All the information so far has come from the United States. In fact, the
Smyth Report, the six volumes of technical information submitted to the
UN, the testimony by scientists at the Congressional hearings on the
McMahon Act, and much declassified information have been of invaluable
aid to Russia in developing her own atomic bomb. It is about time that
this one-way flow of information came to a stop. Not a trickle has so
far come out of Russia—not even an official acknowledgment that she has
exploded her first A-bomb—and until she shows her willingness to
co-operate fully, we must stop playing Santa Claus.
16. SHOULD A NEW PANEL OF EXPERTS ANALOGOUS TO THE ACHESON-LILIENTHAL
BOARD BE APPOINTED TO STUDY THE H-BOMB IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL?
It is now more than 4 years since the Acheson-Lilienthal Board made its
recommendations on international control. Their findings have since been
largely incorporated into the UN plan.
Do the events of the last 4 years make it desirable, for technical
reasons, to rethink the control problem? Are the technical data of
hydrogen bombs such, as to demand a recasting and change of emphasis in
the existing UN plan? Have the prospects of large-scale peacetime
applications of atomic energy sufficiently changed that a different
orientation in control measures is desirable?
If re-examination of the control question is indicated, should this
inquiry be undertaken in the first instance by a group of qualified
Americans? Or should the United States suggest that an internationally
constituted board initially take on this assignment?
Considering the strong Soviet opposition to the UN plan, is it useful to
consider the problem of control? Is the Soviet attitude at all likely to
change in the foreseeable future? Would a rethinking of the control
problem contribute to a solution unless Soviet representatives
participated? Would the appointment of a new “Acheson-Lilienthal Board”
raise false hopes?