_In the fall of 1949 Senator McMahon directed the staff of the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy to study the hydrogen bomb in
relation to international control of atomic energy. The material in the
following pages, with the exception of the comments in Appendix D, was
prepared by the staff at the chairman’s request to assist the joint
committee in considering the problem._
_It is my belief that this valuable material, until now unavailable in
such excellent summary form, will also assist Americans in general in
considering this vital problem. Readers of this volume should find it
helpful in arriving at conclusions of their own, particularly in the
light of the facts and discussion presented in Chapters III and IV. I
further believe that a careful perusal of the following material will
lend strong support to my view that the international control of atomic
weapons, as envisaged in the majority plan of the United Nations,—the
only plan that may give assurance against a surprise atomic attack—had
become wholly impractical even before the entry of the H-bomb into the
picture, and that the imminent development of the H-bomb has made it so
unworkable that any further plan to revive it would be futile._
_This material makes it clear (a) that Russia never had any intention of
reaching any agreement on international control and had set out to
sabotage any plan from the very beginning; and (b) that no plan, no
matter how foolproof, could hope to succeed in the absence of complete
mutual trust and confidence. Events in Korea, I am convinced, have
driven the last nail into the coffin of the UN control plan._
A
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC
WEAPONS
May 1945: Secretary of War Stimson appoints interim Committee to study
problem of atomic energy.
August 6, 1945: Hiroshima.
October 3, 1945: President’s message to Congress outlines necessity
for international control of atomic energy and proposes
conversations with Canada and United Kingdom.
November 15, 1945: Three-nation agreed declaration on atomic energy
(Truman-Attlee-King declaration). Calls for United Nations
Commission to make proposals for international control plan.
Proposals should provide safeguards “by way of _inspection and
other means_.” (Wherever used in the following pages, italics are
supplied.)
December 27, 1945: U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister communiqué on
results of Moscow Conference. Proposes that Canada, China, and
France join with Big Three in sponsoring resolution calling for
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with terms of reference
stipulated in Truman-Attlee-King declaration.
January 24, 1946: General Assembly resolution establishing United
Nations Commission on Atomic Energy. Composed of members of
Security Council plus Canada.
March 28, 1946: Acheson-Lilienthal report. Urges that mines and
“dangerous” atomic-energy facilities be put under _international
ownership_ and _management_ of Atomic Development Authority.
Additional safeguards in the form of _inspection_. Nations to
operate “safe” plants under ADA license. Plants to be distributed
among nations in keeping with _strategic balance_. Control plan to
be implemented by stages.
June 14, 1946: Baruch proposals to United Nations. Closely follow
Acheson-Lilienthal recommendations. Ask “condign punishment,” for
violations, and request agreement that UN Charter _veto_ clause
not apply to sanctions for stipulated violations of atomic-energy
treaty.
June 19, 1946: Soviet Union counterproposals. Demand prohibition of
atomic weapons and destruction of existing stockpiles _before_
international control plan is negotiated. Soviet proposals provide
no safeguards against evasion.
December 31, 1946: First Report of UNAEC. Incorporates essential
features of Baruch proposals into statement of principles for plan
for international control of atomic energy. Adopted 10 to 0, with
U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining.
June 11, 1947: U.S.S.R. control proposals. Soviets assent to _periodic
inspection_, but this would apply only to _declared_ plants.
August 11, 1947: Soviets consent in principle to concept of _quotas_.
September 11, 1947: Second Report of UNAEC. Outlines powers,
functions, and limitations thereon of any international agency in
implementing effective control plan.
May 17, 1948: Third Report of UNAEC. Reports impasse because Soviets
refuse to accept majority plan and persist in refusing to put
forward effective proposals of their own. Concludes that further
work in UNAEC is fruitless until Soviet cooperation in broader
fields of policy is secured. Recommends that Commission’s work be
suspended until sponsoring powers find that basis for agreement
exists.
September 25, 1948: Soviets modify position by asking that conventions
for prohibition of atomic weapons and for international control go
into effect simultaneously.
November 4, 1948: By vote of 40 to 6, UN General Assembly endorses
majority control plan. Calls upon UNAEC to continue work and
requests that sponsoring powers consult to explore possible basis
of agreement.
August 9, 1949: First meeting of sponsoring powers of UNAEC.
September 23, 1949: President Truman’s announcement of Soviet atomic
explosion.
October 25, 1949: Canada, China, France, United Kingdom, United States
statement reveals Soviet attitude still prevents agreement.
November 23, 1949: General Assembly resolution calls upon sponsoring
powers to continue consultations.
November 23, 1949: Soviets reverse position on quotas, abandoning
previous assent in principle.
January 19, 1950: U.S.S.R. walks out of sponsoring powers
consultations over China recognition issue.
January 31, 1950: President Truman announces that United States will
proceed with development of hydrogen bomb.
B
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
PROPOSALS AND NEGOTIATIONS
_Early steps looking toward international control_
Even before the test explosion at Alamogordo, N. Mex., had ushered in
the atomic age, the United States Government was studying methods of
making atomic energy a socially constructive force.
In May 1945 an Interim Committee appointed by Secretary of War Stimson
commenced investigating the problem. The Committee recognized “that the
means of producing the atomic bomb would not forever remain the
exclusive property of the United States....” Therefore, “Secretary of
War Stimson was one of the first to recommend a policy of international
supervision and control of the entire field of atomic energy....”
When on August 6, 1945, President Truman made the first public statement
on the atomic bomb, he made clear that “under present circumstances it
is not intended to divulge the technical process of production or all
the military application, pending further examination of possible
methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of
sudden destruction.” He assured the American people that he would “make
further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can
become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world
peace.”
The President’s recommendations were transmitted to the Congress on
October 3, 1945. He spoke of the necessity for “international
arrangements looking, if possible, to the renunciation of the use and
development of the atomic bomb, and directing ... atomic energy ...
toward peaceful and humanitarian ends.” So great a challenge could not
await the full development of the United Nations. The President,
therefore, proposed initiating discussions “first with our associates in
this discovery, Great Britain and Canada, and then with other
nations....”
_The Truman-Attlee-King declaration_
In the three nations agreed declaration of November 15, 1945—frequently
called the Truman-Attlee-King declaration—was recorded the concerted
objectives of the three nations that had developed the atomic bomb.
According to the declaration, any international arrangements should have
a dual goal: Preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive
purposes, and promoting its use for peaceful and humanitarian ends. To
reach these objectives, the signatory nations proposed a United Nations
Commission empowered to make recommendations to the parent body. It was
asked that the Commission make specific proposals “for effective
safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect states
against the hazards of violations and evasions.” It was further
suggested that the Commission’s work “proceed by separate stages, the
successful completion of each of which will develop the necessary
confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken.”
Contained in the agreed declaration was the genesis of the basic feature
of the control proposals subsequently advanced by the United States, and
accepted by a large majority of the United Nations: safeguards through
inspection and _other means_. It was recognized even at this early date
that “effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards” against evasion
represented the minimum prerequisite of a satisfactory international
arrangement.
At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in
December 1945, the Truman-Attlee-King proposals received the Soviet
Union’s endorsement. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union agreed to invite Canada, China, and France to join with them in
sponsoring a resolution calling for a United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission. Such a Commission would consist of the 11 members of the
Security Council plus Canada when that state was not sitting on the
Council. It is noteworthy that the Commission’s proposed terms of
reference were exactly those suggested by the Truman-Attlee-King
declaration.
In its first substantive resolution, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously adopted the recommendations of the Moscow Conference and
established the United Nations Commission on Atomic Energy on January
24, 1946.
_The Acheson-Lilienthal report_
In order to inquire into the nature of the “effective, reciprocal, and
enforceable safeguards” called for in the Truman-Attlee-King
declaration, Secretary of State Byrnes in January 1946 appointed a
Committee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The Committee
in turn enlisted the aid of a Board of Consultants under the
chairmanship of David Lilienthal.
The findings of the two groups were made public on March 28, 1946, in
the Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, commonly
called the Acheson-Lilienthal report. It was advanced “not as a final
plan but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to build.”
The report concluded that no security against atomic attack could be
found in an agreement that merely “outlawed” these weapons. Nor was it
considered feasible to control atomic energy “only by a system which
relies on inspection and similar police-like methods.” Instead,
inspection must be supplemented by _international ownership and
management_ of raw materials and key installations. “Dangerous”
operations—those of potential military consequence—would be carried out
by an Atomic Development Authority, an international agency under the
United Nations. Only “safe” activities—those of no military
importance—would be conducted by the individual nations, under licenses
from the Atomic Development Authority. Any plan finally agreed upon
would be implemented by _stages_ with the United States progressively
transferring its fund of theoretical and technological knowledge to an
international authority as safeguards were put into effect.
The report amplified the Truman-Attlee-King proposals in two important
respects.
First, it stated that international ownership—not specifically mentioned
in the earlier declaration—was a necessary adjunct of international
inspection. Second, it advanced the concept of “strategic balance” or
“quotas.” The Report held that an acceptable plan must be “such that if
it fails or the whole international situation collapses, any nations
such as the United States will still be in a relatively secure position,
compared to any other nation.” To help attain this end, it was proposed
that the Atomic Development Authority’s stock piles and plants be well
distributed geographically.
_The Baruch proposals to the United Nations_
Less than 3 months after the publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal
report, the United States Government gave the world its proposals for
the international control of atomic energy. On June 14, 1946, Bernard
Baruch presented them to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission “as
a basis for beginning our discussion.”
Mr. Baruch stated that:
When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the
renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put
into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations
of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international
crimes, we propose that: