The Line of Communication with the Kurram Valley—Hostile Action of the
Tribes—Skirmish on the Surkhai Kotal—Defeat of the Tribesmen by the
Shutargardan Garrison—The Enemy Reinforced—The Garrison
Surrounded—Serious Complications—The Shutargardan relieved by
General Charles Gough.
CAMP SIAH SUNG, _24th October_.
There is one great consolation for the troops who did not share in the
advance upon Cabul, and that is, they have not been allowed by the
tribes in our rear to rest in peace at the stations guarding the Kurram
line of communication. General Gordon at Ali Kheyl, and Colonel Money at
the Shutargardan, have had their hands very full indeed during the past
few weeks; Mangals, Ghilzais, and their allies considering it a grand
opportunity for attack. The bulk of our army was too far ahead, and had
too important a mission to fulfil, to send back reinforcements; and no
doubt these mongrel tribesmen believed they would have it all their own
way. I hear that they called upon the Shinwaris and Khugianis on the
northern slopes of the Safed Koh to come over and join in the rare
chance that was presented of cutting up our troops; but the ill-timed
zeal of the Mangal _moollahs_ spoiled the whole arrangement. They gave
out that we had been defeated at Cabul, and further promised their
fanatical followers that bullets and bayonets should leave them
unscathed for a few days if they would only attack the handful of
infidels then left at their mercy. Accordingly Ali Kheyl was attacked,
and the result of the fighting in that neighbourhood was the complete
dispersal of the tribesmen. At one time the situation seemed so full of
peril that General Gordon made up his mind to abandon the Shutargardan,
Colonel Money having informed him that he was surrounded on all sides,
his forage cut off, and his water-supply threatened. Such a step would,
of course, have only been resorted to in the last extremity, for a force
retiring through the Hazara Darukht defile, followed by swarms of our
enemy, confident that their success was assured, might have ended in a
disaster. But there were at the Shutargardan two splendid fighting
regiments, well-officered and in perfect trim, and their stubborn
resistance, kept the enemy in check until it was too late for them to
profit by our difficulties. During the worst period at the Shutargardan,
General Hugh Gough, with the 5th Punjab Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry,
and four mountain guns was on his way thither to bring down supplies and
close the communication, as it was no longer needed; and a welcome flash
from Captain Straton’s heliograph informed Colonel Money that help was
at hand. The Mangals and their allies seem to have had earlier
information, for they had already begun to disperse, though their stray
shots into camp kept the garrison alive, and cost them something in the
way of chargers and baggage animals. The abandonment of the post in the
face of an enemy far superior in number was thus happily avoided, as
well as the ill-effect it would have had upon every tribesman from Thull
to Cabul. It is believed here that there was a tendency to exaggerate
the danger at Ali Kheyl, and that undue importance was attached to the
attack there; but we are loth to think that General Gordon would have
recalled the two regiments from the Shutargardan merely to strengthen
his own post. Such a step might have brought about a really serious
conflict, as it would have been too glaring an admission of weakness not
to have been appreciated by the neighbouring tribes. Of the earlier
fighting at the Surkhai Kotal on the 14th, we have now full accounts
from Colonel Money, which I give below.
On the 13th instant information was brought into the camp at
Shutargardan that the Machalgu Ghilzais were assembling in force, and
would probably appear near Karatiga and the Surkhai Kotal, on that side,
for the purpose of blocking up the road to Ali Kheyl and molesting our
picquet on the Kotal. That mischief was on foot was proved by the
telegraph wire to Ali Kheyl being cut at nine o’clock the same evening.
The next morning Colonel Money, in sending the usual relief of 90 men to
the picquet, ordered Major Collis, commanding the 21st P.N.I., to take
two companies of his regiment and two guns of the Kohat Mountain
Battery, and see what was occurring. He was further to attack and
disperse any bodies of tribesmen who might have assembled, to detach a
party to bring up ammunition left at Karatiga, and to repair the
telegraph wire. On arriving at the Kotal, Major Collis found the picquet
already engaged with a large body of Ghilzais, who had attacked at
daybreak. His first step was to seize a hill on the right commanding the
Kotal, which the enemy had failed to occupy. Fifty sepoys under a native
officer were soon swarming up this, and in the meantime Captain Morgan
opened fire with the mountain guns upon _sungars_ filled with men, on a
hill to the east. The shells were well pitched, and the enemy were so
shaken that when 50 rifles of the 21st P.N.I., under Captain Gowan, and
a similar number of the 3rd Sikhs under Lieutenant Fasken, went in at
them with the bayonet, they abandoned their _sungars_, leaving several
killed and wounded on the ground. The tribesmen then attacked on the
south of the position, and came under fire of the 50 men first sent up
to occupy the hill, commanding the Kotal. A company of the 21st P.N.I.,
under Lieutenant Young, was detached to strengthen this point, and at
the same time a welcome reinforcement of 100 of the 3rd Sikhs under
Major Griffiths arrived. One company of these doubled over the open, and
got in rear of 600 of the enemy whom Captain Gowan and Lieutenant Fasken
were driving back, and soon the hills to the north were all cleared. But
on the south there were still 2,000 men to be dealt with; and as they
were showing a bold front, Major Griffiths judged that a combined
movement must be made against them as soon as the two companies returned
from pursuing the 600 men they had scattered. The advanced company of
the 21st P.N.I. under Lieutenant Young was bearing the brunt of the
enemy’s fire, and Major Collis was left on the Kotal with instructions
to proceed to their relief along the crest with his two companies when
they returned, their right being protected by 100 of the 3rd Sikhs and
two guns. Major Griffiths took the guns to the 3rd Sikhs, but on
rounding the shoulder of the hill he found that it would be dangerous to
wait any longer, as the enemy were growing bolder every minute. The
company of the 21st P.N.I. under Lieutenant Young accordingly charged
along the ridge and captured two standards, while the 3rd Sikhs under
Lieutenant Cook (with whom as volunteers were Captain Turner, Political
Officer; Captain Waterfield, R.A.; Captain Nicholson, R.E.; Lieutenant
Fisher, 10th Hussars; Lieutenant Sherstone, Aide-de-camp; and Mr.
Josephs, Superintendent of Telegraphs) came to close quarters on the
slope below. The enemy retreated till they reached a spur running at
right-angles to the ridge on which they had raised more strong
_sungars_. The sepoys soon found themselves checked in their rush, the
21st getting into broken ground commanded by the main _sungar_, while
the Sikhs had to halt at a ravine, the opposite side of which was bare
of cover and swept by the fire of the Ghazis. Captain Waterfield, having
shot down a man with his revolver, was himself shot through the thigh
directly afterwards, and was pluckily removed out of danger by
Lieutenant Cook. The mountain guns were brought into action again over
the heads of the troops, as Major Collis was still waiting for his two
companies to come up; but the enemy seeing so small a number of men
opposed to them, charged out of the _sungars_, sword in hand, at
Lieutenant Young’s company; and, though checked by a hot fire, secured a
good position from which to repeat the manœuvre. Just in the nick of
time Major Collis arrived with his two companies, and three shells
having been dropped right into the enemy’s advanced position, he led the
20th straight at the _sungars_ and cleared the ridge in fine style. The
enemy fought most pluckily, hurling stones at our men as they went up to
the _sungars_ and leaping out to meet them; opposing their short swords
to the sepoys’ bayonets. Their numbers were, however, of no avail
against the splendid form of our gallant fellows, and after a short
hand-to-hand struggle they broke and fled towards Spegha. They were
pursued for over a mile, and the mountain guns harassed them still
further. Their number was calculated at between 3,000 and 4,000, and
they were beaten in fair fight by 150 of the 21st P.N.I. and 100 of the
3rd Sikhs, aided by two mountain guns. Forty of their dead were counted
on the ground, and their total loss is estimated at 200 killed and
wounded; while our casualties were only two killed and Captain
Waterfield and seven sepoys wounded.
Meanwhile, a little affair had been going on at the Shutargardan itself.
When Colonel Money had sent off Major Griffiths to reinforce the Surkhai
Kotal, he took precautions for his own safety by ordering up two
companies of the 21st P.N.I. with a mountain gun to the ridge which
overlooks the Shutargardan camp. The move was a wise one, for the enemy
were on the other side within fifty yards of the crest, and were only
driven back with difficulty. They gathered together again and made a
second attempt, but were again unsuccessful. Their persistency induced
Colonel Money to proceed with two companies of the 3rd Sikhs and the
fourth mountain gun to the ridge, and he was able from this point to
watch the fight at the Surkhai Kotal. Seeing that Major Griffiths was
hotly engaged, he sent Jemadar Sher Mahomed (the native officer who did
such gallant work at Karatiga on the 27th of September) with a company
of the 3rd Sikhs to make a diversion on the enemy’s flank, and when the
tribesmen fled, this party doubled down upon them, and after killing
eight and wounding several others, joined in the general chase.
It was altogether a brilliant skirmish, this defeat of so large a body
of the enemy at the Surkhai Kotal; and we hope to give the 3rd Sikhs an
ovation when they march in here with General Hugh Gough in a few days.
The 21st move back to Ali Kheyl.
The garrison had, after the skirmish, to hear a siege which came about
in this way:—On the morning of the 14th it was found that the main body
of the enemy still held the position they had taken up after being
driven off the Surkhai Kotal. A wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry
was sent with orders to attack if they moved towards the Kotal, and a
company of the 3rd Sikhs went to the Karatiga Fort to bring up the
stores and ammunition left there. The fort was found to have been
thoroughly looted. Allahaddin, a brother of Padshah Khan, the Ghilzai
chief, reported that the enemy had been largely reinforced, and said
from 10,000 to 17,000 men had assembled, the whole country being in
arms. Colonel Money therefore wisely resolved to draw in his defences
under cover of night. The Surkhai Kotal was abandoned on the 15th. News
of 300 or 400 regular soldiers of the Amir’s army, armed with Sniders
and Enfields, joining the tribes was given soon afterwards. The enemy
showed in such numbers southwards of the ridge and to the south of the
camp that the outlying picquet was withdrawn and fell back upon the
strong picquet posts near the camp. On the 17th the enemy occupied the
road from Karatiga to Kassim Kheyl, and cut off the grass-supply. Their
numbers were so great that reasonable anxiety was felt about an attack,
so our men worked at strengthening the defences, and Captain Nicholson,
R.E., laid down wire entanglements at weak points to check any rush. In
the evening Allahaddin brought in the _jirgah_ who proposed some absurd
terms of surrender,[21] but they were sent back with a hint to go to
Cabul and settle terms there. The garrison had only regimental
ammunition with them, and this had been greatly reduced by the action of
the 14th. The mountain guns also having a small number of rounds,
Colonel Money resolved to husband his ammunition and act on the
defensive, as he did not know when he might be relieved. On the 18th the
enemy showed in still greater force, and pushed to within 300 yards of
our outpost picquets, and cut off the water supply. On both the 17th and
18th, they had kept up a incessant fire into the camp, but with little
result. On the 19th, when matters looked very serious, the heliograph
was seen flashing at Kushi, and Colonel Money learnt that General Hugh
Gough was there with two regiments and four guns. Upon this he knew he
was safe, and after sending skirmishers down towards the springs on the
Kushi Road he got his guns into action and shelled the enemy’s line with
common shell and shrapnel right heartily. The shells soon silenced the
opposition musketry fire, and the tribesmen gradually drew off, not a
man being left at evening. Their loss is estimated at 100 killed and
wounded. Our casualties were seven men wounded. The enemy had brought
200 of their women to witness the final successful attack, but they were
all disappointed. General Gough occupied the Shinkai Kotal on the
evening of the 19th and reached the Shutargardan next day in a
snow-storm. His arrival was the signal for the dispersion of all tribes.
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Footnote 21:
An officer wrote at the time:—“In the evening the enemy sent in five
confidential men to say that, of course, we must now give in, that two
regiments could not hold out an hour, but they were willing to allow
us to leave the Shutargardan and to provide us with carriages and
hostages; we to be at liberty to retire to Ali Kheyl or to Cabul, and
for this consideration we were to pay them two lakhs. Poor Allahaddin
Khan was at his wits’ end.”
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