4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative
character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic
knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to
detect—misuse of atomic energy. To be effective, the Authority must
itself be the world’s leader in the field of atomic knowledge and
development and thus supplement its legal authority with the great
power inherent in possession of leadership in knowledge.
These proposals represented a broadening—rather than essential
modification—of the Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. The additional
features concerned (1) _condign punishment_, and (2) the so-called power
of veto of the United Nations Charter.
Whereas the Acheson-Lilienthal report had not dealt with the subject of
sanctions, Mr. Baruch held that a realistic agreement must provide for
penalties “of as severe a nature as the nations may wish and as
immediate and certain in their execution as possible....” Such “condign
punishment” would be meted out if _previously stipulated_ violations of
a control plan occurred.
This problem, Mr. Baruch stated, was intimately related with the veto
provisions of the United Nations Charter. Under the Charter, sanctions
can be invoked only with the concurrence of the five permanent members
of the Security Council, i.e., China, France, United Kingdom, United
States, and the Soviet Union. Mr. Baruch maintained, however, that
“there must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn
agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive
purposes.... The bomb does not wait on debate.” He pointed out that the
United States was “concerned here with the veto power only as it affects
this particular problem.”
A United States memorandum of July 12, 1946, stressed that “Voluntary
relinquishment of the veto on questions relating to a specific weapon
previously outlawed by unanimous agreement because of its uniquely
destructive character, in no wise involves any compromise of the
principle of unanimity of action as applied to general problems or to
particular situations not foreseeable and therefore not susceptible of
advance unanimous agreement.”
_The first Soviet proposals—Gromyko’s statement of June 19, 1946_
A week after the American plans were put forward, the Soviet Union
announced its own proposals. They were marked chiefly by Soviet
insistence that the United States agree to stop the production of atomic
weapons and destroy existing bombs _before_ international control
arrangements were negotiated.
Although they called for “an international convention for outlawing
weapons based on the use of atomic energy,” the Soviet proposals did not
provide “effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to
protect complying states against the hazards of violations and
evasions.” They proposed that the “rule of unanimity” in the Security
Council apply to atomic-energy matters. Hence if one of the permanent
members of the Security Council or a friend violated a control scheme,
the other members of the United Nations would have no legal means, under
the Charter, of invoking sanctions against it.
Throughout 1946 the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission continued
its investigations of the control problem. On December 31, 1946, the
Commission issued its _First Report_. It revealed that the essential
features of the Baruch proposals had won the support of all the members
of the Commission except the Soviet Union and Poland.
_The Soviet Proposals of June 11, 1947_
A year after it suggested a convention for “outlawing” atomic weapons,
the Soviet Union came forward with a set of control proposals.
A chief point of interest in the plan was the fact that the Soviets now
assented to “_periodic_ inspection of facilities for mining and
production of atomic materials” by an international inspectorate. In
answer to a United Kingdom inquiry, however, the Russians stated that
“normally, inspectors will visit only _declared_ plants”—with this
supplemented by special investigations when there were “grounds for
suspicion” of violation of the convention for the prohibition of atomic
weapons. The power of the Control Commission would be further limited to
making recommendations to governments and to the Security Council. On
other matters that separated the Soviet Union from the majority
position—such as international ownership and management, and the veto
question—there was no change in the Russian position.
The subsequent half-year brought one sign of a further modification of
the U.S.S.R. stand. On August 11, 1947, Mr. Gromyko seemingly brought
the Soviets closer to the majority position by agreeing that “the idea
of quotas deserves attention and serious consideration by the Atomic
Energy Commission....”
_The Second and Third Reports of the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission—September 11, 1947, and May 17, 1948_
The _Second Report_ of the Atomic Energy Commission spelled out in
detail the precise powers and functions and the limitations thereon of
any international agency in implementing an effective control plan. When
the _Report_ was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of 40 to 6,
the plan developed in the UNAEC became a world plan—to which only the
Soviet Union and her satellites took exception.
By the spring of 1948 the UNAEC became convinced that the Soviet Union’s
refusal to accept any plan that met the technical requirements of
controlling atomic energy was symptomatic of broader differences which
made further negotiations on the Commission level fruitless.
The _Third Report_ stated that “the majority of the Commission has been
unable to secure the agreement of the Soviet Union to even those
elements of effective control from the technical point of view, let
alone their acceptance of the nature and extent of participation in the
world community required of all nations in this field....”
It appeared to the Commission that the atomic deadlock was but one
manifestation of the more widespread dispute between the Soviet Union
and the rest of the world. In view of this, the Commission majority
recommended that negotiations in the Commission be suspended until the
permanent members of the UNAEC found that “there exists a basis for
agreement on the international control of atomic energy....”
The following were regarded as the basic considerations which, even on a
technical level, made the U.S.S.R. position untenable:
I. The powers provided for the International Control Commission by the
Soviet Union proposals, confined as they are to _periodic inspection_
and _special investigations_, are insufficient to guarantee against
the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities, and
do not provide the means to detect secret activities.
II. Except by recommendations to the Security Council of the United
Nations, the International Control Commission has no powers to enforce
either its own decisions or the terms of the convention or conventions
on control.
III. The Soviet Union Government insists that the convention
establishing a system of control, even so limited as that contained in
the Soviet Union proposals, can be concluded only _after_ a convention
providing for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the destruction of
existing atomic weapons has been “signed, ratified, and put into
effect.” [Italics in original.]
The Commission’s work had come to a standstill.
_Atomic energy negotiations since 1948_
Meeting in Paris in the fall of 1948 the General Assembly, by a vote of
40 to 6, approved the general findings and recommendations of the FIRST
REPORT and the specific proposals of part II of the SECOND REPORT “as
constituting the necessary basis for the establishing of an effective
system of international control of atomic energy.” However, it called
upon the UNAEC to continue its work and to study such subjects as it
deemed “practicable and useful,” and asked that the permanent members of
the Commission “consult in order to determine if there exists a basis
for agreement....” The permanent members were requested to transmit the
results of their consultations to the General Assembly.
In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union had served notice of what appeared to
be a significant change in its position. In a draft resolution dated
September 25, 1948, the Soviets proposed—
To elaborate draft conventions for the banning of atomic weapons and
conventions for the establishment of international effective control
over atomic energy, taking into account that the convention for the
banning of atomic weapons and the convention for the establishment of
international control over atomic energy must be signed and
implemented and entered into force _simultaneously_.
It was the last word of this resolution that marked a change in the
U.S.S.R. stand. Previously, the Soviets had demanded that atomic weapons
production be prohibited and stock piles be destroyed _before_ a control
plan was discussed.
Nonetheless, the new Soviet proposal gave no indication that the Soviets
would accede to what the majority regard as an _effective_ control plan.
Furthermore, the proposal for simultaneous prohibition and control was
considered to be physically impossible to implement. “The development of
atomic energy is the world’s newest industry, and already is one of the
most complicated. It would not be reasonable to assume that any
effective system of control could be introduced and enforced overnight.
Control and prohibition must, therefore, go into effect over a period of
time and by a series of stages.”
The record of negotiations from the fall of 1948 to the present is
largely one of inaction.
On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that an atomic
explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. One month later, the
sponsoring powers of the UNAEC revealed that the consultations between
them “had not yet succeeded in bringing about agreement between the
U.S.S.R. and the other five powers.”
Despite this, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1949, asked that the
permanent members of the Commission continue their consultations and
keep the Commission and the General Assembly informed of their work. On
the same day, Vishinsky revealed that the Soviets no longer entertained
favorably the principle of quotas.
On January 19, 1950, consultations came to an end when the Soviet Union
withdrew from the discussions over the question of recognition of the
Chinese Government.
C
THE ATOMIC IMPASSE
Regarded in fundamental terms, the deadlock in international control
negotiations reflects diametrically opposed notions of the
responsibilities of individual nations in a world of atomic energy.
All nations except the Soviet Union and her satellites “put world
security first, and are prepared to accept innovations in traditional
concepts of international cooperation, national sovereignty, and
economic organization where these are necessary for security. The
government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and is unwilling
to accept measures which may impinge upon or interfere with its rigid
exercise of unimpeded state sovereignty.”
This basic variance in the objectives of the Soviet Union and the other
members of the United Nations is mirrored in the majority and minority
control proposals.
The specific differences in the two plans may be summarized as follows: