Winter Supplies—The Forage Difficulty—Lack of Civilized Appliances and
Inventions—Compressed Hay—The Sick Convoy for India—Alleged
Atrocities—The Inquiry into Dr. Bourke’s Statement—An Exaggerated
Description of the Charasia Battlefield—General Macpherson’s
Excursion to Tagao—Attitude of the Safis—Shere Ali’s Military Road
along the Northern Bank of the Cabul River—The Skirmish at
Doaba—Narrow Escape of Captain Poole’s Company—Defeat of the Safis.
SHERPUR, _14th November_.
The fall of sleet on the evening of the 11th led us to believe that
severe weather might be setting in; but, to our surprise, the same
genial days which delighted us before have returned; and after three
sharp nights, in which a cheerful fire in a walled building would have
been very welcome, we are hoping that winter will spare us further
inclemency at least for two or three weeks. The Ghazni expedition may, I
think, be looked upon as abandoned; and we are trusting to local sirdars
to bring us in the large supplies of forage which we were going out to
seek. Advances in hard cash are made to these men, so that they may go
out with the practical evidence of our willingness to buy up all the
_bhoosa_ in the country, and from Daoud Shah downwards they promise us
great things in the way of supplies. As I said in a late letter, the
question of forage is the most pressing, as, once the ground is covered
with snow, the scanty supply of grass which now comes in will be
entirely cut off. From Kohistan, the Logar and Chardeh Valleys, and the
villages in the Cabul plain eastwards to Butkhak, we have drawn some
thousands of maunds;[24] but with the horses of the 9th Lancers, three
native regiments, and two batteries of Artillery, as well as the mules
of two mountain batteries, to be kept in good condition, and all the
transport animals to be fed, the consumption is enormous. Pressed hay
would he worth its weight in silver if we could only get it here; but,
of course, we might as well long for sea-coal fires. One sees much
written of what ought to be done by armies advancing from India into
Afghanistan, and the slowness of our marches is sometimes criticized
very rabidly; but the critics seem to forget that we have no railways
upon our lines of communication, and that we are asked to make war in
almost as rude a way as the barbaric hordes which swept to and from
India centuries ago. Barring our weapons and ammunition—and even here we
have been served with Gatling guns that will not work—we have but the
old means of advance: the camels, mules, and ponies, which have been
time-honoured carriers since the days of Alexander; and we have them in
such small numbers, that the loss of even 100 is a serious matter. We
feed them as the old warriors fed their beasts of burden—on such corn
and forage as we can get; but whereas they appropriated every maund that
was to be found, and asked no questions, we pay exorbitant prices,
dealing as traders, and not as conquerors, with the people. Civilization
has done this much, that it has shown there are ways by which forage for
a month can be carried in so small a compass that it is but little
encumbrance; but we reap no benefit from the discovery, and are thrown
into a by-no-means fertile country to do as best we can with such
supplies as may be forthcoming. The very hackeries which ply along the
road from Jhelum to Jumrood groan out reproaches against the
civilization which permits them to linger out their lives; and every
grass-cutter’s pony, half hidden by his huge bundle of worthless straw,
or burnt-up grass, kicks against the absurd pricks which force him to do
as his ancestors did—fetch and carry bulky loads of which he himself
eats nearly half. We could do mighty deeds, and march mighty distances,
were it not that our transport equipment is usually _x_—an unknown
quantity, which can never be relied upon. In the morning x may equal the
equivalent of 10,000 camels; in the evening it may be 9,500; after six
months’ campaigning it may be 500. We have not merely to forage for the
chargers of our fighting men—we have to feed the very animals which
carry the forage, and carry it often in its bulkiest form. If we had
merely to do the latter, we might trust to the country, especially where
the local baggage animals are used for carriage. A Cavalry Brigade that
could carry its own forage—and such a brigade could be created if
advantage were taken of the principle which reduces bulk to
one-twentieth or even less—would be so powerful an aid to an advancing
force, that delays would be almost unknown. There would be no question,
as there is now, of sending back regiments to pasturing-grounds; there
would be the means of sustaining them always at hand. A pony that now
carries a load which a horse can eat in a day, could carry food for
twenty days. A trooper could strap his forage to his saddle as he now
does his gram-bag. We might take many a hint from the nomads of Central
Asia—perhaps the horsemen who can travel long distances, and keep their
horses always equal to the work, better than any other race in the
world. The Turcoman carries with him, in the ingenious shape of small
balls of food, such concentrated nourishment, that his horse never flags
in a sixty-mile ride; and if he can do this in his own rude way, and be
independent of passing supplies, we, with elaborate hay-presses and
chemical processes, might surely put ourselves at least on his level. I
have been led into this dissertation chiefly by reason of the proposed
splitting up of our cavalry brigade. It is said that the 12th Bengal
Cavalry will probably remain for the winter in the Jellalabad Valley,
where forage is fairly plentiful; and it is also possible that another
cavalry regiment will be sent from our camp here to join them. We all
regret that the cavalry which has been with us during the march upon
Cabul should have to be sent back even for three or four months; and yet
what can be done? 150,000 maunds of _bhoosa_ (chopped straw) is the
estimate made by the Commissariat Department of the quantity of forage
required from the 1st of November to the end of March, and we have only
gathered in between 15,000 and 20,000 maunds. The deficiency is so great
that, unless the sirdars we are now employing as purchasing agents keep
their pledges, our cavalry must starve or be sent back. Besides, we have
been busy in providing the army with several hundred _yaboos_ as
transport animals. These _yaboos_ will have to be fed during the winter,
in addition to the mules and camels we brought up with us from Ali
Kheyl: there were not many certainly, for we did wonders in the way of
removing with little carriage. It may seem trifling, with passing
events, to grow eloquent upon so dry a subject as hay; but in warfare,
such as we are engaged in, cavalry are so indispensable, that their
position should be fairly represented. We hear of hay-presses being made
for the Candahar Force, but we do not want to be encumbered with these.
Could not the forage, ready compressed, be sent to us without further
trouble?
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Footnote 24:
One maund = 40 seers = 80 lbs.
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The convoy of sick and wounded, which left Sherpur to-day, was made up
of fifty-two Europeans, seventy-two native soldiers and followers, and
eight officers. There were also a number of time-expired men, and a
sufficient escort was sent to take care of the convoy as far as Butkhak,
whence the 12th Bengal Cavalry and the 28th Native Infantry will be
detailed to see them through the mountainous country lying between the
Cabul plain and the Jellalabad Valley. All the elephants here have also
been sent away to General Bright’s force, as we are not likely to want
them until the spring, and they would have probably died off when the
snow came. The convoy will do the distance to Peshawur by easy marches,
and every precaution will be taken against possible attacks in the
Passes that have to be gone through. The sick have not been sent away a
day too soon, as the cold nights here are very trying to weakly men. The
hospital quarters in the barracks are now ready, and are very
comfortable. Such invalids as are only suffering from slight ailments
are now in the rooms, the strong mud walls of which set at defiance the
cold which penetrated so easily the thin canvas of the tents.
Further examination of the Luttabund route has shown that a good road
can be made with very little trouble, the difficult bits near the Kotal
being avoided by a slight diversion. Scarcely any blasting will be
needed, and as this kind of skilled labour is generally very protracted
and tiresome, the saving of much valuable time is a great consideration.
The Pioneers will be enabled to return to Sherpur to finish their lines
and to carry out such defensive works on the Bemaru Heights as may be
thought necessary. These works will probably be on a large scale, so far
as the general design goes; but the immediate work to be done will be
the building of block-houses, or towers, where the picquets can be
posted under shelter from the cold wind which sweeps across the ridge.
Three or four tents are now pitched on the heights; but it is very
trying, especially for native troops, to do sentry-go in such an exposed
spot. An enemy would scarcely venture to attack the Camp from the north,
as they would have to cross a level, grassy plain, on which the cavalry
would have them at their mercy. The long, shallow Wazirabad lake,
bordered by marshy ground, shuts in this plain to the north, a spur from
the Pughman range again bounding the lake still further to the north.
The _maidan_ is now used as a polo-ground, or for giving our horses a
gallop; while the lake affords wild-fowl shooting for sportsmen lucky
enough to have guns and cartridges.
There has not been much to excite us in Camp lately, except two slight
shocks of earthquake yesterday; and as the executions have for the
present ceased, there seems falling upon us that fatal period of
inactivity which always follows successful movements against an enemy
who runs away after the first brush. But one unpleasant incident has
occurred, and it has been made the most of. We have had a Court of
Inquiry, and the subject thereof has been nothing less than
“atrocities.” In a letter from the correspondent of the _Civil and
Military Gazette_ appeared a paragraph in which “a noble corps” was said
to have disgraced itself by burning alive the wounded Afghans left
behind by their friends on the Charasia Heights. The paragraph implied,
from the context, that the 72nd Highlanders had been guilty of this
cruelty; but, on inquiry being made, Dr. Bourke, the correspondent of
the Lahore paper, said that, although he had not named the regiment, it
was the men of the 5th Ghoorkas who had burned the Afghan wounded. This
was the first General Roberts had heard of any such occurrence, as Dr.
Bourke had made no report on the subject, although he had drawn a
highly-coloured picture of the scene in his letters. The General at once
ordered a court to assemble and to take evidence, not merely to clear
the good name of the 72nd, but to investigate the charge against the
Ghoorkas. The President of the Court was Major Pratt, of the 5th Punjab
Infantry. Being a closed court, it has not, of course, transpired what
evidence was taken; but I believe the following are the facts of the
cases of cruelty said to have taken place. When the heights were cleared
by the general rush of General Baker’s troops, the Afghans left their
dead on the ground as well as several men wounded at close quarters. A
Ghoorka was seen stooping near one of the latter; and when Dr. Bourke,
with the ambulance, came up, it was found that the Afghan, who had been
shot through the breast and almost disembowelled by a bayonet thrust or
slash from a _kookrie_, had had his clothes set on fire. A box of
matches was lying near the body. The man was _in extremis_, and was said
to be insensible; and by Dr. Bourke’s orders a European soldier shot him
through the head. Another Afghan lying near had also his white clothing
smouldering, and he was shot in a similar way. This seems to be the
plain truth about the affair, which has been exaggerated into the
wholesale burning alive of wounded men. The Ghoorkas know the
superstitious dread among Mussulmans of any part of their body being
destroyed after death; and, on the face of it, there is the probability
of a lighted match having been applied to the clothes of men seemingly
dead, in order to send their souls to perdition. The passions of the
Ghoorkas have also been highly inflamed by a story which reached Ali
Kheyl from Cabul, that a Ghoorka, with the Guides’ escort, was led
through the city streets with his face blackened, was horribly tortured,
and afterwards burned alive. They believed fervently in this story, and,
as I have said, they may have thought to kill the Afghans in the next
world as well as this. No one in the force would seek to be an apologist
for such cruel acts as burning alive, deliberately and systematically,
the wounded men of an enemy even so cruel as are the Afghans; but the
reflections cast upon the 72nd Highlanders and upon General Roberts
himself, as letting such acts go unpunished, are as unjust as they are
absurd. The General knew nothing whatever of the incident until his
attention was called to it in the newspapers, and his action then was
prompt enough. I understand that he has now called upon Dr. Bourke to
give his reasons for not reporting the matter officially.
_16th November._
Yesterday Sir Frederick Roberts and Brigadier-General Baker rode over to
Butkhak, where Brigadier-General Macpherson is encamped after his late
excursion in the Tagao country. There have been so many movements of
troops in the Cabul plain lately, that the only escort the General
thought it necessary to take with him was six sowars of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry. Since the first brigade marched to Butkhak on the 1st instant,
the villagers in the plain and in the lower Logar Valley, which runs
down from the Sang-i-Nawishta defile, have seen small parties of cavalry
constantly on the move backwards and forwards, and within the last few
days have watched the 23rd Pioneers encamped on the banks of the Logar
and the long convoy of sick and wounded march along on the way to India.
There have been so many evidences of our presence, that any unruly
tribesmen or disbanded sepoys have wisely kept very quiet. The road may
be considered safe, even for a solitary traveller; the telegraph wire
has hitherto been scrupulously respected; and our foraging parties have
never been molested.
We were, of course, anxious to learn some particulars of the late
skirmish, in which a company of the 67th had come to close quarters with
the Safis; and, leaving the invalid camp, we passed up to the
head-quarters of the 1st Brigade near the village walls. Sir Frederick
Roberts heard the details of the affair from General Macpherson as well
as an account of the work done by the Brigade in opening up
communication with the Khyber Force. I may here incidentally state that
Sir F. Roberts has now received the local rank of Lieutenant-General,
and commands all the troops in Eastern Afghanistan, Jumrood being the
point in the Peshawur direction to which his power of control extends.
Some severe strictures have been passed upon those who have hitherto had
the supreme control of the force operating from Peshawur, and the answer
given to these is that General Bright’s advanced Brigade was a “flying
column.” If that were so, how was it that it took twenty-four days to
“fly” from Jellalabad to Kata Sung, a distance of about sixty miles?
Surely its wings must have been clipped by Transport or Commissariat
scissors, in which case it would cease to be a flying column at all, and
would drop down to the lower level of a sedate brigade moving two and a
half miles a day, sleeping comfortably in tents, and living on the fat
of the land. But in that case there should have been supplies sufficient
to have justified the stay of the troops at Kata Sung, and so to have
secured the road. General Macpherson had of course no supplies with
_his_ force, as everything is being gathered into Sherpur for the
winter; and he could not stay at Kata Sung, but had to try and find food
north of the Cabul river. Here accordingly came in the story of the
reconnaissance northward into Tagao and of the collision with the Safis.
The bed of the Cabul river lies about ten miles north of Kata Sung, Sei
Baba, and the Luttabund Kotal, its direction being due east and west.
From the vast pile of mountains which shut out the Cabul plain from
Gundamak high spurs run down towards the river, and among these the
Tezin stream, with two or three small tributaries, finds its way. When
General Macpherson found that the force he had come to meet at Kata Sung
had withdrawn, he turned off to the north, and proceeding down the bed
of the Tezin stream for six or seven miles, reached the banks of the
Cabul. He encamped at Sirobi, and on the 8th, resolved to cross the
river to the village of Naghloo, on the opposite bank, two miles higher
up. The natives had reported that a good road was in existence on the
northern side of the Cabul from that point, and that it had been
regularly used as the military convoy route between Cabul and
Jellalabad. General Macpherson found, without much difficulty, a ford
over the Cabul, which is here a stream with a strong current travelling
very rapidly on account of the descent of 4,000 feet, which the river
makes from Cabul to Jellalabad. Like all fords, however, in the Cabul
river, this crossing-place was found to have its dangers, the least
divergence from the narrow roadway—if the word can be used where there
is no dry land—plunging men and horses into deep water. The fatal
experience of the 10th Hussars at Jellalabad last spring was remembered,
and ropes were stretched across the stream by which the men were guided.
This marked the road to be taken and minimized the danger. On the
evening of the 8th half the force had crossed to Naghloo without any
accident, except that Lieutenants Forbes and Macgregor, of the 92nd
Highlanders, acting as orderly officers to the General, were swept away
by the current. By a little hard swimming they managed to reach the bank
again. The troops bivouacked without tents. On the following day a
reconnaissance was made from Naghloo eastwards, towards the Lughman
country, Lieutenant Manners Smith, Assistant Quartermaster-General,
going out with a few cavalry to examine the district. The orders given
to the troops were not to fire upon any of the local tribesmen, unless
the latter first opened fire; and this order was rigorously carried out.
Working down on the left bank of the Cabul, a _kotal_ was gained eight
or ten miles from Camp, from which a splendid view of the Lughman Valley
was obtained. There was a track right through this, and this was
undoubtedly the road used by the late Shere Ali for his military
convoys. It seemed to traverse an almost level country; and except that
to use it would involve two bridges—one near Naghloo and the other at
Jellalabad,—there can be no question that it would he far easier than
_viâ_ Jugdulluck, Gundamak, and Futtehabad. The country, however, north
of the Cabul is known to be inhabited by Safis—converted Kafirs, whose
fanaticism exceeds that of almost any other Mahomedans. Tagao, in which
they live, boasts of several fertile valleys, watered by the Panjshir,
Tagao, and Uzbin rivers, and might furnish supplies if the people could
be reduced to obedience. Their chief is one Usman Khan,[25] a noted
robber; and of the temper of his followers we have already had an
example. When the reconnoitring party were looking into the Lughman
Valley, some seventy Safis, all armed with _jhezails_ and swords,
appeared a few hundred yards off, and threatened to attack the troops if
they proceeded further into their country. As they did not open fire, no
notice was taken of their threats, and Lieutenant Smith returned to
Naghloo in peace. On the next day, the 10th, a foraging party of one
company of the 67th Foot, under Captain Poole, was ordered to march up
the Cabul river to a village some six or seven miles to the west of
Naghloo. This village is in close proximity to Doaba, at the junction of
the Panjshir and Cabul rivers. The villagers near the Cabul are not
Safis; and as they had expressed their willingness to sell grain and
forage, only a small party of men were sent out in charge of about 100
camels and mules. The road taken was found to be rather difficult, a
narrow defile close to the river having to be passed through, four miles
from Naghloo. After passing through this, the narrow camel-track passed
over a small semicircular piece of open ground, the hills falling away
to the north. At the western end was a second defile, with a high ridge
running up to the right and shutting out from view the village beyond.
When Captain Poole was crossing the open with thirty men, some distance
in front of the baggage animals, he met a number of villagers hastening
along with their household goods and cattle. They were evidently
panic-stricken and shouted wildly to Captain Poole, but as he did not
understand their language he pushed on to the second defile. It appears
that what they really said was that the Safis were in force over the
defile, had attacked their village, burned their houses, and murdered
some of the inhabitants. Upon getting through the second defile, Captain
Poole saw on the slope below some 800 or 1,000 armed men, who
immediately opened fire. The thirty men of the 67th returned the fire
and checked the enemy, who had tried to rush forward. It was important
to keep them back until the baggage animals with their small guard of
twenty-four men could retrace their steps through the first defile.
After firing for some time, our men observed 300 or 400 Safis creeping
round over the hill to the north, with the evident intention of getting
into the open plain and cutting off all retreat. The position of the
handful of men then became so hazardous, that Captain Poole ordered them
to fall back, and for an hour and a half he faced towards the Safis, who
advanced to within 40 yards. It was in the open that our men began to
drop, although one had been shot dead in the defile. Cover was taken
under the river bank, which was three or four feet above the level of
the stream; and though the enemy opened fire from the southern bank,
they could not do much mischief. The steadiness of the soldiers, who
used their Martinis with good effect, was remarkable throughout, one or
two incidents being worth recording. The crack shot of the regiment,
Corporal Woolley, was with the company, and his practice was wonderfully
good. He was unfortunately shot through, the leg, but still continued
firing. One of his comrades, on being shot down, fell into the river,
and struggled hard to gain the bank. Two Safis ran down to cut him up;
and these men Corporal Woolley shot before they could make their way to
the wounded man. The latter was so exhausted by his efforts that he fell
back, and was drowned in the stream. Corporal Woolley also brought down
two standard-bearers. The fighting was so close that Captain Poole could
not carry off his dead (two others were killed in the open besides the
men in the defile); and the Safis mutilated them in a horrible way.
Their eyes were gouged out, and faces cut to pieces by sharp knives, so
that the bodies could scarcely be identified. While fighting across the
open, Captain Poole was struck by a bullet in the calf of the leg, and
four other soldiers were wounded. One, who was too badly hit to be able
to walk, was put upon a camel, and carried safely away. Lieutenant
Carnegy kept the men together after his Captain had been hit; and
although eight men and an officer out of fifty-six had been either
killed or wounded, the others never wavered. A sowar had galloped back
to Naghloo for assistance, and General Macpherson sent out at once a
squadron of the 12th Bengal Cavalry and four mountain guns; 150 of the
67th, and a company of the 28th Punjab Native Infantry following. The
cavalry arrived at the trot, but the defile was so blocked by the
baggage animals, that to get through was impossible. The sowars
dismounted and went up the hill to use their carbines, and the guns,
also arriving, went up the crest under escort of the 28th and one
company of the 67th, under Major Baker, and opened fire at 1,000 yards
into the mass of the Safis below. The shells had a wholesome effect upon
the enemy, and volleys from the Martinis and Sniders were also fired at
long ranges. One man of the 28th was killed by a stray bullet. The other
company of the 67th, under Lieutenant Atkinson, went along the river
bed, and the enemy then retreated behind a _sungar_ on the ridge to the
north of the second defile, and covering their right flank. The mountain
guns came into action again at 1,700 yards, having been brought down
into the plain, and Major Baker marched over the hills to take the
_sungar_ in flank. Lieutenant Atkinson advancing at the same time, the
Safis fled towards the Doaba, the cavalry pursuing them for six miles.
Their loss must have been heavy, as they left many of their dead behind;
seven bodies were found in one nullah. The mutilated bodies of three men
of the 67th were recovered: the fourth had been swept down the river.
The whole affair proves how great a risk small foraging parties run in
an unexplored country, where the temper of the inhabitants is uncertain.
It is true no resistance was expected; but the fanaticism of the Safis
is so well known, that extra precautions should have been taken. The
difficult ground to be traversed also put a small body of infantry,
encumbered with baggage animals, at a great disadvantage. That one-sixth
of Captain Poole’s company was put out of action is too significant to
be lightly regarded.
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Footnote 25:
Afterwards killed on the Asmai Heights on December 14th.
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