See comment on questions 12 and 13.
12. HOW DOES THE H-BOMB BEAR UPON THE PROBLEM OF DISPOSITION OF EXISTING
STOCKS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL?
When a control plan takes effect, what should be done with supplies of
U-235 and plutonium in excess of a quantity immediately usable for
peacetime purposes? This problem has received relatively little
consideration in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. If excess
stocks were destroyed, a valuable future source of energy and storehouse
of neutrons would be lost. On the other hand, if the stocks were kept in
existence under UN guard, seizure by an aggressor state might rapidly
permit it to attack with atomic bombs—and innocent countries might have
relatively little warning.
Such seizures might quickly lead, under certain circumstances, to the
construction of “triggers” for H-bombs. Does this fact tip the balance
in favor of destroying excess U-235 and plutonium? Or are these
substances still too valuable and too difficult to replace to justify
destruction? Is there a third alternative—possibly involving partial
destruction or the use of “denaturants” or the construction of many
power reactors, regardless of cost factors—to keep excess stocks of
fissionables contaminated with fission products?