_Of the resemblance emotions bear to their causes._
That many emotions bear a certain resemblance to their causes, is a
truth that can be made clear by induction; though, so far as I know, the
observation has not been made by any writer. Motion, in its different
circumstances, is productive of feelings that resemble it. Sluggish
motion, for example, causeth a languid unpleasant feeling; slow uniform
motion, a feeling calm and pleasant; and brisk motion, a lively feeling
that rouses the spirits and promotes activity. A fall of water through
rocks, raises in the mind a tumultuous confused agitation, extremely
similar to its cause. When force is exerted with any effort, the
spectator feels a similar effort as of force exerted within his mind. A
large object swells the heart. An elevated object makes the spectator
stand erect.
Sounds also produce emotions that resemble them. A sound in a low key,
brings down the mind. Such a sound in a full tone, hath a certain
solemnity, which it communicates to the emotion produced by it. A sound
in a high key, chears the mind by raising it. Such a sound in a full
tone, both elevates and swells the mind.
Again, a wall or pillar that declines from the perpendicular, produceth
a painful emotion, as of a tottering and falling within the mind. An
emotion somewhat similar is produced by a tall pillar that stands so
ticklish as to look like falling. For this reason, a column upon a base
looks better than upon the naked ground. The base, which makes a part of
the column, inspires a feeling of firmness and stability. The ground
supporting a naked column, is too large to be considered as its base.
And for the same reason, a cube as a base, is preferred before a
cylinder, though the latter is a more beautiful figure. The angles of a
cube, being extended to a greater distance from the centre than the
circumference of a cylinder, give the column a greater appearance of
stability. This excludes not a different reason, that the base, shaft,
and capital, of a pillar, ought, for the sake of variety, to differ from
each other. If the shaft be round, the base and capital ought to be
square.
A constrained posture, uneasy to the man himself, is disagreeable to the
spectator; which makes it a rule in painting, that the drapery ought not
to adhere to the body, but hang loose, that the figures may appear easy
and free in their movements. Hence the disagreeable figure of a French
dancing-master is one of Hogarth’s pieces. It is also ridiculous,
because the constraint is assumed and not forced.
The foregoing observation is not confined to emotions raised by still
life. It holds also in those which are raised by the qualities, actions,
and passions, of a sensible being. Love inspired by a fine woman,
assumes her qualities. It is sublime, soft, tender, severe, or gay,
according to its cause. This is still more remarkable in emotions raised
by human actions. It hath already been remarked[46], that any signal
instance of gratitude, beside procuring esteem for the author, raiseth
in the spectator a vague emotion of gratitude, which disposeth him to be
grateful. I now further remark, that this vague emotion, being of the
same kind with what produced the grateful action, hath a strong
resemblance to its cause. Courage exerted inspires the reader as well as
the spectator with a like emotion of courage. A just action fortifies
our love to justice, and a generous action rouses our generosity. In
short, with respect to all virtuous actions, it will be found by
induction, that they lead us to imitation by inspiring emotions
resembling the passions that produced these actions. And hence the
benefit of dealing in choice books and in choice company.
Grief as well as joy are infectious: the emotions they raise in a
spectator resemble them perfectly. Fear is equally infectious: and
hence in an army, fear, even from the slighted cause, making an
impression on a few, spreads generally through all, and becomes an
universal panic. Pity is similar to its cause. A parting scene betwixt
lovers or friends, produceth in the spectator a sort of pity, which is
tender like the distress. The anguish of remorse, produceth pity of a
harsh kind; and if the remorse be extreme, the pity hath a mixture of
horror. Anger I think is singular; for even where it is moderate and
causeth no disgust, it disposes not the spectator to anger in any
degree[47]. Covetousness, cruelty, treachery, and other vicious
passions, are so far from raising any emotion similar to themselves, to
incite a spectator to imitation, that they have an opposite effect. They
raise abhorrence, and fortify the spectator in his aversion to such
actions. When anger is immoderate, it cannot fail to produce the same
effect.