of, federal Chancellors of Exchequer, 134; preference of Committee of,
for indirect taxation, 134; Committee of, in House of Commons, 139-144;
weight of votes of Committee of, in Commons, 142; House Committee of,
formerly controlled appropriations, 161; character of Committee of, 170;
policy of Committee of, compared with policy of English Chancellor of
Exchequer, 171-175; reports of, deferred to reports of Committee on
Appropriations, 174, 183, 184.
"Ways and Means Bills," 143, 144.
Webster, Daniel, 89, 204, 218, 252, 259.
William the Silent, 207, 208.
William III., 313, 314.
Windham, Wm., 207, 208.
Year, British financial, 140; federal financial, 148.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] These are Mr. Bagehot's words with reference to the British
constitutional system. See his _English Constitution_ (last American
edition), p. 69.
[2] _Works_, vol. vi., p. 467: "Letter to Jno. Taylor." The words and
sentences omitted in the quotation contain Mr. Adams's opinions as to
the value of the several balances, some of which he thinks of doubtful
utility, and others of which he, without hesitation, pronounces
altogether pernicious.
[3] _Federalist_, No. 17.
[4] Cooley's _Principles of Const. Law_, p. 143.
[5] McMaster, _Hist. of the People of the U. S._, vol. i., p. 564.
[6] Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_ (Am. Statesmen Series), p. 85.
[7] Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_, p. 105.
[8] Its final and most masterly exposition, by C. J. Marshall, may be
seen in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316.
[9] The following passage from William Maclay's _Sketches of Debate in
the First Senate of the United States_ (pp. 292-3) illustrates how
clearly the results of this were forecast by sagacious men from the
first: "The system laid down by these gentlemen (the Federalists) was as
follows, or rather the development of the designs of a certain party:
The general power to carry the Constitution into effect by a
constructive interpretation would extend to every case that Congress may
deem necessary or expedient.... The laws of the United States will be
held paramount to all "state" laws, claims, and even constitutions. The
supreme power is with the general government to decide in this, as in
everything else, for the States have neglected to secure any umpire or
mode of decision in case of difference between them. Nor is there any
point in the Constitution for them to rally under. They may give an
opinion, but the opinions of the general government must prevail.... Any
direct and open act would be termed usurpation. But whether the gradual
influence and encroachments of the general government may not gradually
swallow up the state governments, is another matter."
[10] Pensacola Tel. Co. _v_. West. Union, 96 U. S. 1, 9. (Quoted by
Judge Cooley in his _Principles of Constitutional Law_.)
[11] 18 Stat., part 3, 336. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339.
[12] Sect. 5515 Rev. Stats. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371. Equally
extensive of federal powers is that "legal tender" decision (Juilliard
_v_. Greenman) of March, 1884, which argues the existence of a right to
issue an irredeemable paper currency from the Constitution's grant of
other rights characteristic of sovereignty, and from the possession of a
similar right by other governments. But this involves no restriction of
state powers; and perhaps there ought to be offset against it that other
decision (several cases, October, 1883), which denies constitutional
sanction to the Civil Rights Act.
[13] _Principles of Constitutional Law_, pp. 143, 144.
[14] Marbury _v_. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.
[15] Cooley's _Principles_, p. 157.
[16] For an incisive account of the whole affair, see an article
Entitled "The Session," _No. Am. Review_, vol. cxi., pp. 48, 49.
[17] 7 Wall. 506.
[18] For a brilliant account of the senatorial history of these two
treaties, see the article entitled "The Session," _No. Am. Rev._, vol.
cviii. (1869), p. 626 _et seq._
[19] In an article entitled "The Conduct of Business in Congress"
(_North American Review_, vol. cxxviii. p. 113), to which I am indebted
for many details of the sketch in the text.
[20] No Committee is entitled, when called, to occupy more than the
morning hours of two successive days with the measures which it has
prepared; though if its second morning hour expire while the House is
actually considering one of its bills, that single measure may hold over
from morning hour to morning hour until it is disposed of.
[21] Quoted from an exceedingly life-like and picturesque description of
the House which appeared in the New York _Nation_ for April 4, 1878.
[22] _No. Am. Rev._, vol. xxvi., p. 162.
[23] _Id._, the same article.
[24] "Glances at Congress," _Dem. Rev._, March, 1839.
[25] _Autobiography_, pp. 264, 265.
[26] _The National Budget, etc._ (English Citizen Series), p. 146. In
what I have to say of the English system, I follow this volume, pp.
146-149, and another volume of the same admirable series, entitled
_Central Government_, pp. 36-47, most of my quotations being from the
latter.
[27] See an article entitled "National Appropriations and
Misappropriations," by the late President Garfield, _North American
Review_, vol cxxviii. pp 578 _et seq._
[28] Senator Hoar's article, already several times quoted.
[29] Adams's _John Randolph_. American Statesman Series, pp. 210, 211.
[30] On one occasion "the House passed thirty-seven pension bills at one
sitting. The Senate, on its part, by unanimous consent, took up and
passed in about ten minutes seven bills providing for public buildings
in different States, appropriating an aggregate of $1,200,000 in this
short time. A recent House feat was one in which a bill, allowing 1,300
war claims in a lump, was passed. It contained one hundred and nineteen
pages full of little claims, amounting in all to $291,000; and a member,
in deprecating criticism on this disposition of them, said that the
Committee had received ten huge bags full of such claims, which had been
adjudicated by the Treasury officials, and it was a physical
impossibility to examine them."--N. Y. _Sun_, 1881.
[31] Congress, though constantly erecting new Committees, never gives up
old ones, no matter how useless they may have become by subtraction of
duties. Thus there is not only the superseded Committee on Public
Expenditures but the Committee on Manufactures also, which, when a part
of the one-time Committee on Commerce and Manufactures, had plenty to
do, but which, since the creation of a distinct Committee on Commerce,
has had nothing to do, having now, together with the Committees on
Agriculture and Indian Affairs, no duties assigned to it by the rules.
It remains to be seen whether the Committee on Commerce will suffer a
like eclipse because of the gift of its principal duties to the new
Committee on Rivers and Harbors.
[32] See the report of this Committee, which was under the chairmanship
of Senator Windom.
An illustration of what the House Committees find by special effort may
be seen in the revelations of the investigation of the expenses of the
notorious "Star Route Trials" made by the Forty-eighth Congress's
Committee on Expenditures in the department of Justice.
[33] See General Garfield's article, already once quoted, _North
American Review_, vol. cxxviii. p. 533.
[34] _Essays on Parliamentary Reform._
[35] Green's _History of the English People_, vol. iv., pp. 202, 203.
[36] "G. B." in N. Y. _Nation_, Nov. 30, 1882.
[37] An attempt was once made to bring the previous question into the
practices of the Senate, but it failed of success, and so that
imperative form of cutting off all further discussion has fortunately
never found a place there.
[38] As regards all financial measures indeed committee supervision is
specially thorough in the Senate. "All amendments to general
appropriation bills reported from the Committees of the Senate,
proposing new items of appropriation, shall, one day before they are
offered, be referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and all general
appropriation bills shall be referred to said Committee; and in like
manner amendments to bills making appropriations for rivers and harbors
shall be again referred to the Committee to which such bills shall be
referred."--Senate Rule 30.
[39] The twenty-nine Standing Committees of the Senate are, however,
chosen by ballot, not appointed by the Vice-President, who is an
appendage, not a member, of the Senate.
[40] In the Birmingham Town Hall, November 3, 1882. I quote from the
report of the _London Times_.
[41] "No Senator shall speak more than twice, in any one debate, on the
same day, without leave of the Senate."--Senate Rule 4.
[42] These quotations from Bagehot are taken from various parts of the
fifth chapter of his _English Constitution_.
[43] These are the words of Lord Rosebery--testimony from the oldest and
most celebrated second chamber that exists.
[44] There seems to have been at one time a tendency towards a better
practice. In 1813 the Senate sought to revive the early custom, in
accordance with which the President delivered his messages in person, by
requesting the attendance of the President to consult upon foreign
affairs; but Mr. Madison declined.
[45] _North American Review_, vol. 108, p. 625.
[46] _English Constitution_, chap, viii., p. 293.
[47] _Atlantic Monthly_, vol. xxv., p. 148.
[48] Something like this has been actually proposed by Mr. Albert
Stickney, in his interesting and incisive essay, _A True Republic_.
[49] State, Treasury, War, Navy.
[50] As quoted in _Macmillan's Magazine_, vol. vii., p. 67.
[51] I quote from an excellent handbook, _The United States Government_,
by Lamphere.
[52] "In America the President cannot prevent any law from being passed,
nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it His sincere and zealous
cooperation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable, in the
carrying on of public affairs. All his important acts are directly or
indirectly submitted to the legislature, and of his own free authority
he can do but little. It is, therefore, his weakness, and not his power,
which enables him to remain in opposition to Congress. In Europe,
harmony must reign between the Crown and the other branches of the
legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in
America, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is
impossible."--De Tocqueville, i. p. 124.
[53] _Westminster Review_, vol. lxvi., p. 193.
[54] Tenure of Office Act, already discussed.
[55] These "ifs" are abundantly supported by the executive acts of the
war-time. The Constitution had then to stand aside that President
Lincoln might be as prompt as the seeming necessities of the time.
[56] _Central Government_ (Eng. Citizen Series), II. D. Traill, p. 20.
[57] Professor Sumner's _Andrew Jackson_ (American Statesmen Series), p.
226. "Finally," adds Prof. S., "the methods and machinery of democratic
republican self-government--caucuses, primaries, committees, and
conventions--lend themselves perhaps more easily than any other methods
and machinery to the uses of selfish cliques which seek political
influence for interested purposes."
[58] Bagehot: _Essay on Sir Robert Peel_, p. 24.
[59] H. C. Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_ (Am. Statesmen Series), pp. 60,
61.
[60] Bagehot, _Eng. Const._, p. 293.
[61] Bagehot, _Eng. Const._, p. 296.
[62] Green: _Hist. of the English People_ (Harpers' ed.), iv., pp 58,
59.
[63] _Statesman's Manual_, i. p. 244.
[64] Mr. Dale, of Birmingham.
End of Project Gutenberg's Congressional Government, by Woodrow Wilson