It is this constant possibility of party diversity between the Executive

and Congress which so much complicates our system of party government.

The history of administrations is not necessarily the history of

parties. Presidential elections may turn the scale of party ascendency

one way, and the intermediate congressional elections may quite reverse

the balance. A strong party administration, by which the energy of the

State is concentrated in the hands of a single well-recognized political

organization, which is by reason of its power saddled with all

responsibility, may sometimes be possible, but it must often be

impossible. We are thus shut out in part from real party government such

as we desire, and such as it is unquestionably desirable to set up in

every system like ours. Party government can exist only when the

absolute control of administration, the appointment of its officers as

well as the direction of its means and policy, is given immediately

into the hands of that branch of the government whose power is

paramount, the representative body. Roger Sherman, whose perception was

amongst the keenest and whose sagacity was amongst the surest in the

great Convention of 1787, was very bold and outspoken in declaring this

fact and in proposing to give it candid recognition. Perceiving very

clearly the omnipotence which must inevitably belong to a national

Congress such as the convention was about to create, he avowed that "he

considered the executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution

for carrying the will of the legislature into effect; that the person or

persons [who should constitute the executive] ought to be appointed by,

and accountable to, the legislature only, which was the depository of

the supreme will of the society." Indeed, the executive was in his view

so entirely the servant of the legislative will that he saw good reason

to think that the legislature should judge of the number of persons of

which the executive should be composed; and there seem to have been

others in the convention who went along with him in substantial

agreement as to these matters. It would seem to have been only a desire

for the creation of as many as possible of those balances of power which

now decorate the "literary theory" of the Constitution which they made

that prevented a universal acquiescence in these views.

The anomaly which has resulted is seen most clearly in the party

relations of the President and his Cabinet. The President is a

partisan,--is elected because he is a partisan,--and yet he not

infrequently negatives the legislation passed by the party whom he

represents; and it may be said to be nowadays a very rare thing to find

a Cabinet made up of truly representative party men. They are the men of

his party whom the President likes, but not necessarily or always the

men whom that party relishes. So low, indeed, has the reputation of some

of our later Cabinets fallen, even in the eyes of men of their own

political connection, that writers in the best of our public prints feel

at full liberty to speak of their members with open contempt. "When

Mr.---- was made Secretary of the Navy," laughs the New York "Nation,"

"no one doubted that he would treat the Department as 'spoils,' and

consequently nobody has been disappointed. He is one of the statesmen

who can hardly conceive of a branch of the public Administration having

no spoils in it." And that this separation of the Cabinet from real

party influence, and from the party leadership which would seem properly

to belong to its official station, is a natural result of our

constitutional scheme is made patent in the fact that the Cabinet has

advanced in party insignificance as the system has grown older. The

connection between the early Cabinets and the early Congresses was very

like the relations between leaders and their party. Both Hamilton and

Gallatin led rather than obeyed the Houses; and it was many years before

the suggestions of heads of departments ceased to be sure of respectful

and acquiescent consideration from the legislative Committees. But as

the Committees gained facility and power the leadership of the Cabinet

lost ground. Congress took command of the government so soon as ever it

got command of itself, and no Secretary of to-day can claim by virtue of

his office recognition as a party authority. Congress looks upon advice

offered to it by anybody but its own members as gratuitous impertinence.

At the same time it is quite evident that the means which Congress has

of controlling the departments and of exercising the searching oversight

at which it aims are limited and defective. Its intercourse with the

President is restricted to the executive messages, and its intercourse

with the departments has no easier channels than private consultations

between executive officials and the Committees, informal interviews of

the ministers with individual members of Congress, and the written

correspondence which the cabinet officers from time to time address to

the presiding officers of the two Houses, at stated intervals, or in

response to formal resolutions of inquiry. Congress stands almost

helplessly outside of the departments. Even the special, irksome,

ungracious investigations which it from time to time institutes in its

spasmodic endeavors to dispel or confirm suspicions of malfeasance or of

wanton corruption do not afford it more than a glimpse of the inside of

a small province of federal administration. Hostile or designing

officials can always hold it at arm's length by dexterous evasions and

concealments. It can violently disturb, but it cannot often fathom, the

waters of the sea in which the bigger fish of the civil service swim and

feed. Its dragnet stirs without cleansing the bottom. Unless it have at

the head of the departments capable, fearless men, altogether in its

confidence and entirely in sympathy with its designs, it is clearly

helpless to do more than affright those officials whose consciences are

their accusers.

And it is easy to see how the commands as well as the questions of

Congress may be evaded, if not directly disobeyed, by the executive

agents. Its Committees may command, but they cannot superintend the

execution of their commands. The Secretaries, though not free enough to

have any independent policy of their own, are free enough to be very

poor, because very unmanageable, servants. Once installed, their hold

upon their offices does not depend upon the will of Congress. If they

please the President, and keep upon living terms with their colleagues,

they need not seriously regard the displeasure of the Houses, unless,

indeed, by actual crime, they rashly put themselves in the way of its

judicial wrath. If their folly be not too overt and extravagant, their

authority may continue theirs till the earth has four times made her

annual journey round the sun. They may make daily blunders in

administration and repeated mistakes in business, may thwart the plans

of Congress in a hundred small, vexatious ways, and yet all the while

snap their fingers at its dissatisfaction or displeasure. They are

denied the gratification of possessing real power, but they have the

satisfaction of being secure in a petty independence which gives them a

chance to be tricky and scheming. There are ways and ways of obeying;

and if Congress be not pleased, why need they care? Congress did not

give them their places, and cannot easily take them away.

Still it remains true that all the big affairs of the departments are

conducted in obedience to the direction of the Standing Committees. The

President nominates, and with legislative approval appoints, to the more

important offices of the government, and the members of the Cabinet

have the privilege of advising him as to matters in most of which he has

no power of final action without the concurrence of the Senate; but the

gist of all policy is decided by legislative, not by executive, will. It

can be no great satisfaction to any man to possess the barren privilege

of suggesting the best means of managing the every-day routine business

of the several bureaux so long as the larger plans which that business

is meant to advance are made for him by others who are set over him. If

one is commanded to go to this place or to that place, and must go, will

he, nill he, it can be but small solace to him that he is left free to

determine whether he will ride or walk in going the journey. The only

serious questions are whether or not this so great and real control

exerted by Congress can be exercised efficiently and with sufficient

responsibility to those whom Congress represents, and whether good

government is promoted by the arrangement.

No one, I take it for granted, is disposed to disallow the principle

that the representatives of the people are the proper ultimate authority

in all matters of government, and that administration is merely the

clerical part of government. Legislation is the originating force. It

determines what shall be done; and the President, if he cannot or will

not stay legislation by the use of his extraordinary power as a branch

of the legislature, is plainly bound in duty to render unquestioning

obedience to Congress. And if it be his duty to obey, still more is

obedience the bounden duty of his subordinates. The power of making laws

is in its very nature and essence the power of directing, and that power

is given to Congress. The principle is without drawback, and is

inseparably of a piece with all Anglo-Saxon usage; the difficulty, if

there be any, must lie in the choice of means whereby to energize the

principle. The natural means would seem to be the right on the part of

the representative body to have all the executive servants of its will

under its close and constant supervision, and to hold them to a strict

accountability: in other words, to have the privilege of dismissing them

whenever their service became unsatisfactory. This is the

matter-of-course privilege of every other master; and if Congress does

not possess it, its mastery is hampered without being denied. The

executive officials are its servants all the same; the only difference

is that if they prove negligent, or incapable, or deceitful servants

Congress must rest content with the best that can be got out of them

until its chief administrative agent, the President, chooses to appoint

better. It cannot make them docile, though it may compel them to be

obedient in all greater matters. In authority of rule Congress is made

master, but in means of rule it is made mere magistrate. It commands

with absolute lordship, but it can discipline for disobedience only by

slow and formal judicial process.

Upon Machiavelli's declaration that "nothing is more important to the

stability of the state than that facility should be given by its

constitution for the accusation of those who are supposed to have

committed any public wrong," a writer in the "Westminster Review" makes

this thoughtful comment: "The benefit of such a provision is twofold.

First, the salutary fear of the probable coming of a day of account will

restrain the evil practices of some bad men and self-seekers; secondly,

the legal outlet of accusation gives vent to peccant humors in the body

politic, which, if checked and driven inward, would work to the utter

ruin of the constitution; ... the distinction is lost between accusation

and calumny."[53] And of course it was these benefits which our federal

Constitution was meant to secure by means of its machinery of

impeachment. No servant of the state, not even the President himself,

was to be beyond the reach of accusation by the House of Representatives

and of trial by the Senate. But the processes of impeachment, like

those of amendment, are ponderous and difficult to handle. It requires

something like passion to set them a-going; and nothing short of the

grossest offenses against the plain law of the land will suffice to give

them speed and effectiveness. Indignation so great as to overcrow party

interest may secure a conviction; nothing less can. Indeed, judging by

our past experiences, impeachment may be said to be little more than an

empty menace. The House of Representatives is a tardy grand jury, and

the Senate an uncertain court.

Besides, great crimes such as might speed even impeachment are not

ordinary things in the loosest public service. An open-eyed public

opinion can generally give them effective check. That which usually and

every day clogs and hampers good government is folly or incapacity on

the part of the ministers of state. Even more necessary, therefore, than

a power clothed with authority to accuse, try, and punish for public

crime is some ultimate authority, whose privilege it shall be to dismiss

for inefficiency. Impeachment is aimed altogether above the head of

business management. A merchant would not think it fair, even if it were

lawful, to shoot a clerk who could not learn the business. Dismissal is

quite as effective for his purposes, and more merciful to the clerk. The

crying inconvenience of our system is, therefore, that the

constitutional authority whose prerogative it is to direct policy and

oversee administration has fewer facilities for getting its work well

done than has the humblest citizen for obtaining satisfactory aid in his

own undertakings. The authority most interested in appointments and

dismissals in the civil service has little to do with the one and less

to do with the other. The President appoints with the sanction of the

Senate, and cannot dismiss his advisers without legislative consent;[54]

yet the ministers in reality serve, not the President, but Congress, and

Congress can neither appoint nor dismiss. In other words, the President

must in both acts take the initiative, though he is not the real master;

and Congress, which is the real master, has in these vital matters only

a consultative voice, which it may utter, through its upper chamber,

only when its opinion is asked. I should regard my business as a

hopeless undertaking if my chief agent had to be appointed by a third

party, and, besides being himself put beyond my power of control, were

charged with the choice and discipline of all his subordinates, subject

not to my directions, but simply to my acquiescence!

The relations existing between Congress and the departments must be

fatally demoralizing to both. There is and can be between them nothing

like confidential and thorough cooperation. The departments may be

excused for that attitude of hostility which they sometimes assume

towards Congress, because it is quite human for the servant to fear and

deceive the master whom he does not regard as his friend, but suspects

of being a distrustful spy of his movements. Congress cannot control the

officers of the executive without disgracing them. Its only whip is

investigation, semi-judicial examination into corners suspected to be

dirty. It must draw the public eye by openly avowing a suspicion of

malfeasance, and must then magnify and intensify the scandal by setting

its Committees to cross-examining scared subordinates and sulky

ministers. And after all is over and the murder out, probably nothing is

done. The offenders, if any one has offended, often remain in office,

shamed before the world, and ruined in the estimation of all honest

people, but still drawing their salaries and comfortably waiting for the

short memory of the public mind to forget them. Why unearth the carcass

if you cannot remove it?

Then, too, the departments frequently complain of the incessant

exactions made upon them by Congress. They grumble that they are kept

busy in satisfying its curiosity and in meeting the demands of its

uneasy activity. The clerks have ordinarily as much as they can do in

keeping afoot the usual routine business of their departments; but

Congress is continually calling upon them for information which must be

laboriously collected from all sorts of sources, remote and accessible.

A great speech in the Senate may cost them hours of anxious toil: for

the Senator who makes it is quite likely beforehand to introduce a

resolution calling upon one of the Secretaries for full statistics with

reference to this, that, or the other topic upon which he desires to

speak. If it be finance, he must have comparative tables of taxation; if

it be commerce or the tariff, he cannot dispense with any of the

minutest figures of the Treasury accounts; whatever be his theme, he

cannot lay his foundations more surely than upon official information,

and the Senate is usually unhesitatingly ready with an easy assent to

the resolution which puts the whole clerical force of the administration

at his service. And of course the House too asks innumerable questions,

which patient clerks and protesting Secretaries must answer to the last

and most minute particular. This is what the departmental officials

testily call the tyranny of Congress, and no impartial third person can

reasonably forbid them the use of the word.

I know of few things harder to state clearly and within reasonable

compass than just how the nation keeps control of policy in spite of

these hide-and-seek vagaries of authority. Indeed, it is doubtful if it

does keep control through all the roundabout paths which legislative and

executive responsibility are permitted to take. It must follow Congress

somewhat blindly; Congress is known to obey without altogether

understanding its Committees: and the Committees must consign the

execution of their plans to officials who have opportunities not a few

to hoodwink them. At the end of these blind processes is it probable

that the ultimate authority, the people, is quite clear in its mind as

to what has been done or what may be done another time? Take, for

example, financial policy,--a very fair example, because, as I have

shown, the legislative stages of financial policy are more talked about

than any other congressional business, though for that reason an extreme

example. If, after appropriations and adjustments of taxation have been

tardily and in much tribulation of scheming and argument agreed upon by

the House, the imperative suggestions and stubborn insistence of the

Senate confuse matters till hardly the Conference Committees themselves

know clearly what the outcome of the disagreements has been; and if,

when these compromise measures are launched as laws, the method of their

execution is beyond the view of the Houses, in the semi-privacy of the

departments, how is the comprehension--not to speak of the will--of the

people to keep any sort of hold upon the course of affairs? There are no

screws of responsibility which they can turn upon the consciences or

upon the official thumbs of the congressional Committees principally

concerned. Congressional Committees are nothing to the nation: they are

only pieces of the interior mechanism of Congress. To Congress they

stand or fall. And, since Congress itself can scarcely be sure of having

its own way with them, the constituencies are manifestly unlikely to be

able to govern them. As for the departments, the people can hardly do

more in drilling them to unquestioning obedience and docile efficiency

than Congress can. Congress is, and must be, in these matters the

nation's eyes and voice. If it cannot see what goes wrong and cannot get

itself heeded when it commands, the nation likewise is both blind and

dumb.

This, plainly put, is the practical result of the piecing of authority,

the cutting of it up into small bits, which is contrived in our

constitutional system. Each branch of the government is fitted out with

a small section of responsibility, whose limited opportunities afford to

the conscience of each many easy escapes. Every suspected culprit may

shift the responsibility upon his fellows. Is Congress rated for

corrupt or imperfect or foolish legislation? It may urge that it has to

follow hastily its Committees or do nothing at all but talk; how can it

help it if a stupid Committee leads it unawares into unjust or fatuous

enterprises? Does administration blunder and run itself into all sorts

of straits? The Secretaries hasten to plead the unreasonable or unwise

commands of Congress, and Congress falls to blaming the Secretaries. The

Secretaries aver that the whole mischief might have been avoided if they

had only been allowed to suggest the proper measures; and the men who

framed the existing measures in their turn avow their despair of good

government so long as they must intrust all their plans to the bungling

incompetence of men who are appointed by and responsible to somebody

else. How is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the

whipping?

Moreover, it is impossible to deny that this division of authority and

concealment of responsibility are calculated to subject the government

to a very distressing paralysis in moments of emergency. There are few,

if any, important steps that can be taken by any one branch of the

government without the consent or cooperation of some other branch.

Congress must act through the President and his Cabinet; the President

and his Cabinet must wait upon the will of Congress. There is no one

supreme, ultimate head--whether magistrate or representative body--which

can decide at once and with conclusive authority what shall be done at

those times when some decision there must be, and that immediately. Of

course this lack is of a sort to be felt at all times, in seasons of

tranquil rounds of business as well as at moments of sharp crisis; but

in times of sudden exigency it might prove fatal,--fatal either in

breaking down the system or in failing to meet the emergency.[55] Policy

cannot be either prompt or straightforward when it must serve many

masters. It must either equivocate, or hesitate, or fail altogether. It

may set out with clear purpose from Congress, but get waylaid or maimed

by the Executive.

If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this: that in any

business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, _somebody must

be trusted_, in order that when things go wrong it may be quite plain

who should be punished. In order to drive trade at the speed and with

the success you desire, you must confide without suspicion in your chief

clerk, giving him the power to ruin you, because you thereby furnish

him with a motive for serving you. His reputation, his own honor or

disgrace, all his own commercial prospects, hang upon your success. And

human nature is much the same in government as in the dry-goods trade.

_Power and strict accountability for its use_ are the essential

constituents of good government. A sense of highest responsibility, a

dignifying and elevating sense of being trusted, together with a

consciousness of being in an official station so conspicuous that no

faithful discharge of duty can go unacknowledged and unrewarded, and no

breach of trust undiscovered and unpunished,--these are the influences,

the only influences, which foster practical, energetic, and trustworthy

statesmanship. The best rulers are always those to whom great power is

intrusted in such a manner as to make them feel that they will surely be

abundantly honored and recompensed for a just and patriotic use of it,

and to make them know that nothing can shield them from full retribution

for every abuse of it.

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