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encountered during its preparation.
THE AFGHAN WAR OF 1879-80,
Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of
Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar,
and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and
the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan.
by
HOWARD HENSMAN,
Special Correspondent of the _Pioneer_ (Allahabad), and the _Daily
News_ (London).
With Maps.
Second Edition.
London:
W. H. Allen & Co., 13, Waterloo Place, S.W.
Publishers to the India Office.
1882.
[All rights reserved.]
London:
Printed by Woodfall and Kinder
Milford Lane, Strand, W.C.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
=Dedicated=
TO
THE 72ND (DUKE OF ALBANY’S OWN)
AND
THE 92ND (GORDON) HIGHLANDERS,
IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY
RECEIVED AT THEIR HANDS
IN
=AFGHANISTAN.=
ADVERTISEMENT.
------------------
GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS writes in regard to the letters now republished—
“Allow me to congratulate you most cordially on the admirable manner in
which you have placed before the public the account of our march from
Cabul, and the operations of 31st August and 1st September around
Candahar. _Nothing could be more accurate or graphic._ I thought your
description of the fight at Charasia was one that any soldier might have
been proud of writing; but your recent letters are, if possible, even
better.”
PREFACE.
The interest aroused by the massacre of our ill-fated Embassy to the
Amir Yakub Khan, the subsequent capture of Cabul, and the hard-won
successes of our armies during the occupation of the city, can scarcely
yet have passed away; and I have, therefore, ventured to republish the
series of letters which, as a special correspondent, I wrote in the
field. They are a simple diary of the war; and though in this form they
may lack conciseness, they have at least the merit of such accuracy as
an eye-witness can alone hope to attain. It was my good-fortune to be
the only special correspondent with the gallant little army which moved
out of Ali Kheyl in September, 1879. The Government of India had
notified that “non-combatant correspondents” would not be allowed to
join the force, the history of whose achievements was to be left to
regimental officers, who might in their spare hours supply information
carefully _visé_, to such newspapers as chose to accept it. So
carelessly was this strange order issued, that Sir Frederick Roberts
never received official intimation of its existence, and he welcomed me
at Ali Kheyl on the eve of his departure for Kushi as, I am sure, he
would have welcomed any other correspondent who had chosen to cross the
frontier, and push on without escort and with their own baggage animals.
I make this explanation in justice to General Roberts, upon whom the
responsibility of excluding correspondents has been falsely thrown.
Regarding the letters now republished, Mr. Frederick Harrison in the
_Fortnightly Review_ has been good enough to describe them as “admirably
written, with very great precision and knowledge.” While not
sympathizing in the least with Mr. Harrison’s criticism of Sir Frederick
Roberts’s punishment of Cabul, in support of which criticism he mainly
relied upon my letters, I am grateful for his estimate of my work. I can
scarcely hope that all my critics will be equally generous.
I have carefully gone into details where military movements of
importance had to be described, and the sketch maps can be relied upon
as showing exact distances and positions.
HOWARD HENSMAN,
Special Correspondent of the _Pioneer_, Allahabad.
Cabul, _August, 1880_.
* * * * * * *
The above was written when all was peaceful in Afghanistan, but the
disaster at Maiwand once more threw the Cabul army into excitement, and
General Roberts had to march to the relief of Candahar. This now
historical march and the victory at Candahar on September 1st, are
described in detail in Part II. of this volume.
H. H.
Allahabad, _November 1st, 1880_.
CONTENTS.
-------
PART I.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
MASSACRE OF CAVAGNARI—THE KURRAM FIELD FORCE MOVES UPON 1
CABUL
CHAPTER II.
YAKUB KHAN IN THE BRITISH CAMP 6
CHAPTER III.
THE ADVANCE TO CHARASIA AND THE BATTLE OF THAT NAME, ETC. 20
CHAPTER IV.
CAPTURE OF SHERPUR CANTONMENTS—THE AFFAIR OF THE ASMAI 38
HEIGHTS
CHAPTER V.
CABUL OCCUPIED BY GENERAL ROBERTS 51
CHAPTER VI.
THE STORES IN BALA HISSAR ARSENAL—DISASTROUS EXPLOSIONS, 64
ETC.
CHAPTER VII.
EXECUTION OF PROMINENT AFGHANS: THE CASE OF THE KOTWAL OF 82
CABUL, ETC.
CHAPTER VIII.
FIGHTING IN THE SHUTARGARDAN PASS, ETC. 93
CHAPTER IX.
ABDICATION OF YAKUB KHAN; HIS ARREST, ETC. 99
CHAPTER X.
THE BRITISH ARMY MOVES INTO SHERPUR; OPENING COMMUNICATION 114
WITH THE KHYBER FORCE, ETC.
CHAPTER XI.
THE BALA HISSAR DISMANTLED—RAIDING FOR THE MURDERERS OF 127
CAVAGNARI—EXECUTION OF NUMEROUS SEPOYS
CHAPTER XII.
APPROACH OF WINTER—OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SAFIS, ETC. 142
CHAPTER XIII.
DIFFICULTIES AS TO SUPPLIES—BAHADUR KHAN’S CONTUMACY; HIS 153
VILLAGES DESTROYED, ETC.
CHAPTER XIV.
YAKUB KHAN DEPORTED TO INDIA—AFFAIRS IN AFGHAN 170
TURKISTAN—TRIBAL UNEASINESS ABOUT CABUL, ETC.
CHAPTER XV.
THE DECEMBER TROUBLES—FORMIDABLE STRENGTH OF MAHOMED 184
JAN—REPULSE OF GENERAL DUNHAM MASSY—THE AFGHAN ARMY BEFORE
CABUL
CHAPTER XVI.
THE FIGHTING AROUND CABUL—GENERAL ROBERTS WITHDRAWS WITHIN 198
SHERPUR, ETC.
CHAPTER XVII.
THE SIEGE OF SHERPUR—MUSA JAN PROCLAIMED AMIR BY THE AFGHAN 218
LEADER, ETC.
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE SIEGE OF SHERPUR (_continued_)—MAHOMED JAN DELIVERS HIS 239
ATTACK—ITS FAILURE—REINFORCEMENTS FROM THE KHYBER LINE,
ETC.
CHAPTER XIX.
DISPERSION OF AFGHAN ARMY—GENERAL ROBERTS RE-OCCUPIES 259
CABUL—UNIVERSALITY OF THE LATE JEHAD—A LOOTED CITY
CHAPTER XX.
PUNISHMENT OF MIR BUTCHA AND HIS KOHISTANIS—ASMATULLAH 273
KHAN’S OPERATIONS ABOUT JUGDULLUCK—DEPORTATION OF DAOUD
SHAH
CHAPTER XXI.
GENERAL ROBERTS PROCLAIMS AN AMNESTY—AFGHAN CHIEFS AT 283
CABUL—MESSAGE FROM MAHOMED JAN—NEWS OF ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN,
ETC.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE BRITISH HOSPITAL IN CABUL—“HOW WE LIVE IN SHERPUR”—“HOW 297
THEY LIVE IN CABUL”
CHAPTER XXIII.
SHERE ALI’S EFFORTS TO RAISE AN ARMY—GUN-MAKING, ETC. IN 320
CABUL—THE GHAZI AND HIS MODE OF WARFARE
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE EARLY LIFE OF ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN—PROMINENT AFGHAN 339
CHARACTERS, ETC.
CHAPTER XXV.
MR. LEPEL GRIFFIN ARRIVES AT SHERPUR TO INVESTIGATE THE 355
POLITICAL SITUATION—THE MALCONTENT CHIEFS IN
DURBAR—EXPLANATION OF BRITISH POLICY
CHAPTER XXVI.
GENERAL ROSS GOES OUT TO MEET GENERAL STEWART—A SECOND 373
SUCCESSFUL BATTLE AT CHARASIA
CHAPTER XXVII.
GENERAL STEWART AT CABUL—HIS MARCH FROM CANDAHAR—THE BATTLE 388
OF AHMED KHEL—CAPTURE OF GHAZNI, ACTION AT URZOO, ETC.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
“THE DIVINE FIGURE FROM THE NORTH”—A PERIOD OF CALM—THE 403
KIZILBASHES, ETC.
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE AMIRSHIP OFFERED TO ABDUR RAHMAN—CAVALRY ACTION AT 415
PADKHAO SHANA
CHAPTER XXX.
FORMAL RECOGNITION OF ABDUR RAHMAN BY THE BRITISH—HIS 431
INTERVIEWS WITH MR. GRIFFIN—A SETTLEMENT ARRIVED AT
CHAPTER XXXI.
NEWS OF MAIWAND—GENERAL ROBERTS MARCHES TO RELIEVE 450
CANDAHAR—CABUL EVACUATED BY GENERAL STEWART—THE SETTLEMENT
WITH ABDUR RAHMAN
PART II.
CHAPTER I.
THE MARCH TO CANDAHAR—ARRIVAL AT SHASHGAO 464
CHAPTER II.
THE MARCH (_continued_)—RELIEF OF KHELAT-I-GHILZAI—ARRIVAL 477
AT ROBAT—END OF THE MARCH, ETC.
CHAPTER III.
GENERAL ROBERTS IN CANDAHAR—RECONNAISSANCE ON THE HERAT 503
ROAD—BATTLE OF CANDAHAR AND DEFEAT OF AYUB KHAN, ETC.
CHAPTER IV.
THE SIEGE OF CANDAHAR—SORTIE BY THE GARRISON, ETC. 530
CHAPTER V.
THE OPERATIONS ON THE HELMUND—THE DISASTER AT MAIWAND 545
CONCLUSION 558
APPENDIX 565
LIST OF MAPS ILLUSTRATING ENGAGEMENTS.
TO
FACE
PAGE
1. ENGAGEMENT ON HEIGHTS NEAR CABUL, OCTOBER 6, 1879 30
2. ACTIONS AROUND CABUL, DECEMBER 11 TO 14, 1879 188
3. OPERATIONS NEAR CABUL, DECEMBER 13 AND 14, 1879 200
4. THE SIEGE OF SHERPUR—PLAN OF THE DEFENCES 232
5. THE BATTLE OF AHMED KHEL, APRIL 19, 1880 394
6. THE ACTION AT URZOO, APRIL 23, 1880 402
7. THE BATTLE OF CANDAHAR, SEPTEMBER 1, 1880 512
8. THE SIEGE OF CANDAHAR—PLAN OF THE DEFENCES 532
9. THE OPERATIONS ON THE HELMUND, JULY, 1880 546
10. THE BATTLE OF MAIWAND, JULY 27, 1880 552
THE AFGHAN WAR
OF
1879-80.
------------------
PART I.
-------
THE OCCUPATION OF CABUL—THE BRITISH BESIEGED
AT SHERPUR—DISPERSAL OF THE TRIBES.
------------------------------------
CHAPTER I.
Introduction—The Cavagnari Mission—Yakub Khan’s Evasion of the Gundamak
Treaty—Turbulence of the Herat Regiments—Nakshband Khan’s
Warning—The Outbreak—Yakub Khan’s Behaviour—Reception of the News in
India—The Seizure of the Shutargardan, and Preparations for the
Advance upon Cabul.
The Treaty of Gundamak had for its chief object the direct
representation of the British Government at the Court of the Amir Yakub
Khan, and, in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari,
K.C.B., C.S.I., was received at Cabul, as Resident, on July 24th, 1879.
Mr. William Jenkyns, of the Indian Civil Service, accompanied him as
secretary to the Mission. An escort of twenty-five sowars and fifty
sepoys of the Guides’ Corps was the only means of protection at the
Embassy’s command, implicit faith being placed in the Amir’s promise to
guard the lives of his guests. Lieutenant Hamilton was in command of the
escort, and Dr. Kelly, surgeon of the Guides, was the medical officer
attached to the Mission. Including servants and followers, there were in
all some 200 souls gathered in the Residency in the Bala Hissar from
July 24th until the outbreak of the Herat regiments on the morning of
September 3rd. It would be out of place to describe at length the course
of events which culminated in the Massacre, but from the tone of Sir
Louis Cavagnari’s letters there can be no doubt the Amir was never
anxious to carry out to the strict letter the terms of the Gundamak
Treaty. Taking the official diary sent weekly from Cabul to the Indian
Government, it appears that every outward honour was paid to the Embassy
upon its arrival, but that Yakub Khan was so suspicious of his Ministers
and Nobles, that he told off men to watch the Residency. These spies
furnished the names of all who visited Cavagnari without the Amir’s
knowledge. Then came rumours of petty chiefs having been punished for
their friendship to the British during the late campaign, although one
of the main points of the Treaty was directed against this very
contingency.[1] The Amir always avoided reference to this subject, and
as Sir Louis Cavagnari could not obtain direct evidence of the amnesty
clauses being departed from, no redress could be obtained. Apart from
palace intrigues, which are always rife in Cabul, there seemed no direct
element of discord at work in the capital until the troops from Herat
reached Sherpur Cantonment on August 5th. These regiments had not shared
in the humiliation of the defeats suffered by the Cabul soldiery at Ali
Musjid and the Peiwar Kotal; they taunted their comrades in arms with
cowardice, and boasted of their own prowess; and their turbulence soon
assumed a dangerous form. A ressaldar-major of one of our cavalry
regiments, Nakshband Khan, an old and tried soldier, was spending his
furlough at his village of Aoshahr, two miles from Cabul, and he seems
first to have caught the alarm. When the Herat regiments marched, or
rather swaggered, through the streets of Cabul, with bands playing, many
of the soldiers abused the Kafir _elchi_ (ambassador) by name, calling
out to the populace, “Why has he come here?” and showing too clearly
that their passions were dangerously excited. Nakshband Khan learned
from a fellow-countryman in the ranks that the soldiers had been ordered
so to shout in the streets. Full of this news, he went to our Envoy and
warned him of the coming storm. Sir Louis Cavagnari was a man notorious
for his disregard of personal danger: he was brave to a fault, and this
turbulence among the Afghan soldiery scarcely shook his composure.
“Never fear,” was the answer to the Ressaldar; “keep up your heart, dogs
that bark don’t bite!” “But these dogs do bite; there is real danger,”
urged Nakshband Khan. The reply was characteristic of the man: he had
taken up his post and nothing could break down his determination to
remain at all hazards; he quietly said, “They can only kill the three or
four of us here, and our death will be avenged.”
-----
Footnote 1:
Sirdar Sher Ali Khan Kandahari, Governor of Candahar, assured Sir
Donald Stewart that Yakub Khan, from the first, never intended to
pardon the chiefs who had aided us. Such a course of policy would have
seemed madness in the eyes of every Afghan, said the Sirdar; not a man
would have understood it.
-----
This is the story as told by the Ressaldar, who can scarcely be
romancing; but no word of the warning is given by Cavagnari in his
letters to the Viceroy, all of which are full of sanguine hope even as
late as August 30th. His last message was sent on September 2nd, and
concluded with the words “All well,”—and this within twelve hours of the
attack upon the Residency. He trusted altogether to Yakub Khan—for what
could an escort of seventy-five men avail against an army?—and almost
his last written words were: “Notwithstanding all people say against
him, I personally believe Yakub Khan will turn out to be a very good
ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to his engagements.” This
blind trust in the Amir was soon to be rudely broken down, for Yakub was
found wanting even in willingness to save the lives entrusted to his
care.
The story of the outbreak in the Bala Hissar, and the massacre of the
Envoy and his followers, is written at length in the Bluebooks. The tale
is too well known to bear reproduction: the heroic struggle against
overwhelming odds has, perhaps, rarely been equalled, for there were
only four British officers and a handful of native soldiers to meet an
army. Yakub Khan sat in his palace, vacillating and sullen, with the
noise of the fight ringing in his ears, and the roar of the soldiery and
the fanatical populace surging into his council-chamber: but he made no
sign. There were councillors who urged prompt chastisement of the
mutinous sepoys: there were regiments at Bala Hissar which _might_ have
loyally obeyed orders; but the man who had pledged himself to preserve
our Envoy only took the cunning precaution of sending out Daoud Shah,
his commander-in-chief, to “remonstrate” with the armed rabble. It was
like remonstrating with a tiger when the hunter lies at his mercy: like
giving the word “halt” to the incoming tide: Daoud Shah was thrust back
by the first men he met, but they used their bayonets tenderly, and his
wounds were slight. And when it was all over, when the excited crowd
roared through the Bazaar, with Cavagnari’s head held on high, there
seems to have come upon Yakub that fear of vengeance which he had
hitherto thrust aside. Forty years before the body of another Envoy had
been hung on the butcher’s hooks in that same Bazaar; treachery had
scored a success which promised to be lasting; but Pollock had come with
a victorious army from Peshawur, while Nott fought his way from the
south, and the Char Chowk was soon a heap of ruins. How soon would the
vengeance of an outraged nation again fall upon Cabul?
Shortly after midnight of September 4th Sir Frederick Roberts, who was
in Simla, engaged on the work of the Army Commission, was called up to
receive a telegram. It was from the Kurram Valley, and conveyed the
first news of the Massacre, which he then and there hastened to carry to
the Commander-in-Chief. The shock was so terrible that men were
paralyzed for the moment, but the next day the machinery of Government
was put in motion, a council of war was called, and on the afternoon of
September 5th the following instructions were sent to Brigadier-General
Dunham Massy, then commanding the Kurram Field Force at the Peiwar
Kotal[2]:—
“From the Quarter Master General in India to Brigadier-General D.
Massy, commanding Kurram Field Force; dated Simla, 5th September,
1879.
“Move 23rd Pioneers, 5th Ghoorkas, and Mountain Train to Shutargardan,
crest of pass; to entrench themselves there and await orders. Ten days’
supplies.”
-----
Footnote 2:
This telegram is of some importance, as showing the quickness with
which the Viceroy and the military authorities recognized the
necessity of seizing the Shutargardan before the Cabul troops or the
local tribesmen could occupy the Pass in strength.
-----
In accordance with these instructions, Swinley’s Mountain Battery of six
7-pounder guns, escorted by the Pioneers and Ghoorkas, moved upon the
Shutargardan, which was occupied without opposition on the 11th of
September. Colonel Currie, of the 23rd Pioneers, commanded this small
force. The 72nd Highlanders and the 5th Punjab Infantry followed in a
few days to secure the road between Ali Kheyl and the Pass, while the
7th Company of Bengal Sappers and Miners was ordered up from Shulozan
(near Kurram) to improve the road beyond the Shutargardan. In the
meantime, the following appointments had been made:—Colonel Macgregor to
be Chief of the Staff to Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts, Commanding
the Force; Brigadier-General Macpherson, C.B., V.C., to command the 1st
Infantry Brigade; Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., to command the
2nd Infantry Brigade; Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, to command the
Cavalry Brigade; and Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, C.B., V.C., to be
Road Commandant. On September 12th General Roberts arrived at Ali Kheyl.
On the 13th General Baker took command of the troops in the
Shutargardan; which Pass, by the 18th of the month, was held by the
troops which had moved up originally, together with the whole of the
72nd Highlanders and the 7th Company of Sappers and Miners. The position
was strongly entrenched and every precaution taken against a surprise by
the neighbouring tribes.
Having secured the Shutargardan, Sir Frederick Roberts cast about for
means to complete his transport, it being intended to move 6,000 men
upon Cabul with as little delay as possible. With the usual carelessness
which marks the operations of Indian armies, and perhaps with a desire
to curtail expenditure, the transport of the Kurram Valley Field Force
had, upon Cavagnari’s departure for Cabul, been allowed to dwindle down
to insignificant proportions. There were in the Valley, when the news of
the Massacre was received, only 1,500 mules, 500 sickly camels, and 800
pack-bullocks. These were just sufficient to enable the Commissariat
Department to furnish supplies to the winter garrison of the Valley.
Without loss of time all the available animals in Peshawur and near the
frontier were ordered to be sent to Ali Kheyl, and eventually the army
was provided with almost 2,000 mules, between 700 and 800 camels, and
upwards of 600 bullocks.[3] The Gajis, Turis, and local Ghilzais were
induced to send in animals with drivers, and this “local carriage” was
of great service. Padshah Khan, the most influential of the Ghilzai
chiefs, declared himself willing to aid us in the collection of
supplies, and his friendship at this critical moment was all-important.
On the 14th of September the Nawab Sir Gholam Hassan Khan, who had
started from Candahar to join Cavagnari at Cabul, reached the
Shutargardan. He had heard news of the Massacre and had turned off the
Ghazni Road and made for our most advanced post. The fact of his
non-molestation on the road proved that the Logar Valley was quiet, and
this was confirmed by a reconnaissance on the 16th, when General Baker
went as far as the Shinkai Kotal, half-way between Kushi and the
Shutargardan. On the 22nd the Mangals to the number of 200 or 300,
raided upon a small convoy carrying telegraph stores near Karatiga, east
of the Pass, killed six sepoys of the escort (originally only eleven
men), and twenty-one coolies and linesmen. They also succeeded in
carrying off eighty-four mules. This showed that our convoys would
probably he attacked daily, and General Baker ordered that no escort
should be less than twenty-five armed men to 100 transport animals.
-----
Footnote 3:
On October 14th, at Cabul, the returns were:—Mules, 1,973; camels,
675; bullocks, 604; and 230 yabus (ponies purchased in Cabul).
-----