meagre. But, thanks to a narrative prepared

by Captain Dease, and to information supplied by others who were

present, it is possible to form some idea of the desperate struggle

for the possession of the hill. The night piquets were posted at

dusk, and the officers of A company divided the duty between them,

Fosbery taking the watch till 2 A.M., when Dease was to relieve him.

Everything was quiet till about a quarter to twelve, when Dease,

who was in a shelter near the tents of the reserve, heard a distant

challenge, followed almost immediately by the report of a rifle.

Nothing happened, and as nervous sentries often fired at imaginary

enemies, no one was disturbed by the single shot, though, as it

turned out, it was fired not by a British soldier but by a burgher,

who when the sentry at the north-east trench challenged, shot him

dead. Dease was trying to go to sleep again, when two more rifles

rang out; he dashed out of his shelter, and with Fosbery, whom he

met in the fog, hurried to the centre of the plateau to ascertain

the cause of the firing. On the way they came under a sudden

fusilade from a party of Boers who, after scaling the northern and

north-eastern slopes of the kopje, had surprised and carried a couple

of the trenches, thus establishing themselves inside our line of

works. The two officers rushed forward and reached the gun sangar

just as the burghers were advancing upon it.

“The fog,” writes Captain Dease, “at this time was extremely

dense, and the position of the enemy could only be distinguished

by the flashes of the rifles. The Boers at first concentrated on

the maxim gun, and a tremendous hand-to-hand combat took place.

Our men used their bayonets with effect, and some of the machine

gunners (who had slung their rifles in an abortive effort to

get the gun to work) set-to with picks, axes, and anything they

could lay hands on. In short, as the men said, ‘it was the father

and the mother av a fight!’ The enemy suffered so severely that

they ceased trying to get over the sangar wall, but remained a

yard or two on the far side, pouring in a terrific rapid fire at

the crest line of the sangar. It is difficult to be clear about

the sequence of events, but I think that among the eighteen men

originally in the sangar there were only one or two casualties

during the hand-to-hand part of the fight; but during the next

phase, when the Boers contented themselves with sweeping the

crest, we lost very heavily, for our fellows, the lust of battle

on them after the hand-to-hand fight near the machine gun,

exposed themselves in a most reckless manner, and were with

difficulty prevented from getting out of the sangar and charging

into the enemy. The action had continued for about half an hour,

when the Boers made a second rush on the gun, and being met at

that point by a mere remnant, forced us back. At this moment,

as we were gradually drawing back towards the entrance to the

sangar, 3733 Private J. Barry,[312] who was nearest the maxim,

picked up a pickaxe lying near it. As he forced his way to the

gun through the Boers, efforts were made to stop him, and he had

just time to drive in the point of the pick into the junction of

the barrel and breech-casing before he was literally swept down

by a hail of bullets from the enemy round him.[313] As he was

shot at by about a dozen burghers within five yards’ distance

and from all sides, I fancy they must have played havoc in their

own ranks! Fosbery now realised that the position in the sangar

was untenable, and shouting out to us to ‘charge through the

entrance and make for the blockhouse,’ led the way. The Boers

were there in great force, and we were met with a very hot but

unaimed fire. Only Fosbery, Corporal Gorman, and myself took

part in this charge; all the rest of us were either killed or

wounded. About ten yards from the entrance Fosbery, in trying

to club down a Boer with the butt of his carbine, was wounded

in two places: I got a few yards farther, and while occupied

with a couple of the enemy in front was hit on the head by a

butt-ended rifle, and temporarily stunned: Corporal Gorman, I

think, surrendered, but of this I am uncertain, as I was too

busy to notice what he was doing, as he was behind me. When I

recovered consciousness about ten, perhaps twenty, minutes later,

I searched for and found Fosbery, who was still alive. I did what

I could in the way of first aid, but he was hopelessly hit and

had already lost a great deal of blood. The Boers were so close

to him when they shot him down that his clothing was scorched

all round the wounds. A little after this I suddenly ran into a

group of wandering Boers, and having lost my carbine when I was

knocked over, was easily collared and put under escort. But of

this and all subsequent proceedings I can remember nothing. I had

been singularly unfortunate in the fight in jamming my revolver

(a Service Webley) as I reloaded it. It was no good to me, and I

can remember using it as a missile during the charge--I hope with

effect! A carbine that night was a useless weapon for officers.

We had no bayonets, and the short length of the stock and barrel

placed us at a great disadvantage in the hand-to-hand _mêlée_.”

While the support was fighting desperately in the gun sangar

against overwhelming odds, most of the piquets on the perimeter

were swamped by sheer weight of numbers. Their trenches were of

a type found very useful by the battalion in actions where it

had been exposed to continuous bombardment, such as those in the

Colesberg campaign--narrow slits in the ground, 2 feet 6 inches

wide, nearly 5 feet deep, loopholed with a parapet 2 feet in height

and at least 3 feet in width. But excellent as this pattern had

proved elsewhere, it was not a success in very close fighting at

night, for the trench was so deep that its occupants could not see

over the parapet, and the loopholes were ill adapted for firing

on an enemy at a few yards’ range. Around these works parties of

Boers, from twenty to two hundred strong, suddenly loomed up out of

the fog and closed rapidly from all sides upon the defenders, whom

they covered with their rifles, demanding instant surrender. Though

thus caught in an absolute death-trap, most of these little groups

of four or five soldiers showed fight, not laying down their arms

until one or more of their number had been killed or wounded. Here

Lance-Corporal Dowie, a veteran who had served in the Egyptian war

of 1882, met a glorious death. He was in command of a small trench,

which he succeeded in holding during the first assault: he refused to

surrender, though he must have realised that resistance was hopeless,

and with his men continued to fight on desperately until a number

of burghers, rushing in from behind, overwhelmed the party and left

Dowie dead in the work he had defended so gallantly.

The reserve fared no better than the piquets or the support. When

awakened by the sound of battle, the men of D company manned the

broad and shallow trench by which, as it has been said, their tents

were enclosed, though very incompletely. At first the attack came

from their front and right, but after the capture of the sangar had

made the Boers masters of the northern end of the hill, a fresh body

of the enemy fell upon them from the left rear. There was a short,

wild struggle; then the burghers surged forward, and hemmed in the

men of D so closely that many of them could not use their bayonets,

and while the Boers in front seized the muzzles and pointed them in

the air, those behind knocked our men down with the butts of their

Mauser rifles. By this time Captain Milner was severely wounded:

and those of his company who were not killed, wounded, or prisoners

ceased to be a formed body of troops. Singly or in small groups they

tried to make their way towards Belfast, but in the fog they stumbled

across large parties of the enemy, into whose hands they fell. Out

of the ninety-three officers and men of the Royal Irish on the hill

only seven escaped; the remainder were killed, wounded, or captives

in the hands of the enemy. Little more than half an hour after the

first shot was fired the defence had been beaten down completely, and

the only sounds to be heard on Monument Hill were the groans of the

wounded, and the hoarse shouts of the burghers as they collected the

rifles and ammunition and sought vainly for the 4.7-in. gun, which

they hoped to turn upon the garrison of the town.

When the attack began General Smith-Dorrien had only two

companies--(one of the Royal Irish and one of the Shropshire Light

Infantry) available as reinforcements for the posts north of the

line. Both companies turned out, stood to their arms, and awaited

orders, while Lieutenant-Colonel Spens, Shropshire Light Infantry,

at once reconnoitred towards Monument Hill, and before the firing

had quite died down, met a soldier who gave him the grim news that

Fosbery’s detachment had been cut to pieces. Halting his party, Spens

went forward with two or three men to ascertain for himself the real

position of affairs, and, undetected by the enemy, worked his way

up the kopje until he reached a wire fence from which he could see

the burghers swarming over the camp which they were looting. Then,

convinced that the post was lost indeed, he withdrew, taking with

him the men of two small outlying piquets whom the enemy had not

discovered, but who, in his opinion, would inevitably be captured as

soon as the fog lifted. This daring reconnaissance was equalled by

that of a corporal in the 5th Lancers, who volunteered to find out

what had happened to the Royal Irish. He thus described the scene

upon the hill--

“I left the road and struck across the veld, and by running,

creeping, crawling, and rolling I managed to get up to the wire

entanglements which encircled the post. The difficulty now was

to get through the wire. I could hear shouts and groans, and

there was some shooting going on, but whether Briton or Boer

was in possession I could not tell. I dared not go round the

entanglement to the entrances, as I knew they would be guarded,

and so by a series of wriggles soon found myself inside the post.

What was to be done now? I knew if I were seen I should be shot,

whoever held the hill, so I continued to wriggle and roll on my

stomach. I soon came across the effects of the fight, the dead

bodies of the infantry and Boers, and the tents which had been

cut down on top of the Irishmen. Some one was calling ‘Water, for

God’s sake give me water,’ and suddenly a dog barked a few yards

to my right, and I could just distinguish a man. I immediately

covered him with my rifle, but apparently he had not seen me. I

remained where I was for some time, and then slowly crawled back

a little and worked my way to where I heard the shouts for water

coming from. I soon found two of the Irishmen badly wounded, and

asked them in a whisper what had happened, but the only reply

was a piteous appeal for water. I then crawled some fifty yards

to the cook-house and found a camp kettle with some water in it,

and slowly wriggled back to the two wounded men, and filling my

cap with water gave them a good drink. They then told me that the

Boers had rushed the sentries in the fog, cutting down the tents

on their occupants, and shooting and clubbing the men as they

rushed out, and although the garrison had made a gallant fight

they were overpowered and the post captured. There was a lot of

shouting going on by the Boers, and I quietly crawled towards it,

and then there was a shot. Beyond a man standing on the monument

I could see nothing, and so gradually crawled back to the wire

entanglements; as soon as I was clear of these ran back to the

horses, where I found Sergeant Evans and Aldridge safe, and we

rode back to camp and made our report.”[314]

Along the rest of the line of outworks the enemy pressed home the

attack with great gallantry and determination, but was repulsed

at all important points. The Gordon Highlanders beat back Botha’s

burghers, though with the loss of a small isolated post, and the

Shropshire Light Infantry maintained their hold on the vital part

of their position, though also with the loss of a small outlying

detachment. Only at Monument Hill were the Boers successful, and this

success, obtained solely by overwhelming numbers, they failed to turn

to account. Whether they were dispirited by their losses, bewildered

by the fog, or crippled by the want of trained staff officers to

direct their movements and carry out Botha’s plans, it is impossible

to say, but the fact remains that beyond capturing some scores of

rifles, a few tents, and much ammunition from the Royal Irish, the

burghers accomplished nothing, and retired so hastily with their

prisoners and booty that when Spens returned in the early morning to

Monument Hill he found it occupied only by the dead and wounded.

It will be remembered that Botha’s scheme provided for the

simultaneous attack on seven posts along the railway. These attacks

were duly made, but in most cases they were not serious, and in

none were they successful. The returns prove that Belfast was the

real objective of the burghers, for out of 179 casualties sustained

in the defence of these seven places, 143 fell upon the troops in

Belfast. The Royal Irish were by far the greatest sufferers; of the

three officers on Monument Hill, Captain Fosbery was killed, Captain

Milner was severely wounded, Lieutenant Dease injured, and both were

taken prisoners; while among the ninety non-commissioned officers

and privates eight were killed outright, five died of their wounds,

twenty-two were wounded in varying degrees of severity, and fifty-one

were taken prisoner.[315] The Boers on their side also lost heavily:

in the attack on Belfast fifty-eight burghers were killed, of whom

fourteen fell at Monument Hill.

General Smith-Dorrien, in his report on the events of the 7th-8th of

January, stated that the heavy loss in killed and wounded among the

Royal Irish was “sufficient evidence that their defence was a fine

one.” He specially mentioned Captain Fosbery for his “splendid work

in command of the post,” adding that from all sides he heard how well

this officer had behaved until he was shot down. In Force Orders,

dated the 12th of January, 1901, he expressed his

“appreciation of the steadiness of the troops on the morning

of the 8th. He would specially mention the fine defence of the

Royal Irish piquet at the monument under that gallant officer,

Captain Fosbery, whose death he deplores, until overwhelmed by

vastly superior numbers after a hard fight.... He regrets the

heavy losses, but does not consider them heavy, considering the

determined nature of the attack. He also considers that had it

not been for the fog the attack would have been much more easily

repulsed.”

The General also wrote as follows of Private John Barry:--

“I would especially call attention to the heroic conduct of No.

3733 Private J. Barry, Royal Irish, who seeing the machine gun

surrounded by Boers seized a pick and began to smash the action,

which he completed in spite of the threats of the Boers. I regret

to say that the Boers in retaliation shot him dead, or I would

have recommended him for a V.C.”

The War Office decided to award this honourable decoration to Barry,

although he was not alive to wear it, and it was presented to his

widow to be held as a treasured heirloom in Barry’s family. Thus, for

the third time since the Order of the Victoria Cross was instituted,

did a member of the Royal Irish regiment win this, the highest prize

for valour in the British army.

For several days the garrison of Belfast toiled continuously to make

good the weak points in the defences revealed by the night attack,

and then settled down into the old routine of occasional raids into

the neighbouring country and frequent skirmishes on the line of

communication. A party of the Royal Irish under Captain Grogan had

an extraordinary escape while escorting a train about this time; the

burghers had mined the railway with dynamite and expected to see the

train and its guard of soldiers blown sky-high, but their hopes were

disappointed; a couple of heavily laden trucks in front of the engine

met the full force of the explosion and were hurled off the rails;

none of the escort were hurt, and the greater part of the train was

uninjured.

On February 22, F, G, and H companies under Major Orr were sent to

Helvetia, where they spent a fortnight in remodelling the defences,

and then moved on to Lydenburg as escort to a convoy of supplies for

the troops holding that distant post. Though unopposed by the enemy

the march was very trying, for the rain fell in torrents, and the

road, deep in mud, led across three rivers where the water reached to

the waists of the soldiers as they struggled through the fords. Very

soon after the convoy reached its destination Lieutenant-Colonel C.

W. Park, Devonshire regiment, who at that moment was senior officer

at Lydenburg, learned that a small commando of about seventy Boers

had established itself in a valley near Krugerspost, twelve or

fourteen miles north of the British camp. He determined to capture

the laager, and on the 13th of March issued orders for the night

march by which the burghers were to be encircled and surprised.

The infantry selected for the enterprise were three companies of

the Rifle Brigade, three of the Devonshire, and the detachment of

the Royal Irish, now under command of Captain W. H. White, vice

Major Orr, who had been obliged to go into hospital. They were to

be carried in ox waggons for six miles; then after dismounting they

were to make a long sweep across the veld to avoid a Boer piquet, the

position of which had been ascertained, and on reaching a specified

point break into three small columns, and crown the hills commanding

the laager. The operation was by no means easy, for its success

demanded not only that the troops should accomplish the various

stages of the march within the time allowed by the calculations of

the staff, but also that the guides should lead the detachments

quickly and unerringly to the appointed places.

As soon as the column left the road its troubles began: the surface

of the veld was seamed with spruits, pitted with bogs, and covered

with high grass; it was impossible to move in close formation, and

once the companies had been opened out, it became so difficult to

maintain connection between the various units that when the troops

reached the spot where the encircling movement was to begin, they

were half an hour “behind scheduled time.” The Royal Irish detachment

was now handed over to a guide, who led it along a ravine which every

moment grew narrower and steeper. At first the man seemed confident

in himself; then suddenly he lost his head, and confessed he was

doubtful about the exact position of the laager. The situation was

serious, for if the Royal Irish did not succeed in making their way

to the ground allotted to them in the scheme of attack, there would

be a gap in the enveloping line through which the Boers might easily

escape. Captain White accordingly sent Lieutenant Panter-Downes with

H company up the ravine with orders to push on and connect with the

left of the Devons, while he himself moved the remainder of the

detachment farther to the left to feel for the Rifle Brigade. Just

as the first glimmer of dawn was showing in the east a message from

Panter-Downes arrived to report that he had discovered the laager,

which was not visible from the slope up which White was climbing.

While F and G companies linked up with the Riflemen and gained a

crest commanding the Boer camp, H strove to get into touch with the

Devons, but before Panter-Downes could make his way across a very

difficult piece of broken ground the Boers took the alarm, discovered

the gap in our line, and hurled themselves upon it, not without

success, for though they left thirty-seven of their number in our

hands, the remainder of the commando escaped. Some of them owed their

liberty to the chivalry of the Royal Irish; in the words of the

Record of Service they “would have been shot down had they not worn

long night-drawers and so been mistaken for women.” Though about half

the _personnel_ of the commando got away, all its _matériel_--tents,

waggons, horses, and much grain--fell into Colonel Park’s hands at a

cost of only five casualties, all among the Royal Irish.[316]

In a few days the detachment returned to the railway and rejoined

the battalion, which now had been withdrawn from the garrison of

Belfast to take part in active operations in the northern Transvaal.

Early in the year the Intelligence department had become aware

that the repeated attacks upon the railway were intended to divert

attention from the preparations for a great raid to the southward,

by which General Botha hoped to restore the shattered fortunes

of the republican armies. Lord Kitchener, who on Lord Roberts’

departure for England in December, 1900, had succeeded to the supreme

command of the British forces in South Africa, first sent General

French with 22,000 combatants to harry Botha’s commandos south of

the Pretoria-Delagoa Bay line, and then organised a body of nearly

10,000 men with whom Lieutenant-General Sir B. Blood was to sweep

a huge piece of country, bounded on the south by the same railway,

on the north by the 25th degree of latitude, on the east by the

Stenkamps Berg, and on the west by the Oliphant river. The principal

settlement in this district was Roos Senekal, on which Blood’s

troops were to converge from various points. Three of the columns

were commanded by Major-General F. W. Kitchener, the remainder by

Major-General R. S. R. Fetherstonhaugh; the Royal Irish were allotted

to that under the immediate orders of Colonel Park, who was one of

Kitchener’s subordinate commanders. Leaving the railway on March 27,

the battalion reached Lydenburg on April 11, where began six months

of work as arduous, monotonous, and disagreeable as ever British

soldiers were called upon to perform. On some occasions the Royal

Irish formed part of an outer ring of troops whose business it was

to block every Nek and every drift by which a commando could break

from the net that was closing upon it; at other times, as part of

the striking column, they made forced marches by day and night, too

often to find that the burghers had taken the alarm and had fled,

leaving behind them their womenkind, who they knew would be well

treated by the British. They had to “round-up” great mobs of cattle,

to remove women and children from farms used as headquarters by the

local guerillas, to escort convoys, and to march incessantly “in

a most difficult country over almost impossible roads.” For weeks

together they never bivouacked twice in the same place, and whenever

they found themselves for a few days at Lydenburg or at a station

on the line, instead of resting, they had to build blockhouses. On

one of these brief visits to the comparative civilisation of the

railway the battalion was joined by Lieutenant W. G. Lindsey and

thirty non-commissioned officers and men of the 5th (Irish volunteer

battalion), the King’s (Liverpool) regiment, who on May 20, 1901

arrived to replace the volunteer company which on October 8, 1900,

had started on its journey back to England.

A detailed account of the work of the regiment between April and

October, 1901, would contain so little beyond a list of bivouacs at

places with uncouth and unknown names, that no attempt will be made

to follow the wanderings of the Royal Irish: the reader who desires

to know their exact position on every day throughout this period

will find the information in Appendix 8. At the end of September the

battalion, to use the South African expression, “came off trek,” and

as soon as it had been refitted, relieved the Manchester regiment at

Lydenburg. An idea of the straits to which the men had been reduced

by hard marching will be gathered from a report dated September 1:

“many have no shirts at all, and others have no boots. All the boots

and trousers are in a bad state and will not hold together much

longer.”

Colonel Park took the opportunity of thanking the officers and men

for their services in a farewell order dated October 1, 1901--

“It is with the greatest regret that the Officer Commanding the

column has now to part with the first battalion, the Royal Irish

regiment, the last remaining unit of the original force which

started from Lydenburg under his command five and a half months

ago.

“The splendid fighting qualities of the Royal Irish are well

known to all, and their magnificent marching powers and the good

spirit of all ranks under the hardships and privations of active

service have been the admiration of the O.C. column, and of all

ranks who have served with him. Colonel Park wishes them the best

of good luck, and trusts that at some future time he may have

again the honour of serving with this gallant and distinguished

regiment.”

Though the war had already lasted for two years, the strenuous

exertions of Botha, De Wet, and a few other Boer leaders prolonged

the struggle, hopeless though it was, for nine months longer. During

this time the battalion remained at Lydenburg, taking its share of

duty in garrisoning the town, in escorting convoys, and in manning

the fifty-five blockhouses by which the place was linked with the

railway at Machadodorp, forty-five miles away. From the regimental

point of view only two incidents worthy of record occurred in this

phase of the war: the capture of B. Viljoen, the Boer general who had

inflicted so heavy a loss upon the Royal Irish at Monument Hill, and

the destruction by dynamite of a blockhouse held by a party of the

Royal Irish.

At the beginning of the year 1902, Schalk Burger, the acting

President of the Transvaal Republic, was in hiding near Dulstroom

with the few adherents who formed his so-called government. Viljoen,

the commander of the remnants of the commandos raised in the

districts north of the Pretoria-Delagoa Bay railway, had been driven

to Pilgrim’s Rest, whence Burger summoned him to a conference to

arrange for the transfer of the “government” to the comparative

safety of that remote settlement. The preliminaries being settled,

Viljoen preceded Burger on the journey over the fifty miles of

country between Dulstroom and Pilgrim’s Rest. This ride, writes

the author of the Official History, “proved to be the last of the

Boer leader’s many adventures. The British Intelligence Department

was keenly watching the vagrant legislature; and ambuscades lay in

many a likely spruit-bed and rail and river crossing. Into one of

these traps--laid by a party of the Royal Irish regiment, sent out

under Major A. S. Orr by Lieut.-Colonel H. Guinness--fell Viljoen

as, having stolen past the outposts of Lydenburg, he made to ford

the Spekboom river.” The details of the capture were as follows: at

about 7 P.M. on January 25, 1902, Major Orr with five officers and a

hundred and twenty of the other ranks was suddenly ordered to hasten

to two drifts, where it was reported that a party of burghers would

attempt to cross during the night.[317] Captain Farmer was sent with

a detachment to block one of these drifts; near the other Major

Orr hid the remainder of his force, posting twenty men in a ruined

farmhouse a few hundred yards to his flank.

By 10 o’clock at night the trap was set, and the soldiers were

resting after their long march over heavy mealie-fields and through

spruits swollen by recent rain, when the detachment in the farm

opened a sharp fusilade on a small number of Boers approaching

from the south-west, and drove them towards the drift where Orr

had established himself. So perfectly in hand were the Royal Irish

that, though they could hear horses galloping towards them, they

remained silent and motionless until the leading horsemen, who

rode in pairs, were almost under the muzzles of their rifles. Then

Colour-Sergeant J. Boulger, who was nearest the road, shouted “Hands

up.” Disregarding this summons the Boers galloped on: Boulger

realising that they meant to dash through the drift, opened fire on

the horses of the two Boers in front: his men followed his example,

and the animals, one pierced by nine, the other by three bullets,

dropped dead, in their fall pinning to the ground their riders,

Viljoen and Bester, one of the General’s staff. Then there was a

short confused skirmish, in which Nel, another of Viljoen’s staff,

and a Cape Boer lost their lives; the remainder of the party, which

numbered ten in all, escaped, though not across the drift. As soon

as Viljoen and Bester had been drawn from beneath their horses, they

were recognised by one of the civilian scouts, who told Major Orr the

names of the prisoners. Between men who have frequently faced each

other in battle arises a curious feeling of quasi-friendship, and the

Royal Irish and the commandos led by Viljoen had frequently met on

many a hard-fought field: moreover, after Monument Hill Viljoen had

treated his prisoners, both officers and men, with great kindness:

therefore, as Orr hurried his captives to Lydenburg he assured them

that they had fallen into good hands, and during the few days that

Viljoen remained at Lydenburg awaiting an escort to the railway the

regiment did its best to make his captivity agreeable. The burghers

were very anxious to rescue him; and one night, writes an officer,

“two or three of them stole into the town to see if it was possible

to dig him out, but finding a sentry at his door and another at his

window gave up the attempt, leaving behind them a clever cartoon of

Lord Kitchener sitting in a zariba of barbed wire, surrounded by

surrendered burghers whom he was imploring to go out and persuade the

others to come in, while floating above him was the spirit of Joe

Chamberlain! The drawing was signed, ‘Phil Jung, with apologies to

Phil May.’” In his report Colonel Guinness specially mentioned Major

Orr, to whose good dispositions of the force at his command was due

the successful issue of the affair, and Colour-Sergeant Boulger,[318]

who had been very favourably reported upon by Major Orr.

The dynamite episode occurred two months later. Among the blockhouses

held by the Royal Irish was one, named by the troops Ben Tor, which

stood on a kopje so thickly covered with big boulders that the

sentries could not watch all the approaches to it. The building

was of stone, roofed with sheets of galvanised iron; and on the

night of the 18th of March it was held by a non-commissioned

officer--Sergeant M‘Grath--and nine private soldiers. About two

o’clock in the morning of the 19th, the two men on sentry outside

the blockhouse heard sounds which they rightly interpreted to be

those of approaching feet. While one remained on the look-out, the

other crawled into the blockhouse and reported to Sergeant M‘Grath,

who immediately stood to arms and manned his loopholes, but almost

before the men were in their places a bomb was hurled on the roof,

which unfortunately being flat, not sloping, afforded the missile a

secure lodgment. In a second there was a tremendous explosion: the

blockhouse was wrecked; one of the walls was thrown down, and every

man of the garrison dangerously or severely wounded, except the

sentry outside who escaped all injury. After capturing this man the

Boers waited for some minutes to see if any one was still on foot;

then, satisfied that no resistance was to be expected, they rapidly

looted the blockhouse and decamped, fortunately without finding the

boxes of reserve ammunition hidden under the sheets of galvanised

iron which formed the beds of the garrison. Beyond stripping some

of the wounded, the burghers did their victims no harm, and sent

off the uninjured soldier to summon medical aid from Lydenburg. By

dawn a detachment of troops, a doctor, and an ambulance were on the

way to Ben Tor, where, says one of the officers, “the place was

like a shambles--too horrible to describe.” As soon as the wounded

men had been removed,[319] the blockhouse was rebuilt and greatly

strengthened.

Nothing of note occurred in the battalion during the remainder of the

campaign, which was brought to an end by the declaration of peace

on May 31, 1902. This is not the place to discuss the terms upon

which the Boer guerillas were allowed to surrender their arms and

return to their homes; to enumerate the enormous sums spent by the

Imperial Treasury in rebuilding and restocking the burghers farms, or

to speculate on what may be the ultimate effect on South Africa and

the Empire of the policy by which, little more than five years after

the last shot was fired in the war, all the rights and privileges

of self-government were granted to our former enemies. Whatever the

future may have in store for England, the Royal Irish regiment will

always have the satisfaction of remembering that throughout the long

struggle with the Boer republics, all ranks worthily maintained the

honour of their corps.

* * * * *

The doings of the officers and men who served in the mounted infantry

are in no degree less interesting than those of the first battalion,

but, unfortunately, want of space renders it impossible to describe

in detail the many engagements and operations of importance in which

they took part. All that can be attempted is a bare outline of their

work, with a few instances of the many exploits which the independent

nature of their employment gave them the opportunity to perform.

Though for a time the two contingents were in the same brigade, they

were employed together so seldom that their movements are chronicled

separately.

When the first battalion was called upon to provide a section for

Captain St Leger’s Cork company of the 1st regiment of mounted

infantry, commanded by Colonel E. A. H. Alderson, the choice fell

upon Second Lieutenant P. U. Vigors and thirty-seven non-commissioned

officers and men, who landing at Cape Town early in November, 1899,

were sent up country to De Aar, a place important as a great railway

junction and an advanced base, where large quantities of stores had

been accumulated. Here they spent nearly three months, chiefly on

detached duties, such as guarding the railway bridge at Hanover

Road, outposts, and patrols, one of which once pushed out as far as

Prieska in the north-west of Cape Colony. Early in February, 1900,

the 1st regiment of mounted infantry was allotted to the 1st brigade

of mounted infantry, a newly-formed body under Colonel O. C. Hannay,

and composed of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th regiments of mounted

infantry (all regular soldiers) and several corps of Australian and

South African volunteers. In the 5th regiment the Royal Irish were

well represented; it was commanded by Major Hatchell, an officer of

the XVIIIth; and one company, or a quarter of its total strength, had

been contributed by the first battalion.

The Royal Irish section of the Cork company of the 1st mounted

infantry charged with the cavalry at Klip Drift, and took part

in the relief of Kimberley; reached Paardeberg some days before

Cronje surrendered, and shared in the actions of Poplar Grove and

Driefontein. In the operations outside Bloemfontein on March 12, the

Cork company succeeded in forestalling the Boers in the occupation

of an important kopje, just north of the Leper hospital. At the

disastrous affair at Sannah’s Post on the 31st of March, where the

section served in the rear-guard covering the retreat of our broken

force, all did well, and an officer and a lance-corporal especially

distinguished themselves. As Captain St Leger was superintending the

retirement of the rear section of the Cork company he saw a big man,

dismounted, running after the horsemen. St Leger called him, and

ascertained that he was Corporal Parker, 1st Life Guards, who after

escaping from the trap in the Korn spruit had attached himself to the

mounted infantry. While the corporal was speaking he was shot through

the right shoulder, and at that moment St Leger’s orderly, Drummer

Radford, noticed that his officer was staying behind and rode back

to him. Thinking he could manage the Life Guardsman alone, St Leger

ordered Radford to return to the company, but when he tried to get

the trooper on to his (St Leger’s) horse, failed to do so, for the

man’s wound had made him incapable of helping himself, and he was too

heavy to be lifted into the saddle. There was no time to be lost,

so with his right arm round the trooper’s waist, he half supported,

half dragged him in the direction in which the Cork company had

retired. With his left hand St Leger led his horse, which grew very

restive under the pitiless hail of bullets that literally tore up the

ground under the animal’s belly. As the Boers followed up the little

group, now completely isolated and a long way behind the last of the

rear-guard, the outlook seemed almost hopeless. Suddenly St Leger

realised that if he could succeed in getting his wounded man a few

hundred yards farther on, they would not only find temporary cover

in some low-lying and broken ground, but would also be protected by

the fire of a party of Roberts’ Horse who, some distance off, were

holding back the enemy on this part of the battlefield. The burghers

came on fast, and three of them galloped up to within a hundred

yards of the fugitives, and emptied their magazines at them as they

disappeared into cover. As the Boers fired from the saddle none of

their bullets took effect. Bad as the situation was, it grew worse

when the section of Roberts’ Horse turned about, and galloped to a

position farther to the rear. Happily St Leger managed to attract

the attention of one of them--a gallant man, who raced back to him

with a led horse, on which they managed to hoist the Life Guardsman,

who, though faint from his wound, was still able to ride once he was

in the saddle. Then they galloped hard, scattering in order to offer

a smaller target to the shower of Mauser bullets by which they were

pursued. Corporal Parker recovered from his wound completely; and

neither the trooper in Roberts’ Horse nor Captain St Leger was hit;

indeed, good luck followed the latter throughout the day, for thanks

to the resolution of his groom, Private Ward, his favourite pony was

saved from the general wreck of the column. Private Ward was riding

with the waggons when they fell into the ambush; when called upon to

surrender, he refused to do so, and though his own horse was hit,

succeeded in escaping with St Leger’s pony, in whose saddle-bags were

sixty sovereigns, just received for the men’s pay. Lance-Corporal

Hall distinguished himself by two acts of signal bravery under very

heavy fire. Noticing a wounded gunner staggering along in the retreat

he rode back to him, and placed him upon his own horse: later in the

day, when the Boers were pressing hard upon the mounted infantry, he

saw a trooper of Roberts’ Horse whose pony had been killed and who

was in imminent danger of being shot or captured. He dashed after a

stray horse, caught it, and brought off the irregular in safety. Hall

escaped unhurt; only three of the Royal Irish were wounded in this

engagement.[320]

The section formed part of the army which invaded the Transvaal, and

was at the passage of the Reit and the Zand rivers, the action of

Johannesburg, the capture of Pretoria, and the battle of Diamond Hill

(11th and 12th of June). For the next few weeks it remained in the

neighbourhood of Pretoria, chiefly engaged in outpost duty, sometimes

of a very exciting nature. Thus at Reitvlei, on July 15, a piquet of

sixteen men was saved from capture or destruction by the intelligence

of Sergeant Connolly who, discovering that a party of two hundred

burghers with three guns was threatening the post, reported so

clearly and so promptly that his officer was able to signal for

reinforcements, which fortunately arrived in time. When Lord Roberts

began to advance towards Komati Poort the Cork company pushed on with

the remainder of the mounted infantry; a few of the Royal Irish

section were fortunate enough to be engaged at Bergendal, but none

reached Komati Poort, the company remaining at Kaapsche Hoop until

November, when it was ordered back to Pretoria and thence to the

northern frontier of Cape Colony.

Since the beginning of June, De Wet had kept the Free State in a

blaze, and although after his failure in various minor enterprises

he was chased up and down the country, and very roughly handled at

Bothaville on November 6, he rallied enough burghers around him to

be able to swoop upon the British garrison of Dewetsdorp, which

surrendered to him on the 23rd of November, 1900. The fall of this

place seemed to remove one of the chief obstacles to the raid into

Cape Colony which for months had been discussed round the camp fires

of every Free State commando,[321] and De Wet pushed towards the

Orange river, believing that once he gained its southern bank the

Dutch population in the colony would welcome him with enthusiasm.

As soon as his plan was discovered, troops were hurried from all

parts of the theatre of war towards the Orange river, among them

the column to which the Cork company was attached. After a long and

weary journey by train from Pretoria to Bethulie, it shared in the

operations in December by which De Wet was prevented from crossing

the river, and driven backwards into the eastern Free State, where

though harried incessantly by our troops he never abandoned his

scheme for a second invasion of British territory. The Cork company

was soon called away from the pursuit of De Wet to that of two of

his lieutenants, Kritzinger and Hertzog, who succeeded in passing

across the river and waged guerilla warfare in many districts of Cape

Colony. Early in February, 1901, De Wet, with extraordinary skill

and equally extraordinary good fortune, threaded his way through

the troops closing round him, and dashed across the Orange at an

unguarded drift, but there his lucky star failed him, and the British

mounted troops, though almost spent by their unending pursuit of

Kritzinger and Hertzog’s raiders, who had now joined the commandos of

their leader, drove the invaders back into the Free State at the end

of February, 1901.

Between March and November 1901, the section was in the south of the

Free State, occupied in clearing the country and similar uncongenial

duties, the monotony of which was relieved by occasional skirmishes.

In one of these affairs two soldiers distinguished themselves.

Private W. Sweeney found himself surrounded by four mounted Boers

who, covering him with their rifles, called upon him to surrender;

though they were all within fifty yards of him he refused to do so,

and firing at them from the saddle succeeded in making his escape.

His name was specially mentioned to the General commanding the column

for his gallantry on this occasion.[322] Private Radford, while

carrying a message for Lieutenant Vigors, was wounded and his horse

was hit under him; nevertheless he delivered his message and then

made his way back to report that he had done so. The next two months

were spent at Winburg, and in January, 1902, the section began to

take part in the “drives” which marked the final phase of the war in

the north-east of the Free State. In addition to the non-commissioned

officer and men already mentioned, Lieutenant Vigors, in the

statement he prepared for the regimental records, gives praise to the

good conduct throughout the war of Sergeants Kennedy and Colthorpe,

Lance-Corporals Mackay and Griffin, Privates Tobin and (5914) Power.

It was said on page 311 that just before the battalion sailed

from England Captain R. A. Smyth, Lieutenants S. H. L. Galbraith

and E. Lloyd, with sixty-seven of the other ranks went to the

mounted infantry at Shorncliffe. From this nucleus developed a

company, composed of the same officers and a hundred and thirty-six

non-commissioned officers and men, who landed at Cape Town on

January 31, 1900, and formed part of the 5th regiment of mounted

infantry. The company received its baptism of fire on February 11,

1900, while reinforcing the flank-guard of a convoy in difficulties

between Ramah and Roodipan. In this affair Private M. Maher greatly

distinguished himself by volunteering to carry a written order to a

detachment, separated from the main body by a broad stretch of ground

completely swept by the enemy’s fire. He set an excellent example by

walking, not running, across the danger zone; delivered the note,

and then, refusing to remain with the detachment which was under

cover, coolly returned to report that the order had duly reached

the officer to whom it was addressed. Maher was not hit; in this

affair there were only two casualties among the Royal Irish, neither

fatal.[323] The company was at a skirmish near Jacobsdal, where

Major Hatchell was wounded; and after a long night march arrived at

Klip drift on the Modder river on the 15th, too late to take part

in Lieutenant-General French’s charge through the Boer position,

though in time to see the cavalry division re-form and start on its

final advance upon Kimberley. The Royal Irish were sent on outpost

at once, and remained on piquet until dawn, when they were ordered

to work eastward down the river to Klipkraal drift, one of the fords

by which it was expected that Cronje, now in full retreat from the

kopjes of Magersfontein, would attempt to cross the stream. The

company was engaged all day with the Boer rear-guard, and several

men were wounded, among whom was Sergeant Peebles, whose experiences

were singularly unpleasant;[324] while on patrol he was shot through

the thighs, and falling helpless on the ground was stripped naked

by marauding Boers, and left for dead, until late in the evening he

was rescued by a party of his comrades. After spending the night

in guarding a battery of artillery, the company at daybreak on the

17th was sent to ascertain if the burghers still held the ground

they had occupied when darkness put an end to the combat. As soon

as the Royal Irish reported that the position had been evacuated,

the column was set in motion, but the Boers had gained a long start;

their rear-guard again fought stoutly, and it was not until late in

the evening of the 17th that the mounted infantry bivouacked two

miles south of Paardeberg drift, near the laager which Cronje had

formed a few hours sooner, when to his dismay he found that he had

been “headed off” by French, who with a weak brigade of cavalry and

two batteries of Royal Horse artillery from Kimberley had thrown

himself boldly across the Boer general’s path. At 4 A.M. on the

18th, Hannay’s brigade marched eastwards to form the right of the

line of troops with which Lord Kitchener proposed to attack the

enemy’s position on every side. The Royal Irish company was engaged

all day, and in the ill-fated charge led by Colonel Hannay against

the north-east face of the laager was represented by Captain Smyth,

Lieutenant Lloyd, and thirteen or fourteen non-commissioned officers

and men, of whom several privates were wounded.[325] During the

remainder of the operations, ending in Cronje’s surrender on February

27, the company was employed in scouting and patrolling the country

south-east of Paardeberg; and after taking part in the action of

Poplar Grove it marched into Bloemfontein with Lieutenant-General

Tucker’s column on March 16th.

During the next five weeks the 5th regiment of mounted infantry was

not employed in any important operation, but at the end of April it

joined a force under Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton, which forced

its way through the defile of Israel’s Poort, and after co-operating

in driving the Boers from Thabanchu, marched northwards as right

flank-guard to the main column in Lord Roberts’ advance from

Bloemfontein to the Transvaal. Between the 23rd of April, when the

Royal Irish company left Bloemfontein, and the 4th of June, when it

entered Pretoria, there were few days when it was not under fire,

and it was present at nearly all the actions in which the enemy was

driven from one fortified position after another. Considering how

constantly the company was engaged its casualties were not heavy:

at Thabanchu, Captain Smyth and a private soldier were wounded; at

Welkom, Private Murphy was killed by a shell, which striking him on

the back of the head, hurled him ten feet out of the saddle; and

in a fight between Heilbron and Lindley on May 20, Lieutenant M. H.

E. Welch and several men were wounded by the burghers, who after

driving in the rear-guard succeeded in getting between the main

column and the right flank-guard, of which the Royal Irish company

formed part.[326] In this skirmish, where Britons and Boers were

fighting in a confused mass, Captain Smyth had a narrow escape: he

had given up his horse to a wounded Royal Irishman when a mounted

burgher tried to ride him down, but Smyth “dodged” the charge, and

then laid his enemy low by a well-aimed shot. Though the company was

exposed to heavy artillery fire at the battle of Diamond Hill, none

of the officers and men were hit; and the same good fortune attended

them for many weeks, for though as part of Hamilton’s (afterwards

Hunter’s) Force, the 5th M.I. fought their way from Heidelberg to

the Brandwater Basin, there were no casualties among them until July

28, when at Naauwpoort Nek Corporal Hogan was blown to pieces by a

shell, and a private soldier was wounded. After Prinsloo’s surrender

the company helped to escort two thousand prisoners to the railway,

reaching Winburg on August 12, and in less than a fortnight was again

“on trek,” this time in a column hurriedly despatched to the help of

a detachment which, while reconnoitring in the Doornberg range, a few

miles from Winburg, had been surrounded by a body of Boers five times

its strength. This detachment, composed of South African volunteers

and a handful of British militia, was hard pressed, and had lost

nearly fifteen per cent of its numbers when the Boers retired on the

approach of the relieving column. The only casualty among the Royal

Irish was Captain Smyth, who was so severely hurt by a fall that

he was obliged to go into hospital. Captain Brush replaced him in

command of the company, at that moment only about thirty strong, the

remainder of the men being either in hospital or stranded in various

parts of South Africa waiting for remounts.

A few hours after the return of the troops to Winburg on the 27th

of August, the town was attacked by the Boers, who finding it too

strong to take, drew off and sent a portion of their force against

Ladybrand. The 5th mounted infantry and all other available troops

were at once concentrated at Bloemfontein, and after relieving

Ladybrand hunted the commandos up and down the Orange Free State

for many weeks. As a rule the burghers succeeded in eluding their

pursuers, but on November 6, 1900, C. De Wet with a strong body

of men was surprised near Bothaville by the 5th mounted infantry

under Major K. E. Lean, Royal Warwickshire regiment, who when Major

Hatchell was wounded at Jacobsdal had succeeded him in command. The

fight began at dawn and lasted till midday, when the timely arrival

of reinforcements broke down the enemy’s resistance; De Wet and

the greater part of his followers retired in confusion, leaving

behind them a detachment of brave men, who fought stubbornly until,

threatened by a charge of bayonets, they hoisted the white flag.

Our spoils of war included a 12-pr. Horse Artillery gun, taken by

the Boers at Sannah’s Post, and one of the 15-prs. lost by us at

Colenso; four Krupps, a pom-pom, a machine gun, much artillery and

rifle ammunition, many horses and carts, and a hundred and thirty

prisoners. The Boers lost twenty-five men killed and thirty wounded;

our casualties were thirteen killed and thirty-three wounded, among

whom were three of the Royal Irish.[327] Most of the company were

hotly engaged on the right of the line throughout the action, often

at very close range; while a few were attached to the guns, where

three privates of the Royal Irish greatly distinguished themselves.

One of the gun detachments was reduced to a single man, who served

his piece alone; while Privates Radigan and Maher by their steady and

well-aimed shooting kept back a party of the enemy who threatened to

take the gun in flank. In another part of the field Private Murphy

was conspicuous by his bravery in dragging a wounded officer from

under a deadly fire. Two or three days later Major-General Knox

thanked the whole of the company for their services at Bothaville,

and gave especial praise to these three men for their behaviour

during the fight.

Soon after the 5th regiment of mounted infantry had refitted at

Kroonstad important news reached them: De Wet had recovered from

his losses at Bothaville, and had appeared in the south-east of the

Free State, where he was attacking Dewetsdorp, whose defenders were

hard pressed. The regiment was sent off by rail to Edenburg, where

it joined the relieving column, which unfortunately did not arrive

in time to prevent the surrender of the garrison. The company for

the next two months marched almost incessantly in the eastern half

of the Free State, chasing De Wet, who, like the rainbow, was always

“in the next field.” They had a couple of days’ rest at Christmas,

when they bivouacked at a farm near Ficksburg, where, according to

the diary of one of the officers, “the only liquid available for

our dinner was of so substantial a nature that a mugful evaporated

would leave enough solid matter to make a good-sized brick! We shared

the only dam in the place with the horses, mules, and oxen. Tea was

an impossibility, and the coffee we swallowed with our eyes shut.”

Towards the end of January, 1901, it was discovered that De Wet was

secretly concentrating his burghers for another attempt to raid into

Cape Colony. Many columns, including that in which the 5th M.I. were

serving, were directed against him and caught up his rear-guard at

the Tabaksberg, where on the 29th of January the Boers fought a

delaying action, in the course of which a handful of the Royal Irish

earned praise first for their dash in “rushing” a kopje, and then

for holding it against very heavy odds. The 5th were now ordered to

Bloemfontein, and after a slow railway journey detrained at Bethulie

to take part in the movements by which De Wet and his guerilla bands

were to be expelled from Cape Colony. They were sent off to the

north-west, and so hard was the marching that when the Royal Irish

company reached Hopetown at the end of February, it had lost sixty

out of the eighty horses it possessed a month before. In the course

of the trek Private Maher again came to the fore by volunteering to

cross a drift, in order to ascertain if the farther bank of the river

was occupied by the enemy.

From Hopetown the company worked its way back to the east of the

Free State, on one occasion bivouacking near Ramah, where it had

smelt powder for the first time, on another halting at Hout Nek,

where under Hamilton it had fought at the beginning of May, 1900.

During the remainder of the war the 5th regiment of mounted infantry

was chiefly employed in patrolling, escorting convoys, and clearing

farms, duties which entailed incessant and monotonous work. The

process of clearing a farm of food and forage was by no means easy,

especially when it had to be done very quickly by a flank-guard under

stringent orders to keep its proper place in the column. After a

harassing day’s work, an officer in the regiment wrote in his diary

that “to tell a flank-guard to clear farms on its march is all very

well in theory, but when it comes to getting sacks of wheat or tons

of loose mealies [_i.e._, Indian corn] out of a back room through

several narrow doors or narrower windows, the flank-guard often finds

itself left behind the rear-guard. Some people seem to think that in

clearing a farm you have only to blow a whistle, and all the animals

commit suicide and all the grain jumps into the nearest dam.” It must

not be imagined that these duties were carried on unopposed. There

were frequent skirmishes; in one of these affairs (October 17, 1901)

a detachment of the Royal Irish company, finding itself surrounded by

an overwhelming force of burghers in a place from which there was no

possibility of fighting its way out, was compelled to lay down its

arms after the officer in command and three soldiers had been wounded.

* * * * *

The British losses in South Africa were by no means heavy,

considering that the war lasted two years and eight months, and that

during a great part of the time more than a quarter of a million of

troops were in the field. The casualties were--

Officers |Other ranks.| Total.

(exclusive of staff).| |

--------------------------------------------+------------+-------

Killed 518 | 5,256 | 5,774

Died of wounds, disease, or | |

from accident 554 | 15,614 | 16,168

Wounded 1851 | 20,978 | 22,829

The casualties in the Royal Irish regiment were as follows:[328]--

Officers--

Killed Captains S. G. French, W. Gloster, and F. L.

Fosbery.

Died of wounds Captains J. B. S. Alderson, R. R. Arbuthnot, and

Sir John Power, Bart. (5th battalion).

Died of disease Captain G. A. Ashfordby-Trenchard (5th battalion)

and 2nd Lieutenant A. C. S. Fletcher.

Wounded Majors H. M. Hatchell and B. J. C. Doran;

Captains E. F. Milner, R. A. Smyth, and

T. Warwick-Williams (volunteer company);

Lieutenants M. H. E. Welch and J. A. M. J. P.

Kelly.

Severely injured Captain G. Hearn (4th battalion).

Other ranks--

| Died of | Died from | Died from |

Killed.| wounds. | accidents. | disease. | Total.

| | | |

27 | 15 | 6 | 61 | 109

Wounded, 128; severely injured, 2.

In recognition of the services of the Royal Irish regiment the words

“South Africa 1900-02” were added to the battle honours on the

Colours, and the following officers, non-commissioned officers, and

private soldiers were mentioned in despatches and received special

rewards for their services:--

To be Companion of the Order of the Bath--Lieutenant-Colonel H.

W. N. Guinness.

To be Companions of the Distinguished Service Order--

Major H. M. Hatchell, Major A. S. Orr, Major and

Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. B. Doran, Major H. J. Downing,

Captain E. H. E. Daniell, Lieutenant J. A. M. J. P. Kelly.

Promotions by brevet--

Major A. G. Chichester, Major A. N. Lysaght, and Major B. J. C.

Doran to be Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonels.

Captain R. A. Smyth (mounted infantry) and Captain E. M.

Panter-Downes to be Brevet-Majors.

To be Honorary Major--

Quartermaster and Honorary Captain F. P. Reger.

Mentioned in Despatches--

Major K. P. Apthorp, Captain E. F. Milner, Captain A. W. Brush,

Lieutenants S. H. L. Galbraith, P. U. Vigors, E. C. Lloyd, and H.

G. Gregorie (while serving in the Imperial Light Infantry before

he joined the Royal Irish regiment).

The Victoria Cross was awarded to No. 3733 Private John Barry.

The Distinguished Conduct Medal was awarded to the following

non-commissioned officers and men who were also mentioned in

despatches:--

_Sergeant-Major_ J. Bergin. _Sergeants_ J. O’Connor, H. Loney,

T. Connolly. _Lance-Corporals_ P. Doyle, E. Lovely, P. Dumphy,

W. Tytherleigh. _Privates_ T. Baker, W. Sweeney, M. Maher, J.

Murphy, J. Radigan.

Mentioned in Despatches--

_Colour-Sergeants_: T. Mahoney, J. Reddan, E. Murray.

_Sergeants_: H. Hall, T. McHale. _Lance-Sergeants_: C. Kennedy

and T. Kelly.

_Corporals_: M. Kelly, J. Chaffey. _Lance-Corporals_: J. Moran,

M. Tobin, J. Rathbone, C. Beresford.

_Privates_: J. Kavanagh, J. Kennedy, J. O’Neill, J. Ryan, J.

McCullough, W. Patterson, M. Healey, H. Densmore (volunteer

company).

_Special promotions_--

Corporal Wallace was appointed Lance-Sergeant for good service

during the campaign, and Private P. Doyle was promoted to be

Corporal to reward his excellent behaviour at the action of

Slabbert’s Nek.

In the militia battalions affiliated to the Royal Irish the

following were mentioned in despatches:--

Captain C. Langford, 4th battalion, serving with Imperial

Yeomanry.

Captain A. B. Crabbe, 5th battalion, with Imperial Yeomanry.

Lance-Corporal J. Mahood, 5th battalion, while on railway patrol

on May 16, 1901, “was suddenly fired at by a party of Boers who

were mining the line. Though mortally wounded he continued to

fire as long as he could hold his rifle.”

To all who served in South Africa one, and in many cases two medals

were granted. Towards the end of 1900, it was believed officially

in England that the war was virtually at an end, and a medal was

struck, bearing the effigy of Queen Victoria, for issue to those

who had taken part in the campaign. But after the war had dragged

on for more than a year longer, it was decided to prepare a second

medal with the effigy of King Edward VII., which was to be given

to all who had served in the war for eighteen months and who had

been in South Africa on January 1, 1902. Clasps were granted for

various battles, sieges, and series of operations, and for service

in certain specified areas during the years 1899-1900; and also for

service in any part of South Africa during the years 1901-1902. The

battle clasps obtained by the first battalion were for Wittebergen

(_i.e._, Bethlehem, Slabbert’s Nek, Brandwater Basin), and Bergendal;

the Royal Irish section of the 1st mounted infantry received clasps

for the Relief of Kimberley, Paardeberg, Driefontein, Johannesburg,

Diamond Hill, and Bergendal, and the Royal Irish company of the

5th mounted infantry for the Relief of Kimberley, Paardeberg,

Johannesburg, Diamond Hill, and Wittebergen.

During the war the militia battalions of the regiment were embodied,

and formed part of the garrison of the United Kingdom.[329]

In memory of the members of the regular or militia battalions who

died in South Africa two memorials have been erected, one in St

Patrick’s Cathedral, the other in the barracks at Clonmel. Both are

described in Appendix 10.

It has been decided that this history should end with the close of

the South African war, and therefore nothing will be said about the

doings of the regiment since May, 1902. And indeed, a detailed record

would show little beyond that unceasing training for active service

for which the army and the nation have to thank the campaign in

South Africa. During this period there have been only two incidents

of note. In December, 1905, the first battalion had the honour

of sending three officers and a hundred men to guard His Majesty

George V. when, during his tour in India as Prince of Wales, he was

encamped at Kala-Ki-Serai. Three years later the same battalion was

mobilized for active service in the expedition against the Mohmands

on the north-west frontier of India; but unfortunately for the Royal

Irish, this hill campaign was brought to so speedy and successful a

conclusion that they were not called up to the front.

During the two hundred and twenty-seven years of its existence

the XVIIIth regiment has served in nearly all the important wars

in which England has been engaged, and has earned undying laurels

whenever it has had an opportunity of distinguishing itself. The

roll of battle honours, long as it is, by no means commemorates all

the achievements of the regiment: in the Low Countries the Royal

Irish took a leading part in the storming, not only of Namur, but of

many other fortresses; in the capture of the Schellenberg, in the

engagement at Bunker’s Hill, in the defence of Toulon, and in the

fighting in Corsica the regiment won great praise, but the names of

none of these operations are emblazoned on its Colours. Early in its

career, the regiment earned the reputation of being second to none in

the British army. This reputation it has maintained to the present

day; and the author is convinced that when in years to come, his

successor writes the continuation of this history, it will be seen

that the future generations of officers and men of the Royal Irish

regiment have carried on the glorious traditions of the XVIIIth, and

have rivalled, though they could not surpass the brilliant feats of

arms which have been described in these pages.

[Illustration: THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR MONUMENT AT CLONMEL.]

APPENDIX 1.

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE XVIIITH ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT FROM THE TIME

OF ITS FORMATION IN 1684 TO THE END OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA IN

1902, AND THE PLACES WHERE IT HAS BEEN QUARTERED IN TIME OF PEACE.

1685 Sailed for England; quartered at Chester, and then

returned to Ireland.

1687 At the Curragh during the summer.

1688 At the Curragh during the summer: then sailed for

England, and marched to London, thence to

Salisbury; returned to Colnbrook near London,

and in the winter quartered in Hertfordshire.

1689. April Hertfordshire to Chester; thence to Wales.

1689. August Ordered to Ireland on active service. (See Chapter I.)

1689 to 1691 On active service in Ireland. (See Chapter I.)

1691. December At Waterford and Youghal.

1692 Embarked at Waterford for Bristol; marched to

Portsmouth and sailed to the Low Countries on

active service, returning in the autumn to

Bristol.

1693. May Bristol to Portsmouth where the regiment was

embarked on men-of-war to serve as Marines;

in the autumn it was landed, and after a short

time at Norwich, returned to the Low Countries

on active service. (See Chapter I.)

1694 to 1697 On active service in the Low Countries until the end

of 1697, when the regiment was sent to Cork.

(See Chapter I.)

1698 Moved from Cork to Waterford.

1699 Moved from Waterford to Dublin.

1700 Moved from Dublin to Kinsale.

1701 Ordered to Low Countries in anticipation of active

service.

1702 to 1712 On active service in the Low Countries and Germany.

(See Chapter II.)

1713-14 In garrison at Ghent.

1715 In the autumn part of the regiment returned to

England, and was quartered at Gloucester.

1716. February The remainder arrived at Gloucester; later in the

year the whole regiment moved from Gloucester

to Oxford.

1717. May Moved to Portsmouth.

1718 Embarked at Portsmouth for Minorca.

1727 A detachment was sent from Minorca to reinforce

the garrison of Gibraltar during the siege of

1727. (See Chapter III.)

1727 to 1741 At Minorca.

1742 Embarked at Minorca for Portsmouth; quartered on

arrival in and around Taunton.

1743 Taunton to Exeter and Plymouth.

1744 Exeter and Plymouth to the neighbourhood of

Hounslow and thence to Fareham.

1745 To the Low Countries on active service (see Chapter

III.); returned to England in the autumn and

quartered at Dartford.

1746. March Dartford to Gravesend, where the regiment embarked

for Scotland, but arrived too late to take part

in the suppression of the Jacobite rising.

Leith to Nairn, Inverness, and Elgin.

1747 Concentrated for the summer at Fort Augustus; during

the winter quartered at Edinburgh and Stirling.

1748 Edinburgh and Stirling to Berwick, Newcastle, and

Carlisle, and thence to Glasgow.

1749. February Glasgow to Ireland; stationed at Enniskillen and

Ballyshannon.

1750 At Kinsale.

1751 At Cork.

1752 At Waterford.

1753 At Dublin.

1754 At Londonderry and Ballyshannon.

1755. April Embarked for Liverpool; marched to Berwick, in October

to Edinburgh.

1756. May Edinburgh to Fort William, with detachments in the

Highlands.

1757 Returned to Ireland.

1758 to 1766 In Ireland.

1767 Ireland to Philadelphia, North America.

1775 On active service in North America. (See Chapter III.)

1776 North America to England; quartered at Dover.

1777 At Dover.

1778 At Coxheath encampment.

1779 At Warley encampment.

1780 At the encampments at Finchley, and “Hyde Park in

London.”

1782 England to Jersey and Guernsey.

1783. July Guernsey to Portsmouth, and in October to Gibraltar.

1784 to 1792 At Gibraltar.

1793 Embarked at Gibraltar for active service at Toulon.

(See Chapter IV.)

1794 to 1797 On active service in the Mediterranean.

1798-1799 At Gibraltar.

1800-1801 On active service in the Mediterranean. (See Chapter

IV.)

1802 In the summer embarked at Elba for Cork, where they

landed on August 29th; quartered at Armagh.

1803 In the summer ordered from Armagh to Newry, where a

second battalion was raised. Both battalions

were quartered in Scotland during the autumn of

1803, at Edinburgh, Haddington, and Dunbar.

1804 In the summer both battalions sent to the camp on

Barham Downs near Canterbury; the _second

battalion_ sent later in the year to Jersey.

1805. January _First battalion_ embarked for Jamaica, where it

arrived at the end of April or beginning of May.

1806 _First battalion_ in Jamaica; _second battalion_ in

Jersey.

1807 _First battalion_ in Jamaica; _second battalion_

embarked for West Indies and was stationed at

the island of Curaçoa.

1808 No change of stations.

1809. June 7th _First battalion_ from Jamaica to the Island of San

Domingo (see Chapter IV.) on active service and

back to Jamaica; _second battalion_ at Curaçoa.

1810 _First battalion_ at Jamaica: _second battalion_

returned to England.

1811 _First battalion_ at Jamaica: _second battalion_

ordered to Jersey.

1812 to 1813 No change of stations.

1814 _First battalion_ at Jamaica: _second battalion_

disbanded.

1815-16 The regiment at Jamaica.

1817 Returned to England, landing in March, and was

stationed at Brighton, Chatham, Sheerness, and

finally at Hilsea Barracks.

1818 Hilsea Barracks to Haslar and Gosport; in December

returned to Ireland, landing at Cork, and was

stationed at Fermoy.

1819 January Fermoy to Waterford, Wexford, Carlow, Duncannon

Fort, Kilkenny.

1820. July Ordered to Cork.

1821. February Cork to Malta.

1824. May-June Malta to Ionian Isles.

1825 to 1831 In the Ionian Isles.

1832. February 6 Embarked for Portsmouth; landed on March 7th, and

marched to Weedon, whence a Wing was sent in

July to Tynemouth and Sheffield; the remainder

of the regiment followed soon afterwards to

Ashton. Later in the year the regiment sent

detachments to Wigan, Chester, and Mold.

1833 August Headquarters ordered to Salford Barracks, Manchester,

where the detachments rejoined.

1834. May 8 Manchester to Dublin.

” October Dublin to Limerick, with detachments at Newcastle,

Killaloe, Tipperary, Tarbert Fort, Carrick

Island, and New Port.

” August Limerick to Birr.

1836. March Birr to Athlone, with detachments at Roscommon and

Shannon Bridge.

” Nov. 15 Detachment of the regiment embarked at Cork for

Ceylon.

1837 to 1840

” Jan. 10 Headquarters and remainder of regiment embarked at

Cork for Ceylon.

” April 10 The detachment arrived in Ceylon.

” May 31 Headquarters and remainder of regiment arrived in

Ceylon; regiment stationed at Colombo with

detachment at Point de Galle; later headquarters

moved to Trincomalee.

1840. May 1 Headquarters and part of regiment embarked for the

China war, followed shortly by the remainder of

the XVIIIth. (See Chapter V.)

On active service.

1841 On active service.

1842 On active service till peace signed: then quartered

at Chusan and Kulangsu.

1845. May Concentrated at Hong Kong.

1846 At Hong Kong.

1847 At Hong Kong, and for a few days on active service

in the Canton river.

” Nov. 20 Embarked for Calcutta.

1848. January 10 Landed at Calcutta and quartered at Fort William,

with a detachment at Dum-Dum.

” Dec. 19 Headquarters and the greater part of regiment

embarked on river steamers for Allahabad,

whither they had been preceded by a detachment.

1849. Jan. 22 Headquarters arrived at Allahabad; ordered to

Umballa.

” March 24 Arrived at Umballa.

” Dec. 25 Began the march to Meerut.

1850. Jan. 4 Arrived at Meerut; detachment sent to Cawnpore.

1850. Oct. 14 Began the march to Allahabad.

” Nov. 21 Arrived at Allahabad.

” Nov. 22 A wing of the regiment embarked at Allahabad for

Calcutta.

” Dec. 14 Arrived at Calcutta.

1851. January 22 Headquarters and the other wing embarked at Allahabad

for Calcutta.

” Feb. 15 Arrived at Calcutta.

1852. Jan. 19 Headquarters and a wing of the regiment embarked

for Burma on active service. (See Chapter VI.)

” March 14 The remainder of the regiment followed.

1853 On active service in Burma; returned in November to

Calcutta.

” Dec. 27 Embarked in four transports for England.

1854. May-June Arrived in England: stationed at Chatham with a

detachment at Canterbury, and for a short time

also at Windsor Castle and Wellington Barracks,

London.

” Dec. 8 Embarked for active service in the Crimea. (See

Chapter VII.)

” ” 30 Landed at Balaclava.

1855 On active service in the Crimea.

1856 On active service in the Crimea till the declaration

of peace.

” July 10 Landed at Portsmouth, and after a few days at

Aldershot, proceeded to Kingstown for Dublin.

” Aug. 27 Dublin to the Curragh.

1857. March to } A detachment sent from the Curragh to Kilkenny on

April } duty during the election.

” Sept. 24 A detachment embarked at Cork for Bombay on active

service against the mutineers of the Bengal army.

1857. Nov. 12 The detachment was followed from the Curragh by

headquarters and the remainder of the regiment,

which embarked at Cork.

” Dec. 3 The detachment arrived at Bombay, and was sent to

Poona. (See Chapter VIII.)

1858. Feb. 6 Headquarters and remainder of the regiment arrived

at Bombay, and were sent to Poona.

For the next twelve months the regiment was split up

into many detachments, which frequently changed

their stations. Among other places they were

temporarily quartered at Colaba (Bombay),

Mahableshwar, Poona, Singhur, Malligaum, Nassick,

Ahmednagar, Jaulnah, Sattara, Asseerghur,

Sholapore, and Adjunta.

” March to } _A second battalion_ was raised at Enniskillen, in

April } Ireland.

” Aug. 30 Enniskillen to Londonderry.

FIRST BATTALION.

1859. May 26 Headquarters and five companies left Sholapore for

Secunderabad.

” June 21 Arrived at Secunderabad, where they were gradually

joined by the detachments, the last of which did

not reach headquarters till the spring of 1860.

SECOND BATTALION.

” March 29 Londonderry to the Curragh.

” Oct. 17 The Curragh to Aldershot.

FIRST BATTALION.

1860 At Secunderabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

” October Aldershot to Shorncliffe.

FIRST BATTALION.

1861 At Secunderabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Aug. 21 Shorncliffe to Portsmouth.

FIRST BATTALION.

1862 At Secunderabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

” May 28. Portsmouth to Jersey with a detachment at Alderney.

FIRST BATTALION.

1863 At Secunderabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Feb. 21 Jersey and Alderney to Parkhurst.

” April 1 Headquarter and eight Companies embarked at

Portsmouth for New Zealand.

” ” 12 The remainder of the battalion followed.

” July 2 Headquarters reached Auckland, New Zealand; the

second ship arrived somewhat later. The

battalion was at once employed on active

service. (See Chapter IX.)

FIRST BATTALION.

1864 At Secunderabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

On active service in New Zealand.

1865 The same.

FIRST BATTALION.

1866. Jan. 16. Marched from Secunderabad to Sholapore, arriving on

February 8: train to Poona and on to Bombay,

where it embarked on two ships, the slower of

which did not reach England till June 30th. The

battalion was quartered at Shorncliffe.

” Dec. 13 Shorncliffe to Aldershot.

SECOND BATTALION.

On active service in New Zealand.

FIRST BATTALION.

1867. Aug. 19 Aldershot to Chester, with detachments at Weedon,

Bradford, and Liverpool.

SECOND BATTALION.

In New Zealand; headquarters at Auckland, with

detachments at Taranaki and Napier.

FIRST BATTALION.

1868. May 21 Chester to Edinburgh with detachment at Greenlaw.

” Oct. 14 Edinburgh to the Curragh.

” November Detachments were sent during the elections to Dublin

and Naas.

SECOND BATTALION.

In New Zealand: the headquarters and detachments as

in 1867, with a company at Wellington.

FIRST BATTALION.

1869. Oct. 26 The Curragh to Belfast; detachments sent at various

times to Londonderry, Carrickfergus, Newry,

Monaghan, Armagh, Galway, Gort, Portumna,

Oughterard, and Birr.

SECOND BATTALION.

In New Zealand: stations as in 1868.

FIRST BATTALION.

1870. June 21 Belfast to Birr.

” July 12 Birr to the Curragh.

SECOND BATTALION.

From New Zealand to Sydney (New South Wales),

with detachments at Melbourne (Victoria),

Adelaide (South Australia), and Hobart

(Tasmania).

” August The battalion embarked at Sydney and Melbourne

in two ships, the slower of which arrived at

Plymouth on December 4th.

FIRST BATTALION.

1871. May 22 The Curragh to Cork, with a detachment at Camden

Fort.

” Aug. 26 Cork to Fermoy.

SECOND BATTALION.

At Devonport.

FIRST BATTALION.

1872. Jan. 18 Embarked at Cork for Malta.

” Jan. 30 Landed at Malta.

SECOND BATTALION.

” July Devonport to Aldershot.

FIRST BATTALION.

1873 At Malta.

SECOND BATTALION.

” August Aldershot to Gosport.

FIRST BATTALION.

1874. Oct. 20 Embarked at Malta for Bombay.

” Nov. 15 Landed at Bombay.

” ” 25 Arrived at Bareilly; detachment at Moradabad.

SECOND BATTALION.

” May Gosport to Shorncliffe.

FIRST BATTALION.

1875 At Bareilly.

SECOND BATTALION.

” June-July Shorncliffe to Aldershot for summer drills and

then to Colchester.

FIRST BATTALION.

1876 At Bareilly.

SECOND BATTALION.

” July Colchester to Fermoy, with detachments at

Hardbowline, Rocky Island, Tralee, Clonmel,

and Mitchelstown.

FIRST BATTALION.

1877 At Bareilly.

SECOND BATTALION.

Fermoy to the Curragh for summer drills and then to

Kilkenny, with detachments at Waterford, Clonmel,

Duncannon Fort, Carrick-on-Suir.

FIRST BATTALION.

1878. Feb. 13 Bareilly to Loodianah by train, marching on to

Ferozepore.

” Feb. 24 Arrived at Ferozepore.

” Sept. 29 Detachments sent to Multan and Dera Ismail Khan.

SECOND BATTALION.

” May 1 Kilkenny to the Curragh.

” Aug. 9 The Curragh to Dublin.

FIRST BATTALION.

1879 At Ferozepore.

SECOND BATTALION.

” May 19 Dublin to Aldershot.

FIRST BATTALION.

1880. Jan. 4-25 On march to Peshawar.

” April 30 Marched to Lundi Kotal on active service in the

Afghan war. (See Chapter X.)

SECOND BATTALION.

At Aldershot.

FIRST BATTALION.

1881. Mar. 18-19 Returned to Peshawar.

” April 11 Arrived at Rawal Pindi.

” ” 24 Marched to Kuldanah in the Murree Hills with

detachments at Chungla gully and Bara gully.

” Nov. 6 Kuldanah to Rawal Pindi with a detachment at

Ghariat.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Oct. 19 Aldershot to Chatham.

FIRST BATTALION.

1882 At Rawal Pindi.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Aug. 11 Chatham to Portsmouth, for Egypt on active service.

(See Chapter XI.)

After the Tel-el-Kebir campaign was over, the

battalion was quartered in Cairo from September

20 to October 11, when it was sent to Alexandria.

FIRST BATTALION.

1883. May 4 Rawal Pindi to Kuldanah, with detachments as before.

” Oct. 11 Kuldanah to Rawal Pindi, and on to Meerut.

” Dec. 11 Arrived at Meerut; detachment at Fategarh.

SECOND BATTALION.

” February Alexandria to Malta.

” May 17 Malta to Portsmouth.

” ” 27 Portsmouth to Aldershot.

FIRST BATTALION.

1884. Aug. 20 Meerut to Bombay.

” ” 29 Sailed for Egypt.

” Sept. 29 Reached Cairo.

” Nov. 12 Left Cairo on active service in the Nile expedition.

(See Chapter XII.)

SECOND BATTALION.

” Feb. 28. Embarked for Malta.

FIRST BATTALION.

1885. Aug. 24 Embarked at Alexandria.

” Sept. 9 Arrived at Plymouth.

” Dec. 16 Plymouth to Devonport.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Jan. 7 Embarked at Malta for Bombay.

” ” 26 Arrived at Bombay.

” Feb. 4 Arrived at Umballa.

” April 24. Umballa to Subathu, with detachment at Jutogh.

FIRST BATTALION.

1886 At Devonport.

SECOND BATTALION.

No change of station, except during camp of exercise.

FIRST BATTALION.

1887. Oct. 3 Devonport to Plymouth.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Nov. 4. Subathu to Nowshera, arriving there on December 25th,

detachments at Fort Attock and Cherat.

FIRST BATTALION.

1888. Oct. 11. Plymouth to Devonport.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Sept. 21. Nowshera to Derband. On active service in the Black

Mountain or Hazara expedition. (See Chapter

XIII.)

” Nov. 15. At the end of the operations, Derband to Nowshera,

where the battalion arrived on 29th November.

FIRST BATTALION.

1889. May 6 Devonport to Harwich by sea and thence to

Colchester.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Oct. 24. To Peshawar for a review by the Viceroy.

” Nov. 3. Peshawar to Nowshera.

” Dec. 18. Nowshera to Peshawar.

FIRST BATTALION.

1890 At Colchester.

SECOND BATTALION.

” April 21. Peshawar to Cherat; detachment at Peshawar.

” Oct. 1 Cherat to Peshawar.

” November At camp of exercise.

” Dec. 5 Began march to Lucknow.

FIRST BATTALION.

1891. Nov. 4 Colchester to the Curragh.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Mar. 3. Arrived at Lucknow; detachment at Fategarh.

1892-93 Neither battalion changed station, except during

manœuvres and camps of exercise.

FIRST BATTALION.

1894. Oct. 31. After the summer manœuvres, the battalion made a

short halt at Birr, and then proceeded to

Limerick.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Nov. 29. Began march from Lucknow to Jubbulpore.

FIRST BATTALION.

1895 At Limerick.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Jan. 2 Arrived at Jubbulpore from Lucknow; detachment at

Sangor.

FIRST BATTALION.

1896. While the drainage of the barracks at Limerick was

being modernised, part of the battalion was

temporarily quartered at Templemore, and then

returned to Limerick.

A section of mounted infantry were sent to South

Africa, and were employed in the Mashonaland

expedition. (See Chapter XIV.)

SECOND BATTALION.

At Jubbulpore.

FIRST BATTALION.

1897 At Limerick.

SECOND BATTALION.

” Sept. 15. Jubbulpore for Rawal Pindi, on active service on

the Tirah campaign. (See Chapter XIII.)

FIRST BATTALION.

1898. Aug. 30. Limerick to Buttevant, with detachment at Clonmel.

SECOND BATTALION.

” April Arrived at Mhow from Rawal Pindi; detachment at

Indore.

FIRST BATTALION.

1899. Nov. 23. Buttevant to Aldershot.

” Dec. 16. Embarked at Southampton for South Africa on active

service. (See Chapters XIV. and XV.)

SECOND BATTALION.

At Mhow.

FIRST BATTALION.

1900 On active service in South Africa.

SECOND BATTALION.

At Mhow.

FIRST BATTALION.

1901 On active service in South Africa.

SECOND BATTALION.

At Mhow; detachments at Indore, Kamptee, and

Sitabaldee.

FIRST BATTALION.

1902. (to June 1) On active service in South Africa.

SECOND BATTALION.

” April 28 Mhow to Kamptee.

APPENDIX 2.

CASUALTY ROLL.

(In this Appendix an attempt has been made to collect the names of

the officers, non-commissioned officers, and private soldiers of

the regiment who in its many campaigns have been killed or wounded,

or who died from accident or disease. The information about the

losses in the wars of William III. and of Marlborough is very

incomplete, for it is obvious that far greater numbers of officers

and men must have perished than are recorded by Parker, Kane, and

Stearne, who only mention the casualties in battles and sieges of

great importance. The names of non-commissioned officers and men

who, though wounded, recovered from their injuries cannot be traced

further back than the Crimean war.)

(A).

WILLIAM III.’s CAMPAIGNS.

1690. 1st Siege of Limerick.

(Though seven officers are said to have been killed and

eight wounded, the following are the only names that can

be traced.)

Officers Killed Captains R. Needham and C. Brabazon; Lieutenant

P. Latham and Ensign ---- Smith.

Died of Lieutenant-Colonel G. Newcomb (or Newcomen).

wounds

Wounded Colonel the Earl of Meath; Lieutenants R.

Blakeney and C. Hubblethorne.

Other ranks More than 100 killed or wounded.

1691. Battle of Aughrim.

Officers Killed Captain ---- Butler.

Wounded A major, a captain, and two subalterns (names

unknown).

Other ranks 7 killed, 8 wounded.

1695. Siege of Namur.

Officers Killed Lieutenant-Colonel A. Ormsby; Captains B.

Purefoy, H. Pinsent, N. Carteret; Lieutenants

C. Fitzmorris and S. Ramme; Ensigns A.

Fettyplace, ---- Blunt, H. Baker, and S.

Hayter.

Died of Captain John Southwell; Ensign B. Lister (or

wounds Leycester) and an officer whose name cannot

be traced.

Wounded Colonel Frederick Hamilton; Captains R. Kane,

F. Duroure, H. Seymour, and W. Southwell;

Lieutenants L. La Planche, T. Brereton, C.

Hybert (or Hibbert), and A. Rolleston;

Ensigns T. Gifford, J. Ormsby, and W.

Blakeney.

Other ranks The losses in killed or wounded were 380 or

271. (See Chapter I. p. 21.)

(B).

MARLBOROUGH’S CAMPAIGNS

IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.

1704. Capture of the Schellenberg.

Officers Wounded Captain M. Leathes; Ensigns J. Pinsent (or

Pensant), S. Gilman, and E. Walsh.

Non-commissioned

officers 1 killed, 3 wounded.

Privates 11 killed, 32 wounded.

Battle of Blenheim.

Officers Killed Captains H. Browne and A. Rolleston; Ensign

W. Moyle.

Died of Captain W. Vaughan (or Vauclin).

wounds

Wounded Major R. Kane; Captains F. de la Penotière

and N. Hussey; Lieutenants W. Weddall (or

Weddell), S. Roberts, J. Harvey, B. Smith,

W. Blakeney, and Ensign R. Tripp.

Non-commissioned

officers 5 killed, 9 wounded.

Privates 52 killed, 87 wounded.

1706. Battle of Ramillies. The regiment is said to have been “greatly

mauled” in the battle. (See Chapter II.

p. 44.)

1706. Siege of Menin.

Officers Killed 2 captains and 5 subalterns.

Wounded Captain-Lieutenant Parker and seven others.

(Other names unknown.)

Other ranks About 100 killed or wounded.

1708. Battle of Oudenarde.

Officers Killed 1 lieutenant (name not known).

Other ranks 8 killed, 12 wounded.

Siege of Lille.

Officers Killed 2 captains, 3 subalterns. (Names not known.)

Wounded Major and several others. (Names not known.)

Other ranks 200 killed or wounded.

1709. Siege of Tournai. See Chapter II. p. 55. It is obvious that

the regiment suffered considerably; but

the numbers are not clear.

Battle of Malplaquet.

Officers Wounded 2 (names not known).

Other ranks 10 killed or wounded.

1710. Siege of Aire.

Officers Killed 3 (names not known).

Wounded 5 (names not known).

Other ranks 80 killed or wounded.

1711. Siege of Bouchain.

Officers Wounded 4 (names not known).

Other ranks About 40 killed or wounded.

(C).

THE WAR WITH THE AMERICAN COLONISTS.

1775. Retreat from Concord and Lexington.

Killed Privates S. Lee and J. Russell.

Wounded 4 private soldiers.

Battle of Bunker’s Hill.

Officers Wounded Lieutenant W. Richardson.

Other ranks Killed Privates D. Flynn, T. Smith, and W. Sorrel.

Wounded 7 private soldiers.