SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I admit that I do not know anything about that.
I do not know whether you were still in Hitler’s confidence at the time
or not. But, wasn’t it a fact that Signor Attolico came on the 25th and
told Hitler that the Italian Army and Air Force were not ready for a
campaign? Were you told that?
GÖRING: Yes, of course I was told that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was why the orders for the attack were
cancelled on the 26th, wasn’t it?
GÖRING: No, that is absolutely wrong, because when the question of
Italian assistance came up, the fact was that its value was doubted in
many quarters. During the tension of the preceding days it became
evident that the demands made by the Italians which could not be
fulfilled by us were formulated in order to keep Italy out of the war.
The Führer was convinced that England had only given such a clear-cut
guarantee to Poland, because in the meantime the British Government had
learned that it was not the intention of Italy to come into the war as a
partner of the Axis.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will put to you your own account of what the
Führer said. “I will have to see whether we can eliminate British
intervention.” Isn’t it correct that you tried, through Mr. Dahlerus, in
every way, to try and eliminate British intervention?
GÖRING: I have never denied that. It was my whole endeavor to avoid war
with England. If it had been possible to avoid this war by coming to an
agreement with Poland, then that would have been accepted. If the war
with England could have been avoided in spite of a war with Poland, then
that was my task also. This is clear from the fact that, even after the
Polish campaign had started on 1 September 1939 I still made every
attempt to avoid a war with England and to keep the war from spreading.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In other words, what you were trying to do from
the 25th onwards was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich
in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn’t that right?
GÖRING: That, of course, is quite clearly expressed.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember the interview with Mr.
Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the
map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th
of August it will not mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that
I can ask you one or two questions about it.
You remember, at that time, that you were upset at the interview which
had taken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply, and there
had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that?
GÖRING: Yes, of course I was upset, since that had suddenly completely
disturbed my whole position.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on Page
72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the
Poles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying: “Wir kennen die
Polen”? Do you remember that?
GÖRING: Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I
had heard about the excesses and I would not go and tell Dahlerus, a
neutral, that I considered Germany wholly guilty and the Poles
completely innocent. It is correct that I did say that, but it arose out
of a situation.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still an admirer of Bismarck?
GÖRING: I admire Bismarck absolutely, but I have never said that I am a
Bismarck.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you
might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember: “Haut
doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen”? (Let us strike the Poles
until they lose the courage to live.) Is that what was in your mind at
the time?
GÖRING: No, I had no such thoughts, still less because for years I had
genuinely sought friendship with Poland.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have been quite frank about your general
intention, and I am not going to take time on it, but I just want to put
one or two subsidiary points.
You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus’ book about the
airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him,
mentioning the Defendant Ribbentrop—you remember that passage? You have
given your explanation and I just want to . . .
GÖRING: Yes, yes, I gave that explanation and I made it quite clear.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, your explanation was that Herr Dahlerus was
confusing your concern that his airplane should not be shot down in
making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn’t it?
You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was
your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn’t that
right? That is as I understood it.
GÖRING: No, I think I have expressed it very clearly. Would you like me
to give it again? I will repeat it.
Dahlerus, who stood in the witness box here, used the words, “I must
correct myself,” when he was asked about Ribbentrop. I am quoting
Dahlerus. He said, “I connected it with Ribbentrop, since shortly
beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection.”
Thereupon I explained I was really anxious lest something might happen.
I explained that very clearly and I need not repeat it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question I put to you, Witness—I think we
are agreed on it—was that your anxiety was about his plane, and the
point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not
occur on this day when Dahlerus was preparing for his third visit, but
occurred when he was in England and rang you up during his second visit.
He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on Page 59 of
his book he says:
“Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telephoned Göring to
confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He
seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he
was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British, or over
German territory. He asked me to hold the line, and a minute
later came back and gave me a concise description of the route
the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He
also assured me that the anti-aircraft stations along our course
would be informed that we were coming.”
What I am suggesting to you is that your explanation is wrong, that you
have confused it with this earlier incident of which Mr. Dahlerus
speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about
the second incident which occurred 2 days later.
GÖRING: That is not at all contradictory. In regard to the first flight
the position was that it was already dark, which means that the danger
was considerably greater; and I again point out that, in connection with
the second journey, preparedness for war in all countries had reached
such a degree that flying was hazardous.
I emphasize once more that I had to correct Dahlerus when he was
questioned by my counsel, that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had
planned an attack against him. I emphasize for the last time that Von
Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dahlerus.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you really say that? Do you remember that on
the 29th of August—first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m.,
when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the
difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering
direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, “We must summon Field
Marshal Göring to discuss it with him.” That is in our _Blue Book_, and
as far as I know it has never been denied. You were summoned to the
interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Nevile
Henderson.
GÖRING: No, I must interrupt you. The Führer said, “We will have to
fetch him,” but I was not fetched and that is not said in the _Blue
Book_ either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says:
“During our conversation Göring described how he had been
summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson’s departure, how
Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that
had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of
them were with the result. In this connection Hitler had turned
to Ribbentrop and said mockingly, ‘Do you still believe that
Dahlerus is a British agent?’ Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied
that perhaps it was not the case.”
You say that is not true, either?
GÖRING: Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been
present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived
after Henderson had already left. The description is a little colorful.
Ribbentrop had no idea what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and
the Führer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely
knew that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was of course, opposed
to him, because he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels
being used.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly the point, you know, that I put
to you about 7 minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did know you were using
Dahlerus, with which you disagreed. You now agree that he knew you were
using Dahlerus, so I will leave it.
GÖRING: No, I beg your pardon. I still say—please do not distort my
words—that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus
about, and that he had not even heard of it through the Führer.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said “distort my words.” I especially did
not say to you that he knew what you were negotiating about. I said to
you that he knew you were using Dahlerus, and that, you agree, is right.
I limited it to that, didn’t I? And that is right, isn’t it?
GÖRING: He did not know either that I was carrying on negotiations with
England through Dahlerus at that time. He did not know about the flights
either.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to help me on one or
two other matters.
You remember that in January of 1937, and in October of 1937, the German
Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviolability and
neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that?
GÖRING: I do not remember it in detail, but it has been mentioned here
in Court.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that on the 25th of August
1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and
Great Britain—oh no, that France would declare war during the case of
Fall Grün, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that?
It is Document Number 375-PS, Exhibit Number USA-84. I want you to have
it generally in mind because I am going to put a passage to you.
GÖRING: May I ask whether the signature is Wolter? W-o-l-t-e-r?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall let you know. Yes, that is right.
GÖRING: In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given
to me here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right. I only want to recall your
recollection to one sentence:
“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it
is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to
the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
carried out, and how long it would take.”
Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you
remember it?
GÖRING: That is absolutely correct. That was the principal work of a
captain of the General Staff, 5th Department, who, naturally, when
making his report, must propound the best arguments.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you
remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a
number of states, and this applied to Holland and Belgium? I think that
was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstag and mentioned a
number of small states as well as that; but he said it included Holland
and Belgium.
GÖRING: Yes. It has, of course been mentioned repeatedly here.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, do you remember that on the 23rd of
May, in the document that I have already put to you, at the meeting at
the Reich Chancellery, Hitler said this: “The Dutch and Belgian air
bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must
be ignored.”
Do you remember his saying that?
GÖRING: It says so in the document, yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, on the 22d of August 1939, in the speech to
the commanders-in-chief, which is Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-29, he said:
“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well
as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.”
Do you remember his saying that?
GÖRING: You can see for yourself from those words how often the Führer
changed his ideas, so that even the plan he had in May was not at all
final.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are perfectly consistent in my estimation.
He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality
must be ignored, and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and
France will not violate the neutrality, so it is perfectly easy for
Germany to do it.
GÖRING: No, what he means to say is that we on our part would not find
it necessary to do so either. I merely want to point out that political
situations always turn out to be different, and that at these
interrogations and this Trial we must regard the political background of
the world as a whole.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was on the 22d. You have agreed as to what
was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, 4 days later, Hitler gave
another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave
another assurance?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the 6th of October, 1939, he gave a
further assurance, and on the 7th of October, the day after that last
assurance, the order, which is Document Number 2329-PS, Exhibit GB-105,
was issued.
“Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special
orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if
the political situation so demands.”
And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler:
“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried
out as soon and as forcibly as possible.”
Isn’t it quite clear from that, that all along you knew, as Hitler
stated on the 22d of August, that England and France would not violate
the neutrality of the low countries, and you were prepared to violate
them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn’t
that quite clear?
GÖRING: Not entirely. Only if the political situation made it necessary.
And in the meantime the British air penetration of the neutrality of
Holland and Belgium had taken place, up to October.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say not entirely. That is as near agreement
with me as you are probably prepared to go.
Now I want to ask you quite shortly again about Yugoslavia. You remember
that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the
war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with
the Yugoslav people, and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am
putting it quite shortly.
GÖRING: That is correct.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was emphasized, if you will remember,
on the first of June 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince
Paul.
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, 80 days after that, on the 12th of August
1939, the Defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler, and Ciano had a meeting, and
just let me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count
Ciano.
“Generally speaking . . .”
GÖRING: I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, it was my fault—Document Number
TC-77, Exhibit Number GB-48. It is the memorandum of a conversation
between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of
August.
GÖRING: I merely wanted to know if this was from Ciano’s diary? That is
important for me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh no, not from Ciano’s diary, it is a
memorandum. This is the official report.
“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for
uncertain neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This
process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion
one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing
with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as
a neutral of this kind.”
That was rather inconsistent with your statement as to the good
intentions towards Yugoslavia, and the Führer’s statement to Prince
Paul, wasn’t it?
GÖRING: I should like to read that through carefully once more and see
in what connection that statement was made. As it is presented now it
certainly would not fit in with that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know I do not want to stop you unnecessarily
in any way, but that document has been read at least twice during the
Trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will
agree, unless I have wrenched it out of its context—and I hope I have
not—that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not?
GÖRING: As I said, it does not fit in with that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, it was 56 days after that, on the 6th of
October, Hitler gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said:
“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would
also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in
peace and friendship with her.”
And then again in March 1941, on the entry of the Tripartite Pact, the
German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all
times.
Now, after that of course, as I have always said when you dealt with
this, there was the Simovic Putsch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said
quite frankly in your evidence, that Hitler and yourself never took the
trouble, or thought of taking the trouble, of inquiring whether the
Simovic Government would preserve its neutrality or not. That is right,
is it not?
GÖRING: I did not say that. We were convinced that they were using these
declarations to mislead. We knew that this Putsch was first of all
directed from Moscow, and, as we learned later, that it had been
financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we
recognized the hostile intentions as shown by the mobilization of the
Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear, and we did not want to
be deceived by the Simovic declarations.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like to say one word about the
mobilization in a moment. But on the 27th of March, that was 2 days
after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a
conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which
you were present, and do you remember the Führer saying:
“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations to
destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted
anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will
start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready.
Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
military destruction is effected in a lightning-like
undertaking. The plan is on the assumption that we speed up
schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that
the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest
possible time.”
It was not a very friendly intention toward Yugoslavia to have no
diplomatic negotiations, not give them the chance of assurance or coming
to terms with you, and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it?
GÖRING: I have just said that after the Simovic Putsch the situation was
completely clear to us, and declarations of neutrality on the part of
Yugoslavia could be regarded as only camouflage and deception in order
to gain time. After the Putsch, Yugoslavia definitely formed part of the
enemy front, and it was therefore for us also to carry out deceptive
moves and attack as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time
were relatively weak.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You realized, of course, that you said that
General Simovic was inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that
point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was 3 months
before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you?
GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. It was precisely the Simovic Putsch which
removed the Führer’s last doubts that Russia’s attitude towards Germany
had become hostile. This Putsch was the very reason which caused him to
decide to take quickest possible counter measures against this danger.
Secondly . . .
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in
the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was
postponed for 6 weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is
quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn’t it?
GÖRING: No. If you will read again my statement on that point, you will
see I said that a number of moves on the part of Russia caused the
Führer to order preparations for invasion, but that he still withheld
the final decision on invasion, and that after the Simovic Putsch this
decision was made. From the strategic situation it follows that the
military execution of this political decision was delayed by the
Yugoslavian campaign.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you one other point about
Yugoslavia.
You remember your evidence that the attack on Belgrade was due to the
fact that the war office and a number of other important military
organizations were located there. I am trying to summarize it, but that
was the effect of your evidence, was it not?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember how it was put in Hitler’s
order which I have just been reading to you:
“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible
with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground
installations . . .”
Now, I ask you to note the next word “and”:
“. . . and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by
waves. Besides the Air Force has to support the Army.”
I put it to you that that order makes it clear that the attack on
Belgrade was just another of your exhibitions of terror attacks in order
to attempt to subdue a population that would have difficulty in
resisting them.
GÖRING: No, that is not correct. The population of Belgrade did defend
itself. Belgrade was far more a center of military installations than
the capital of any other country; and I would like to draw your
attention to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am going to pass from that matter
to one or two points on which you gave evidence—I think at the instance
of counsel for the organizations. You remember you gave evidence in
answer to Dr. Babel about the Waffen-SS? Do you remember that—a few
days ago?
GÖRING: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at a document
which has not got a number, but it is the Führer’s ideas about the
Waffen-SS, and to see if you agree. It is Document Number D-665, and it
will be Exhibit Number GB-280. It is a document from the High Command of
the Army, General Staff of the Army—statements of the Führer regarding
the future state military police—and the covering letter of the
document says, “After the Führer’s proposals for the Waffen-SS had been
passed on, doubts arose as to whether it was intended that they should
be given wider distribution.” If you will pass to the documents, perhaps
you will follow it while I read it. I do not think it has been
introduced before:
“On 6 August 1940 when the order for the organization of the
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”—Adolf Hitler Bodyguard—“was
issued, the Führer stated the principles regarding the necessity
for the Waffen-SS as summed up below:
“The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include
within its frontiers only those national groups which from the
very beginning will be well disposed towards the Reich. It is
therefore necessary to maintain outside the Reich proper a state
military police capable in any situation of representing and
imposing the authority of the Reich.
“This task can be carried out only by a state police composed of
men of best German blood and wholeheartedly pledged to the
ideology on which the Greater German Reich is founded. Only such
a formation will resist subversive influences, even in critical
times. Such a formation, proud of its purity, will never
fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which
undermines the fundamental idea. In our future Greater German
Reich, a police corps will have the necessary authority over the
other members of the community only if it is trained along
military lines. Our people are so military-minded as a result of
glorious achievements in war and training by the National
Socialist Party that a ‘sock-knitting’ police, as in 1848, or a
bureaucratic police, as in 1918, would no longer have any
authority.
“It is therefore necessary that this state police proves its
worth and sacrifices its blood at the front, in close
formations, in the same way as every unit of the armed forces.
Having returned home, after having proved themselves in the
field in the ranks of the Army, the units of the Waffen-SS will
possess the authority to execute their tasks as state police.
“This employment of the Waffen-SS for internal purposes is just
as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never
again allow the conscripted German Wehrmacht to be used against
its fellow countrymen, weapon in hand, in critical situations at
home. Such action is the beginning of the end. A state which has
to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its
armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby gives
itself up.
“There are deplorable examples of this in our history. In future
the Wehrmacht is to be used solely against the foreign enemies
of the Reich.
“In order to ensure that the men in the units of the Waffen-SS
are always of high quality, the recruitment into the units must
be limited. The Führer’s idea of this limitation is that the
units of the Waffen-SS should generally not exceed 5 to 10
percent of the peacetime strength of the Army.”
Do you agree with that? Is that a correct description of the purpose of
the Waffen-SS?
GÖRING: I am absolutely convinced that he did say that, but that does
not contradict my statement.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you, while we are on the SS, to
look at a note which is Document D-729 and will be Exhibit Number
GB-281. It is on the conversation between you and the Duce in the
Palazzo Venezia on 23 October 1942. At that time you were still in good
odor with the Führer and still retained your power; is that right?