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Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
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A caret character is used to denote superscription. A
single character following the caret is superscripted
(example: obed^t). Multiple superscripted characters are
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[Illustration: THE NORTH TRANSEPT OF ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL, DUBLIN.
CONTAINING THE COLOURS AND MEMORIALS OF THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT.]
THE CAMPAIGNS AND HISTORY
OF THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT
FROM 1684 TO 1902
by
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G. LE M. GRETTON
Late 3rd Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment
NAMUR, 1695
OUDENARDE
CHINA
NEW ZEALAND
TEL-EL-KEBIR
BLENHEIM
MALPLAQUET
PEGU
AFGHANISTAN, 1879-80
NILE, 1884-5
RAMILLIES
EGYPT
SEVASTOPOL
EGYPT, 1882
SOUTH AFRICA, 1900-02
William Blackwood and Sons
Edinburgh and London
1911
PREFACE.
This history of the war services of the Royal Irish regiment has been
written at the request of the officers of that very distinguished
corps. When I accepted the task, I knew that I had undertaken a
delightful but difficult piece of work, for it is no easy matter to
do justice to the achievements of a regiment which has fought in
Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in America, and in Australasia. After
serving with credit in William III.’s war in Ireland, the Royal
Irish won undying laurels in the Siege of Namur in 1695. They formed
part of the British contingent in the army commanded by Marlborough
in the Low Countries and in Germany, and fought, not only at the
great battles of Blenheim, Ramillies, Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, but
in the long series of desperate but now forgotten sieges by which
fortress after fortress was wrested from the French. A detachment
took part in the defence of Gibraltar in 1727: the whole regiment
was involved in the disasters of the campaign of 1745: the flank
companies encountered foemen worthy of their steel at Lexington and
Bunker’s Hill. In the first phase of the great war with France the
Royal Irish were in the Mediterranean: they served in the defence
of Toulon; they helped Nelson and Moore to expel the French from
Corsica, and they were sent to the mainland of Italy where for some
months they established themselves firmly at Piombino, a port on
the Tuscan coast. A few years later they fought under Abercromby in
Egypt, but then their good luck changed, for they were ordered to the
West Indies, where they remained till the end of the Napoleonic war.
In 1840, the outbreak of the first war with China re-opened the gates
of the Temple of Janus to the XVIIIth; and during the last sixty
years almost every decade has seen the regiment employed on active
service, for after the Chinese war came the second war in Burma; the
Crimea; the Indian Mutiny; the New Zealand war; the second Afghan
war; the campaign of Tel-el-Kebir; the Nile expedition; campaigns
on the north-west frontier of India; and the war with the Dutch
republics in South Africa.
The Historical Committee had hoped that Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley
would have written a preface to the history of the regiment, with
which throughout his military career he has been associated closely.
In Burma he won his spurs leading a charge of infantry among whom
were many of the Royal Irish; as an acting Engineer at the siege of
Sebastopol he frequently supervised the operations of the regiment in
the trenches; in the Tel-el-Kebir campaign and the Nile expedition
the Royal Irish formed part of the troops under his command; and
for the last thirteen years he has been their Colonel-in-Chief. Ill
health unfortunately has prevented Lord Wolseley from writing at
any length, but in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee, he
expressed his admiration for the regiment in the following words:--
“HAMPTON COURT PALACE, MIDDLESEX,
_19th June 1910_.
MY DEAR GREGORIE,--I am indeed very glad to hear that the History of
the Royal Irish Regiment is soon to be published. Its story cannot
fail to be a fine one. Every soldier who like myself, had the honour
of fighting, I may say shoulder to shoulder with it, will read this
new work with the deepest interest.
Were it to be my good fortune to lead a Storming party this afternoon
I should indeed wish it were to be largely composed of your
celebrated corps.
Believe me to be,
Very sincerely yours,
WOLSELEY.”
“_To_ General C. F. GREGORIE, C.B.,
Royal Irish Regiment.”
A lithographic reproduction of this letter will be found facing page
viii.
This history has been prepared, not for the officers alone but for
all ranks of the Royal Irish, and the Committee are supplying it to
non-commissioned officers and private soldiers at a price so low that
even the last joined recruit can buy it, and read of the gallant
deeds of his predecessors in the regiment.
As I am fully impressed with the importance of recording the names,
not of the officers only, but of all members of the regiment who on
active service laid down their lives for their country, I have tried
to mention in the Casualty appendix all ranks who were killed, or
died from the effects of wounds or sickness in the many wars in which
the Royal Irish have taken part. In the campaigns of the seventeenth
and the greater part of the eighteenth centuries but few names are
to be found, and it is not until the middle of the nineteenth
century that those of wounded non-commissioned officers and men can
be traced. In other appendices are lists of those who won medals for
distinguished conduct in the field, and also those to whom medals for
long service and good conduct have been awarded.
It has been my object to write this book as far as possible on the
lines of a biography, and by quotations from regimental sources
of information to let the Royal Irish describe their doings in
their own words. In the wars of William III. and of Anne this was
comparatively easy, for though the regiment has preserved no official
records for the 17th and 18th centuries, during the first thirty
years of its existence it produced four military historians, three
of them officers, one a sergeant. Brigadier-General Kane, Captain
Robert Parker, and Sergeant John Millner have left books, and
Brigadier-General Robert Stearne a manuscript journal describing the
events they witnessed. Unfortunately they all wrote for a public far
more concerned in the general results of a battle or a siege than in
the doings of an individual regiment; and though they gave excellent
accounts of an engagement, they failed as a rule to describe the
part played in it by the men under their command. Whether their
laconic style was due to modesty--for the three officers were all
distinguished soldiers--or to want of descriptive power, it is
impossible to say, but the fact remains that they have bequeathed to
their successors in the Royal Irish accounts singularly deficient
in regimental detail. In some cases they failed to record the
casualties among the XVIIIth in a battle or a siege, and when they
remembered to do so, often forgot to give the names of killed or
wounded officers. Their indifference to the losses of the lower ranks
is characteristic of all armies in the 17th and 18th centuries; and
they tell us nothing of the deaths by disease, or of the drafts of
recruits by which the waste of war was made good. Sergeant Millner
is equally unenlightening. If, instead of devoting his undoubted
talents to the production of a sort of Quartermaster-General’s diary
of Marlborough’s movements, he had written an account of the life of
the regiment on active service, he would have left behind him a very
interesting book, instead of a comparatively dull one.
The adventures of the XVIIIth in the campaign of 1745 in the Low
Countries were described in the journal of one of the officers,
whose name has not been preserved. For a hundred years the regiment
produced no more authors, until, after the end of the first Chinese
war, Lieutenant A. Murray wrote an interesting account of the Royal
Irish in that campaign.
For the wars in the beginning and middle of Queen Victoria’s reign
much valuable material was obtained from private sources by the
honorary secretary of the Historical Committee, Lieutenant-Colonel
A. R. Savile, who for many years devoted himself to the collection
of information from officers who had served with the regiment in
these campaigns. Probably no one but the man who has profited by
Colonel Savile’s exertions can appreciate adequately the energy and
perseverance he displayed in this labour of love for his regiment.
He has also prepared two appendices; one giving an epitome of the
services of the Colonels of the regiment, the other describing the
memorials which have been raised by the officers and men of the
Royal Irish to the memory of those of their comrades who died on
active service. Nor is this all for which I have to thank him: his
collection of historical matter relating to the regiment at all
periods of its existence has proved of great help to me:--indeed in
all honesty I may say that if this book meets with success a great
part of that success will be due to the “spade work,” the results of
which Colonel Savile has generously placed at my disposal.
Many of the past and present officers of the Royal Irish regiment
have given me great assistance in the later campaigns by preparing
for me statements recording their personal recollections, and by
lending me their diaries and letters, written at the seat of war; and
several non-commissioned officers have supplied me with interesting
details about episodes in South Africa.
With the officers who form the Historical Committee I have worked
in perfect harmony and identity of views, and I have to thank them
warmly for the unfailing support they have given to me during the two
years which it has taken me to prepare this book.
I have to express my sense of obligation to the Librarians of the War
Office, the India Office, the United Service Institution, and the
Royal Colonial Institute, and the officials at the Record Office for
their friendly help.
To Mr Rudyard Kipling the warm thanks of the regiment are due for his
kindness in allowing the reproduction of his ballad on the second
battalion of the Royal Irish in the Black Mountain campaign.
In the compilation of this record very many books have been
consulted. Among them stands out pre-eminently the ‘History of the
British Army,’ by the Hon. John Fortescue, who, by his masterly
descriptions of the campaigns he has dealt with up to the present,
has made the path of a regimental historian comparatively smooth.
SHERBORNE, DORSET.
[Illustration: (Handwritten letter from Lord Wolseley.)]
[Illustration: (Text of the letter is in the Preface.)]
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PREFACE v
CHAPTER I.
1684-1697.
THE RAISING OF THE REGIMENT: AND THE WARS OF WILLIAM III. 1
CHAPTER II.
1701-1717.
MARLBOROUGH’S CAMPAIGNS IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 25
CHAPTER III.
1718-1793.
THE SECOND SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR--THE SIEGE OF OSTEND--LEXINGTON--
BUNKER’S HILL 65
CHAPTER IV.
1793-1817.
THE WAR WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC: TOULON--CORSICA--EGYPT. THE
NAPOLEONIC WAR: THE WEST INDIES 89
CHAPTER V.
1817-1848.
THE FIRST WAR WITH CHINA 120
CHAPTER VI.
1848-1854.
THE SECOND WAR WITH BURMA 145
CHAPTER VII.
1854-1856.
THE WAR IN THE CRIMEA 162
CHAPTER VIII.
1856-1859.
OPERATIONS DURING THE MUTINY IN INDIA 189
CHAPTER IX.
1858-1882.
RAISING OF THE SECOND BATTALION: THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND 193
CHAPTER X.
THE FIRST BATTALION.
1865-1884.
CHANGE IN ARMY ORGANISATION: THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR 225
CHAPTER XI.
THE SECOND BATTALION.
1882-1883.
THE WAR IN EGYPT 232
CHAPTER XII.
THE FIRST BATTALION.
1884-1885.
THE NILE EXPEDITION 253
CHAPTER XIII.
THE SECOND BATTALION.
1883-1902.
THE BLACK MOUNTAIN EXPEDITION: THE TIRAH CAMPAIGN 288
CHAPTER XIV.
THE FIRST BATTALION.
1885-1900.
MOUNTED INFANTRY IN MASHONALAND: THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA:
COLESBERG AND BETHLEHEM 305
CHAPTER XV.
THE FIRST BATTALION.
1900-1902.
SOUTH AFRICA (CONTINUED): SLABBERT’S NEK: THE BRANDWATER BASIN:
BERGENDAL: MONUMENT HILL: LYDENBURG: THE MOUNTED INFANTRY OF
THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT 332
APPENDICES.
1. THE MOVEMENTS OF THE XVIIIth ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT FROM THE
TIME OF ITS FORMATION IN 1684 TO THE END OF THE WAR IN SOUTH
AFRICA IN 1902, AND THE PLACES WHERE IT HAS BEEN QUARTERED IN
TIME OF PEACE 375
2. CASUALTY ROLL 385
3. OFFICERS OF THE 1ST AND 2ND BATTALIONS WHO DIED IN THE
WEST INDIES BETWEEN 1805 AND 1816 403
4. ROLL OF OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS, AND MEN OF THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT TO WHOM HAVE
BEEN AWARDED THE VICTORIA CROSS, MEDALS FOR DISTINGUISHED
CONDUCT IN THE FIELD, FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE, AND FOR LONG
SERVICE AND GOOD CONDUCT 404
5. THE TIRAH CAMPAIGN: COLONEL LAWRENCE’S ORDER OF JUNE 8, 1898 414
6. THE SOLDIER’S KIT IN SOUTH AFRICA 416
7. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF TRAINS 417
8. DIARY SHOWING MOVEMENT OF THE FIRST BATTALION IN THE NORTH
OF THE TRANSVAAL BETWEEN APRIL 12, 1901, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1901 418
9. SUCCESSION OF COLONELS OF THE REGIMENT 422
10. MEMORIALS OF THE ROYAL IRISH REGIMENT 431
11. TABLE SHOWING THE FORMER NUMBERS AND PRESENT NAMES OF THE
INFANTRY REGIMENTS OF THE REGULAR ARMY 440
INDEX 443
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
THE NORTH TRANSEPT OF ST PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL,
DUBLIN _Frontispiece_
LITHOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTION OF LORD WOLSELEY’S LETTER _facing_ viii
MEMORIAL TO THOSE WHO DIED IN THE AFGHAN, EGYPTIAN,
AND NILE CAMPAIGNS 231
MEMORIALS TO THOSE WHO FELL IN SOUTH AFRICA 305, 374
LIST OF MAPS.
NO. 1. BLENHEIM, RAMILLIES, OUDENARDE, AND MALPLAQUET _facing_ 60
NO. 2. THE LOW COUNTRIES ” 78
NO. 3. BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN ” 116
NO. 4-5. CHINA AND BURMA ” 160
NO. 6. THE CRIMEA ” 188
NO. 7. NEW ZEALAND ” 220
NO. 8-9. THE WAR IN EGYPT, 1882--THE NILE EXPEDITION ” 286
NO. 10. SOUTH AFRICA ” 442
CORRIGENDA.
page line
40 24 _for_ Lieut. G. Roberts _read_ S. Roberts.
69 10 ” Colonel Crosby ” Cosby.
70 1 of footnote ” ” ” ” ”
121 10 ” ” Lieut. D. Edwards ” Edwardes.
128 4 ” ” Lieut. C. W. Davis ” G. W. Davis.
{ 3 ” ” Lieut. H. J. Stephenson ” H. F. Stephenson.
147 {15 ” ” Lieut. G. W. Stackpoole ” G. W. Stacpoole.
{17 ” ” Ens. T. E. Esmond ” T. E. Esmonde.
160 28 ” Lieut. W. F. Cockburn ” W. P. Cockburn.
165 4 of footnote ” Capt. G. W. Stackpole ” G. W. Stacpoole.
The Campaigns and History of
The Royal Irish Regiment.
CHAPTER I.
1684-1697.
THE RAISING OF THE REGIMENT: AND THE WARS OF WILLIAM III.
The Royal Irish regiment was raised on April 1, 1684, by Charles
II., when he reorganised the military forces of Ireland, which had
hitherto consisted of a regiment of foot guards and a number of
“independent” troops of cavalry and companies of infantry maintained
to garrison various important points in the island. Charles formed
these independent troops and companies into regiments of horse and
foot; and as many of the officers had seen service on the Continent
in foreign armies, and a large number of the rank and file were
descendants of Cromwell’s veterans, Arthur, Earl of Granard,[1]
when granted the commission of colonel in one of the newly raised
infantry regiments, took command not of a mob of recruits with
everything to learn, but of a body of soldiers of whom any officer
might be proud. Of the corps thus raised all but one had an ephemeral
existence. During the struggle between James II. and William III.
for the possession of Ireland some followed the example of the foot
guards, joined the Stuart king in a body, and then took service in
France, while others broke up, officers and men ranging themselves
as individuals on the side of the monarch with whose religious or
political views they were in sympathy. The one bright exception was
the regiment formed by Lord Granard, which under the successive
names of Forbes’, Meath’s, Hamilton’s, the Royal regiment of Foot
of Ireland, the XVIIIth, and the Royal Irish regiment, has earned
undying laurels in every part of the world.
Though brought over to England to help in the suppression of
Monmouth’s rebellion against James II., Granard’s took no part in the
operations by which the rising was crushed at Sedgemoor, and in the
autumn of 1685 returned to Ireland,[2] where evil days awaited it.
With James’s attempt against the liberties of his English subjects
it is not the province of a regimental historian to deal; but it
is necessary to explain that the King, desiring ardently to own an
army upon which he could count to obey him blindly in the political
campaign he was planning, proposed to drive from the Colours all
officers and men upon whom he could not rely implicitly to carry out
his schemes. He decided to begin operations in Ireland, where he gave
the Earl of Tyrconnel unlimited power to remodel the _personnel_
of the troops. In 1686, Tyrconnel summarily dismissed from many
regiments all the Protestants in the ranks, whom he stripped of
their uniforms and turned penniless and starving upon the world.
The officers fared little better: two of Granard’s captains, John
St Leger and Frederick Hamilton, were “disbanded” solely on account
of their religious beliefs. As a protest against these proceedings
Lord Granard resigned his commission, to which his son Arthur, Lord
Forbes, was appointed on March 1, 1686. Next year the regiment
“underwent a further purge,” thus described by Brigadier-General
Stearne,[3] who was then one of Forbes’s officers. “Tyrconnel made
a strict review of each troop and company, wherein he found a great
many descendants of the ‘Cromelians,’ as he termed them, who must
turn out also, and took the name of every man who was to be of the
next disbandment, so that every soldier of an English name was marked
down. As soon as the camp broke up and the army returned into winter
quarters, most of the officers as well as soldiers were disbanded,
and only a few kept in for a while to discipline those that supplied
their places.” Tyrconnel rid himself of about four thousand of all
ranks, or considerably more than half the Irish army; the men he
replaced with peasants, good in physique but without discipline or
training, while the officers he appointed were of a very inferior
class, who in the war of 1690-91 failed in many cases to turn to good
account the splendid fighting qualities of their soldiers. It is,
however, only fair to Tyrconnel’s memory to mention that while he
thus reduced the efficiency of the Irish army, he increased its power
of expansion by devising a short service and reserve system by which
many thousand men could be recalled to the Colours in case of need.
Thanks to the political influence and strong personality of Forbes,
a “bold and daring man,” who had learned the trade of war first in
the army of France under the great Turenne, and later in a campaign
against the Turks in Hungary, the regiment in the general ruin
suffered less than any other corps. In defiance of Tyrconnel, Forbes
succeeded in retaining more of his old officers and soldiers than
any other colonel, and in 1688, when the regiment, 770 strong, was
ordered to England to meet the invasion threatened by the Prince of
Orange, it still contained a number of good officers, sergeants, and
old soldiers, whose united efforts had welded into shape the mass
of recruits recently poured into its ranks. For the next few months
the strain upon these veterans must have been great, as they had to
keep the young soldiers in order in a country where Irish troops
at that time were looked upon with deep suspicion and hostility by
the people, and not as now heartily welcomed by all classes. After
being stationed for some time in London the regiment marched to
Salisbury, where James had concentrated his troops to meet the Prince
of Orange; and when the King, deserted by his generals, statesmen,
and courtiers, abandoned his army and fled to France, Forbes kept
his men together and returned to the neighbourhood of London, where
he was quartered at the village of Colnbrook, near Hounslow. From
the Prince of Orange, who by this time was actually, though not yet
legally, King of England, Forbes received orders to disband the Roman
Catholics of his regiment, and after five hundred officers and men
had been disarmed and sent to Portsmouth _en route_ for the Isle of
Wight, several officers, many sergeants, corporals, and drummers,
and about a hundred and thirty private soldiers, remained with the
Colours.
Soon after this turning of the tables the regiment had an experience,
probably unique in military history--an examination in theology,
in which all ranks passed with high honours. The adventure is thus
described in Stearne’s journal:--
“A report spread through the whole kingdom that the Irish were
murdering, burning and destroying the whole country, insomuch
that there was not one town in the whole nation that had not an
account they were committing all these cruelties in the very next
town or village to them. Sir John Edgworth, who was our major,
commanded the regiment at this time (Lord Forbes being with the
Prince of Orange in London); he was quartered at Lord Oslington’s
house near Colnbrook, and upon the first of this flying report,
sent for all the regiment to repair immediately to his quarters
where there was a large walled court before the door, in which he
drew them up with the design to keep them there until this rumour
was over, but the country people, hearing that an Irish regiment
was there, came flocking from all parts to knock us on the head:
but Sir John bid them at their peril, not to approach, and told
them we were not Irish Papists but true Church of England men;
and seeing among the crowd a gentleman, called to him and desired
he would send to the minister of the parish to read prayers
to us, and if the minister did not convince them we were all
of the Church of England, we would submit to their mercy. The
minister was soon sent for, and to prayers we went, repeating the
responses of the Liturgy so well and so exactly that the minister
declared to the mob he never before heard the responses of the
Church of England prayers repeated so distinctly and with so much
devotion, upon which the mob gave a huzza, and cried ‘Long live
the Prince of Orange,’ and so returned home.”
In February 1689, the regiment was re-equipped,[4] and in
anticipation of the recruits who in a few months began to refill its
depleted ranks, weapons were issued for its full establishment. Five
hundred and seventy-nine men were to be armed with flint-lock muskets
and bayonets, while two hundred and forty were still to carry long
pikes for the protection of the musketeers against cavalry on the
battlefield and on the march. The pike, however, was a dying weapon,
and was soon superseded completely by the bayonet. No mention is made
of hand-grenades, though these missiles were already carried by the
grenadier company, composed of men chosen from their comrades in the
regiment for height, strength, and courage.
During the winter of 1688-89 Lord Forbes resigned his commission, on
the ground that having sworn allegiance to James II. he could bear
arms for no other king during his old master’s lifetime.[5] For a few
weeks Major Sir John Edgworth replaced him, but owing to financial
scandals compromising to himself and several of his subordinates he
was obliged to retire,[6] and Edward, Earl of Meath, was appointed
to the vacancy on May 1, 1689, when William III. completed his
arrangements for re-officering the regiment, which was numbered the
Eighteenth of the infantry of the line. He issued forty-one new
commissions, some to the seniors who had escaped disbandment at
Tyrconnel’s hands, others to officers who had been expelled from the
army during James’s reign, others again to young men with no previous
military experience. The names of the officers are given in the
footnote.[7]
One of the results of the revolution by which James II. was deposed
and William and Mary placed upon the throne was to plunge England
into the vortex of Continental politics. As Prince of Orange, William
had been the moving spirit in the coalition of States formed to curb
the ambition of the French king, Louis XIV., who throughout his life
strove to aggrandise himself at the expense of his neighbours; and
when James II. took refuge in France, Louis saw his opportunity to
strike a heavy blow at William. By long and careful attention to his
navy he had made it superior to the combined fleets of the English
and the Dutch--the great naval powers of the time--and, thanks to
his command of the sea, was able to land James at Kinsale with five
thousand excellent French soldiers to give backbone to the forty
thousand men collected by Tyrconnel in anticipation of his Royal
master’s arrival. So slow was communication in those days that,
though James disembarked at Kinsale in March 1689, the news of the
invasion did not reach England for several weeks, when William had
already despatched most of his best troops to swell the forces of
the Allies facing the French in the Low Countries. William hurriedly
raised more regiments, but it was not until August that Marshal
Schomberg, the veteran selected for the command of the expedition,
landed near Belfast, where in a few days he was joined by Meath’s[8]
regiment, which for some months had been quartered in Wales. The
army was sent to Ireland utterly unprepared to take the field. There
was no transport, the commissariat was wretched, the artillery was
short of horses; guns, muskets, and powder, food, clothing, and shoes
alike were bad. No wonder, therefore, that after taking the town of
Carrickfergus, Schomberg refused to give battle to James, and fell
back upon an entrenched camp at Dundalk to await reinforcements
of every kind. Before the autumnal rains set in the General
ordered his troops to build themselves huts, and the foreigners in
William’s pay--old warriors, who had bought their experience in many
campaigns--worked with a will; but the English regiments, composed
of lazy, careless, and ignorant recruits, whose officers were no
better soldiers than their men, would not take the trouble to run up
shelters or dig trenches to drain their camping-grounds. Fever soon
broke out with appalling results. Out of the 14,000 troops assembled
at Dundalk, 1700 died on the spot, 800 perished on the waggons in
which the sick were carried to the coast, 3800 died in the hospitals
of Belfast. The losses in the XVIIIth regiment are not known, but
from Schomberg’s confidential report on the troops under his command
it seems to have suffered less than other corps. Writing on October
23, 1689, the Marshal says: “Meath’s (18th Foot), best regiment
of all the army, both as regards clothing and good order, and the
officers generally good. The soldiers being all of this province, the
campaign is not so hard on them as on others.”
Early in November James gave up the attempt to entice Schomberg out
of his entrenchments and went into winter quarters. The Marshal
promptly followed his example, holding the country between Lough
Erne and Belfast with a chain of fortified posts, and establishing
his headquarters at Lisburn, where the XVIIIth was placed in charge
of his personal safety. The staff of the regiment must have been
hard-worked in the spring of 1690, for recruits streamed in so fast
that in June it was nearly the strongest corps in the British army,
standing on parade six hundred and seventy-eight officers and men.
For several months there was constant skirmishing along the line
of outposts; but no movements of importance took place until June,
when William III. arrived at Carrickfergus with two hundred and
eighty-four transports and many vessels laden with stores. Though
this great mass of shipping was escorted by a ludicrously small
squadron of only six men-of-war, it was not attacked on the voyage,
for the French had neglected to send a fleet to cruise in the Irish
seas, thus leaving the line of communication across St George’s
Channel uninterrupted. When the reinforcements brought by the King
had landed, the army in Ireland reached the respectable total of
about 37,000 men, of whom 21,000 were British, and the remainder
Huguenots, Dutch, and Danes--continental mercenaries whom William had
imported to lend solidity to his recently raised English regiments.
The French officers in James’s army had repeatedly urged him to
retire into Connaught and defend the line of the Shannon, but on
political grounds he declined to accept this excellent advice, and
after some manœuvring took up a position on the river Boyne, near
Oldbridge and Duleek. Here he entrenched himself, but on the 1st of
July William attacked and routed him with considerable loss. As the
XVIIIth regiment played no important part in the engagement, if,
indeed, it came under fire at all, it is only necessary to say that
though some of James’s troops fought with distinguished gallantry in
this battle, others did not show the fine qualities they exhibited
later at Limerick and Aughrim. Covered by a rear-guard of Frenchmen,
the defeated army fell back upon the Shannon. James, for the second
time, deserted his soldiers and fled to France, while William
occupied Dublin, and matured his plans for the next phase of the
campaign. By a great victory over the Anglo-Dutch fleet at Beachy
Head the King of France won for the moment the absolute command of
the British Channel, and thus could throw reinforcements at will
into the south and west of Ireland by the ports of Waterford, Cork,
Kinsale, Limerick, and Galway. These towns were, therefore, essential
to William; and hardly less important was Athlone, the entrance to
the wild districts of Connaught, to which he hoped to confine the
future operations of the war. A strong detachment under General
Douglas was therefore sent against Athlone, while William himself led
the greater part of his army towards Limerick, where a large number
of James’s troops had been concentrated. Though these regiments had
worked hard to improve the fortifications of the city, its defences
were still so imperfect that when the French heard that William was
approaching they pronounced the place to be untenable and moved off
to Galway, leaving the Irish, about 20,000 strong, to defend it,
under the command of General Boisleau, an officer who had learned to
appreciate the good qualities of his allies, and Sarsfield, an Irish
soldier of great brilliancy and courage. Reinforced by Douglas, whose
detachment had failed to make any impression on Athlone, William
appeared before Limerick on August 9, and after brushing away the
enemy’s skirmishers pitched camp within a quarter of a mile of the
city wall, expecting little resistance from a place so weak that the
French had declared it “could be taken by throwing apples at it.” In
eight days William opened his batteries, though with very inferior
ordnance, for by a daring raid Sarsfield had swooped on the convoy
bringing up his siege-train and destroyed nearly all his heavy guns.
On the 20th the grenadiers of the XVIIIth and Cutts’s regiments
greatly distinguished themselves by the capture of a strong redoubt
near John’s Gate. A sudden rush from the trenches brought them to the
foot of the work, into which they hurled a shower of hand-grenades,
and then scrambling over the parapet under heavy fire, dislodged
the defenders with the bayonet. As it was known that the redoubt
had an open gorge, a quantity of fascines had been collected in the
trenches, with which the grenadiers filled up the gap, and then held
the redoubt against a determined sally until they were relieved by
other troops. The affair cost the victors two hundred and seventy-one
killed and wounded; but though it is known that the grenadiers
suffered heavily, the only casualty recorded in the XVIIIth is the
death of Captain Needham, who was killed by a random shot at the end
of the engagement.
This success was followed by the capture of another outlying work;
the trenches were pushed close to the walls, and six batteries played
upon the defences, which, near John’s Gate, began to crumble under
the bombardment. This breach William determined to assault, though
he was warned by some of his officers that Limerick was not yet
sufficiently shaken to be stormed. According to many historians,
his reasons for hurrying on the attack were that his supply of
ammunition was running low, and that with the example of Dundalk
before him, he could not venture to expose his troops to the terrible
rains which had set in. “At times the downpour was such that the men
could not work the guns, and to mount fresh batteries soon became
an impossibility: the trenches were knee-deep in mud: the soldiers
were never dry from morning till night and from night till morning:
sickness, which had been prevalent in the camp before, increased to a
plague: the tenting ground became a mere swamp, and those who could
afford it kept down the overwhelming damp only by burning bowls of
spirits under the canvas.”[9] On the 27th the breach appeared to be
practicable, and William ordered Douglas to deliver the assault.
Half the grenadiers of each regiment, five hundred men in all, were
to lead, supported by the XVIIIth and five other infantry corps:
on the left of the main attack was another column of infantry: and
drawn up in rear stood a strong force of cavalry. At half-past three
in the afternoon the grenadiers dashed out of the trenches, hurled
themselves against the palisade of the counterscarp, and carried it
after fierce fighting; then, gaining the covered way, they dropped
into the ditch, scrambled up the breach, and pursued its defenders
headlong into the town. So far all had gone well: the impetuous
valour of the grenadiers had carried all before it, and victory was
within William’s grasp, when a mistaken interpretation of orders
ruined the day’s work. The supporting infantry should have followed
the grenadiers up the breach, but, allowing themselves to be drawn
into pursuit of some of the enemy along the covered way, they left
the grenadiers without reinforcements. When the defenders saw that
no more troops were pressing up the breach, they rallied, and,
excited by witnessing the destruction of one of William’s foreign
battalions by an accidental explosion, they drove the remnants of the
grenadiers back into the covered way. If the failure to carry the
breach was to be redeemed even partially, it was essential that the
covered way should remain in the attackers’ hands, and round this
part of the fortifications raged a fierce fight, in which both sides
showed splendid courage; but, after three hours’ indecisive combat,
Douglas found that his men had used nearly all their ammunition,
and drew off to camp with a loss of at least five hundred dead
and a thousand wounded. In this unsuccessful assault the XVIIIth
suffered severely;[10] more than a hundred sergeants, corporals, and
“sentinels” (as private soldiers were then termed) were killed or
wounded, and, though the officers of the regiment who left accounts
of this war are not agreed as to the exact casualties among the
commissioned ranks, it appears certain that six were killed and
eight wounded.[11] Though all their names have not been recorded,
it is known that Captain Charles Brabazon, Lieutenant P. Latham,
and Ensign ---- Smith were killed; Lieutenant-Colonel G. Newcomb
(or Newcomen) died of his wounds, and Colonel the Earl of Meath,
Lieutenants R. Blakeney and C. Hubblethorne, were wounded.
Dispirited by his reverse, William raised the siege, ordered his army
into winter quarters, and after handing over the command to Ginkell,
a Dutch general, returned to England after a campaign in which he
had scored only one marked success--the victory at the Boyne. He had
failed to capture Athlone and Limerick, and, with the exception of
Waterford, all the ports in the south and west were still open to the
French navy. In September, however, the arrival of Marlborough with
an expedition from England improved the situation: Cork and Kinsale
surrendered, and thus the harbours of Limerick and Galway alone
remained available for the enemy’s operations. Ginkell’s first step
was to establish himself on a line which, starting at Ballyshannon
in the north-west, ran through Enniskillen, Longford, Mullingar,
Cashel, and Fermoy to Castletown-Berehaven in the south-west. The
regiment was ordered to Mullingar, where it passed the winter--very
unpleasantly, according to Stearne, who states that, “in the month of
December our garrison being reinforced by several regiments of Horse
and Foot, marched towards the enemy’s frontier, where after having
fatigued the troops for upwards of three months in this bad season
of the year in ravaging and burning the country we returned to our
quarters.”
Ginkell opened the campaign of 1691 by an attack on Athlone, a town
built on both sides of the Shannon, and enclosed by walls, not in
good condition but still by no means to be despised. On the right or
Connaught bank a grim old castle frowned down upon a stone bridge,
the only permanent means of communication across the river, for
though there was a ford it was practicable only in very dry weather.
After a short cannonade, Ginkell breached and stormed the defences
on the Leinster side of the river, and, driving the enemy before
him across the bridge, made himself master of the eastern half of
Athlone. But now his real difficulties began. Batteries bristled on
the bank above the ford; the guns of the castle commanded the bridge,
which was so narrow that a few men could hold it against a regiment;
and General St Ruth, a French officer of great experience, from his
camp hard by could reinforce the garrison without hindrance from the
besiegers. Ginkell rapidly threw up batteries, and opened so vigorous
a fire with fifty guns and mortars that one side of the castle
crumbled away and the houses on the Connaught bank were knocked to
pieces. But until he had crossed the river he could not close with
his enemy; his pontoons were far behind him, and he had no transport
to bring them to the front; and the defence of the bridge was so
stubborn that he gained ground there only a few inches at a time.
St Ruth scoffed at the idea of the place being in serious danger,
decrying Ginkell as an old soldier who ought to know better than to
waste time and men on a hopeless enterprise. “His master,” he said,
“ought to hang him for trying to take Athlone, as my master ought to
hang me if I lose it.” But the Dutch general determined to ascertain
if the river was fordable, and, in the words of Stearne, instead of
calling for volunteers,
“promised three Danish soldiers who lay under sentence of death,
their lives and a reward if they would attempt fording the river,
which they gladly accepted, and at noonday put on armour, and
entered the river a little below the bridge, and went at some
distance from each other; the enemy took them for deserters, and
we from our trenches fired seemingly at them, but over their
heads at the enemy; when they had passed the depth of the water,
and almost on the other side, they turned back, which when the
enemy perceived they fired at them as hard as they could, but our
cannon which was reserved for that purpose, as also our small
shot, fired so briskly upon them that they could not hold up
their heads to take aim at the men, by which they were saved,
two being only slightly wounded. The General finding the river
fordable (which it had not been for many years) resolved to try
and pass it, upon which he gave orders for 40 Grenadiers from
each company and 80 choice men out of each Battalion of the whole
army to march as privately as possible into the trenches, and the
whole army to be under arms to sustain the attack should there be
occasion.
“On the 20th June[12] the detachments marched into the trenches
(I being one of the Captains who commanded ours) with all the
privacy we could, but notwithstanding all our caution, St Ruth
had notice of our motion and design by the appearance of crowds
of people on the hills to see the action, upon which he marched
down his whole army to the bank of his part of the town, and
filled the Castle and trenches with as many men as it could
well hold; our General perceiving this, put off the attack till
another time, ordering our detachments back to Camp, but at the
same time gave private orders that not a man should stir from his
Regiment, or be put on any other duty, but to be all ready at a
minute’s warning. St Ruth seeing us draw off, was persuaded that
our General dare not pass the River at this time, and in this
security marched his Army back to Camp, leaving only a slight
body of men to guard their works and the Castle. The next day
a soldier of our Army (whether sent by the General, or he went
of himself, I can’t say) went over to the enemy and was carry’d
before St Ruth, and told him that the common report in our Camp
was that the General finding it was not practicable to pass the
River at this time resolved to try what he could do at Banagher
which lay ten miles down the River, and that everything was
getting ready for the march. St Ruth, easily persuaded with
this notion, and finding all things very quiet in our Camp, made
a splendid entertainment for all the Ladies and Gentlemen, the
Officers of the Town, and the Camp. The same day, being 22nd
June, our General sent private orders along the Line for all
the detachments to march directly into the trenches, and to
keep under all the cover they could, at the same time he posted
several sentries on the hills to prevent anybody appearing to the
enemy. About 3 o’clock, when St Ruth was at the height of his
merryment, we began the attack by jumping into the River, and
whilst we were wading over, our Cannon and small shot played with
great fury over our heads on the enemy, insomuch that they did us
but little hurt in passing, and when we got over they made but
little or no resistance but fled immediately.
“At the same time we jumped into the River, part of our
detachments attacked the Bridge, and laid planks over the arch
that had been broken down upon our taking the first town, so
that before St Ruth had any account of our design we were in
possession of the town; however he marched his army down to try
if he could force us back again, but he committed a grand error
which he found out too late, and that was leaving the works at
the back of the town stand, which became a fortification against
himself, for had it not been for this, we should never have been
able to maintain the town against his army, as we were not in
possession of the Castle. When St Ruth found there was no forcing
us back without a formal siege he returned to his camp, and those
in the Castle seeing him march off immediately surrendered at
discretion, and next day very early St Ruth decamped and marched
off with great precipitation. In this action we had only 27 men
killed, and about as many wounded, and not one Officer of note
hurt.”
Ginkell now proposed to take the town of Galway and then turn
southwards against Limerick, but before this plan could be put into
execution it was necessary to dislodge St Ruth from the strong
defensive position he had taken up near Ballinasloe, where he was
determined to fight a pitched battle in the hope of retrieving the
reputation he had lost on the banks of the Shannon. His left rested
on the castle of Aughrim, a few miles south of Ballinasloe; his right
was marked by the village of Urachree; his centre ran along the
slopes of a green and fertile hill, well suited for counter-attacks
by horse and foot. Much of the ground he occupied was surrounded
by bogs, crossed by a few tracks, of which only two were fit for
cavalry, while all were under the fire of his guns. Between the foot
of the hill and the bogs were many little patches of cultivation
enclosed by hedges and ditches, some of which St Ruth levelled to
allow his cavalry free movement, while he left others intact in order
to give cover to his marksmen, to break the enemy’s formations, and
to conceal the movement of his troops upon the field of battle. The
infantry held the centre; the cavalry were on the flanks with a
strong reserve in rear of the left under Sarsfield, who had specific
instructions not to move without a distinct order from St Ruth
himself. On July 11, the armies, each about 20,000 strong, were
within touch, but owing to a heavy fog it was not until the afternoon
of the 12th that the battle began with a sharp skirmish, which
revealed to Ginkell the strength of St Ruth’s position, and convinced
him that his only hope of success lay in turning the enemy’s left.
He accordingly made a feigned attack upon the Frenchman’s right,
launched the remainder of his infantry against the centre and left,
and sent his cavalry to force their way past the Castle of Aughrim.
The troops directed against the centre were to halt when they had
crossed the bog, and on no account to push on until the column on
their right was safely over the quagmire and the cavalry had turned
the enemy at Aughrim. But when the soldiers, after floundering
thigh-deep in mud and slime, reached firm ground they got out of
hand, and forgetting their orders rushed forward, carrying everything
before them until a sudden charge of cavalry swept them backwards
in confusion, while the column for which they should have waited
was still struggling in the bog. When this supporting column, of
which the XVIIIth regiment formed part, had scrambled through the
quagmire and re-formed its ranks, it moved towards the hill over
a part of the field apparently deserted by the enemy, but really
filled with sharpshooters, who, hidden in hedges and ditches, with
admirable coolness held their fire until the leading companies were
within twenty yards of them. Then a storm of bullets smote the head
of the column; men dropped in scores, and for a moment the advance
was checked, but the troops quickly rallied, and hurling themselves
against the first hedge carried it against a resolute defence.
Hedge after hedge, ditch after ditch, were charged and won, but by
the time the last obstacle was surmounted the infantry had fallen
into great confusion: the regiments “were so intermingled together
that the officers were at a loss what to do,” and at that moment St
Ruth’s cavalry came thundering down upon them. Under this charge the
disorganised infantry gave way, and were being driven backwards into
the bog, when St Ruth’s horsemen were themselves assailed in rear by
some of Ginkell’s cavalry, who, after a daring march and still more
daring passage of a stream under the walls of Aughrim Castle, reached
the battlefield in time to save the foot soldiers from annihilation.
During this cavalry combat occurred an interesting instance of the
value of steady barrack-square drill. Throughout the winter of
1690-91 the infantry had been practised in regaining its formation
rapidly after a charge, and now, when relieved from the pressure of
the enemy, the battalions re-formed with comparative ease, and then
attacked along the whole line. At this moment victory trembled in
the balance, for though the losses on both sides had been heavy,
the defenders, on the whole, had had the best of the day, and in
Sarsfield’s strong body of cavalry they possessed a reserve which had
not yet been called into action. Had Sarsfield then struck into the
battle his troopers might have turned the scale, but he was fettered
by his instructions not to move except on St Ruth’s own order, and St
Ruth, struck down by a stray cannon-ball, was lying a headless corpse
upon the ground. The absence of the French general’s directing hand
was soon felt, though his death was concealed as long as possible;
and when the attacking infantry began to gain ground steadily, and
the cavalry turning movement was fully developed, the men who for
hours had so valiantly defended their position lost heart and began
to fall back in disorder. Then their discipline failed them, and they
broke, rushing in panic towards Limerick and Galway, with Ginkell’s
cavalry and dragoons spurring fiercely after them.
The losses in this battle were very heavy. In William’s army 73
officers were killed and 109 wounded; of the other ranks 600 were
killed and 908 wounded. The XVIIIth escaped lightly: only one
officer, Captain ---- Butler was killed; a major, a captain, and two
subalterns were wounded; among the non-commissioned officers and
men seven were killed and eight wounded.[13] On the subject of the
casualties in the army commanded by St Ruth historians differ widely;
but 7000 appears to be the number fixed upon by those least given to
exaggeration. Whatever the actual figures were, however, there can
be no doubt that James’s soldiers were so completely routed that in
their retreat they strewed the roads with their discarded weapons.
A reward of sixpence was offered for every musket brought into
Ginkell’s camp; in a short time so many waggon-loads were collected
that the price was reduced to twopence, and great numbers of firearms
still came in.[14] The dispersal of St Ruth’s army was the death-blow
to the Stuart cause: Galway made little resistance, and though the
garrison of Limerick fought stoutly for a month it was obliged to
surrender on October 3, 1691. The French officers were allowed to
return to their own country, accompanied by those of James’s soldiers
who wished to enter the French army, and with their departure ceased
all organised opposition in Ireland to the rule of William III., who
was thus free to transfer his troops to the Low Countries.
The regiment, however, did not go abroad at once. After wintering
at Waterford it was ordered in the spring of 1692 to Portsmouth, to
reinforce the garrison of England against an invasion threatened
by Louis XIV., and after the French fleet had been beaten at the
battle of Cape La Hogue the XVIIIth was one of the regiments
selected for a raid against the seaport towns of France; but the
coast proved so well guarded that it was impossible to land, and the
transports sailed to the Downs and thence to Ostend, where the troops
disembarked and marched towards the towns of Furnes and Dixmude,
which the French evacuated without waiting to be attacked. While
employed in strengthening the walls of Dixmude the XVIIIth had a
curious experience: there was an earthquake, so violent that the
soldiers thought the French were blowing up the place with hidden
mines, while the Flemish peasants, who were working as navvies,
became paralysed with terror and declared that the end of the world
was come. In a few weeks the greater part of the troops re-embarked
for England, but not all reached land in safety, for a great storm
scattered the transports, several of which went to the bottom. The
XVIIIth regiment, however, was fortunate enough to escape all loss.
In the course of the winter Lord Meath retired,[15] and was succeeded
in the colonelcy by Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Hamilton; Major
Ormsby became Lieutenant-Colonel, and Captain Richard Stearne was
promoted to the Majority. In 1693, the regiment, which now was known
as Frederick Hamilton’s, was turned for a few months into a sea-going
corps.
“In May, 1693, we marched to Portsmouth, and embarked on board
the Grand Fleet, commanded by three joynt Admirals (viz., Sir
Ralph Delaval, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and Admiral Killigrew) when
we served this summer as Marines. Our rendezvous was Spithead;
in June we sailed to Torbay, where we waited for the Fleet which
was to go under the command of Sir George Rooke who had twenty
Men of War to convoy them up the Mediterranean. About the latter
end of June Sir George joyned us, and the whole Fleet set sail
together, and was looked upon to be the greatest that had been
in one sea for many years; there being in all with Men of War
and Merchantmen, English and Dutch, near 800 sail: the Men of
War with their tenders stretching in one line between the Coast
of France and the Merchantmen. The Grand Fleet kept Sir George
company till they passed the Bay of Biscay, being the utmost
limits of our Admirals’ orders, notwithstanding they very well
knew that the French Fleet had sailed out of Brest, and was lying
before them to intercept Sir George. Yet their orders were such
that they dare not sail any farther, but then parted and returned
to Torbay.
“The French, who never wanted intelligence from our Courtiers,
had an exact account to what degree our Grand Fleet had orders
to convoy Sir George, therefore lay by with their Grand Fleet
about eighteen hours sail beyond the limit of our Grand Fleet;
they upon first sight believed that our Grand Fleet had still
kept Sir George company, which put them into such a consternation
that for some time they stood away, which gave Sir George an
opportunity of making signals to his Merchant ships to shift for
themselves and make the best of their way back, whilst he with
his Men of War sailed after them in very good order. As soon as
the Enemy discovered their mistake they made all sail they could
after him, but Sir George, keeping astern of his Merchant ships,
made a running fight of it, by which means he saved his whole
fleet except a few heavy sailers which were picked up by their
Privateers.
“After this the French Fleet made the best of their way to
Brest, and the account coming to our Court, orders were sent to
the Grand Fleet to sail immediately in quest of them, upon which
our Admirals sailed immediately to Brest to try if they could get
there before the enemy, but in vain, for they had got in several
days before we left Torbay. This affair being over we returned to
our port, and in September the Land Forces were put on shore. Our
Regiment was landed part at Chatham and part at Southampton, and
joyned at Norwich in October. In December we marched to London,
and were reviewed in Hide Park by the King; two days after we
embarked at Red House, and sailed for Flanders and landed at
Ostend in December 1693.”[16]
The regiment was now to play a distinguished part in the war with
France, which with a breathing space of five short years lasted
until 1712. With the exception of the campaign of 1704 in Germany,
the fighting in which the XVIIIth was concerned took place chiefly
in the country now called Belgium, but then known as Flanders.[17]
Its soil was fertile, and cultivated by a large and industrious
population. Its numerous cities were celebrated throughout Europe for
the wealth of their traders, whose merchandise was carried to the
sea over a network of canals and navigable rivers. Every town was
walled, and the whole country was studded with fortresses, with many
of which the regiment was to become well acquainted in the course of
the next twenty years. On the French side of the frontier a chain
of forts stretched from Dunkirk to the Meuse, and Louis had further
strengthened his border by a great line of field-works, in the hope
of making an invasion of France impossible. In a country so highly
fortified the war necessarily became one of sieges. Each side tried
to breach the other’s line of defences by capturing fortresses. There
were ceaseless marches and counter-marches, and gigantic attempts to
relieve the besieged strongholds, met by equally strenuous efforts to
prevent the relieving forces from fulfilling their mission. Flanders,
however, was by no means the only part of Europe affected by the
war, for sooner or later the French armies invaded nearly every
country unfortunate enough to be within their reach. To describe the
whole of Louis’s struggle for supremacy, and to explain the means
by which he induced some of the Allies to abandon the coalition and
range themselves on his side, would be far outside the scope of a
regimental history. It is enough to say that though the conflict
raged from the shores of the North Sea to the south of Spain, where
a few thousand British soldiers served for several years, it was in
Flanders that Marlborough won most of his splendid victories over the
French.
The XVIIIth’s first campaign on the Continent--for the few weeks
spent at Dixmude in 1692 cannot be dignified by this name--was
uneventful. There were no great battles, and the only operation of
importance was the siege of Huy, where the regiment was employed
with the covering force. In the spring of 1694 the order of
precedence among the regiments of the British army was settled in
a way very displeasing to Hamilton’s officers and men, who ever
since the camp at Dundalk had claimed for their corps the numerical
position due to its having been raised in April 1684.[18] Kane
chronicles the decision in a few words.
“A Dispute arose about the Rank of our Regiment in particular,
which were (_sic_) regimented 1 April 1684 from the old
Independent Companies in Ireland, and had hitherto taken Rank of
all the Regiments raised by King James the Second, but now those
Regiments disputed Rank with us: the King referred the Affair to
a Board of General Officers; and most of them being Colonels of
those Regiments, would not allow us any other Rank than our first
coming into England, which was some time before the King landed,
when he came over Prince of Orange on the Revolution, by which we
lost Rank of eleven Regiments, taking Rank after those raised by
King James, and before all those raised by King William. The King
thought the General Officers had acted with great Partiality, but
as he had referred the Affair to them, he confirmed it.”
The whole question of precedence was re-opened in 1713, and the
colonel of the XVIIIth made a strong effort to obtain rank for the
regiment from the date of its formation in 1684, but without success.
When William III. took the field in 1695, he commanded an army of
124,000 men, composed of contingents from England, Holland, Denmark,
and many of the German States. The British numbered about 29,000, and
as the King employed them on every occasion when desperate courage
and bull-dog tenacity were needed, it is clear that, however much he
despised the English politicians who intrigued against him with Louis
XIV., he appreciated his British soldiers at their true worth. As
his object was the recapture of the fortress of Namur, taken by the
French three years before, he began a series of manœuvres designed
to decoy Marshal de Villeroi, the French Commander-in-Chief, so far
into the western half of the theatre of war that the Allies would
be able to dash upon Namur and invest it before their intention
was discovered. William was so far successful that he was able
to surround the fortress on June 23, but not before the French
had thrown in strong reinforcements under Marshal de Boufflers,
who took command of the garrison of thirteen or fourteen thousand
excellent troops. The citadel stands on a rocky height at the end
of the tongue of land formed by the junction of the rivers Sambre
and Meuse. The town is built on the left bank of the Sambre; and in
the fortification of both citadel and town the highest military art
had been displayed--first, by the Dutch engineer Cohorn, who planned
and built the works; and later, by his French rival Vauban, who had
extended and improved them so greatly that Namur was now considered
to be impregnable. A hundred and twenty-eight guns and mortars were
mounted on its walls, and its arsenals and storehouses were well
supplied in every way. On June 28th, William began his trenches, and
five days later opened fire upon the town, which after desperate
fighting surrendered on July 24, one of the conditions being that the
garrison should be allowed to retire into the citadel with full power
to take part in its defence.
During this, the first phase of the siege, the XVIIIth was part
of the covering detachment of 20,000 men with which the Prince de
Vaudemont, one of William’s trusted lieutenants, protected the
operations of the besiegers so successfully that during several
weeks he engrossed the attention of the French Commander-in-Chief’s
vastly superior force of 90,000 troops. Before quoting Kane’s
interesting account of the way de Vaudemont “sparred for time,” it
must be explained that the French were in no hurry to relieve Namur,
where they thought de Boufflers could hold his own indefinitely. De
Villeroi accordingly marched against de Vaudemont, who had entrenched
himself on the river Lys, nine or ten miles south of Ghent; but
“finding him stand his Ground, he proceeded with the more
Caution, and halted about two Leagues short of him, till he
had sent to Lille for some Battering-Cannon. This took up some
Time which was what Vaudemont wanted to keep him in Play till
the King could fix himself before Namur. At length Villeroy
advanced within less than half a League of us, and finding the
Prince still keep his Ground, ordered a great many Fascines to
be cut in order to attack us early next Morning. He also sent
Lieutenant-General Montal with a strong Body of Horse round by
our Right, to fall in our Rear, and cut off our Retreat from
Ghent, which was three Leagues in the Rear of us. Now the Prince
had three trusty Capuchin Fryars for his Spies, one of whom
kept constantly about Villeroy’s Quarters, who found Means to
inform himself of all his Designs; the other two plied constantly
between both Camps without ever being suspected, who gave
Vaudemont an Account of everything. Now the Prince having drawn
Villeroy so near him, thought it high Time to make his Retreat;
he therefore, as soon as Villeroy appeared, sent off all the
heavy Baggage and Lumber of the Camp to Ghent, and about Eight
in the Evening he ordered part of the Cavalry to dismount and
take the Intrenchments, and the Infantry to march privately off
with their Pikes and Colours under-hand, lest the Enemy should
discover us drawing off; and as soon as it grew duskish the
Cavalry mounted and marched after the Foot. Soon after Villeroy’s
Advance-Guard finding our Works very quiet, ventured up to them;
who finding the Birds fled, sent to acquaint the General; on
which they marched after us as fast as they could. Montal, who by
this time had got into our Rear, finding us marching off, thought
to have fallen on our Flank; but Sir David Collier, with two
Brigades of Foot, gave them so warm a Reception, that they were
obliged to retire with considerable Loss. Next Morning all our
Army got safe under the Works of Ghent, at which Time the Enemy’s
Horse began to appear within a Mile of us; whereupon we past the
Canal that runs from thence to Bruges, along which a Breast-Work
had been thrown up.... Vaudemont had now a very difficult Part
to act in Defence of this Canal against so powerful an Army.
Villeroy marched immediately down to the Canal, where, for
upwards of three Weeks, by Marches and Countermarches he harassed
our small Army off their Legs; however, he could not make the
least Movement, or form any Design, but the Prince had timely
Notice of it; which was very surprising if we consider the Canal
that was between us, so that the French said he dealt with the
Devil.[19] Villeroy finding he could not pass the Canal on the
Prince, at length turned towards Dixmude, where the Prince could
give no manner of Assistance; here he succeeded beyond his most
sanguine Expectations.”
After an easy victory at Dixmude, which the Governor surrendered
without firing a shot, de Villeroi turned towards Brussels, where
the wealth of the citizens promised much loot to his soldiers; but
here he was again foiled by de Vaudemont, who out-marched him and
took up a position which saved the city from capture, though not
from a savage and unnecessary bombardment. After his artillery
had devastated a large part of Brussels, de Villeroi drew off to
await orders from Paris, thus giving the covering detachment the
opportunity of joining hands with the main army before Namur, where
William was assiduously battering the citadel with a hundred and
thirty-six heavy guns and fifty-eight mortars, whose fire towards
the end of the siege cost de Boufflers three hundred men a day. On
the 10th of August, the XVIIIth and three other British regiments
were transferred to the besieging force, to replace corps shattered
in the earlier operations, and at once began duty in the trenches.
A few days later de Villeroi advanced, hoping to defeat William in
a pitched battle, and thus to relieve the garrison which he had so
long neglected, but he found the King so well posted and the covering
army so heavily reinforced by the besieging troops that he did not
venture to attack. While the French Commander-in-Chief was beginning
to realise that in leaving de Boufflers so long unrescued he had made
an irreparable mistake, William gave orders for a general assault
upon the citadel, where the works had been breached in several
places. During the night of the 19th, six thousand men from the
covering detachment filed into the trenches, where before daybreak
they were joined by the greater part of the besiegers. Seven hundred
British grenadiers and four regiments--the 17th,[20] the XVIIIth, and
Buchan’s and Mackay’s, two corps which have long since disappeared
from the Army List,--under the command of General Lord Cutts, were
to assault the work called the Terra Nova; while the Bavarians,
Hessians, Brandenburgers,[21] and Dutch were to make simultaneous
attacks on the other breaches. As the trenches could not hold all
the troops poured into them, the XVIIIth and Buchan’s were sent to
conceal themselves in the abbey of Salsine, about half a mile from
the foot of the Terra Nova breach.
At 10 A.M. on August 20, the explosion of a barrel of gunpowder gave
the signal for the attack, and from Cutts’s trenches began to emerge
the red coats, to whom the most dangerous duty had, as usual, been
entrusted; four sergeants, each followed by fifteen picked men,
led the column; the grenadiers were close behind them; the 17th
and Mackay’s followed in support, with the XVIIIth and Buchan’s in
reserve. It was a desperate enterprise. Between the trenches and the
Terra Nova was a stretch of several hundred yards of ground--smooth,
coverless, and swept by frontal and cross fire, and before the
grenadiers had crossed it they had left behind them a long trail of
killed and wounded. Owing to a mistake in the organisation of the
attack, the grenadiers and the 17th assailed the breach before the
other regiments were at hand to support them, and by the time the
XVIIIth came up the assault had been repulsed with heavy loss; many
of the officers had been hit, and Cutts, the idol of the troops, was
wounded and for the moment incapable of giving orders. Undismayed by
the confusion and depression around them, the Irishmen with a yell
rushed at the breach. At first they had to scramble over the bodies
of those who fell in the first attempt, but half-way up they reached
the grenadiers’ high-water mark, and thence struggled upwards over
ground covered by no corpses but those of the XVIIIth. From the
neighbouring works they were tormented by cross fire, but yet pushed
on, to the admiration of their foes who through the clouds of smoke
watched them gradually winning their way up the breach, the Colours
high in air, despite the carnage among the officers who carried them.
Mad with excitement, determined to win at all cost, the regiment by a
splendid effort reached the top of the breach, where the Colours were
planted to show the King, who from a hill behind the abbey eagerly
watched the progress of his British troops, that the Terra Nova was
his. But as the men surged forward they found themselves faced by
a retrenchment undamaged by the bombardment. The officers, holding
their lives as nothing for the honour of their country and their
corps, led rush after rush against this retrenchment, but in vain.
They could not reach it; guns posted on the flank of the breach mowed
down whole ranks; infantry fired into them at close range. All that
men could do the XVIIIth had done, but nothing could withstand such
a torrent of lead; the second attack failed, and the remnants of the
regiment were driven backwards down the breach, and then charged by a
counter-attack of horse and foot which the French let loose upon them.
Shaking themselves clear of the enemy, the survivors fell back
towards the spot where Cutts, on resuming the command after his wound
was dressed, had ordered his broken regiments to reassemble. While
the British were retreating they learned that the Bavarians had not
fared much better than themselves; badly led, they had missed their
proper objective, the breach in a work called the Coehorne, and had
attacked the covered way at a spot where the garrison was in great
force; and after two hours’ hard fighting they reported that unless
help came at once they could not hold their ground. Cutts, who
from his love of a “hot fire” had earned for himself the nickname
of the Salamander, instantly determined to go to the rescue of the
Bavarians, and halting, turned towards the Coehorne and re-formed
his column. To the onlookers it seemed impossible that troops fresh
from the costly failure at the Terra Nova would face another breach,
but Cutts knew what British soldiers could do, and his call for
volunteers for a forlorn hope was answered by two hundred men, who
headed this fresh attack, followed by Mackay’s, with the XVIIIth
and the other regiments behind them in support. The assault was
successful; the covered way was seized and held by the British,
and all along the line victory smiled upon the Allies, who by five
o’clock in the afternoon were lodged solidly within the enemy’s works.
To reward the XVIIIth for the magnificent courage it showed at the
Terra Nova the King formally conferred upon it the title of the
Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland, with the badge of the Lion of
Nassau and the motto “Virtutis Namurcensis Præmium.”[22] In the
year 1832, the Royal Irish received the somewhat belated official
permission to emblazon this motto on their Colours; and it was not
until 1910, two hundred and fifteen years after the capture of
the fortress, that the regiments who took part in the siege were
allowed to add Namur to their battle honours. In these matters our
Government does not move with undue haste; it was only in 1882, that
the Royal Irish were granted leave to commemorate on their Colours
the fact that they had shared in the glories of Blenheim, Ramillies,
Oudenarde, and Malplaquet, the last of which was won in 1709!
The distinctions given by William were dearly earned, for though the
authorities differ as to the actual numbers of the casualties in the
XVIIIth, all agree that they were enormous. According to the army
chaplain D’Auvergne, who wrote one of the best accounts of William
III.’s wars in Flanders, the regiment lost twenty-five officers
and two hundred and seventy-one non-commissioned officers and men.
Parker and Kane give the same figures, but as both these officers
were severely wounded it is probable that the returns had been sent
in long before they came back to duty, and that in their books they
adopted D’Auvergne’s numbers without investigation. In Stearne’s
unpublished journal he states that twenty-six officers (whose names
he does not mention) and three hundred and eighty of the other ranks
were killed or wounded; and as Stearne was one of the few senior
officers left with the regiment on the evening of the 20th of August,
he must have had every opportunity of knowing the exact numbers. Two
theories have been advanced to explain this discrepancy: the first,
that Stearne included in his total all who were wounded, while the
other historians took count only of the men who were gravely injured
and admitted into the base hospital at Liege; the other is that among
his four hundred and six casualties were the officers and men hit in
the trenches after the XVIIIth joined the besieging army and before
the day of the assault, or in other words that his figures show the
regiment’s losses during the whole of the siege. But even taken on
the lower, and therefore safer estimate, the percentage of loss is
astonishingly high. At the beginning of a campaign a regiment was
seldom more than 600 strong; indeed, many historians consider that
500 was the average strength. Since the XVIIIth had taken the field
in June it had done much marching and some work in the trenches,
so that Hamilton’s ranks cannot have been quite full when he gave
the order to storm the breach; but assuming that Hamilton had with
him about 600 men, more than 49 per cent, or very nearly half the
regiment, were killed or wounded on August 20, 1695. If the strength
be taken at 500, the percentage shows that about six men out of
every ten were hit; while if Stearne’s casualties are adopted the
percentage is 81, more than eight men killed or wounded out of every
ten who went into action. As it is impossible to ascertain definitely
the strength of the XVIIIth, or to pronounce on the accuracy of the
rival chroniclers, it is enough to say that the regiment suffered
more heavily than any of the other British corps in Cutts’s column,
whose losses, including those of the grenadiers, amounted at the
least to thirteen hundred and forty-nine officers and men.[23]
In the XVIIIth Lieutenant-Colonel A. Ormsby; Captains B. Purefoy, H.
Pinsent, and N. Carteret; Lieutenants C. Fitzmorris and S. Ramme;
Ensigns A. Fettyplace, ---- Blunt, H. Baker, and S. Hayter were
killed. Captain John Southwell, Ensign B. Lister (or Leycester), and
an officer whose name cannot be traced, died of their wounds. Colonel
Frederick Hamilton; Captains R. Kane, F. Duroure, H. Seymour, and
W. Southwell; Lieutenants L. La Planche, T. Brereton, C. Hybert (or
Hibbert), and A. Rolleston; Ensigns T. Gifford, J. Ormsby, and W.
Blakeney were wounded.[24]
The result of the assault convinced de Boufflers that he could not
resist a renewed attack, and early on the 22nd he made signals of
distress to de Villeroi, who finding it impossible to relieve him,
retired to Mons, leaving the garrison of Namur to make the best
terms it could. De Boufflers accordingly ordered his drummers to
beat the _Chamade_, the recognised signal that a fortress desired
to parley with the enemy, and after two or three days’ negotiations
surrendered: the troops were to be allowed to return to France, the
citadel, artillery, and stores remaining in the hands of the victors.
On the 26th, the French, reduced by the two months’ siege to less
than five thousand effectives, marched out with all the honours of
war--drums beating, Colours flying, and arms in their hands--and
after filing through a double line of the allied troops were escorted
to Givet, the fortress to which they had safe conduct. With the fall
of Namur the campaign of 1695 virtually came to an end, for though
there was some marching and counter-marching nothing came of these
manœuvres, and the Allies went into winter quarters early in the
autumn.
The campaigns of 1696 and 1697 were spent in operations unproductive
of any affairs of importance, and the finances of all the combatants
were so much exhausted by the strain of this long war that peace
was signed at Ryswick in September of the latter year. The British
contingent was sent to Ostend to await ships from England to take
them home, and on December 10, the XVIIIth sailed on an adventurous
voyage, thus described by Stearne.
“The ship I was in, with one more, having got near the Coast of
Ireland, there came up with us a Sallee Man of War of about 18
guns, carrying Zealand colours.[25] When the master of our ship
saw her bearing down upon us, he called up all the Officers and
told us what danger we were in of being made slaves for ever. We
thought it a very hard case after getting over so many dangers
as we had gone through, upon which we all resolved to die rather
than be taken, and having got all our men to arms, we made them
lye close under the gunnel, that they might not discover what
we were, and called to the other ship, and told them that in
case she boarded us, that then they should lay her on board the
other side, and that we would do the like in case they boarded
them; and our Seamen were to be all ready with ropes to lash us
together as soon as they laid us on board. At the same time we
were to jump into her, and so take our fate. By the time she
came up with us we had got everything ready to put our design
in execution, but she fell in the wake of us, we being much
the larger ship, and hailed our Master to go on board her, who
answered that he would not leave his ship, and so kept on his
course. The Sallee Man of War kept us company about an hour, and
was once, as we thought, coming up to board us; however, she
thought better of it, fell astern, and stood off without firing a
shot, being prevented by the wind which blew very fresh, so that
they could not put a gun out of their ports.
“This affair had not been long over when we made the Land, but
it put our Master in such a fright, that he went quite out of
his course, so that the Old Head of Kinsale which was the first
land we made, he took to be the Highlands of Dungarvon, which
made him stand away to the Southward, instead of directly in to
the Shore, untill our Master was quite got out of his knowledge,
and night coming on we were obliged to stand out to sea, the
wind rising till it blew a storm, insomuch that we were in great
danger of foundering at sea in an old rotten ship. Next morning
we stood in towards the shore, the wind still continuing very
high, and not a soul on board knew where we were, and though we
made signals of Distress, yet the wind was so high that no boat
dare venture out to our relief, and had it not been for one of
our Lieutenants who had been formerly in the West Indies, and
who remembered something of the Coast, we should certainly have
perished the night following; by his directions we made shift
to get into Bantry Bay before night, and very fortunate it was,
for that night the wind blew so violent that it was with much
difficulty our Ship could ride it out, with all the anchors and
cables we had. Next day, being the 24th December, we landed at
Bantry, and from there marched to Cork, where the other part of
the Regiment landed some days before.”