CH. I.—Of the Order in which the King left his Affairs in the Kingdom of
Naples upon his Return into France.—1495.
To continue my Memoirs, and for your better information, we must return
to our discourse of the king, who, from his first arrival at Naples
to his departure, minded nothing but his pleasures, and his ministers
attended to nothing but their own advantage. His youth might excuse him
in some measure; but nothing could excuse them, for the king referred all
to their management; and if they only had had the discretion to advise
him to put strong garrisons into three or four of the chief castles, such
as that of Gaeta; nay, if he had only garrisoned the castle of Naples
(whose magazines and furniture had been given away and embezzled, as you
have heard), the kingdom of Naples had been his at this day; for, if he
had been master of that castle, the town would never have revolted. Upon
the conclusion of this Italian alliance, he assembled all his forces
together, and ordered 500 French men-at-arms, 2,500 Swiss, and some
French foot to remain to guard the kingdom; and with the rest he resolved
to march back into France by the same way he came; while the confederates
were determined to stop him. The King of Spain had sent, and was still
sending, his caravels[388] into Sicily, though with but few men on board
them. However, before our king’s departure they had garrisoned Rheggio in
Calabria, which is near to Sicily. I had often acquainted my master with
their designs of sending supplies thither, for the ambassador of Naples
had told me so, supposing they had got there already; and if the king
had sent any forces thither in time, he would certainly have taken the
castle; and the town had declared for him before. For want of our sending
thither, the enemy landed, forces at Mantia and Tropea. The townsmen of
Otranto in Apulia had set up our king’s colours; but, being informed of
the new alliance, and considering how near neighbours they were both
to Brindisi and Gallipoli, and how difficult it would be to furnish
themselves with troops, they pulled them down again, and erected the
standard of Arragon; and Don Frederic, who was at Brindisi, supplied them
with a garrison. There was a universal change in the minds of the people
through the whole kingdom; and fortune, which had been so propitious but
two months before, began now to frown upon us; both in relation to the
alliance, the king’s departure, and the great want in which he left the
kingdom, and that rather in respect of officers than soldiers.
The supreme command was committed to Monsieur de Montpensier[389], of the
house of Bourbon, a brave soldier, and a noble gentleman; but his valour
was greater than his wisdom, and, besides, he was so intolerably lazy,
he would never rise till noon. In Calabria he left the Lord d’Aubigny, a
Scotchman (a brave and worthy knight), to command in chief. The king had
made him grand constable of the kingdom, and given him (as I said before)
the county of Acri, and the marquisate of Squillazzo. At his first coming
thither the king had made the seneschal of Beaucaire, Stephen de Vers,
governor of Gaeta, Duke of Nola, and lord high chamberlain, and all the
money in that kingdom passed through his hands; but he took more upon
him than he was able to perform; yet he was very desirous of keeping the
kingdom of Naples. The king created the Lord Dom Julian[390] of Lorraine,
Duke of St. Angelo, in which post he behaved himself with a great deal of
honour and reputation. He left Gabriel de Montfaucon[391] at Manfredonia.
He was a person for whom the king had a great esteem; but he managed
things imprudently there; for, though he found it well provided with
corn and everything else, yet he delivered it up in four days for want of
provisions. To all his followers the king gave great estates in land; but
several sold whatever they found in their castles, and it was reported
that Gabriel did so too. At Trani he left William de Villeneuf[392]
to defend the town; but, being betrayed and sold by some of his own
servants to Frederic, he was kept by him a long time in the galleys.
He left Tarento to the command of George de Suilly[393], who behaved
himself well, and held out till he was forced by famine to surrender,
and then died there of the plague. In Aquila he placed the bailiff of
Vitry[394], who discharged his duty as he ought to do; and Gratian des
Guerres[395] did the same in Abruzzo. The king left them very little
money, only assignments upon the revenue, and of that but very little
was ever raised. The king took care to make a handsome provision for the
princes of Salerno and Bisignano, who served him faithfully, as long as
it was in their power to do so. He also gratified the Colonne in whatever
they demanded, and gave them and their friends the possession of about
thirty towns; which, if they had defended as they ought and as they swore
to do, they would have done his majesty singular service, and reaped
the honour and advantage of it themselves; for I do not believe they
had been so great for a hundred years before. But they had no patience
to stay till the king had left Italy, before they fell to caballing. It
is true they were engaged with us upon the Duke of Milan’s account, for
they are naturally Gibellines. However, that ought not to have led them
to break their oaths, especially after they had been so civilly treated;
besides, the king had done more for them than this; for, under pretence
of friendship, he carried prisoners with him the Lord Virgil Ursini
and the Count de Petillane, and several others of the Ursini who were
their enemies; which, indeed, was a little severe, for, though they were
prisoners of war, yet the king knew they were to have had passports. But
his intention was to carry them no farther than Asti, and then to dismiss
them upon their parole of honour. This he did at the request of the
Colonne; and yet, before he could get thither, the Colonne revolted, and
appeared the first against him without the least pretence or occasion.
CH. II.—How the King departed from Naples, and returned to Rome, from
whence the Pope fled to Orvieto; of the Conference the King had with the
Lord of Argenton upon his Return from Venice; and his Deliberation about
the Restitution of the Florentine Towns.—1495.
As soon as the king had settled his affairs as he designed, he began his
march with what forces he could collect, which, I believe, were about
nine hundred men-at arms (including his guards), and two thousand five
hundred Swiss; in all, of his standing army about seven thousand men,
besides about fifteen hundred more who followed the camp as servants, and
were able to bear arms. The Count de Petillane, who had reviewed them,
and knew their number better than I did, told me after the battle (of
which I shall speak presently) that they were nine thousand effective
men. The king bent his march directly towards Rome[396], where his
Holiness, having no mind to attend him, determined to go to Padua, and
put himself under the protection of the Venetians, and lodgings were
prepared for him in that city; but afterwards they changed their minds,
and both they and the Duke of Milan sent forces to him to Rome for the
defence of the town, which arrived in time enough; yet the Pope durst not
stay, though the king had done him all imaginable honour and service,
and had sent ambassadors on purpose to desire him to stay; but he retired
to Orvieto, and from thence to Perusia, leaving the cardinals to receive
his majesty at Rome. The king was received very honourably by them; but
he made no stay among them, nor suffered the least injury to be done to
anybody. From thence I was sent for to attend him at Siena[397], where
I waited on his majesty, who received me graciously. He asked me, in a
jesting way, whether the Venetians had sent any forces to fall upon his
rear; for his men were all young, and he thought no troops were able
to engage with them. I humbly replied that upon my leaving Venice the
Signory informed me, in the presence of one of their secretaries called
Loredano, that they and the Duke of Milan would bring forty thousand men
into the field, not to molest him, but to defend themselves; and on the
day I set out from Venice they ordered one of their proveditors who was
employed against us to inform me, at Padua, that their army should not
pass a river near Parma (which, if I mistake not, is called the Oglio),
unless his majesty invaded the Duke of Milan; and the said proveditor
and I took private tokens and directions how we might correspond with
each other, if there should be any occasion, to make a treaty of peace;
for I was unwilling to refuse any overture of that nature, because I
knew not how my master’s affairs might succeed. There was present at
our conference one Monsieur Lewis Marcel, who (as a kind of treasurer)
had that year the command of the Mots Viere[398], and had been sent by
them to escort me. There were besides in the company some of the Marquis
of Mantua’s servants, who were carrying him money; but they were at a
distance, and heard nothing of our discourse. From these or others I
procured for the king a list of the confederate army, their horse, foot,
and Stradiots, and the chief officers that commanded them all; but few
about the king believed what I told him.
After the king had halted two days at Siena to refresh his troops, I
earnestly pressed his majesty to march onward, for the enemy were not yet
together, and I feared nothing till the Germans came up; for the King of
the Romans was busily raising both men and money. But, notwithstanding
all I said to the contrary, the king would have two things first solemnly
debated in council, which took up but a little time: one was, whether
he should restore all the Florentine towns, and receive thirty thousand
ducats (which was an arrear of a former gift), and seventy thousand more
which they offered to lend him, besides a reinforcement of three hundred
men-at-arms (under the command of Francisco Secco, an experienced and
brave commander, and one in whom the king put great confidence), and two
thousand foot, to secure his passage into his own kingdom. It was my
opinion (and several others agreed with me) that the king should restore
all but Leghorn, which he should keep till he had reached Asti. If he
had followed our advice, he would have been able to have paid his army,
and have had enough to have bribed the enemy, and then he might have
fought them as he pleased; but we could not get a hearing; Monsieur de
Ligny prevented it (who was a young gentleman, and cousin-german to the
king); but he scarce knew why he did so, unless it were in compassion to
the Pisans. The other point to be debated was set on foot by Monsieur de
Ligny himself, and proposed in council by one Gaucher de Tinteville[399],
and by a party in Siena who wished to have Monsieur de Ligny for their
governor; for that town is always divided into factions, and is governed
the worst of any in Italy. My judgment was demanded first, and I answered
that I thought it would be better for the king to march forward than to
amuse himself with things of so little importance, which could not be
of any service to him for a week; besides, that town belonged to the
emperor, and to dispose of it in that manner was to set the whole empire
against us. Everybody agreed with my opinion, and yet it was carried
against us; and Monsieur de Ligny was made the governor of Siena, with
large promise of a revenue, but he never received any. This trifling
debate detained us six or seven days, during which time the king diverted
himself among the ladies; and he left in this town above three hundred
of his choicest troops, to the great weakening of his army. He then
advanced towards Pisa[400], by the way of Poggibonzi, a castle belonging
to the Florentines; but those who were left at Siena were driven out in a
month.
CH. III.—Of the memorable Preachings of Friar Jerome of Florence.—1495.
I had almost forgotten to mention that while I was at Florence, on my
way to join the king, I went to pay a visit to a certain friar called
Friar Jerome[401], who, by report, was a very holy man, and had lived
in a reformed convent fifteen years. There went along with me one John
Francis[402], a very prudent person, and steward of the king’s household.
The occasion of my going to visit him was upon the account that he had
always, both in the pulpit and elsewhere, spoken much in the king’s
favour, and his words had kept the Florentines from confederating
against us; for never any preacher had so much authority in a city.
Whatever had been said or written to the contrary, he always affirmed
that our king would come into Italy, saying that he was sent by God to
chastise the tyranny of the princes, and that none would be able to
oppose him. He foretold likewise that he would come to Pisa and enter it,
and that the State of Florence should be dissolved on that day. And so it
fell out; for Peter de Medicis was driven out that very day. Many other
things he presaged long before they came to pass: as, for instance, the
death of Laurence de Medicis; and he openly declared that he knew it by
revelation; as likewise he predicted that the reformation of the Church
should be owing to the sword. This is not yet accomplished; but it very
nearly occurred, and he still maintains that it shall come to pass.
Many persons blamed him for pretending to receive divine revelations,
but others believed him; for my part I think him a good man. I asked him
whether our king would return safe into France, considering the great
preparations of the Venetians against him, of which he gave a better
account than I could, though I had lately come from Venice. He told me
he would meet with some difficulties by the way, but he would overcome
them all with honour, though he had but a hundred men in his company;
for God, who had conducted him thither, would guard him back again. But
because he had not applied himself as he ought to the reformation of the
Church, and because he had permitted his soldiers to rob and plunder the
poor people (as well those who had freely opened their gates to him as
the enemy who had opposed him), therefore God had pronounced judgment
against him, and in a short time he would receive chastisement. However,
he bade me tell him that if he would have compassion upon the people,
and command his army to do them no wrong, and punish them when they did,
as it was his office to do, God would then mitigate, if not revoke, his
sentence; but that it would not be sufficient for him to plead that he
did them no wrong himself, and that he would meet the king when he came,
and tell him so from his own mouth; and so he did, and pressed hard for
the restitution of the Florentine towns. When he mentioned the sentence
of God against him, the death of the dauphin[403] came very fresh into
my mind; for I knew nothing else that could touch the king so sensibly.
This I have thought fit to record, to make it the more manifest that this
whole expedition was a mystery conducted by God Himself.
CH. IV.—How the King retained Pisa and several other Florentine Towns in
his Hands, while the Duke of Orleans on the other Side entered Novara, in
the Duchy of Milan.—1495.
While the king (as I said before) was at Pisa, the people of that town,
both men and women, begged of us that for God’s sake we would intercede
for them to the king, that they might not again be subjected to the
tyranny of the Florentines, who, indeed, treated them very barbarously;
but they fared as well as their neighbours, who are subject to other
States in Italy. Pisa and Florence had been at war for three hundred
years before the Florentines subdued them. These supplications, being
delivered with tears in their eyes, wrought strangely upon our soldiers;
so that, forgetting what our king had promised and sworn before the altar
of St. John in Florence, they all unanimously (including even the very
archers and Swiss) interposed in their behalf, and threatened all such as
wished that the king should keep his oath, and particularly the Cardinal
of St. Malo[404], who, in other places, I have called the General of
Languedoc; and him I heard an archer threaten myself, and others talked
as boldly to the Marshal de Gié. The President Gannay, for three nights
together, durst not lie in his own quarters; and the great promoter
of all this was the Count de Ligny. The Pisans daily made their sad
complaints to the king, and moved us all to compassion, though we had no
reason to relieve them.
One day after dinner, as the king was playing at tables with the Lord
de Piennes, and only two or three of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber
waiting on him, forty or fifty armed gentlemen of his household entered
the room, and, in the name of the rest, the son of Sallezard the
elder[405] made a speech to the king in favour of the Pisans, and charged
some of the persons above named of nothing less than betraying him; but
the king reprimanded them severely, and there never was any such thing
afterwards.
Six or seven days the king spent to no purpose at Pisa; and, having
altered the garrison, he put into the castle one Entragues[406], a
servant to the Duke of Orleans, but an ill-conditioned man. Monsieur de
Ligny had recommended him to the king, and by his interest a detachment
of infantry from Berry was left with him. This Entragues managed
his affairs so well (I suppose by means of his money), that he got
Pietrasanta into his hands, and another town not far off, called Mortano;
besides which, he had another government at Librefatta, near Lucca. The
castle of the town of Sarzana, which was extremely well fortified by
the interest of Monsieur de Ligny, was put in the hands of the bastard
of Roussi[407], who was the Count’s servant. Another castle, called
Sarzanello, he put into the hands of one of his other servants; and the
king left great bodies of his forces in these places (though he will
never have so much need of them again), and rejected the assistance and
offers of the Florentines, who, upon his refusal, grew desperate. And
yet, before he left Siena, he had intelligence that the Duke of Orleans
had taken the city of Novara[408] from the Duke of Milan; and it was
therefore certain that the Venetians would declare war against him; for
they had sent him word that if he invaded the Duke of Milan, they should
be obliged, by the alliance they had lately made, to assist him; and
their army, which was numerous, was quite ready to take the field.
Now you must understand, that just upon the conclusion of the league,
the Duke of Milan had a design upon Asti, supposing he should have found
no troops in it. But my letters prevented him, and hastened the supplies
which the Duke of Bourbon sent thither; and first there arrived forty
lances of the Marshal de Gié’s troops, who had been left behind in
France, all very well appointed; and after them five hundred foot from
the Marquis di Saluzzo. The arrival of these forces diverted the Duke
of Milan’s army, commanded by Galeas di St. Severino, who was posted at
Annone, a castle belonging to the said duke, within two miles of Asti.
Some time after they were joined by three hundred and fifty men-at-arms,
and gentlemen of Dauphiny, and all the Frank-Archers of that country, and
about two thousand Swiss; so that they were in all fully seven thousand
five hundred fighting men. It was a prodigious expense and trouble to
assemble these forces, and when that was done, they did not answer the
end for which they were designed; for they were sent for to have assisted
the king, and instead of that he was forced to support them. The king had
written to the Duke of Orleans and his chief officers that they should
attempt nothing against the Duke of Milan, but only have a care to secure
Asti, and come to meet his majesty as far as the river Tesino, where they
were to assist and favour his passage, there being no other river where
he could be stopped; for the Duke of Orleans had been left at Asti, and
had gone no further with the king. However, notwithstanding the king’s
orders to the contrary, he was so pleased with the honour of having
Novara delivered into his hands (which was but ten leagues from Milan)
that he could not contain himself, but entered it in a triumphal manner;
and the whole city, both Guelphs and Gibellines, received him with all
imaginable demonstrations of joy; and the Marchioness of Montferrat was
a great instrument in carrying out the plot. The castle held out two or
three days; but if in the meanwhile he had gone or sent to Milan, where
his party was strong, he would have been received with more joy (as I
have been told by many great persons of that duchy) than ever greeted him
at his own castle at Blois; and during the first three days he might have
done it with ease, for the Duke of Milan’s forces were at Annone, near
Asti, when Novara was surprised, and came not up till four days after;
but perhaps he durst not rely upon the information he received.
CH. V.—How King Charles crossed several dangerous Passages over
the Mountains between Pisa and Sarzana; and how the Germans burned
Pontremoli.—1495.
From Siena the king was come to Pisa, as you have already heard, and from
Pisa he marched to Lucca, where he was well received by the townsfolk,
and stayed with them two days; and from thence he went to Pietrasanta,
where Monsieur Entragues was governor; and neither he himself, nor any
that were about him, had the least fear or apprehension of the enemy.
Yet he found great difficulty in his march over the mountains betwixt
Lucca and that place, where there were several passes very easy to have
been defended by small bodies of foot; but the confederates were not
assembled as yet. Not far from Pietrasanta, on one side there is the pass
of Seierre, or Salto della Cerva, and on the other that of Roctaillé, or
Rotaio, with a deep marsh at the foot of it, over which we were forced
to march upon a causeway, as if it had been through a standing pool.
This was the pass of which I had heard so much, and which I dreaded
more than all the rest between Pisa and Pontremoli; for a small body
of troops, with a cart overturned in the midst of it, and two pieces
of cannon, would have stopped our passage, and left our army helpless.
From Pietrasanta the king marched to Sarzana, where the Cardinal of St.
Peter ad Vincula met him, and offered (if he pleased to send some of his
forces thither) to make Genoa revolt to him. This proposal was referred
to a council of officers, of whom I was one, and it was concluded by all
that it should not be attempted; for if the king got the victory, Genoa
would surrender of course; and if he lost the battle, it would do him
no good; and this was the first time we ever heard fighting mentioned.
Our resolution was reported to the king; but for all that, he sent
thither the Lord de Bresse (since Duke of Savoy), the Lord de Beaumont
de Polignac[409], my brother-in-law, and the Lord d’Aubijoux[410], of the
house of Amboise, with six-score men-at-arms, and five hundred archers,
newly sent him by sea out of France. I wondered that a prince of his age
should not have one minister of state about him that durst be plain with
him, and tell him the dangers to which he exposed his person; but indeed
he put no confidence in what I said.
We had a few forces at sea, which came from Naples, under the command of
Monsieur de Miolans, Governor of Dauphiny, and one Stephen de Neves, of
Montpelier; they were in all about eight galleys, and were arrived at
Spezzia and Rapalo, where they were defeated at the time I speak of, and
in the same place where our men had beaten King Alphonso’s forces in the
beginning of this expedition, and by the same party who had been on our
side at that battle (that is to say, Signor John Lewis di Fieschi, and
Signor John Adorno); and everything was changed in Genoa. It had been
better management to have had them on the king’s side, though that would
have been little enough. Monsieur de Bresse and the Cardinal advanced
into the suburbs of Genoa, expecting their party in the town would rise
in their favour; but the Duke of Milan had taken care to prevent any
insurrection; and the Adorni and Signor John Lewis di Fieschi had given
such orders about the affair that our forces were in great danger of
being handled as they had been at sea, considering the smallness of
their numbers; nor did anything prevent it but the fear the prevailing
party in Genoa had, that if they sallied out of the town, the Fregosi
would rise up in arms and shut the gates upon them; however, our men met
with difficulty enough before they got to Asti; and they were not at the
battle, where they might have been more serviceable and better employed.
From Sarzana the king marched on towards Pontremoli, which he was
forced to pass, it being the entrance into the mountains. The town and
castle were strong, and the country about them almost inaccessible; and
had they been well garrisoned, they could never have been taken; but
it seemed as if what Friar Jerome told me proved true, that God would
lead him, as it were, by the hand, till he was out of all danger; for
the enemy were blind and stupid, and had not put above three or four
hundred men to defend that important pass. The king sent his vanguard
to Pontremoli, under the command of the Marshal de Gié and Signor John
James di Trivulce, whom he had entertained in his service ever since King
Ferrand’s flight out of Naples. This Trivulce was a gentleman of Milan,
of a noble family, a good officer, a worthy man, and a great enemy to
the Duke of Milan, for he had been banished by him; and by his means
the place was presently delivered without an assault, and the garrison
marched out. But a great inconvenience ensued upon this; for, as I have
already mentioned, when the Duke of Milan was there last, there happened
a dispute between the townsmen and some of the Germans (forty of whom
were slain by the townsmen), so that the Swiss, in revenge, and contrary
to their articles, now put all the men to the sword, plundered the town,
set fire to it, and burned it and all the magazines, with about ten of
their own men, who, being drunk, could not escape, and it was not in
the Marshal de Gié’s power to prevent it. After they had committed this
outrage, they besieged the castle, in order to have used those who were
in it after the same manner, though the garrison consisted of none but
Signor John James di Trivulce’s troops, who had been put into it when
the enemy marched out; neither would they give over their attack till
the king himself sent to command them to desist. The destruction of this
place was a great inconvenience to the king, as much for the dishonour
it brought on us as for the provisions that were spoiled, of which there
was great plenty, and we were in extremity of want, though the people
were not much against us, excepting only those about the town, who
had suffered more particularly. But if the king had hearkened to the
overtures made him by Signor John James di Trivulce, several places and
persons of importance would have surrendered and allied themselves to
him; for he advised him to set up the young duke’s standard, who was son
of John Galeas, the last Duke of Milan, that lies buried at Pavia, as
you have heard; which young duke was in the Lord Ludovic’s power. But
the king would not be persuaded to do it, out of kindness to the Duke of
Orleans, who laid claim to the duchy. After this the king marched from
Pontremoli, and encamped in a small valley, where there were not ten
houses, and the name of which I have forgotten. He lay in that camp five
days (I know not why), with his army in great distress for provisions,
and the main body thirty miles behind the vanguard, with high and steep
rocks all around, where such great cannon had never been seen till then;
for those with which Duke Galeas had passed that way were but four
falconets, which perhaps weighed five hundred pounds a-piece, and yet the
people regarded them with infinite wonder.
CH. VI.—How the Duke of Orleans behaved himself in the City of
Novara.—1495.
But to return now to the Duke of Orleans. As soon as he had taken the
Castle of Novara, he lay still for some days, and then marched to
Vigevano. Two little towns[411] hard by sent to him and offered to
receive his troops; but he wisely refused the overtures they made him.
The citizens of Pavia sent twice to him likewise, and certainly he was
mightily to blame in refusing their offer. However, he drew up in battle
array before the town of Vigevano, where the Duke of Milan’s whole army
was encamped, and commanded by the sons of Galeas St. Severino, whom I
have so often mentioned before. The town is worth nothing, not a jot
better than St. Martin de Cande.[412] I came thither not long after the
Duke of Milan had been there, and the chief officers who were there
showed me the places where their armies had been drawn up, both within
and without the town; and if the Duke of Orleans had advanced but a
hundred paces farther, the enemy must have retreated over the river
Tesino, where they had made a large bridge of boats, and were drawn up
on the bank; and I saw them demolish an earthwork which they had made on
the other side to secure their retreat; for they had resolved to quit
both the town and the castle, which would have been a great disadvantage
to them. This is the place where the Duke of Milan generally resides,
and indeed it is the best seat for hunting and hawking, and all kinds of
sports, that I ever yet saw.
But perhaps the Duke of Orleans thought the town stronger than it really
was, and that he had done enough already, without attempting anything
farther; and therefore he marched off to a place called Trecate, the lord
of which place had a conference with me not long after, and had something
in charge from the Duke of Milan. To this town of Trecate the chief
citizens of Milan sent to invite the Duke thither, and tempt him into
their town, offering their children as hostages; and they could easily
have put him into possession of it, as I have been credibly informed
since by persons of great authority who were there at that time; for
the Duke of Milan would not have found men enough to have defended the
castle, and the nobility and commons both desired the destruction of
the house of Sforza. The Duke of Orleans also, and his men, have told
me the same, but they durst not trust the citizens; and they wanted a
person that understood them and their ways better than they did; besides,
his great officers were not all of the same opinion in relation to that
affair.
A body of two thousand Germans sent by the King of the Romans, and about
a thousand German horse under the command of Monsieur Frederic Capelare,
a native of the county of Ferrette, now joined the Duke of Milan’s army.
With this reinforcement Galeas and the rest of the officers were so
mightily encouraged that they marched directly to Trecate, and offered
the Duke of Orleans battle; but he was advised not to fight, though his
army was more numerous than theirs. Perhaps his officers were unwilling
to hazard their army, lest the loss of a battle should be the ruin of
the king, of whom they could get no intelligence, because the couriers
were all stopped. Upon this the Duke of Orleans retreated with his whole
army to Novara, having with great indiscretion neglected the favourable
opportunity of supplying the town with provisions, or preserving as they
ought what was already in their magazines, though they might have got
enough at that time in the country round about without money; but when
they wanted it afterwards, the enemy was within half a league of the town.
CH. VII.—How the King passed the Apennine Mountains with his Train of
Artillery, by the Assistance of the Swiss; and of the great Danger to
which the Marshal de Gié and his whole Vanguard were exposed.—1495.
We left the king encamped in a valley on this side Pontremoli, in great
want of provisions, and yet he stayed there five days without any manner
of necessity for doing so. Our Swiss, who had committed the great fault
at Pontremoli[413], did us a singular piece of service at this time;
they were fearful their crime would give the king a displeasure against
them, and that his majesty would never endure them more; and therefore,
to atone for what was past, they came to him of themselves, and offered
to convey his great guns over those almost impassable mountains (and well
I may call them so, for their height and steepness), where there was no
track or path to direct them. I have seen most of the chief mountains
both in Italy and Spain, but none of them are to be compared to these;
and this offer the Swiss made upon condition the king would forgive them,
which he did. Our train consisted of fourteen extraordinary great guns.
At the farther end of the valley we began to climb up a very steep path,
where our mules could scarce get up; but these Swiss corded themselves
two and two abreast, and drew a hundred and sometimes two hundred in a
company, till they were weary, and then they were relieved by as many
more; besides these, there were the horses belonging to the artillery,
and every one of the courtiers who had any carriage, lent a horse to
hasten their passage; but had it not been for these Swiss, the horses
would never have done it; and to speak truth, they helped over not only
the artillery, but the whole army; for had it not been for them, not a
man could have passed the mountains; wherefore they were well assisted;
and besides, they had as great a desire to be over as the rest of the
army; they had committed many faults, but this good action did more than
sufficiently atone for all. However, the greatest part of the difficulty
was not to get the artillery up; for as soon as our men were at the
top, they saw great deep valleys below them, to which there was no way
but what nature had prepared; so that our horses and men were forced to
draw backward, and the letting the guns down was infinitely more trouble
than the hauling them up; and besides, the smiths and the carpenters
were forced to be constantly by; for if any of the guns slipped, they
had to be mended before they could go on. Many advised the king, for
expedition’s sake, to break up his great guns, but he would by no means
consent to it.
The Marshal de Gié was thirty miles before us, and pressed the king
to hasten his march; and yet it was three days before we could reach
him, and by that time the enemy was come within sight. Their army was
encamped in a large field about half a league from him; and if they
had attacked him, he would certainly have been defeated. The marshal
afterward took up his quarters at Fornovo, a strong town at the entrance
into the plain, and this he did to keep the enemy from assaulting us on
the mountains; but we had a better guardian than he to protect us, for
God put other thoughts into the heads of our enemies, and so blinded
their understandings with avarice that they were resolved to wait for our
coming into the plain, that nothing might escape them; for they thought
if they should attack us upon the mountains we might retreat to Pisa,
or some of the towns we had in the territory of Florence; but they were
mistaken, for those places were too remote; and if they had beaten us,
they might have pursued as fast as we could have fled, and they would
have had the advantage of knowing the country better than we.
Thus far on our side the war was not begun; but the Marshal de Gié sent
the king word that he had passed the mountains, and that having sent out
a party of forty horse to reconnoitre the enemy, they had been charged
by the Estradiots, and one of them (called Lebeuf) being slain, the
Estradiots cut off his head, put it upon the top of a lance, carried
it to their proveditor, and demanded a ducat. These Estradiots are of
the same nature with the Genetaires[414]; they are horse and foot, and
habited like Turks, only they wear no turbans upon their heads. They
are hardy people, and lie abroad all the year round with their horses;
they were all Greeks, from the places which the Venetians possess in
those parts, some of them from Naples and Romagna and the Morea, others
from Albania and Durazzo. Their horses are all Turkish, and very good;
the Venetians employ them often in their wars, and put great confidence
in them. I saw them all upon their first landing at Venice, and they
mustered in the island where the abbey of St. Nicholas is built, and
their number was near fifteen hundred; they are stout, active fellows,
and will plague an army terribly when they once undertake it.
These Estradiots, as I said before, having beaten our party, pursued them
to the marshal’s quarters, where the Swiss were posted, of whom they
killed three or four, and carried away their heads according to their
custom. For the Venetians, having been at war against the Turks formerly,
in the time of Mahomet, the present Turk’s father, Sultan Mahomet would
not suffer his soldiers to give quarter, but allowed them a ducat for
every head, and the Venetians did the same. My opinion is they did it
on purpose to terrify us, and indeed so they did; but the Estradiots
themselves were no less affrighted with our artillery; for a shot from
a falconet having killed one of their horses, they retired with great
precipitation; but in their retreat they took one of our Swiss captains,
who had gotten on horseback to watch their retreat, and, being unarmed,
was run through the body with a lance. This captain was a wise man, and
they carried him before the Marquis of Mantua (who was captain-general
for the Venetians) and his uncle, the Lord Rodolph of Mantua, and the
Count di Cajazzo, who commanded for the Duke of Milan, and who knew him
extremely well. The enemy’s army had taken the field (at least all of
them that were joined, for some were still to come up) about eight days
before, but lay still in expectation of their confederates; so that the
king might have gone back into France without any impediment in the
world, had he not squandered away his time to no purpose by the way, as
you have heard; but God had ordered it otherwise.
CH. VIII.—How the Marshal de Gié withdrew with his Army to the Mountains,
and waited until the King came up to him.—1495.
The Marshal de Gié, fearing to be attacked, retired to the mountains.
He had with him (as he told me) about eight score men-at-arms, and
eight hundred Swiss, and no more, and from us he could not expect any
assistance; for, by reason of our heavy cannon, we could not join him in
less than a day and a half. The king, in his march, lay at the houses
of two little marquises. Our vanguard, being posted upon the mountain,
was awaiting an attack by the enemy, whom they saw drawn up in order of
battle at a good distance in the plain; but God (who had always preserved
our army) infatuated our adversaries’ understanding. Our Swiss captain,
being examined by the Count di Cajazzo, who commanded their army, and was
then in their van, was asked what number of men-at-arms were with the
marshal, though the count knew our strength as well as we did ourselves,
for he had been with us during the whole campaign.
The Swiss magnified our forces, represented us to be much stronger than
we were, and said the marshal had with him three hundred men-at-arms
and fifteen hundred Swiss. The count told him plainly that he lied, for
in the whole army we had not above three thousand Swiss, and it was
improbable we would send half of them in our van; upon which the captain
was sent prisoner to the Marquis of Mantua’s tent, where a council of war
was called, in order to consult how to attack us. The marquis believed
what the Swiss captain had said, and urged that their infantry were not
so good as the Swiss; that all their forces had not joined them; that it
would be a great injury to the allies to engage without them; and that,
if they should lose the battle, the Signory would have just reason to
blame their conduct; that it would be better, therefore, to wait for our
coming into the plain, where we must pass in front of them; and the two
proveditors being of the same opinion, the rest durst not oppose. Others
affirmed, that if they routed our vanguard, the King must of necessity be
taken prisoner; but, for all that, it was concluded to await us in the
plain, and they confidently believed that none of us could escape. This
I have been informed of since by the very persons whom I have mentioned;
for, afterwards, we discoursed together, and the Marshal de Gié and I
had this relation from their own mouths. Upon this they retired into the
plain, being assured that within a day or two the king must of necessity
come to Fornovo; and in the meantime the rest of the confederate forces
arrived in their camp, and the way was so narrow we were obliged to march
close by them.
Upon our descending from the mountains, we had a prospect of the plain
of Lombardy, which is the pleasantest and best country in the world, and
most plentiful in everything; yet, though I call it a plain, it is scarce
passable for horses, for it is as full of ditches as Flanders, or rather
more, but much better, and more fruitful both in corn, wine, and fruit;
and their ground never lies fallow. It pleased us exceedingly to see
so fine a country after the famine and hardships which we had suffered
since our departure from Lucca; but our train of artillery gave us great
trouble, especially to let down, so steep and difficult was the pass.
In the enemy’s camp there were great numbers of tents and pavilions,
which made it look very large, and indeed so it was. The Venetians made
good their message by me to the king, when they promised that the Duke
of Milan and they would bring forty thousand men into the field; and if
they had not their full number, they wanted not much of it, for they were
five and thirty thousand effective men, and of them four-fifths were in
the Venetian pay. They had at least two thousand six hundred men-at-arms
barded, every one attended by his bowman on horseback, or some other
person in livery, making four horses to every man-at-arms. Their
Estradiots and other light horse were about five thousand, and the rest
were infantry, encamped in a very strong position, and furnished with a
large train of artillery.
CH. IX.—How the King and his small Army arrived at Fornovo, near the
Camp of his Enemies, who awaited him in very fine Order, and with a
Determination to defeat and capture him.—1495.
The king descended from the mountains about noon, and took up his
quarters in Fornovo on the 5th of July, being Sunday, in the year 1495.
We found good store of provision in the town both for our horses and
ourselves. The people received us very kindly, for nobody did them the
least injury; they brought us victuals and bread, but their bread was
small and black, and they sold it very dear, and their wine was three
parts water; they brought us likewise some of their fruits, and were
exceedingly diligent in attending our army. I ordered them to bring me a
little of everything, which I had tested in my presence; for we had great
suspicion that this plenty of provisions had been left there on purpose
to poison us, so that at first nobody touched them; and our suspicion was
much increased by the death of two of our Swiss, who were found dead in
a cellar, having killed themselves with excessive drinking, or else died
of cold in the cellar; but before night our horses began to eat, and at
last the soldiers followed their example, and we refreshed ourselves very
well. I must say this in honour of the Italians, that we never found that
they endeavoured to do us any mischief by poison; if they had, we could
hardly have secured ourselves in this march. On the Sunday (as I said
before) we arrived about noon at Fornovo; most of our people of quality
ate nothing but a crust of bread at the place where the king alighted and
drank; and, indeed, at that time there was little else to be got; for the
provisions that were in the town nobody durst venture to taste.
Presently after this refreshment, the Estradiots sallied out of their
camp, and dashing up to our very army, gave us a strong alarm. Our men,
being unacquainted with their way of fighting, drew out into the field,
and put themselves into order of battle, with a van, main body, and rear
so exactly well distanced that they were not a bowl’s cast one from
another, so that upon any disaster they might easily have supported each
other; but no action happened at that time, and both parties retired to
their camps. Our tents were but few, and our camp extended so near to
theirs that twenty of their Estradiots were enough to give us an alarm at
any time; wherefore they lay constantly in our front, having the benefit
of a wood, through which they might march close up to us before they were
discovered. We lay betwixt two little hills in a valley, divided by a
small river called Tarro, which is usually fordable on foot, unless it
is swelled by the waters from the mountains, which fall very suddenly,
and are as suddenly gone. The valley in which we lay encamped, being
full of gravel and great stones, was very incommodious for our cavalry;
it was about a quarter of a league in width; and upon the hill on our
right hand, within half a league of us, the enemy were posted, so that we
were obliged to pass in sight of their whole army, with only that river
between us. On that side on which we were quartered, beyond the hill on
the left hand, there was another road which we might have taken; but then
we should have seemed to have been afraid of them. About two days before,
it was proposed to me by some prudent persons in our army, who now began
to be apprehensive of their danger, that I should go and desire a parley
with the enemy, and should take another along with me, to observe their
numbers and the situation of their camp. I had no great inclination to
undertake this duty (and without a safe-conduct there was no going at
all); wherefore I told them that, at my departure from Venice, and at
Padua, I had taken my leave very kindly of the proveditors, and that
we had promised correspondence upon occasion, and therefore I did not
question but upon any overture of a treaty they would meet me half way;
whereas, if I should condescend to go to them, it would but make them the
more arrogant; besides, I feared it was too late.
The same Sunday I wrote to the proveditors (one of them was called Luca
Pisani, and the other Melchior Trivisano), desiring that, according to
the agreement between ourselves at my departure from Padua, they would
send me a passport, in order that I might have a conference with them.
They sent me word they would have done it with all their hearts, had we
not begun a war against the Duke of Milan; however, one of them (as they
should agree) would meet me in some place midway between the two armies.
I had their answer the same night, but none of those who had influence
with the king attached any importance to it. I was fearful of going too
far, lest they should have interpreted it as cowardice; so that I pressed
it no farther that night, though I would willingly have done anything to
have delivered the king and his army out of danger, had I been able.
About midnight the Cardinal of St. Malo left the king; and his tent being
near mine, he came to me, and told me that the king would march the next
morning, and that he was resolved to pass by them, and when he began
to march, that he would fire some of his great guns into their army by
way of defiance, and then march on in as good order as he could. I am
of opinion this was the Cardinal’s own advice, for he was ignorant in
such cases, and knew not what counsel to give; and it had been much more
prudent in the king to have called a council of his officers and all the
grave men about him, to have consulted what measures it would be proper
to take in that exigence of affairs; but the result would have been the
same, for in this very march I had seen many things concerted in council
with very great prudence, but managed quite contrary when they came to
be executed. I told the Cardinal that if we came so near as to fire into
their camp, they would certainly come out and skirmish with us, and
that then it would be impossible to avoid a general battle; besides, it
did not consist with the overture I had made, so that I was extremely
concerned to hear the resolution the king had taken. However, such had
been my condition from the beginning of this king’s reign, that I durst
not object, for fear I should disoblige his favourites, and make them my
enemies; for they had, indeed, greater authority with him than they ought
to have had.
That night we had two great alarms, and all through our own negligence,
in not having taken the same precautions to secure ourselves against
the incursions of the Estradiots, as we used to do against the light
horse; for twenty of our men-at-arms, with their archers, would easily
have stopped two hundred of them; but they were new to us then. We had
great rains that night also, and such claps of thunder and lightning, as
if heaven and earth were coming together, or that this was an omen of
some impending mischief. But we were at the foot of great mountains, in
a hot country, and in the height of the summer, so that the thing was
natural enough; however, it was very terrible, and our consternation was
increased by our enemies being so numerous before us, and our having no
possibility to pass without fighting them, which must be done to our
great disadvantage; for our army was but small, not amounting to above
nine thousand men in the whole; and of these, I believe, two thousand
were servants, and such as followed the camp, without reckoning pages and
footmen belonging to the officers.
CH. X.—The Arrangement of the two Armies for the Battle of Fornovo.—1495.
On Monday morning, the 6th of July, in the year 1495, by seven o’clock,
the noble king mounted on horseback, and called for me several times:
I came to him, and found him completely armed, and mounted upon the
best horse I ever saw in my life. The horse was called Savoy, of the
Bressian breed, and had been given him, according to common report, by
Charles, Duke of Savoy. It was a black horse, with but one eye, of no
extraordinary stature, but tall enough for him that was to ride him. This
young prince seemed that day quite another person than what one would
take him to have been by his nature, proportion, and complexion. He was
exceeding bashful, especially in speaking, and is so to this day; and no
wonder, for he had been brought up in great awe, and in the company of
inferior people; but now, being mounted on his horse, his eyes sparkled
with fire, his complexion was fresh and lively, and all his words showed
wisdom and discretion,—so that I could not but believe the predictions of
Friar Jerome (and I thought of them at that time) when he told me that
God would conduct him, as it were, by the hand, and that he should meet
with some difficulties in his return to his own dominions, but that he
should overcome them all, and gain immortal honour by it. The king told
me that if those people wished to treat, I might go treat with them; and
the Cardinal being by, he nominated him to go along with me, and also the
Marshal de Gié, who at that time was in a violent passion, occasioned
by a dispute between the Counts of Narbonne and Guise, both of whom
pretended to the command of the van that day. I replied, “Sire, I shall
observe your commands; but I never saw two great armies so near without
fighting before they parted.”
Our whole army marched out of their camp in good order, the battalions
being near one another, as on the day before; but yet methought they
did not make so fine an appearance as those I had formerly seen under
Charles, Duke of Burgundy, and our king’s father Louis XI., nor indeed
were they half so numerous. The Cardinal and I withdrew a little, and
dictated a letter to the two proveditors, which was written by one
Monsieur Robertet[415], one of the king’s secretaries, in whom he had
great confidence. The substance of the letter was, that it was the
Cardinal’s duty, by virtue of his quality and function, to procure peace,
if it lay in his power, and mine also, as I had been ambassador lately at
Venice; wherefore it would not be improper for me to be a mediator now.
We signified to them that the king’s resolution was only to march through
the country in his way to France, without committing any hostilities;
and therefore, if they desired a conference, as was proposed the day
before, we were ready to meet them, and would employ all our interest
to accommodate matters. By this time the fight was begun, and there was
skirmishing on all sides. As we were marching on slowly, with the river
between us, we came within a quarter of a league one of the other, they
being also drawn up in order of battle; for it is their custom to make
their camp so large, that they can put themselves into battle array
within it.
They sent out a party of their Estradiots and mounted bowmen, and some
few men-at-arms, who marched directly, by private roads, to the village
of Fornovo, which we had just left, with a design to pass the little
river Tarro in that place, and fall upon our baggage-train, which was
very numerous (in all, I believe, besides waggons, about six thousand
sumpter-horses, mules, and asses). Their army was drawn up in as good
order as possible, and had been so for several days before; and they
relied much upon the superiority of their forces. They attacked the
king’s army on every side; so that, if we had been beaten, not a man
of us could have escaped, considering the country we were in, and that
those whom I mentioned before had fallen upon our baggage. On the left
hand, there were the Marquis of Mantua and his uncle, the Lord Rodolph,
with the Count Bernardino di Montone[416], and the flower of their army,
consisting of six hundred men-at-arms, as they told me afterwards;
and these charged our rear. All the men-at-arms were well barded,
with fine plumes of feathers, and bourdonnasses[417]; and with their
cross-bow men on horseback, their Estradiots, and their infantry to
support them. Against the Marshal de Gié and our vanguard, the Count di
Cajazzo advanced with about four hundred men-at-arms well accoutred, and
supported also by a good body of foot. There was also another brigade of
about two hundred men-at-arms, commanded by the son[418] of Signor John
Bentivoglio, of Bologna, a young gentleman who had never been in battle
before; and, to speak the truth, they wanted good officers as much as we
did. These were to second the Count di Cajazzo, and fall upon our van;
and there was also another squadron, in the nature of a reserve to the
Marquis of Mantua’s brigade, which was commanded by Anthony d’Urbino, a
bastard of the late Duke of Urbino; and, besides all these, there were
two great bodies left in their camp. This I understood afterwards from
themselves, and the next day I saw it with my own eyes; for the Venetians
would not venture all at one stake, nor leave their baggage unguarded;
yet, in my judgment, they had done better to have put all to a push,
since they were so far engaged.
I shall now acquaint you with what became of the letter which the
Cardinal and I had sent by a trumpeter. It was received by the
proveditors, and as soon as they had read it, our great guns began to
fire, and they immediately answered us; but their artillery was not so
good as ours.[419] The proveditors sent the trumpeter back, and the
marquis sent another of his own with this message, that they would
willingly treat, and if we would give over cannonading, they would do so
too. I was then at a distance from the king, who was riding up and down
from rank to rank: so I sent back the trumpeters to say, that our cannon
should cease firing; and having given orders to that purpose to the
master of the artillery, both sides ceased for a time; but on a sudden
they fired a gun amongst us, and ours began to play more fiercely than
before, with three fresh pieces which we had levelled against them. As
soon as our two trumpeters were arrived in their camp, they were carried
to the marquis’s tent, where it was solemnly debated whether they should
treat or engage. The Count di Cajazzo (as they told me, who were present)
urged that we were half vanquished already, and that this was no time
for a treaty; and one of the proveditors (who told me the story) was
of his judgment, but the other was not. The marquis was of that mind
too, but his uncle was against it; and being an honest and discreet man,
strenuously opposed it, for he loved us well, and served against us
unwillingly. At length they were unanimous in their opinion for fighting.
CH. XI.—How Parleys were vainly attempted; and the Beginning of the
Battle of Fornovo.—1495.
You must know that the king had placed his greatest strength in his van;
for in it there were about three hundred and fifty men-at-arms, three
thousand Swiss (the hopes of the whole army[420]), three hundred archers,
and some of the two hundred mounted cross-bow men of his own guard (which
was a great loss to him, as he ordered them to fight on foot). Besides
these we had very few foot; but what we had were distributed among them.
There fought on foot among the Swiss the Lord Englebert of Cleves[421],
brother to the Duke of Cleves, the Lord of Lornay[422], and the bailiff
of Dijon, who commanded them; and the artillery was placed in their
front. The forces that had been left in the territories of Florence,
and those which had been sent to Genoa against the judgment of all
people, would have been of very great service to us on this occasion.
Our vanguard had by this time marched on as far as the enemy’s camp,
and everybody expected they would have attacked us; but our two other
bodies were neither so near each other, nor so well ordered as on the
day before; and because the Marquis of Mantua (who had already passed
the river, and entered the plain) was within a quarter of a league of
our rear ready to attack them, but marching slowly on, and in such close
order, that it was a very fine sight to behold, the king was forced to
turn his back upon his own vanguard, and face about to his enemies at
the rear. I was at that time with the Cardinal, awaiting an answer; but
I told him it was no time to trifle any longer, and so I passed by the
Swiss squadron and went to find out the king. In my passage I lost a
page (who was my cousin-german), a valet-de-chambre, and a foot-boy, who
followed me at a little distance; and I did not see when they were slain.
I had not come a hundred paces, when I heard a great noise in the place
from whence I came, or a little behind it: it was the Estradiots, who
were gotten into the king’s quarters, where there were not above three or
four houses; and they rifled his baggage, and killed or wounded four or
five men, but the rest escaped. They killed altogether about a hundred
footboys and servants belonging to our carriages, and put our whole
train in very great disorder. When I came where the king was, I found
him making knights. The enemy being come very near him, he was obliged
to give over; and I heard Matthew the bastard of Bourbon[423] (who was
in great favour with the king), and one Philip du Moulin[424] (a very
brave gentleman), call to the king, and say, “On, sir, on;” upon which
he went to the head of the army, and placed himself directly before his
standard, so that there was not a man that I saw nearer the enemy, unless
it were the bastard of Bourbon. I had not been with the king a quarter
of an hour before the enemy were advanced within a hundred paces of his
majesty, who was as ill guarded and attended as any prince or noble that
I ever saw; but he is well guarded who is guarded by God: and it was true
what the venerable Friar Jerome had presaged, who said, “That God would
lead him as it were by the hand.” His rear was posted on the right, a
little behind him. The next battalion to him on that side was the Duke of
Orleans’ troop, consisting of about eighty lances, commanded by Robinet
de Framezelles[425], about forty more under the Sieur de la Trimouille,
and the hundred Scottish archers, who put themselves into as close order
as if they had been men-at-arms. I was on the left among the gentlemen of
the Vingt-Escus[426], the pensioners, and others of the king’s household:
I will not mention their several captains for brevity’s sake; but the
rear was commanded by the Count of Foix.
About a quarter of an hour after my arrival, the enemy, being advanced so
near the king (as you have heard), began to couch their lances, advanced
upon a gentle gallop, and in two bodies charged our two squadrons on
the right of them, and the Scottish archers; our men advanced towards
them, and the king as bravely as any. On the left, where I was posted,
we charged them on the flank much to our advantage; and, indeed, to say
truth, never charge was brisker on both sides. The Estradiots, who were
in the rear of that division, seeing our mules and sumpter-horses making
with all speed to our vanguard, and that their comrades were beginning
to plunder, quilted their men-at-arms, and ran to get their share of the
booty; but certainly, if fifteen hundred light horse had but attacked
us with their scimitars in their hands (which is a terrible weapon),
considering the smallness of our number, we must certainly have been
beaten; but God assisted us, for no sooner had they charged us with
their lances but their Italian men-at-arms fled, and all their infantry,
or the greatest part of them, gave ground also. At the same time that
this squadron charged us the Count di Cajazzo attacked our van; but they
came not so close, for when they should have couched their lances their
hearts failed, and they fell into disorder; and the Swiss took fifteen or
twenty of them in a company, and put them to the sword: the rest fled,
and were but indifferently pursued; for the Marshal de Gié with much ado
kept his forces together, for he perceived another great body of them not
very far off. However, some followed the chase, and the enemy fled over
the ground where we had charged along the highway, with their swords only
in their hands; for they had thrown away their lances.
But you must know that that brigade which charged the king was warmly
pursued; for all of us made after them: some of them fled to the village
from whence we were come, others made at the top of their speed to their
camp, and all of us after them: only the king stayed behind with some
of his troops, and put himself in no little danger by doing so. One of
the first men of the enemy who was slain was the Lord Rodolph of Mantua,
the marquis’s uncle (who was to have sent orders to the Lord Anthony of
Urbino, when it was time for him to advance), for they thought the battle
would have lasted a long while, according to the custom of Italy; and
the Lord Anthony excused himself upon that score, but I believe he saw
nothing to encourage him to advance. We had a great number of grooms and
servants with our waggons, who flocked about the Italian men-at-arms,
when they were dismounted, and knocked most of them on the head. The
greatest part of them had their hatchets (which they cut their wood
with) in their hands, and with them they broke up their head-pieces,
and then knocked out their brains; otherwise they could not easily have
killed them, they were so very well armed; and to be sure there were
three or four of our men to attack one man-at-arms. The long swords also
which our archers and servants wore did very good execution. The king
continued on the ground where he had been charged, declaring that he
would neither follow the chase nor retire to our vanguard, which was at
too far a distance. He had appointed seven or eight young gentlemen to
attend constantly about him. He had escaped very well the first charge,
considering how near he was to the enemy; for within twenty paces of him
the bastard of Bourbon was taken prisoner and carried off to their camp.
CH. XII.—Consequences of the Victory gained by the French at Fornovo; and
the Danger to which King Charles VIII. found himself exposed.—1495.
The king (as I said before) remained in the same place, and so ill
attended that of all his squadron he had none left him but Anthony des
Aubus, a gentleman of his bed-chamber, a little man, and but ill-armed;
the others were all dispersed, as he told me himself at night before
their faces, and they ought to have been ashamed of themselves: but they
returned to his assistance very seasonably; for a small party of the
routed enemy coming along the road, and perceiving it so thin of men,
fell upon the king and the aforesaid gentleman of his bed-chamber; but
the king, by the activity of his horse (which was the best in the world),
kept them at bay till others of his men came up, who were not far off;
and then the Italians were all forced to fly. Upon this the king took
their counsel and retired to his van, which had never stirred from its
ground. Thus the king came off victoriously with the main battle, and if
the van had advanced but a hundred paces, the enemy’s whole army would
have fled: some said they ought to have advanced, and others that they
ought not.
Our troops, which had pursued, followed the enemy to their very camp,
which was extended towards Fornovo; and I saw none of our men touched but
one Julian Bourgneuf, who fell down dead from a blow that was given him
by an Italian who passed by him; but he was very ill armed. Upon that
accident our men stopped, and cried, “Let us return to the king;” and at
that very word the whole party halted to give their horses breath, which
had been very hard ridden, and were tired with the length of the way,
which was full of sharp stones and gravel. Not far from us we saw a party
of about thirty of the enemy’s men-at-arms march along in retreat; but we
were in disorder and suffered them to pass. When our horses had taken a
little breath we went in search of the king, not knowing where he was: we
set off at a good trot, but we had not gone far before we perceived him
at a great distance. We then caused our servants to alight and gather
up the lances, which lay very thick upon the field, and especially the
bourdonnasses; but they were good for nothing, for they were hollow and
light, and weighed no more than a javelin, yet they were finely painted;
so that we were now better furnished with lances than on the day before,
and marched directly towards the king. In our way we fell in with several
bodies of the enemy’s foot, who were of the marquis’s division, and had
hid themselves behind the hills when he made his charge upon the king.
Several of them were slain; but others got over the river and escaped,
and we did not trouble ourselves much about them.
Some of our men in the heat of the action cried out “Remember Guynegate,”
which was a battle[427] we had lost in King Louis’ time in Picardy
against the King of the Romans, because our people fell to plundering the
waggons, though there our men had got nothing; but here their Estradiots
took what they thought good, and pillaged as they pleased; but they
carried off only five and fifty of our richest and best-covered sumpters,
which belonged to the king and his chamberlains, and took one of the
king’s gentlemen of the bed-chamber called Gabriel[428], to whose care
were committed all the relics and curiosities which for a long time had
belonged to the kings of France, and were then in the army, because the
king was there in person. Many other of our sumpters and waggons were
overturned, destroyed, and plundered by our own men; but the enemy had
no more than I have already mentioned. We had, indeed, several pimps and
wenches who followed the camp on foot, who stripped the dead and did a
great deal of mischief.
To speak the truth (upon impartial information from both sides), we
lost only Julian Bourgneuf, the captain of the king’s gate, nine of the
Scottish archers, one gentleman of the household, about twenty horse of
the vanguard, and seventy or eighty servants belonging to our baggage. On
their side they lost three hundred and fifty men-at-arms upon the field;
for no prisoners were taken, which perhaps never happened before. Few
of their Estradiots were slain, for they were busy in plundering when
they should have been fighting. In the whole (as I have been informed
by several of their nobility) they lost three thousand five hundred men
(others say more), and among them were several persons of quality. I
myself saw a list of eighteen, all of them considerable persons, and
among the rest four or five of the Gonzagas, which is the name of the
marquis’s own family. The Marquis of Mantua in this battle lost sixty
gentlemen of his own subjects, all mounted and not one on foot among
them. It is strange that so many should have been killed with the
sword, for our artillery killed not ten in both armies, and the battle
lasted not a quarter of an hour; for as soon as the enemy had broken
their lances they fled, and the chase lasted about three-quarters of an
hour. Their battles in Italy used not to be managed at this rapid rate;
their custom was to fight squadron after squadron, and the fight lasted
sometimes a whole day together, without either side winning the victory.
The rout was great on their side: three hundred of their men-at-arms, and
most of their Estradiots fled, some to Reggio[429], and others to Parma,
which was about eight leagues from the field of battle. When our army was
first engaged in the morning, the Count de Petillane and the Lord Virgil
Ursini fled from us: the Lord Virgil only retired to a gentleman’s house
hard by, and stayed there upon his parole; but the truth is, we had done
him an injury. The Count de Petillane went over to the enemy; he was a
person well known in their army, for he had always had a command under
the Florentines or King Ferrand. As soon as he was got amongst them he
began to cry out “A Petillane, a Petillane;” and he followed those who
fled above three leagues, calling out to them, and assuring them that
there was no danger, and that if they faced about, the day would still be
their own: by which means he rallied a great part of them, and gave them
good hopes; and if it had not been for him, it would have been a total
defeat, for it was a great encouragement to them to have such an officer
escape from us and come to their assistance.
He was eager for attacking us again that very night, but all the rest
of the officers opposed it. He told me so himself afterwards, and the
Marquis of Mantua confirmed it, and owned that advice to be his; and
this is certain, had it not been for him, their army would not have kept
together till morning.
As soon as we were got up to the king, we discovered a great body of
men-at-arms drawn up in order of battle outside their camp, with some
infantry; but we could only see their heads and the tops of their pikes
and lances. They had stood there all day, but they were farther off than
we imagined: before we could have come at them we must have passed the
river, which was deep, and increased every hour, for it had thundered,
lightened, and rained most prodigiously all that day, especially during
the fight and while we were in the pursuit. The king immediately called a
council of war, in which it was debated whether he should advance against
this new body or not. There were then with him three Italian knights;
one of them was Signor John James di Trivulce (who is yet living, and
behaved himself very well that day); another was Signor Francisco Secco,
a brave man of seventy-two years of age, who had been bred a soldier
under the Florentines; the third was Signor Camillo Vitelli, who, with
three of his brothers, was then in the king’s service. These came unsent
for from Citta-de-Castello as far as Sarzana (which is a great way),
to be present at this battle; and, finding that it was impossible to
come in time enough with his troops, Camillo left them to march slowly
after, and advanced with all speed to overtake the king. The last two
were of opinion that we should attack the body that was still unbroken;
but the French officers being consulted, gave their judgment against it,
pretending that we had done enough, and that it grew late and was time to
think of quarters.
Secco persisted, and pressed hard to have that body charged; he showed
them that people were passing to and fro upon the great road that led to
Parma (which was the next town they had to retreat to), and assured them
that the enemy were either flying or rallying again; and, as we heard
afterwards, he was in the right. His behaviour and counsel denoted him
to be a brave and wise man, for all the officers told me afterwards,
and some of them before the Duke of Milan’s face, that, if we had but
advanced against them, we had certainly obtained the greatest and most
glorious victory that the French nation had won for ten years! and,
had we known how to have improved it, and obliged the people by our
civil treatment of them, in eight days’ time the Duke of Milan would
not have had anything left but the castle of Milan, so inclinable were
his subjects to revolt from him. And the Venetians would have been much
in the same condition, and there would have been no need to care about
Naples; for the Venetians would have been able to have raised men only
in Venice, Brescia and Cremona (which is but a small place), for all the
rest of their territories in Italy would have been lost. But God had
dealt by us as Jerome had foretold, and we had the honour of the day,
though, to speak truth, our ill conduct did not deserve it, nor did we
then know how to manage our victory; but now, in the year 1497, if such
good fortune should happen to the king, I think he could order it better.
Whilst we were in this suspense the night drew on, and the enemy that had
faced us marched off into their camp. We, on the other side, took up our
quarters about a quarter of a league from the field of battle. The king
lay in a farmhouse or cottage (to judge by the meanness of the building),
but the houses belonging to it were full of unthreshed corn, which served
for provender for our horses. There were a few houses besides that in
which the king lay, but they were even worse than it; so they were but
little benefit to us, and every one was forced to quarter as he could.
For my part, I remember I lay in a little pitiful vineyard, upon the
ground without any shelter; for the king had borrowed my cloak in the
morning, and my baggage was not to be found. He that had anything to eat
kept himself from starving; but very few had any victuals more than a
crust of bread or so, which they took from their servants. I saw the king
in his chamber, where there were several wounded; amongst the rest, the
seneschal of Lyons and others, whom he caused to be dressed. The king was
very cheerful, and every one was pleased he had escaped so well; but we
did not boast and swagger as we used to do, for the enemy was at hand.
All our Swiss were that night upon the guard; the king gave them three
hundred crowns, and they watched very diligently and their drums beat
bravely during the whole night.
CH. XIII.—How the Lord of Argenton went alone to parley with the Enemy,
upon the Refusal of those that were deputed to go along with him, and of
the King’s safe Arrival with his whole Army at Asti.—1495.
The next morning I resolved with myself to pursue our negotiations for
peace, as I was still very solicitous about the king’s passage in safety;
but I could scarce find a trumpeter that would venture to the enemy’s
camp, because nine of their trumpeters had been slain (unwittingly) in
the battle, and they had taken one of ours and killed another, whom (as
I mentioned before) the king had sent to them before the fight began;
but at last one of our trumpeters was prevailed upon to go, and went
to the enemy with a passport from the king, and brought me another to
meet and confer in the midway between the two armies. I judged it to be
dangerous; however, I resolved not to break with them, nor pretend any
difficulty. The king nominated the Cardinal of St. Malo, the Lord de Gié,
marshal of France, the Lord de Piennes his chamberlain, and myself. The
enemy appointed the Marquis of Mantua captain-general of the Venetians,
the Count di Cajazzo general for the Duke of Milan, and formerly of our
side, and Signors Luca Pisani and Melchior Trevisano the two proveditors.
We approached so near that we could plainly discern them, and that there
were only those four upon the bank and the river between us, which was
much swollen since the day before. Nobody but they appeared out of their
camp, and on our side there was nobody but we four and a sentinel that
stood over against them. We sent a herald to know whether they would
pass the river to us, which I thought a hard matter to persuade them to,
because I believed it was what both sides would scruple to do. Their
answer was, that by agreement the conference was to be in the midway
between the two armies; that they had advanced already above half-way,
and, being the chief officers in their army, they could not pass over
without danger, which they did not think it prudent to venture.
Our deputies were as careful of themselves, and made the same difficulty
on their side, but would needs have me go and confer with them without
further instructions. I told them I could not in discretion go alone, and
that I would at least have one witness along with me. Upon which there
went with me one of the king’s secretaries called Robertet, a servant
of my own, and a herald, with whom I passed the river, in confidence
that, if I could not come to any accommodation, I should yet discharge
my duty to them, since by my means the conference had been accepted.
When I came within hearing, I told them they were not come half-way as
they pretended, and that they ought at least to have come to the river’s
side; however, since they were so near, I did not think it fit to let
them return without being spoken with. They replied that the river was
broad, and the noise of the waters so great, that they could not hear
us from the other side; and I could use no argument powerful enough to
persuade them to advance any farther; but they asked me for my proposals.
I answered, that I had no such commission, and that alone I could say
nothing to them; but, if they pleased to offer anything, I would acquaint
the king with it. While we stood talking in this manner, a herald came
to me to let me know that our commissioners were going back, and I
might make what overtures I pleased; but I refused to do that, for they
understood the king’s pleasure better than I, as being his confidants;
besides which, they had whispered in his ear at their coming away; but,
as to the business then in discussion, I knew as much as the best of them.
The Marquis of Mantua began to discourse about the battle, and asked me
if the king would have put him to death if he had taken him prisoner. I
told him “No,” but he would have treated him honourably; for the king had
reason to esteem him, for the great honour he had gained by attacking
him. Then he spoke to me in behalf of the prisoners, and particularly of
his uncle the Lord Rodolph, whom he thought to be alive, but I knew the
contrary; however, I assured him they should all be civilly used; and
then I recommended to him the bastard of Bourbon, who was their prisoner.
It was no hard matter to use our prisoners well; for we had none, which
perhaps had never been known in any battle before; and the marquis had
lost seven or eight of his near relations, and about sixscore of his
men-at-arms. After which discourse I took my leave, and promised to
return before night; until when we agreed to a cessation of arms.
Upon my return to the king, with his secretary, he asked me what news?
and immediately called a council of war in a pitiful poor chamber;
but everybody’s eye was fixed upon his neighbour, and we came to no
resolution. The king whispered something in the Cardinal’s ear, and
then told me I should go back, and see what they would say (but, as the
proposition of a conference had proceeded from me, it was probable they
would insist that I should make some overtures first); however, the
Cardinal told me I must conclude nothing; but that was trifling, for it
was not in my power to conclude anything unless I had instructions from
them. However, I would neither say nor do anything that might hinder
my going, for I resolved to do no harm, and I was in hopes to discover
something by the enemy’s looks, who, without doubt, were more fearful
than we; and I thought perhaps something or other might fall from them
that might be improved to the benefit of both parties. So I set out for
their camp; but it was night before I reached the banks of the river.
One of their trumpeters met me there, with a message from their four
commissioners to desire I would advance no further that evening; for
their Estradiots were upon the guard, who knew nobody, and therefore,
in all probability, it would be dangerous for me to venture; but, if I
pleased, he told me he would stay with me all night, and conduct me in
the morning. However, I sent him back, and told him I would be there
again next morning by eight o’clock, and that he should await me; or, if
anything happened to prevent me, I would give them notice by a herald;
for I had no mind he should know anything of our condition that night,
nor could I tell what resolution the king would take; for I saw people
whispering in his ear, which made me suspicious; and so I returned to
give his majesty an account of what I had done.
Every man supped on what he could get to eat, and took up his lodging
upon the ground. About midnight I went to the king’s quarters, where I
found the gentlemen of his bed-chamber booted and spurred, and ready to
mount on horseback. They acquainted me with the king’s resolution of
retreating with all expedition towards Asti and the territories of the
Marchioness of Montferrat; and desired me to stay behind and amuse the
enemy with a treaty. I heartily thanked them for their love, told them
I took no delight in being killed, and that I would be on horseback as
soon as the best. Awhile after the king awaked; and, having heard mass,
he mounted immediately. An hour before day one of our trumpeters sounded
the watch, but when we marched off we made no use of our trumpets, nor,
indeed, was it proper to do so: however, this silent stealing away in the
night was enough to have discouraged the whole army, especially those who
knew what it meant; for we turned our back upon the enemy, and consulted
nothing but our safety, which in an army is of dangerous consequence.
Besides, at our first decampment we had very difficult marching; for
the ways were deep and woody, and, having no guides, we lost ourselves
several times. I heard the soldiers call for guides to their ensigns; but
the master of the horse and all of them answered there were none: but
we had no need of any, for God had conducted us thither, and (as Friar
Jerome said) He would carry us back again; otherwise it could not have
been supposed that so great a prince would have marched in the night
without a guide, where so many might have been had. Besides, God gave us
a greater evidence than this of His immediate protection; for the enemy
perceived nothing of our decampment till noon the next day, as they still
depended upon the treaty which I had set on foot: and then the river was
so swollen, it was past four in the afternoon before any durst venture
over to pursue us. The first that passed was the Count di Cajazzo, with
two hundred Italian light horse, but the current was so strong, they
passed in a great deal of danger, and, as I was told afterwards, one or
two men were drowned.
In the meantime, we marched on through woody and uneven ways, where
we could go but one abreast for near six miles together; but at last
we came into a fair plain, where our van, artillery, and baggage were
arrived already, and were so numerous and great, that at first sight they
frighted us, when we saw the white colours chequered with red, which
belonged to Signor John James di Trivulce, and were like those which
were carried before the Marquis of Mantua in the fight. Our van were
in no less fear of our rear, seeing them at a distance along the road,
and marching towards them as fast as they could; upon which both parties
stood to their arms, and drew up in order of battle: but this fear was
soon over, for our scouts met immediately, and recognized one another; so
we marched to Borgo San-Donino, where we halted and refreshed our men,
and where also a false alarm was given, on purpose to get our Swiss out
of the town, lest they should have plundered it. From thence we marched,
and took up our quarters that night at Firenzuola, and the second night
near Piacenza, where we passed the Trebia, but left two hundred lances,
our Swiss, and all our artillery, except six guns, on the other side
of the river: and this the king did, that his army might encamp more
commodiously; for the river is usually low, and especially at that time
of the year. However, about ten o’clock at night it swelled so fast,
that nobody could get over either on foot or on horseback; neither could
one party have relieved the other, in case of necessity, which was a
matter of great concern, considering how near the enemy were to us. All
that night was spent on both sides in contriving a remedy; but nothing
would do till the water fell of itself, which happened at about five in
the morning. Then we threw over ropes to the other side, to help the
passage of our foot, who were forced to wade up to the waist in water.
When they were over, the horse and artillery followed; but with great
difficulty and danger, not only from the garrison of Piacenza, but from
the Count di Cajazzo, who was got into the town, upon intelligence that
there were designs to betray it to the king, in trust for a young son
of John Galeas, the last Duke of Milan, who had died not long before,
as you have heard. If the king would have accepted such overtures as
these, several other persons and towns would willingly have come over
to him, by the interest of Signor John James di Trivulce; but he would
not hearken to anything prejudicial to the pretensions of his cousin the
Duke of Orleans, who was then in Novara; and yet, to speak impartially
on the other hand, his majesty was not desirous to advance the grandeur
and power of his cousin; but his chief design was to march on with his
army, and leave these disputes to be adjusted as they might. The third
day after the battle, the king dined at Castel San-Giovanni, and lay
in a wood; the fourth he dined at Voghera, and lay at Ponte Curone;
the next night he lay near Tortona, where he passed the river Scrivia,
which Fracasse[430] was to have defended, for the garrison of Tortona
supported the Duke of Milan, and were commanded by him: but when he was
informed by our quarter-masters that the king intended not to remain, he
retired into the town, and sent us word, that he would furnish us with
what provisions we pleased; and he faithfully performed his promise;
for when our whole army marched under the walls of the town, Fracasse
came out (in his armour) to wait upon the king, but attended only by two
persons; he excused himself as handsomely as he could for not quartering
us in the town, sent us out more provisions, (so that our army was
plentifully furnished,) and came again at night, to pay his respects
to the king in his tent. But you must know he was of the house of St.
Severino, brother to the Count di Cajazzo, and the Lord Galeas; and not
long before had served the king in Romagna, as has been already observed.
From thence our next march was to Nizza della Paglia[431], which belongs
to the Marquisate of Montferrat; and glad we were to reach that place;
for then we were safe, and in the country of our friends. Before our
arrival there, the enemy’s light horse, under the command of the Count di
Cajazzo, were perpetually at our heels, and gave us great disturbance;
for few of our horse were willing to be in the rear, and the nearer we
approached to a place of security, the more difficult it was to persuade
them to fight. Some say this is the nature of the French, and Italian
authors have written, that in their attacks they are more than men, but
less than women in their retreats. The first part of their character I
believe, for certainly upon a charge they are the fiercest nation in the
world (I mean their cavalry); but at the end of an engagement, there is
no nation in the world but is less daring and courageous than they were
in the beginning of the action.
CH. XIV.—How the Swiss secured the French army in its retreat.—1495.
But to continue this discourse: Our rear was brought up by three hundred
Swiss, with several field-pieces, and a strong body of hackbutters, who
drove off the Estradiots, who were not numerous. However, the grand army
which had fought us was pursuing with all possible diligence, but as they
began their march a day after us, and were heavily armed, they could not
get up to us; so that we lost not a man in our retreat, nor could they
ever come within twenty miles of our rear. When they found they could
not come up with us, (and perhaps they never desired it,) they turned
off towards Novara, where, as we said before, the Duke of Milan and the
Venetians had another army; but if they could have reached us, soon after
we began our retreat, in all probability they had succeeded better than
in the valley of Fornovo.
I have said in several places of these Memoirs, that I have seen, and
by experience found, that God the Creator was our conductor in this
expedition into Italy; yet it is convenient for me to repeat it again,
for though from the time of the battle to our arrival at Nice, our
quarters were taken up without proper order, yet we bore the hardships
and inconveniences of the long march, without raising any mutiny or
murmuring in the least. Our great want was of provisions, yet we were
in some measure supplied by the country people, who might easily have
poisoned us if they had pleased, not only in our victuals and wine, but
in our water too, and our wells, which might have been dried up in a
moment; for I do not remember I saw any but what were very small. If they
had had a mind to have destroyed us by poison, it was in their power to
have done it, and therefore we may reasonably believe our Saviour and
Redeemer Jesus Christ prevented that desire in them. I have seen our men
so thirsty, that our foot in great numbers have lain down, and drank out
of the ditches round about the little villages through which we marched.
Our marches were long, and our drink nothing but standing water that
stank; and yet our men were so greedy, they plunged in it up to the
waist to come at it; for we had multitudes that followed, the camp, and
were not soldiers, but attended to our mules. The king always marched
before day, but never took a guide with him, nor baited till noon, and
then he dined; and those that attended him took what care they could of
themselves. No man in the whole army, though of the best quality, was
excused from looking to his own horse, but every one brought his own
straw or hay in his arms. Twice I did it myself, and was two days without
eating any thing but bread, and that none of the best; yet I suffered not
so much hardship as others did. Our army was highly to be commended for
one thing, and that is, that I never heard any of our soldiers complain;
and yet it was the most painful and incommodious march I ever made,
though I have been through several that were bad enough, with Charles
Duke of Burgundy. We marched no faster than our artillery, and were
often forced to halt, on purpose to mend the guns, which, because of
the want of horses to draw them, incommoded us extremely; but whenever
we were hard put to it, we were generously supplied by the officers of
the army; so that we lost not one piece, nor one pound of powder in our
retreat; and yet I am of opinion never any man saw guns of their size
conveyed with such expedition through such impassable places. And if I
have mentioned any thing of disorder or inconvenience in our quarters or
elsewhere, it was not for want of good officers and men of experience in
our army; but (as fortune would have it), they had no authority with the
king, who was young and intractable, as I have said before; so that to
conclude, our Saviour Jesus Christ did most manifestly reserve all the
glory of that journey to himself.
The seventh day after the battle, we marched from Nice, and encamped all
together in the field, not far from Alessandria. We doubled our guards
that night, and kept very strict watch, and the next morning we marched
to Asti, that is to say, the king and those that attended on him, but the
army continued in the field. We found the town of Asti well furnished
with provisions, which was a great refreshment to our wearied troops, who
wanted them severely, having endured much hunger, thirst, labour, heat,
and watching; and after all had no clothes to their backs, but what
were ragged and worn out. As soon as the king was in Asti, about an hour
before bedtime, I despatched a gentleman named Philip de la Couldre (who
had formerly been in my service, but was then a servant to the Duke of
Orleans), to Novara, where the duke was besieged, though not so closely
but that people might get in and out; for their design was only to starve
them. I sent him word by this gentleman, that our king had several
treaties on foot with the Duke of Milan (one of which I managed by means
of the Duke of Ferrara), for which reason I thought it convenient he
should immediately come to the king, after he had assured his party in
the town that he would return in a short time, or send them relief. They
were no less than 7500 men in pay, and as fine a body of troops (for
their number) both French and Swiss, as ever were seen in the field.
After the king had been a day at Asti, he had intelligence from the Duke
of Orleans and from others, that the enemies’ two armies were joined
before Novara; and the duke pressed for supplies, for (by reason of their
imprudence at first) their provisions now began to fail; but had they
been so provident when they came into the town, as they ought to have
been, they need not have been in distress; for there was plenty enough in
the villages about it, especially of corn, which if they had brought in
time into the town, and carefully laid up in their magazines, they would
not have been forced to surrender: for had they held out but one month
longer, they would have come off honourably themselves, and covered the
enemy with shame and confusion.
CH. XV.—How the King fitted out a Fleet with an intention to have
relieved the Castles of Naples; and of the Miscarriage of that
Design.—1495.
As soon as the king had refreshed himself for some few days at Asti, he
marched to Turin[432]; and at his departure from Asti he despatched
Peron de Basche, the steward of his household, to equip a fleet at Nice
with all speed for the relief of the castles of Naples, which held out
for the king. Peron obeyed his majesty’s orders, prepared a fleet, and
gave the command of it to the Lord d’Arban[433], who sailed with it as
far as Pruce[434], within sight of the enemy; but the weather was bad,
and would not suffer them to engage, so that the fleet did nothing; for
the Lord d’Arban returned to Leghorn, where most part of his men got on
shore, and ran away from their ships; and the enemy came with their fleet
into the port of Bengon[435], not far from Piombino, where they continued
two months; so that our men were able to send some small supplies into
Naples, by reason that the nature of the port of Bengon is such, that
unless it be by one single wind ships can hardly get out, and that wind
blows seldom in winter. The Lord d’Arban was valiant in person, but not a
very skilful admiral.
During the king’s stay at Turin many proposals of treaties passed between
the king and the Duke of Milan; and some were managed by the mediation
of the Duchess of Savoy, who was the Marquis of Montferrat’s daughter,
a widow, and mother to the young duke[436] that was then living. Others
were transacted by other people: I was also concerned therein: for the
confederates (by whom I mean the commanders at that time before Novara),
had a great desire to have me employed in the matter, and sent me a
passport; but (as there are always emulations at court) the Cardinal
would not suffer it, but prevailed that the overture proposed by the
Duchess of Savoy might be preferred, which was managed by the Cardinal’s
landlord, who was treasurer of Savoy, a wise man, and a good servant to
his mistress: this treaty took up a long time, and for this cause the
Bailiff of Dijon was sent ambassador into Switzerland, to raise five
thousand of their men.
I have already mentioned the equipment of our fleet at Nice, and its
setting sail for the relief of the castles of Naples, which it was
unable to effect for the above-mentioned reasons; whereupon the Lord
de Montpensier, and the rest of the officers that were in the castles
aforesaid (perceiving their condition), resolved to march off by the
help of the army, which had been left in divers places for the defence
of that kingdom, and was then drawn as near the castle as possible; but
they left a number to defend the castles proportionable to the quantity
of provisions which remained; for they were insufficient to sustain them
all. And having given the command of the garrison to the Lord Ognas and
two other officers of conduct and experience, the Lord de Montpensier,
the Prince of Salerno, the Seneschal of Beaucaire and others, marched off
with two thousand five hundred men, for Salerno. King Ferrand pretended
it was contrary to their treaty, and that the hostages which they had
given him a few days before (which were the Lord d’Alegre, Monsieur
de la Marche d’Ardain[437], the Lord de la Chapelle d’Anjou, Monsieur
Roquebertin, a Catalonian, and one Monsieur Genly[438]), were at his
mercy, and that he might lawfully put them to death. You must understand
that some three months before, by intelligence with the enemy, and our
bad order, King Ferrand had got into the town of Naples[439], though
our men had notice of all his designs. I would enlarge upon this, but
I can say nothing of it except by hearsay (yet I had it from very good
hands); however, it is not my method to insist upon any thing that I was
not an eye-witness of myself. But while King Ferrand was in Naples, he
received the news of our master’s being killed in the battle of Fornovo;
and our men in the castle had the same news, from several letters and
stories forged by the Duke of Milan, which they believed as readily as
the Colonne, who revolted from us immediately, as desiring to be always
on the strongest side, though (as I said before) they were under great
obligations to the king. Upon these reports, but chiefly because our
men were confined in great numbers in the castle (where provisions were
scarce), and had lost all their horses and household stuff in the town,
they came to a treaty, on the 19th of October 1495, after they had been
besieged three months and fourteen days; and about three weeks after
making the treaty, they marched away. They had promised, that if they
were not relieved by a certain day, they would march off into Provence,
and leave the castles without doing any farther act of hostility against
that kingdom, either by sea or by land; for performance of which promise
the said hostages were given. And King Ferrand alleged they had broken
their promise by departing without leave; but our men affirmed the
contrary; howbeit, the hostages were in no little danger, and not without
cause. Whatever their articles were, I think our men did wisely to march
away; but they had done better if they had delivered up the castles
when they went, and taken their hostages along with them: for by reason
of their want of provisions and their despair of relief, the remaining
garrison was forced to surrender within twenty days after, and the loss
of the castle of Naples was the loss of the whole kingdom.
CH. XVI.—Of the great Famine and Misery to which the Duke of Orleans
and his army were reduced at Novara: Of the Death of the Marchioness
of Montferrat: Of the Death of the Duke of Vendôme; and the conclusion
of a Peace for the preservation of the besieged after several
negotiations.—1495.
The king, during his stay at Turin, or at Quiers[440], (whither he went
sometimes for his diversion) grew impatient for the Swiss whom he had
sent the Bailiff of Dijon to raise in Switzerland; for he was extremely
desirous, if possible, to restore the young Duke of Milan, and paid but
little attention to the distress of his cousin the Duke of Orleans, who
began to be straitened in provisions, and sent couriers to us every day
to beg the king to relieve him. The enemy had advanced their approaches,
and gotten nearer the town than ever: besides, they were reinforced with
a thousand German horse, under the command of Monsieur Frederic Capelare,
of the county of Ferrete, a brave soldier and an excellent officer, and
trained in the wars of both Italy and France; they had a recruit likewise
of eleven thousand Landsknechts, out of the territories of the King of
the Romans, commanded by Monsieur George Dabecfin[441], a native of
Austria, a person of great valour, and the very same that took St. Omers
for the King of the Romans.
The king, seeing the enemy’s army daily reinforced, and that no
honourable terms were to be expected, was persuaded to retire to
Vercelli[442], and there to concert measures how to relieve the Duke
of Orleans, who (as I have said before) had taken no care to erect any
magazines for the subsistence of his army upon his first entrance into
Novara; and certainly it had been much better for the duke to have
followed the advice which I gave him upon the king’s return to Asti,
to put all useless persons out of the town, and repair himself to the
king: for his presence would have advanced his affairs, or at least the
troops he had left behind would not have been reduced to such extremity
of hunger, for he would have capitulated sooner, had he found there was
no hope of relief. But the Archbishop of Rouen[443], who was with him
at the taking of Novara, and was then with the king, to solicit in his
behalf, sent him word not to stir, and assured him of relief; grounding
his confidence upon the promises of the Cardinal of St. Malo, who was all
powerful with the king. The archbishop spoke as his affections prompted
him; but I was assured of the contrary, for nobody had any inclination to
return to the battle, unless the king went in person, and his Majesty had
no inclination to do so, as the dispute was only about that town, which
the Duke of Orleans desired to keep, and the Duke of Milan to recover;
because as it is within ten leagues of Milan, he thought it necessary
that they should be both under one jurisdiction, there being nine or ten
great cities near one another, within a small compass, and all depending
upon the said duchy. However, Ludovic Sforza offered fair terms, that if
we would deliver up Novara, and not disturb him in Genoa, in other things
he would serve the king to the utmost of his power.
Several great convoys of provision, both of corn and meal, were sent into
Novara; but they always lost half by the way; and once a small force of
sixty men-at-arms, under the command of Chastillon, a young gentleman
belonging to the court, was quite routed; some were taken, some few
entered, and others with great difficulty escaped; so that it is not
possible to imagine the extremity the garrison was reduced to. Every day
some were starved to death; two parts out of three were afflicted with
distempers of which we had pitiful and continual accounts, both in cipher
and otherwise, which came to us with very great difficulty. We constantly
gave them fair promises, and as constantly deceived them; those who had
the sole administration of affairs were very inclinable to fight, but
they did not consider that nobody desired it beside themselves; for the
great officers, as for instance the Prince of Orange (whom, upon his late
arrival, the king often consulted in military affairs), and all the other
officers of the army, desired things might be composed and adjusted by a
peace, because winter was approaching, money wanting, the army but weak
and sickly, and soldiers deserting daily, whilst others were dismissed
by the king. Yet all the wise men in the camp were not able to persuade
the Archbishop of Rouen from encouraging the Duke of Orleans not to leave
Novara; by which advice they brought him into a great deal of danger;
but this advice proceeded from an expectation of great recruits out of
Switzerland, which the bailiff of Dijon had assured them he could raise.
Some of our courtiers wrote to him to bring as many troops as he could
assemble; thus our councils were divided, and every man wrote and said
what he pleased.
Those who were averse to an accommodation, or to any meeting about it,
pretended the enemy ought to make overtures first, and that it did not
consist with the king’s honour to begin; and the enemy being equally
haughty on their side, the poor garrison in Novara suffered incredibly,
and their letters were full of nothing but relations of their miseries,
assuring us, first, that they could not hold out above ten days, then
eight, and at last three; but they exceeded the time which they had
mentioned. To be brief, such necessities had not been known in our time,
nor did ever men suffer so great a famine in a hundred years before.
During this posture of affairs the Marchioness of Montferrat died, and
left her country involved in some troubles in respect of the competition
for its government. The Marquis of Saluzzo pretended to it on one side,
and the Lord Constantine, uncle to the Marchioness, claimed it on the
other. He was a Greek as well as his niece, who was the King of Servia’s
daughter; but both of them had been ruined by the Turks. This Lord
Constantine had fortified the castle of Casale, where he kept in his
hands the two sons (the eldest of whom was scarce nine years old) of the
late marquis, and that beautiful and discreet lady his niece, who died
in the twenty-ninth year of her age, and was a constant friend to the
French. Other persons pretended likewise to the government, and there
was great contest for it before the king by their respective agents. The
king commanded me to proceed thither, with instructions to settle things
for the advantage of the young children, and the general satisfaction of
the people; fearing lest by these differences the Duke of Milan should be
brought in, for the lord of that country was our very good ally.