THE SECOND BATTALION.
1882-1883.
THE WAR IN EGYPT.
In Chapter iv. the campaign of 1801 is described, in which the Royal
Irish regiment played a distinguished part in the expulsion of the
French from Egypt. To explain why, more than eighty years later,
it became necessary for British troops again to take the field in
the valley of the Nile, a few words of historical retrospect are
necessary. Our short occupation of Egypt in 1801 was purely military
and in no way interfered with the status of the country, which for
many years continued nominally to be a province of the Ottoman
Empire. In the first half of the nineteenth century an adventurer
named Mahomed Ali, who started in life as a small government official
in Turkish employ, made himself master of Egypt and conquered the
Soudan, a vast no-man’s land, which from Wadi-Halfa, the southern
boundary of Egypt proper, stretched for 1300 miles up the valley of
the Nile. For thirty years he waged an intermittent war with the
Sublime Porte, occupying Syria and threatening the safety of the
Sultan in Constantinople itself, until the great Powers of Europe,
which in 1827 had combined to destroy the Turkish fleet at Navarino,
united in 1840 to save the Ottoman Empire from disruption, and sent
a joint naval expedition against Mahomed’s garrisons on the Syrian
seaboard. Next year the Sultan made peace with his rebellious vassal,
who restored Syria to his overlord as the price of the hereditary
viceroyalty of Egypt, which was then conferred upon him. A few
years later the opening of the “overland route,” by which mails and
passengers for the East were carried between Alexandria and Suez,
began to bring Egypt closely within the sphere of British politics;
and the completion in 1869 of the Suez canal by a French company,
whose moving spirit was M. de Lesseps, the engineer, made the safety
of the new waterway, and the good government of the country through
which it ran a matter of paramount importance to the British
Empire.[233] Yet England by no means desired to add the possession of
Egypt to her other burdens. Her attitude is well described by Lord
Cromer:
“The general political interest of England was clear. England
did not want to possess Egypt, but it was essential to British
interests that the country should not fall into the hands of
any other European Power. British policy, in respect to Egypt,
had for years past been based on this principle. In 1857 the
Emperor Napoleon III. made overtures to the British Government
with a view to the partition of the northern portions of Africa.
Morocco was to fall to France, Tunis to Sardinia, and Egypt to
England. On this proposal being submitted to Lord Palmerston,
he stated his views in a letter to Lord Clarendon. ‘It is very
possible,’ he said, ‘that many parts of the world would be better
governed by France, England, and Sardinia than they now are....
We do not want to have Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that it
should continue to be attached to the Turkish Empire, which is
a security against its belonging to any European Power. We want
to trade with Egypt and to travel through Egypt, but we do not
want the burden of governing Egypt.... Let us try and improve all
these countries by the general influence of our commerce, but let
us abstain from a crusade of conquest which would call down upon
us the condemnation of all other civilised nations.’ On another
occasion Lord Palmerston used the following homely but apt
illustration. ‘We do not want Egypt or wish for it ourselves any
more than any rational man with an estate in the north of England
and a residence in the south would have wished to possess the
inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that
the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing
him when he came with mutton chops and post-horses.’”[234]
Unfortunately Egypt was anything but well governed. A thin veneer of
European civilisation barely concealed the barbaric methods of the
East, and the corruption and extravagance of her rulers were almost
incredible. In 1863, her public debt was about three millions and
a quarter sterling.[235] Thirteen years later, under the rule of
Ismail, it had increased to sixty-eight millions, with a floating or
unfunded debt of twenty-six millions more, or ninety-four millions
in all. As the funded debt had been contracted in Europe, chiefly in
the money markets of London and Paris, and as a large portion of the
floating debt was due to European creditors, the English and French
Cabinets wrung from the Khedive a reluctant consent that European
men of business should be appointed to investigate the financial
condition of his country. In 1878, the Anglo-French committee of
enquiry discovered that the finances of Egypt were rotten to the
core. For the debt of ninety-four millions there was practically
nothing to show, except the Suez canal, towards the building of which
the Government of Egypt had contributed sixteen millions.[236] There
was no money to pay the interest on the bonds, and the old method
of raising a fresh loan to pay the interest on those already in
existence was obviously no longer possible.
In the hope that the influence of high-principled European men of
business would improve the government, the Powers insisted that the
Khedive should employ ministers of their selection. He did so, but
by resolutely obstructing the officials thus imposed upon him, he
reduced the administration to such a state of chaos that in June,
1879, the patience of England and France was exhausted, and with
the concurrence of the other Powers and the reluctant consent of
the Sultan, the Khedive was deposed in favour of his son, Prince
Tewfik. The change of viceroy did not, however, produce the result
anticipated. Affairs did not improve under Tewfik’s rule; by the
end of 1881 the population was in a ferment; a strong anti-European
feeling had arisen among the people, while the army was mutinous,
and regarded not Tewfik but Arabi, a clever and intriguing Egyptian
colonel, as its master. With the object of strengthening the
Khedive’s position, England and France in January, 1882, addressed to
Tewfik a “dual note,” stating that they considered his maintenance
on the throne as the sole guarantee of good order and prosperity
in Egypt. This note, however, in no way impressed the population;
the condition of the country daily grew more unsatisfactory, and by
May a series of military demonstrations had made Arabi the virtual
dictator of Egypt, though Tewfik continued in name to be its ruler.
Massacres of Christians in various parts of the country caused an
enormous exodus of the European population,[237] trade was completely
dislocated, and the safety of the Suez canal appeared imperilled.
The Egyptian army, exclusive of the garrison of the Soudan, consisted
of about 9000 men actually serving with the Colours, but more than
50,000 men had passed through the ranks into the reserve, and in the
Bedouins, the dwellers in the desert, Arabi had a further reserve,
though of very doubtful value. His artillery was powerful; exclusive
of heavy guns there were forty-eight batteries of field-artillery,
not, however, fully horsed. When war broke out the reserve men were
recalled, and 40,000 recruits enlisted, who after a few days’ drill
were thrust, virtually untrained, into the ranks. Egypt was rich in
horses and camels, and in addition to the horses required for the
artillery, eleven thousand transport animals were obtained from the
population. Nominally, these beasts were the free-will offerings of
their owners, but there is reason to believe that the generosity of
their donors was greatly stimulated by the use of the _courbash_.
During 1881, and the first part of 1882, many communications on the
subject of Egypt had passed between the governments of England and
France and the other European Powers.[238] All were agreed that order
should be restored on the banks of the Nile, but, save England and
France, none seemed disposed to undertake the task. At first France
was much more inclined to a military intervention than Britain,
for England in 1882 no more desired to annex Egypt than in 1857,
when she rejected the French Emperor’s schemes for the partition
of northern Africa. But she remembered that, even before the time
of the great Napoleon, France had cast covetous eyes upon Egypt,
and as it was impossible for England to allow Egypt to be occupied
by any Continental nation, her obvious policy was to co-operate
with France, and by re-establishing order and good government in
the country to render the Egyptians capable of managing their own
affairs without European guidance. To this policy England loyally
adhered until France refused to advance further in the matter. As
tangible evidence that the Western Powers really intended to support
the Khedive, an Anglo-French squadron was sent to Alexandria, where
it lay for several weeks, until our Admiral, Lord Alcester (then
Sir Beauchamp Seymour), discovered that in direct defiance of the
Khedive’s orders, Arabi was preparing to make good his threat to
attack any European troops landing in Egypt. Not only was he mounting
guns on the fortifications, but he was also attempting to prevent the
British fleet from leaving the port by secretly throwing great blocks
of stone into the entrance of the harbour. Through Lord Alcester, the
British government informed Arabi that unless he at once desisted
the forts would be shelled. Arabi promised compliance, but when
the search-lights from the ships were turned on, it was seen that
under cover of night the work was being pressed forward.[239] The
danger to the fleet soon grew too serious to be ignored, and after
repeated but equally fruitless warnings, notice was given to Arabi
that on the 11th of July the forts would be bombarded. Thereupon the
French Admiral announced that his instructions did not permit him to
take part in such an operation, and on the 10th he steamed out of
Alexandria, leaving his British colleague in the lurch. The forts
were bombarded with complete success, and Arabi, retiring inland for
a few miles, threatened Alexandria from a position at Kafr-el-Dauar,
astride the railway to Cairo. To save the town from pillage by its
mob, and to defend it against attack by the Egyptian army, a large
number of British sailors and soldiers were landed. The troops had
just arrived from Cyprus, where, under Lieutenant-General Sir A.
Alison, a brigade, supplied by the Mediterranean garrisons, had been
assembled with secret orders to seize and protect the Suez canal
against Arabi, who had openly expressed his determination to destroy
it.
Meanwhile preparations for an expedition were on foot in England.
An army corps drawn from the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean
garrisons, and India was to be sent to Egypt under command of Lord
Wolseley (then Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley) with the
temporary rank of General. It consisted of a cavalry division, two
infantry divisions, artillery, engineers, and a strong contingent
of British and native soldiers from India. In the first division,
under Lieutenant-General G. H. S. Willis, were the 1st, or brigade
of Guards, commanded by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, and the
2nd brigade (in which was the 2nd battalion of the Royal Irish),
under Major-General G. Graham. The second division, commanded by
Lieutenant-General Sir E. Hamley, was composed of the brigades of
Major-General Sir A. Alison and Major-General Sir E. Wood. The Indian
contingent, which was to join Lord Wolseley in Egypt, was led by
Major-General Sir H. T. Macpherson. The total number of troops who
embarked as part of the original army corps were 25,309.[240] The
units selected for the war were mobilised; the reserve, or to be
strictly accurate, those of its members who had left the Colours
within two years were called out; transports were engaged and fitted
up for troops, and the House of Commons voted the necessary money.
Suddenly the policy of France completely veered round, and on the
29th of July, only nine days after the French Ministry had formally
engaged to take part in the expedition, the Chamber by an enormous
majority refused to spend a penny upon the restoration of law and
order in Egypt. This remarkable change of front, which not only threw
the whole expense, but the whole conduct of the expedition upon the
British, was doubtless annoying to our statesmen, but agreeable to
our generals, many of whom knew from personal experience in China
and the Crimea how difficult co-operation with our French allies had
proved in those campaigns. The defection of the French caused no
alteration in Lord Wolseley’s plans. To crush the Khedive’s mutinous
army and to restore order among his subjects it was essential
that Cairo, the hot-bed of disaffection, should be occupied as
speedily as possible by British troops, and this he proposed to
do by landing, not at Alexandria, but at Ismailia, a town on the
canal half-way between Suez and Port Said. From Ismailia to Cairo
is about seventy-five miles, while from Alexandria to the capital
is nearly double that distance. By the former route the track would
lie alongside a canal of drinkable water, over hard sand which made
a fair surface for marching. In the latter route, _i.e._ through
the Delta of the Nile, there were practically no roads fit for
wheeled vehicles, the local traffic being carried on by railway,
by pack animals, and by boats on the innumerable canals by which
the country is irrigated. Moreover, during the months of August,
September, and October--the time of “high Nile,” which was rapidly
approaching--the whole of the Delta is under water. Thus, of the two
lines of advance, that through the desert was obviously the better
one, and it possessed the additional advantage that the preparations
for undertaking it served to protect the Suez canal from attack, and
to secure possession of the canals by which Suez, Ismailia, and Port
Said are supplied with drinking water. It was of the first importance
that Arabi should remain in complete ignorance of the British plans;
and thus the bombardment of Alexandria and the landing of Alison’s
brigade, neither of which had formed part of Lord Wolseley’s original
scheme, turned to our advantage, for the arrival of Alison’s troops
confirmed the Egyptian General in his opinion that the invading army
would disembark at Alexandria. Wolseley seized every opportunity
to strengthen him in this belief; Alison was ordered to keep Arabi
constantly in fear of an attack, and succeeded in doing so by a
series of demonstrations against the works which the rebel army had
thrown up.
By the end of July the troops began to leave the United Kingdom: and
the second battalion of the Royal Irish regiment, almost the last
corps to sail, embarked on August 8, 1882, at Plymouth, bound, as was
then believed by all on board, for Alexandria. To enable the reader
to appreciate the situation when the battalion reached the seat of
war, it is necessary to give a short account of the events which took
place while it was still at sea. On the 15th of August Lord Wolseley
arrived at Alexandria, and with his naval colleague, Admiral Lord
Alcester, settled the details of the combined operation by which the
sailors in the men-of-war already stationed in the Suez canal were
to seize and hold the towns upon its banks, until the soldiers could
begin to land at Ismailia. A considerable portion of the expedition
had already disembarked at Alexandria, and transports were daily,
almost hourly, arriving from England. The question of how these
troops were to be re-embarked and despatched to the canal without
giving Arabi any clue to their destination now had to be solved.
Throughout his career as a soldier, Wolseley had urged the necessity
of deceiving your enemy in war: now he had a great opportunity to
give the British army an object lesson in the art of mystifying
an opponent, and right well did he avail himself of it. A strong
believer in the truth of the axiom that whatever is rumoured in your
camp to-day will be known to-morrow to the enemy, he determined to
mislead, not only Arabi but the whole of the British army as to his
intentions. Orders were accordingly issued for a combined naval and
military attack from the sea upon the forts at Aboukir Bay, supported
by the troops left to garrison Alexandria. Not even General Hamley,
who was in command at Alexandria, was in the secret; and with the
help of his brigadiers, Alison and Wood, he worked out elaborate
details for co-operation in the advance of the main body after it
had landed at Aboukir Bay; the scheme was submitted to Wolseley and
gravely approved! At noon on the 19th of August all the troops,
except those left to hold Alexandria, were on board their ships,
and eight ironclads and seventeen transports steamed away towards
Aboukir. Before his departure the Commander-in-Chief handed a sealed
packet containing his real plan to General Hamley, with strict orders
not to open it till early on the morning of the 20th. The fleet
reached Aboukir in four hours, and anchored till nightfall, when
the gunboats and other small naval craft stood inshore and engaged
the forts, while the big ships slipped away unobserved and arrived
at Port Said early next morning, to find that the navy had carried
out their instructions admirably. The sailors had surprised the
detachments of the enemy watching Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez;
these places were in their hands. They were in possession of the
whole of the Suez canal. They had prevented any vessels from entering
it and, to clear the way for the transports, had ordered all steamers
then in the canal to tie up at the _gares_ or shunting-places,
familiar to every soldier whose service has taken him east of Suez.
The merchant ships complied with three exceptions. A French mail-boat
claimed the right to pass, and was allowed to do so as a matter of
international courtesy: two English master mariners of the baser sort
disobeyed, and when the British gunboat that regulated the traffic
was out of sight they followed in the Frenchman’s wake. This incident
considerably delayed the entrance of the British fleet into the
Canal, but by the evening of the 23rd, the day before the Royal Irish
reached Lake Timsah, 9000 men and a few stores had been landed at
Ismailia; the fresh-water canal and the whole line of railway between
Suez and Ismailia had fallen into our hands, and communication by
land had thus been secured with the Indian contingent, which had
begun to disembark at Suez on the 20th. Thanks to Lord Wolseley’s
_ruse de guerre_, these successes had been obtained almost without
bloodshed.
The report that Aboukir was to be bombarded duly reached Arabi, who
sent large reinforcements to the threatened forts. The Egyptians
believed that the Delta was the object of the British attack, and
consequently had concentrated the greater part of their army at the
mouths of the Nile, with a body of 12,000 men at Tel-el-Kebir, a
post in the eastern desert thirty-three miles to the westward of
Ismailia. To this flank guard was allotted the duty of defending
the Delta against an enemy based on the canal, and of guarding
Zag-a-zig, the most important junction in the railway system of
Egypt. By his successful feint upon Aboukir, Wolseley prevented the
despatch of reinforcements from the Delta to Tel-el-Kebir, and thanks
to the rapidity with which the naval landing-parties had seized the
telegraph lines, news of the occupation of the Suez canal did not
reach the garrison of Tel-el-Kebir in time to enable them to oppose
our disembarkation at Ismailia. Very shortly after Arabi heard that
Wolseley had landed on the bank of the canal he transferred his
Headquarters to Tel-el-Kebir, where his Intelligence department must
have been singularly inefficient, for, “strange as it may appear,
it now seems to be certain that the great transfer of force on the
19th of August from Alexandria to Ismailia remained unknown to Arabi
till he heard of it with evident astonishment about a year later in
Ceylon,”[241] where, after the war was over, he was detained as a
political prisoner. But though the British General had thus stolen a
march upon his enemy, many difficulties still confronted him, well
described in the following extract from the official history of the
campaign.
“There was only one small pier at Ismailia. Ships did not at
first anchor nearer than about half a mile from the shore. Every
man, every horse and every gun, as well as all the ammunition and
stores for the supply of the army, had first to be transhipped
from the transports into barges and small boats, rowed or tugged
to shore, and then landed on the small pier.... In no sense were
the conditions for the rapid landing of a large number of troops
and of a vast quantity of stores in existence at Ismailia. It
is true that this state of things could be ultimately changed
by our engineers. But this would also be a question of time.
Every tool, every scrap of material, all the bridging stores
and all the means of constructing other piers, for laying
down tramways and increasing the pier accommodation must, by
an inexorable necessity, be first landed under the conditions
actually existing. Materials for all these purposes, including
landing-stages expressly made for Ismailia, had been prepared
in England before the expedition sailed, but it would not be
possible to send them forward in the most advanced vessels
of the fleet, for those ships must be otherwise filled. In
order to secure the all-important lines of communication--the
railway and Sweet-water canal--for the advance from Ismailia,
it was essential that the first vessels of the fleet should be
occupied by the troops which would be sent forward to seize
them. These troops, once sent forward, must be supplied with
food and ammunition, so that a considerable force, with all
its guns and equipment, tons of supplies, ordnance stores and
ammunition and the means of local transport ... must be sent
on in the most advanced ships before any engineering material
for the improvement of the means of landing ... could be put on
shore.”[242]
The Egyptians had dammed the “Sweet-water” canal at Magfar, a few
miles west of Ismailia, and the water, the only supply for the towns
on the Suez canal and for the army when it moved into the desert,
was falling rapidly. While keeping every available man at work at
Ismailia, Lord Wolseley sent Graham with a small force of all arms
to Magfar, and after two days’ skirmishing, not only occupied that
place, but Kassasin also, where an important lock, twenty miles
up the canal from Ismailia, fell into our hands. Here Wolseley
determined to establish an advanced base, where, under the protection
of a comparatively small force, supplies could be accumulated in
readiness for the campaign in the desert. Graham was left in charge
of this post; among his troops were two of the units of his brigade
(the 2nd), viz.: a battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry and the
2nd battalion, York and Lancaster regiment; the remainder of his
command, the 2nd battalion of the Royal Irish regiment and the 1st
battalion of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, though they landed on the
night of the 24th, did not take part in these preliminary operations,
being detained at Ismailia to help in unloading the store-ships and
transports.
The Royal Irish arrived from England with a total strength of
seven hundred and seventy-one, including a hundred and fifty
non-commissioned officers and men from the reserve.[243] Among
their fellow-passengers was a newspaper correspondent, Major Terry,
a half-pay officer, who found the XVIIIth such good comrades that
he attached himself to the battalion throughout the war. From his
account the voyage was a pleasant one, the ship comfortable, and the
troops well fed. The time passed quickly, for in addition to the
ordinary routine of life on board a transport, the officers were
hard at work reading the books on Egypt with which Colonel Gregorie
had provided himself, and lecturing to the men about the country
in which they were going to fight. The correspondent described the
rank and file as “rather under height, but a very broad-shouldered
and robust body of men, with quiet manners and pleasant to talk
to. Intensely Irish, they easily brighten into excitement in their
amusements, and when their own stirring national airs are played
by the band.” At Malta the XVIIIth heard many rumours about Lord
Wolseley’s plans, but the only definite information they received
was the order to paint their helmets and belts mud-colour, and to
dull the brass-work on their uniforms. To our modern ideas the
red serge jumpers and blue serge trousers in which the expedition
took the field was a kit singularly ill adapted for a campaign in
Egypt. Spine-pads and spectacles with blue glasses were served
out, but many men did not understand the value of these novel
articles of equipment, and lost them, much to their sorrow when
a few days later they found themselves in the desert exposed to
the full blaze of a semi-tropical sun. On the 22nd the _City of
Paris_ reached Alexandria, and was immediately ordered on to Port
Said, where the battalion found the navy in possession of the town,
apparently quite as much at home there as in Portsmouth harbour. As
the ship was steaming slowly along the canal, the Royal Irish were
much entertained by a party of bluejackets, stationed at Kantara
to protect the floating bridge. The guard of sailors turned out
and presented arms in the most orthodox fashion; and then produced
a concertina and played “Rule Britannia,” dancing on the sand and
swinging their cutlasses round their heads with immense energy.
On August 24, the _City of Paris_ arrived at Lake Timsah, and
anchored in the midst of a great fleet of warships and transports,
the latter surrounded by steam-launches, tugs, and lighters, all
busily employed in landing at Ismailia the _personnel_ and _matériel_
of the expedition. This town, a creation of M. de Lesseps, is on the
western shore of the lake, where, half-hidden in groves of palm and
plane trees, it lies like a green oasis in a desert of yellow sand.
Here the Royal Irish remained for the next four days, earning golden
opinions by the sustained energy which they displayed in carrying
out the irksome duty of moving stores from the water-side to the
railway station. Then came the welcome order to join their brigade
at Kassasin. They moved in detachments, constantly halting to help
repair the railway and to clear obstructions from the Sweet-water
canal. The march was a singularly unpleasant one: the heat was very
great, the dust and flies were exasperating to a degree, the tents
had gone astray, and the only water to be had was from the canal,
which belied its name, as it was polluted by the dead bodies of
Egyptian soldiers. Several of the stations on the railway showed
traces of the recent presence of Arabi’s troops, who in their flight
had abandoned their rifles and ammunition, and left their dead
unburied behind them. There was so much work to be done on the line
that it was not until late on the 8th of September that the last
companies of the Royal Irish reached Kassasin.
Arabi had been misled by the lying reports of his Bedouin scouts, who
informed him that they had cut the communication between Ismailia
and Kassasin, and that the latter was held by a small force, whereas
as a matter of fact the railway from Ismailia to the front was in
working order; Kassasin was occupied by about 8000 men under General
Willis, and the brigade of Guards, a battery, and a regiment of
cavalry were all within reinforcing distance. Acting on this false
information, he determined to take the offensive, and at dawn on the
9th he put his troops in motion and pushed from Tel-el-Kebir towards
Kassasin with several squadrons of cavalry, thirty or thirty-one
guns, and seventeen battalions of infantry. His cavalry advance-guard
greatly outnumbered our mounted troops, who however succeeded in
holding back the Egyptian horsemen, until the infantry had taken
up a position astride the canal to meet the attack now threatening
from the west and north. Covered by a vigorous but comparatively
harmless cannonade, the enemy’s infantry, a large part of which had
been brought by train, advanced towards the camp, the uniforms of the
regular soldiers contrasting strongly with the white robes of the
Bedouins as they moved over the low sandy hummocks of the desert. For
a time General Willis stood on the defensive, and the Royal Irish
were detailed as the escort to the field-guns. Then he gave orders
for a general advance, and the battalion was placed in echelon on
the right rear of the first line of Graham’s brigade, ready to form
front to the right, and face the flank attack which for a moment was
anticipated. At first the battalion moved in quarter column, and
then in line; at no time during the 9th was it extended for attack,
for the British guns played so rapidly upon the Egyptians that they
fell back in disorder, giving Graham’s brigade no opportunity to
close with them; and by half-past ten the enemy had retired to his
works at Tel-el-Kebir, leaving four field-pieces in our hands. From
his entrenchments Arabi opened an angry but harmless artillery fire
upon the troops, who by General Willis’s directions halted out of
range. In ceasing his pursuit at a moment when it seemed that a
vigorous, though necessarily costly attack might have made him master
of the entrenchments, General Willis was acting in perfect accord
with the spirit of Lord Wolseley’s strategy, for Alison’s brigade of
infantry had only just arrived from Alexandria at Kassasin, and the
Commander-in-Chief was not yet ready to advance across the desert.
Had the Egyptians been attacked and beaten on the 9th, Wolseley could
not have followed up the victory, and therefore their defeat would
not have been the absolutely crushing blow that he hoped to inflict
(and did actually inflict) upon them a few days later. The British
troops remained facing Tel-el-Kebir for about three hours, and thus
secured time for a careful reconnaissance of Arabi’s position; then
they were ordered back to camp. The Egyptian losses were severe, but
the British casualties were only three men killed, two officers and
seventy-five other ranks wounded. Among the wounded were Captain H.
H. Edwards, Royal Welsh Fusiliers (attached to the XVIIIth) and two
private soldiers of the battalion.[244] A subaltern in the Royal
Irish thus recorded the experiences of the second battalion on this
occasion: “Just as we were sitting down to breakfast the bugles
sounded for us to fall in, and a minute or two later the enemy had
got so close that they began lodging shell in our camp and made it
so hot that the ---- had to clear out sharp. We were out pretty
quick, and were alongside some guns which opened on the enemy and of
course drew their fire on us. For about an hour we were in a pretty
warm corner; shells burst thickly around us, but no one was touched
except two men slightly wounded. After a time we got the order to
advance, and in doing so we got a few rifle-shots among us which
did not do us any harm. Our men did not fire a shot. As we advanced
the enemy retreated. We were left to cover the retirement of the
battalions who had been in the firing line and were relieved at four
o’clock in the afternoon.”
In a short time the Commander-in-Chief’s preparations were completed;
the whole of the troops selected for the march across the desert were
concentrated at Kassasin, and those appointed to hold the lines of
communication were at their posts. Lord Wolseley had already formed
his plan of attack, which he thus described in his despatch of the
16th of September--
“The enemy’s position was a strong one; there was no cover of
any kind in the desert lying between my camp at Kassasin and
the enemy’s works north of the Canal. These works extended from
a point on the Canal 1½ miles east of the railway station at
Tel-el-Kebir for a distance almost due north of about 3½ miles.
The general character of the ground which forms the northern
boundary of the valley through which the Ismailia[245] Canal and
railway run is that of gently undulating and rounded slopes,
which rise gradually to a fine open plateau from 90 to 100
feet above the valley. The southern extremity of this plateau
is about a mile from the railway and is nearly parallel to it.
To have marched over this plateau upon the enemy’s position by
daylight our troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like
slope in full view of the enemy and under the fire of his
well-served artillery for about five miles. Such an operation
would have entailed enormous losses from an enemy with men and
guns well-protected by entrenchments from any artillery fire we
could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the enemy’s
position either by the right or left was an operation that would
have entailed a very wide turning movement, and therefore a long,
difficult and fatiguing march, and what is of more importance,
it would not have accomplished the object I had in view, namely
to grapple with the enemy at such close quarters that he should
not be able to shake himself free from our clutches except by
a general fight of all his army. I wished to make the battle a
final one; whereas a wide turning movement would probably have
only forced him to retreat, and would have left him free to have
moved his troops in good order to some other position farther
back. My desire was to fight him decisively where he was, in
the open desert, before he could take up fresh positions more
difficult of access in the cultivated country in his rear. That
cultivated country is practically impassable to a regular army,
being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep canals. I
had ascertained by frequent reconnaissance that the enemy did
not push his outposts far beyond his works at night, and I had
good reasons for believing that he then kept a very bad look-out.
These circumstances, and the very great reliance I had in the
steadiness of our splendid infantry, determined me to resort
to the extremely difficult operation of a night march, to be
followed by an attack before daybreak on the enemy’s position.”
The field-works at Tel-el-Kebir were not of uniform strength, for
Arabi, believing that the British would advance along the Sweet-water
canal, had devoted himself to the fortification of the right of his
line, where for more than two miles stretched an unbroken series of
breastworks, with parapets five or six feet high, and ditches varying
from eight to twelve feet in width, and from five to nine feet in
depth. Behind these defences about two miles of interior works had
been thrown up, connected with those in front by rifle-pits and
trenches, and from redoubts built at numerous salients, cross-fire
could be poured in every direction. Towards the left the works
dwindled in size, and at the extreme northern end of the line, that
which, as we shall see, was attacked by the Royal Irish, they were
but a mere collection of shelter trenches. Arabi had twenty-five
thousand soldiers, six thousand Bedouin irregulars, and about sixty
guns with which to defend these fortifications against the eleven
thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and sixty-one guns that the
British Commander-in-Chief could bring against him. The remainder of
Wolseley’s command was absorbed by the garrisons of Alexandria, Port
Said, Ismailia, Suez, and other points on the Suez canal, and the
posts on the line of communication between Kassasin and the base at
Ismailia.
Though the British advance was to be astride the Sweet-water canal,
the main attack was to be delivered on the works to the north of
it, where the first division was to assault the left, the second
division the right of the entrenchments. The cavalry division,
with its batteries of Royal Horse artillery, was to circle round
the left of the Egyptian position, threaten its defenders from the
rear, and pursue them when the infantry had driven them from their
entrenchments. On the south of the canal the Indian brigade and the
naval contingent were to clear the country, capture the villages
which had been placed in a state of defence, and seize the important
railway junction of Zag-a-zig. To the field batteries an interesting
_rôle_ was assigned. It was obvious that in a night march they could
not discharge the ordinary duty of artillery, that of keeping in
check the enemy’s fire so as to render it possible for the attacking
infantry to advance. But it was almost equally obvious that, if the
forty-two field-guns could be brought up to the entrenchments of
Tel-el-Kebir by early dawn, they would be able to pour a crushing
short-range fire upon the defenders: if either division required
support the guns would be at hand to give assistance, and should
either of the infantry attacks fail, the artillery would be ready to
beat the enemy down behind his works until the attackers were able to
renew the assault. The seven field batteries therefore were ordered
to march in the interval between the infantry divisions, keeping
level with them.
The first and second divisions and the field artillery were assembled
after dark on September 12, on the rising ground known to the Staff
as Ninth Hill, which lay about four miles to the east of Arabi’s
position. To give the enemy’s scouts and spies no clue to the
intended movements the tents were not struck till sunset, when all
bugle calls ceased. Then the troops were set in motion, the men
marching light with a hundred rounds of ammunition, rations, and
water-bottles.[246] As soon as the sun went down the Royal Engineers
began to set up on Ninth Hill long lines of posts, running many
hundred yards into the desert, to serve as guides towards the enemy’s
entrenchments. The night was unusually dark, the posts were hard to
find, and it was not till eleven P.M. that all the units had reached
their proper places. Graham’s brigade was on the right of the line,
with its battalions standing in the following order from the right,
Royal Irish, York and Lancaster, Royal Marine Light Infantry, Royal
Irish Fusiliers: in the centre were the field-guns: on the left was
Alison’s brigade. H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught’s brigade of Guards
supported Graham, while in rear of Alison was a small brigade of two
battalions under Colonel Ashburnham, King’s Royal Rifle Corps.
At 1 A.M. on the 13th of September, Graham called together the
officers commanding the battalions of his brigade and in a low voice
gave them instructions, briefly and to the point: the works of
Tel-el-Kebir were to be surprised; the troops were to close upon them
at earliest dawn, and carry them at the point of the bayonet. The
soldiers were then roused; the orders were explained to them, and in
half an hour the greater part of the army was on the march to attack
an enemy of nearly double its numbers, and holding fortifications
about which, except their strength, little definite was known. The
Indian brigade did not leave its resting-place, south of the Canal,
until 2.30 A.M., as to have moved earlier would have run the risk
of giving the alarm to the inhabitants of the belt of cultivated
land through which Macpherson had to march. Throughout the night
telegraphic communication was kept up between the Indian brigade
and a detachment of Royal Marine artillery, who followed behind
the second division. It was many years since a British general had
attempted operations at night upon so large a scale. In the Peninsula
Wellington’s troops had been thoroughly accustomed to marching and
manœuvring in darkness, but the art was now almost a lost one, and
Wolseley wisely gave great latitude to his divisional generals in the
choice of the formations in which their commands were to advance;
he wished the brigades to be so marshalled that no manœuvring would
be necessary to pass them from the order in which they marched into
that in which they were to attack, and he suggested, though without
positively commanding, that each brigade should move in line of
columns of half battalions at deploying intervals. Neither Alison
nor Graham adopted the suggestion in its entirety. Alison drew up
his men in line of half battalion columns of double companies, and
not only marched but attacked in this formation; Graham first moved
in columns of half battalions at deploying intervals, but found it
necessary to make several changes in formation before he finally
closed with the enemy. Nothing but the perfect discipline of the
troops enabled Lord Wolseley and his generals to move this great
mass of men and guns at dead of night, across nearly four miles of
ground which it had not been possible thoroughly to reconnoitre,
and to bring it to within a few hundred yards of the fortifications
before it was detected by the enemy. No smoking was allowed; the
men were as silent as the grave; the few orders issued were passed
along the ranks in a whisper. In the blackness of the night Staff
officers riding from flank to flank found it impossible to see a
column, when two hundred yards away from it; yet when their ears had
grown attuned to the silence, which at first appeared crushing and
unnatural, they became aware of a low dull noise, that sound of human
feet, of horses’ hoofs, of jingling harness, which no forethought
could prevent. Fortunately throughout the night a little breeze blew
from west to east, and thus Arabi’s men, being up-wind, would have
heard nothing if their watch had been vigilant, instead of extremely
negligent.
In the 2nd brigade the precaution of extending a chain of connecting
links between the half battalions did not ensure perfect leading
by the guides. Sometimes the half battalions would open out, and
at others close unduly upon each other. These mistakes had to be
corrected, and each correction took time. At an hour variously
estimated between 3 and 4 A.M.[247] General Willis considered that
the 2nd brigade had come within range of the Egyptian works. He
wished to rest his men for a moment, and accordingly, after forming
line, ordered a short halt. With the priceless trust of British
soldiers in their officers, the men immediately dropped on the sand
and fell fast asleep during the few minutes’ repose which they were
allowed. About the same time the Highland brigade was halted to
refresh the men. As all orders were passed in a low tone from company
to company and from battalion to battalion, this order was not at
once received by the troops on the outer flanks; they continued to
advance, but as they remained in touch with the centre they lost
direction and by the time the command reached them they had wheeled
inwards, though quite unconsciously. Thus the brigade halted not in
line, but in a crescent-shaped formation. When the order was given
to resume the march the flank battalions, quite unaware that they
had lost direction, moved straight to their front, and soon almost
crashed into each other. Each thought the other was the enemy, but
by a triumph of discipline, every man waited for orders to fire,
and thus gave time for the officers to discover the mistake. The
brigade was halted, the companies of direction placed on the true
line of advance, and the remainder of the Highlanders, gradually and
successively drawing back, re-formed upon the proper alignment. This
mistake, which took about twenty-five minutes to correct, is a good
example of the difficulty of night operations and the necessity of
implicit obedience to orders.
After a short rest Graham’s brigade again advanced, this time in
line, but the formation was found unsuitable, and was changed to an
advance by fours from the right of companies. To keep in the proper
direction was no easy matter, especially as the mass of artillery
on the left was steering a few degrees too far to the northward,
and thus continually elbowed the 2nd brigade off the right path: to
correct this pressure frequent turns half-left and half-right had
to be made. Suddenly, at about 4.45 A.M., “far away to the left was
heard a tremendous rattle of musketry, mingled with the firing of big
guns, succeeded by ringing and sustained cheers, and”--to quote the
special correspondent who, as already mentioned, had attached himself
to the Royal Irish--“we felt sure that the Highland brigade had found
its quest and run into it.” At this moment it became necessary again
to correct a mistake in direction, and “a halt and change of front a
quarter circle to the left were at once ordered.... A rattling fire
of small arms now opened on us from the works, distant about 600
yards.[248] It was still dusk, but the blackness of night had given
place to a pale darkness, through which the flashes of fire sparkled
with ceaseless rapidity.”
By this time, owing to the difficulty of marching at night over the
featureless desert with nothing to steer by but the stars, Lord
Wolseley’s force was no longer in line but in echelon from the
left, and when the Highlanders struck the enemy’s works the head of
Graham’s brigade was probably more than 800 yards from the Egyptians’
entrenchments. As soon as the brigade had formed line the Royal
Irish pushed forward, and were rapidly nearing the position when the
brigade-major, suddenly appearing on the scene, told Colonel Gregorie
it was General Graham’s wish that he should form the Royal Irish
for attack. Though it was obvious that the battalion was too close
to the trenches for the evolution to be carried out accurately, the
necessary orders were given, and C and D companies extended, with
B and E in support, and the remainder in reserve. Then the leading
companies swept onwards under a heavy but fortunately ill-directed
fusilade; the supports and reserves closed upon the firing-line, and
with wild yells and almost without firing a shot, the Royal Irish
swarmed over the shelter trenches at the extreme end of Arabi’s
line, driving before them at the point of the bayonet the Egyptians,
who slowly and in good order fell back to a second line of works in
rear. The Royal Irish were now enfiladed by a redoubt on their left
flank, but taking no notice of its fire they pressed onwards until,
after driving the Egyptians from the second line of entrenchments,
they were peremptorily halted and ordered to re-form their ranks.
While this second charge was being delivered, Lieutenant Chichester
made a gallant effort to storm the redoubt with a few men; but he
and two or three of his followers fell wounded, and it remained in
the hands of the enemy until the York and Lancaster carried it with
a rush. The Marines and the Royal Irish Fusiliers gradually made
themselves masters of the works in front of them, and the Egyptians,
falling into confusion, and to a large extent abandoned by their
officers who were among the first to fly, retired in disorder. When
they discovered that the British cavalry had swung round the left
of their position and were directly threatening them from the rear,
their retreat became a rout. Yet there were many among the rank
and file, especially in the regiments composed of Nubians, who had
shown bravery in the battle, and at the time it was thought that had
these men been well led they would have been formidable enemies.
The justice of this, opinion has been proved by the services of the
modern Egyptian troops in the Soudan, where regiments of Egyptian
peasants and Soudanese blacks, trained and officered by men of the
regular British army, have on many occasions acquitted themselves
excellently.
Some interesting episodes have been recorded of the part played
by the Royal Irish in this phase of the engagement. The special
correspondent relates that as the battalion was advancing towards
the first line of trenches two men, mad with excitement, dashed
out of the ranks and rushed towards the enemy. For a moment they
disappeared, but
“presently they were seen by themselves, beyond the first works,
and in front of the big redoubt, in the very midst of the foe.
These gallant two! One was on his knee facing south-west;
apparently he is conscious of having gone beyond support. The
Egyptians in their trenches and ditches are in front, to right
and to left of him. He glances back towards where kneels, a few
yards behind him, his brave companion. But who can save you now,
rash, gallant young Irishmen! You have turned from the front
of your regiment and are cut off from all aid. My position on
horseback enabled me to see the men, who, kneeling, were hid by
the trenches from their own regiment. I saw an Egyptian officer
move up behind the left of the leading man, and seizing his arm,
strike him over the head or shoulder with his sword. A struggle
ensued, but the smoke of battle hid them from further view. After
the fight Colonel Gregorie found two dead bodies of his men among
the others of his regiment in the place described: their names
were Corporal Devine and Private Milligan.”
The good conduct of other soldiers is thus described by Colonel (then
Lieutenant) Chichester--
“They stood back to back, tackled six Nubians, and accounted for
them all. I now forget their names, but I was going to recommend
them for reward, but afterwards heard that they had been killed
later in the battle. A very brave reservist in my company was
badly wounded and lay on the ground close to where I had fallen.
He had eight bullet holes in his body, yet he only died the day
that our transport full of wounded arrived at Plymouth. When the
men came to attend him on the battlefield, he said, ‘Don’t mind
me; look after others, worse hurt.’”
In sharp contrast to the gallant behaviour of this Irishman was the
treachery of an Egyptian officer who lay injured on ground occupied
by the XVIIIth. One of the men offered him water; he drank it, and
then suddenly rolled over, snatched up a rifle and shot down one of
the soldiers who were tending him. Prompt steps were taken to prevent
this ruffian from doing more mischief!
After pursuing for some distance, Graham halted to re-form his
brigade in readiness for further action. He had every reason to be
proud of his command, for, as he reported to Lord Wolseley, “the
steadiness of the advance of the 2nd brigade under what appeared
to be an overwhelming fire of musketry and artillery will remain a
proud remembrance.” As he rode from battalion to battalion he was
greeted with many cheers, a tribute to the leader who, though a
stern disciplinarian, had ever proved himself mindful of the comfort
of his men, watchful of their safety, and who had now led them to
decisive victory. By the time the second brigade had re-formed its
ranks the troops on the left had also finished their work. The task
set to Alison’s command had proved much harder than that allotted to
Graham’s battalions. Not only were the fortifications which faced
the Highland brigade far stronger than those attacked by the second
division, but when the Highlanders had surmounted them they came
under a very heavy fire from the inner works. But thanks to the
timely aid of the guns, which pushed right into the entrenchments,
the enemy was driven back in wild confusion, and in less than an hour
Arabi’s army was shattered as completely as it had been surprised.
Lord Wolseley lost no time in reaping the fruits of his victory. As
soon as the enemy’s works were in his hands the cavalry were ordered
to continue their pursuit, and to strain every nerve to reach Cairo
before Arabi had been able to burn it, as he had threatened to do
if he was defeated; while the Indian brigade, which had completely
driven the enemy from the cultivated country on the southern bank
of the canal, was to push on to Zag-a-zig, and by occupying it,
prevent the various detachments of Arabi’s troops in the Delta from
coming to his assistance. Both enterprises were successful. At four
o’clock on September 14, the cavalry after a magnificent forced march
began to appear before the gates of Cairo, where Arabi, who was one
of the first to quit the entrenchments of Tel-el-Kebir, had taken
refuge. Without attempting to fight, or to carry out his plan for
the destruction of the city, he surrendered at once, and with him the
garrison of ten thousand men. The Indian brigade made itself master
of Zag-a-zig, capturing much rolling stock, in which a great portion
of the infantry was moved up to Cairo. With their arrival the war
was over, and in ten days’ time every garrison in Egypt had been
disarmed, and the men set free to resume the avocations of peace.
Not all the British infantry, however, went on at once to Cairo.
Among the regiments left at Tel-el-Kebir was the second battalion
of the Royal Irish, who thus had plenty of opportunity to admire
the fifty-eight guns which had been taken on the 13th. In the
engagement the Egyptians are believed to have lost about two thousand
killed;[249] of the number of their wounded there is no record, but
several hundred were tended by our army doctors, while many uninjured
prisoners were taken, disarmed, and turned adrift. The British
casualties were nine officers killed and twenty-seven wounded; of the
other ranks forty-eight were killed, three hundred and fifty-five
wounded, and thirty missing--in all, four hundred and sixty-nine.
In the Royal Irish the losses were:
_Killed_ Captain C. M. Jones (attached from
the Connaught Rangers) and three
other ranks.
_Mortally Wounded_ Four private soldiers.
_Wounded_ Lieutenant A. G. Chichester and Lieutenant
H. H. Drummond-Wolff
(attached from the Royal Fusiliers)
and fourteen other ranks.[250]
After a week at Tel-el-Kebir the Royal Irish were moved by train to
Cairo, where they were quartered in a barrack, the filth of which was
so great that to this day the remembrance stinks in the nostrils of
those who occupied it. The duty was heavy; there was much sickness
among all ranks, and beyond ceremonial parades in honour of the
return of the Khedive to the capital in which he had been reinstated
by British bayonets, nothing of interest occurred during the three
weeks the battalion spent in Cairo except a great fire, in the
suppression of which it was employed. Lieutenant W. R. B. Doran (now
Colonel Doran, C.B., D.S.O.), in a letter written at the time, thus
described the part played on this occasion by the Royal Irish, who
were fortunate to escape without any of the casualties which occurred
among other corps--
“On the 29th of September we were startled by a tremendous bang,
followed by what sounded like a succession of cannon-shots. After
an interval there was another great explosion, more cannon-shots,
and then a rattle of musketry. We thought at first it was some
kind of plot. It turned out that a lot of trucks full of powder,
unexploded shells, and small-arm ammunition had been set on fire
by another train containing hay. How the hay was set on fire no
one has yet found out. About 6.30 P.M. we were turned out in a
great hurry, and went to the railway station, to stop all traffic
in the streets in the neighbourhood, and to prevent the scum
from beginning to loot; they had just begun, but they got such
‘toco’ from the ‘Tommies’ that they soon stopped their little
games. We remained guarding the streets till nearly 1 A.M., when
we were relieved and began, as we thought, to march home, but
were grievously disappointed, as before we had gone half a mile
we were halted in a square and told to lie down and go to sleep
in the road. I was rather hungry, as I had not quite finished my
dinner when the order to fall in came, so I managed to get a sort
of penny bun from one of our captains, half of which I ate; the
other half I put under my head and went to sleep on the hardest
bed and strangest pillow I have ever had!”
The battalion was sent to Alexandria[251] on October 11, and a month
later Lieutenant-Colonel Gregorie, after serving his full time in
command, was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. E. Dawson. On
February 1, 1883, the medals with clasps for Tel-el-Kebir were
presented to the Royal Irish on the racecourse of Alexandria by a
veteran soldier, Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., and a
few days later the battalion, which to the great satisfaction of all
ranks was not included in the 10,000 troops left to hold Egypt for
the Khedive, sailed for Malta, and after remaining there for three
months, landed at Plymouth at the end of May, 1883.
The regiment received permission to add to its battle honours the
words “Egypt 1882” and “Tel-el-Kebir.”
Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Gregorie was appointed a Companion of the
Order of the Bath; Major G. W. N. Rogers and Captain J. H. Daubeney
each received a step in brevet rank; Quartermaster and Honorary
Captain T. Hamilton was made an Honorary Major; Lieutenant A. G.
Chichester and Sergeant E. O’Donnell were mentioned in despatches.
The following officers were permitted to accept and wear decorations
awarded by the Sultan, viz.: Lieutenant-Colonel Gregorie, the
Medjidie (3rd class); Major Rogers, the Osmanieh (4th class); Captain
Daubeney, Medjidie (4th class); and Lieutenant Chichester, Medjidie
(5th class), and all ranks were presented by the Egyptian government
with a decoration known as the Khedive’s Star.
Two officers attached to the second battalion--Captain H. H. Edwards,
Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and Lieutenant H. H. Drummond-Wolff, Royal
Fusiliers, were also mentioned in despatches.