The Senate of the United States has been both extravagantly praised and

unreasonably disparaged, according to the predisposition and temper of

its various critics. In the eyes of some it has a stateliness of

character, an eminency of prerogative, and, for the most part, a wisdom

of practice such as no other deliberative body possesses; whilst in the

estimation of others it is now, whatever it may have been formerly, but

a somewhat select company of leisurely "bosses," in whose companionship

the few men of character and high purpose who gain admission to its

membership find little that is encouraging and nothing that is

congenial. Now of course neither of these extreme opinions so much as

resembles the uncolored truth, nor can that truth be obtained by a

judicious mixture of their milder ingredients. The truth is, in this

case as in so many others, something quite commonplace and practical.

The Senate is just what the mode of its election and the conditions of

public life in this country make it. Its members are chosen from the

ranks of active politicians, in accordance with a law of natural

selection to which the state legislatures are commonly obedient; and it

is probable that it contains, consequently, the best men that our system

calls into politics. If these best men are not good, it is because our

system of government fails to attract better men by its prizes, not

because the country affords or could afford no finer material.

It has been usual to suppose that the Senate was just what the

Constitution intended it to be; that because its place in the federal

system was exalted the aims and character of its members would naturally

be found to be exalted as well; that because its term was long its

foresight would be long also; or that because its election was not

directly of the people demagogy would find no life possible in its

halls. But the Senate is in fact, of course, nothing more than a part,

though a considerable part, of the public service, and if the general

conditions of that service be such as to starve statesmen and foster

demagogues, the Senate itself will be full of the latter kind, simply

because there are no others available. There cannot be a separate breed

of public men reared specially for the Senate. It must be recruited from

the lower branches of the representative system, of which it is only the

topmost part. No stream can be purer than its sources. The Senate can

have in it no better men than the best men of the House of

Representatives; and if the House of Representatives attract to itself

only inferior talent, the Senate must put up with the same sort. I think

it safe to say, therefore, that, though it may not be as good as could

be wished, the Senate is as good as it can be under the circumstances.

It contains the most perfect product of our politics, whatever that

product may be.

In order to understand and appreciate the Senate, therefore, one must

know the conditions of public life in this country. What are those

conditions? Well, in the first place, they are not what they were in the

early years of the federal government; they are not what they were even

twenty years ago; for in this, as in other things, the war between the

States ends one distinct period and opens another. Between the great

constructive statesmen of the revolutionary days and the reconstructing

politicians of the sixties there came into public place and legislative

influence a great race of constitutional lawyers. The questions which

faced our statesmen while the Constitution was a-making were in the

broadest sense questions of politics; but the questions which dominated

our public life after the federal government had been successfully set

up were questions of legal interpretation such as only lawyers could

grapple with. All matters of policy, all doubts of legislation, even all

difficulties of diplomacy, were measured by rules of constitutional

construction. There was hardly a single affair of public concern which

was not hung upon some peg of constitutional dogma in the testing-rooms

of one or another of the contending schools of constitutional

interpretation. Constitutional issues were ever the tides, questions of

administrative policy seldom more than the eddies, of politics.

The Republicans under Jefferson drew their nourishment from

constitutional belief no less than did the Federalists; the Whigs and

Democrats of a later day lived on what was essentially the same diet,

though it was served in slightly different forms; and the parties of

to-day are themselves fain to go to these cooks of the olden time

whenever they desire strong meat to fortify them against their present

debility. The great questions attending the admission of new States to

the Union and the annexation of foreign territory, as well as all the

controversies which came in the train of the contest over slavery and

the reserved powers of the States, were of the Constitution

constitutional; and what other questions were then living--save those

which found root in the great charter's implied powers, about which

there was such constant noise of debate? It will be remembered that very

few publicists opposed internal improvements, for instance, on the

ground that they were unwise or uncalled for. No one who took a

statesman-like view of the matter could fail to see that the opening up

of the great water-ways of the country, the construction of roads, the

cutting of canals, or any public work which might facilitate inter-State

commerce by making intercourse between the various portions of the Union

easy and rapid, was sanctioned by every consideration of wisdom, as

being in conformity with a policy at once national in its spirit and

universal in its benefits. The doubt was, not as to what it would be

best and most provident to do, but as to what it would be lawful to do;

and the chief opponents of schemes of internal improvement based their

dissent upon a careful meditation of the language of the Constitution.

Without its plain approval they would not move, even if they had to

stand still all their days.

It was, too, with many professions of this spirit that the tariff was

dealt with. It ran suddenly to the front as a militant party question

in 1833, not as if a great free-trade movement had been set afoot which

was to anticipate the mission of Cobden and Bright, but as an issue

between federal taxation and the constitutional privileges of the

States. The agricultural States were being, as they thought, very

cruelly trodden down under the iron heel of that protectionist policy to

whose enthronement they had themselves consented, and they fetched their

hope of escape from the Constitution. The federal government

unquestionably possessed, they admitted, and that by direct grant of the

fundamental law, the right to impose duties on imports; but did that

right carry with it the privilege of laying discriminating duties for

other purposes than that of raising legitimate revenue? Could the

Constitution have meant that South Carolina might be taxed to maintain

the manufactures of New England?

Close upon the heels of the great tariff controversy of that time came

the stupendous contest over the right of secession and the abolition of

slavery; and again in this contest, as in all that had gone before, the

party which was being hard driven sought refuge in the Constitution.

This too was, in its first stages at least, a lawyer's question. It

eventually slipped out of all lawyerly control, and was given over to be

settled by the stern and savage processes of war; but it stayed with

the constitutional lawyers as long as it could, and would have stayed

with them to the end had it not itself been bigger than the Constitution

and mixed with such interests and such passions as were beyond the

control of legislatures or of law courts.

Such samples of the character which political questions have hitherto

borne in this country are sufficient to remind all readers of our

history of what have been the chief features of our politics, and may

serve, without further elaboration, to illustrate the point I wish to

emphasize. It is manifest how such a course of politics would affect

statesmanship and political leadership. While questions affecting the

proper construction of the Constitution were the chief and most

imperative questions pressing for settlement, great lawyers were in

demand; and great lawyers were, accordingly, forthcoming in satisfaction

of the demand. In a land like ours, where litigation is facilitated by

the establishment of many open and impartial courts, great lawyers are a

much more plentiful product than great administrators, unless there be

also some extraordinary means for the encouragement of administrative

talents. We have, accordingly, always had plenty of excellent lawyers,

though we have often had to do without even tolerable administrators,

and seem destined to endure the inconvenience of hereafter doing

without any constructive statesmen at all. The constitutional issues of

former times were so big and so urgent that they brought great advocates

into the field, despite all the tendencies there were in our system

towards depriving leadership of all place of authority. In the presence

of questions affecting the very structure and powers of the federal

government, parties had to rally with definite purpose and espouse a

distinct creed; and when the maintenance or overthrow of slavery had

ceased to be a question of constitutional right, and had become a matter

of contention between sentiment and vested rights,--between interest and

passionate feeling,--there was of course a hot energy of contest between

two compact hosts and a quick elevation of forceful leaders.

The three stages of national growth which preceded the war between the

States were each of them creative of a distinct class of political

leaders. In the period of erection there were great architects and

master-builders; in the period of constitutional interpretation there

were, at a distance from the people, great political schoolmen who

pondered and expounded the letter of the law, and, nearer the people,

great constitutional advocates who cast the doctrines of the schoolmen

into policy; and in the period of abolitionist agitation there were

great masters of feeling and leaders of public purpose. The publicists

of the second period kept charge of the slavery question, as I have

said, as long as they could, and gave place with bitter reluctance to

the anti-slavery orators and pro-slavery champions who were to talk the

war-feeling into a flame. But it was of course inevitable that the new

movement should have new leaders. It was essentially revolutionary in

its tone and in its designs, and so quite out of the reach of those

principles of action which had governed the policy of the older school

of politicians. Its aim was to change, not to vindicate, the

Constitution. Its leaders spoke, not words of counsel, but words of

passion and of command. It was a crusade, not a campaign; the impetuous

movement of a cause, not the canvass of a mooted measure. And, like

every big, stirring cause, it had its leaders--leaders whose authority

rested upon the affections and sympathies of the people rather than upon

any attested wisdom or success of statesmanship. The war was the work,

mediately, of philanthropists; and the reconstructions which followed

the war were the hasty strokes of these same unbalanced knights of the

crusade, full of bold feeling, but not of steady or far-sighted

judgment.

The anti-slavery movement called forth leaders who, from the very nature

of their calling, were more picturesque than any who had figured on the

national stage since the notable play of the Revolution had gone off the

boards; but it was no better cast in leading parts than had been the

drama which immediately preceded it. When the constitution of a

self-governing people is being consciously moulded by the rapid

formation of precedent during the earliest periods of its existence,

there are sure to be antagonistic beliefs, distinct and strong and

active enough to take shape in the creeds of energetic parties, each led

by the greatest advocates of its cherished principles. The season of our

constitutional development, consequently, saw as fine a race of

statesmen at the front of national affairs as have ever directed the

civil policy of the country; and they, in turn, gave place to men brave

to encounter the struggles of changed times, and fit to solve the doubts

of a new set of events.

Since the war, however, we have come into a fourth period of national

life, and are perplexed at finding ourselves denied a new order of

statesmanship to suit the altered conditions of government. The period

of federal construction is long-passed; questions of constitutional

interpretation are no longer regarded as of pressing urgency, the war

has been fought, even the embers of its issues being now almost

extinguished; and we are left to that unexciting but none the less

capitally important business of every-day peaceful development and

judicious administration to whose execution every nation in its middle

age has to address itself with what sagacity, energy, and prudence it

can command. It cannot be said that these new duties have as yet raised

up any men eminently fit for their fulfillment. We have had no great

administrators since the opening of this newest stage, and there is as

yet no visible sign that any such will soon arise. The forms of

government in this country have always been unfavorable to the easy

elevation of talent to a station of paramount authority; and those forms

in their present crystallization are more unfavorable than ever to the

toleration of the leadership of the few, whilst the questions now most

prominent in politics are not of such a nature as to compel skilled and

trustworthy champions to come into the field, as did the constitutional

issues and revolutionary agitations of other days. They are matters of a

too quiet, business-like sort to enlist feeling or arouse enthusiasm.

It is, therefore, very unfortunate that only feeling or enthusiasm can

create recognized leadership in our politics. There is no office set

apart for the great party leader in our government. The powers of the

Speakership of the House of Representatives are too cramped and covert;

the privileges of the chairmanships of the chief Standing Committees

are too limited in scope; the presidency is too silent and inactive, too

little like a premiership and too much like a superintendency. If there

be any one man to whom a whole party or a great national majority looks

for guiding counsel, he must lead without office, as Daniel Webster did,

or in spite of his office, as Jefferson and Jackson did. There must be

something in the times or in the questions which are abroad to thrust

great advocates or great masters of purpose into a non-official

leadership, which is theirs because they represent in the greatest

actions of their lives some principle at once vital and widely loved or

hated, or because they possess in their unrivaled power of eloquent

speech the ability to give voice to some such living theme. There must

be a cause to be advanced which is greater than the trammels of

governmental forms, and which, by authority of its own imperative voice,

constitutes its advocates the leaders of the nation, though without

giving them official title--without need of official title. No one is

authorized to lead by reason of any official station known to our

system. We call our real leaders by no names but their own: Mr. Webster

was always Mr. Webster and never Prime Minister.

In a country which governs itself by means of a public meeting, a

Congress or a Parliament, a country whose political life is

representative, the only real leadership in governmental affairs must be

legislative leadership--ascendency in the public meeting which decides

everything. The leaders, if there be any, must be those who suggest the

opinions and rule the actions of the representative body. We have in

this country, therefore, no real leadership; because no man is allowed

to direct the course of Congress, and there is no way of governing the

country save through Congress, which is supreme. The chairman of a great

Committee like the Committee of Ways and Means stands, indeed, at the

sources of a very large and important stream of policy, and can turn

that stream at his pleasure, or mix what he will with its waters; but

there are whole provinces of policy in which he can have no authority at

all. He neither directs, nor can often influence, those other chairmen

who direct all the other important affairs of government. He, though the

greatest of chairmen, and as great, it may be, as any other one man in

the whole governmental system, is by no means at the head of the

government. He is, as he feels every day, only a big wheel where there

are many other wheels, some almost as big as he, and all driven, like

himself, by fires which he does not kindle or tend.

In a word, we have no supreme executive ministry, like the great

"Ministry of the Crown" over sea, in whose hands is the general

management of legislation; and we have, consequently, no great prizes of

leadership such as are calculated to stimulate men of strong talents to

great and conspicuous public services. The Committee system is, as I

have already pointed out, the very opposite of this. It makes all the

prizes of leadership small, and nowhere gathers power into a few hands.

It cannot be denied that this is in ordinary times, and in the absence

of stirring themes, a great drawback, inasmuch as it makes legislative

service unattractive to minds of the highest order, to whom the offer of

really great place and power at the head of the governing assembly, the

supreme council of the nation, would be of all things most attractive.

If the presidency were competitive,--if it could be won by distinguished

congressional service,--who can doubt that there would be a notable

influx of talents into Congress and a significant elevation of tone and

betterment of method in its proceedings; and yet the presidency is very

far from being equal to a first-rate premiership.

There is, I know, one distinctive feature of legislative leadership

which makes it seem to some not altogether to be desired; though it

scarcely constitutes such an objection as to make no leadership at all

seem preferable. It is the leadership of orators; it is the ascendency

of those who have a genius for talking. In the eyes of those who do not

like it, it seems a leadership of artful dialecticians, the success of

tricks of phrase, the victory of rushing declamation--government, not by

the advice of statesman-like counselors, but by the wagging of ready

tongues. Macaulay pointed out with his accustomed force of statement

just the fact which haunts those who hold to such objections. The power

of speaking, he said, which is so highly prized by politicians in a

popular government, "may exist in the highest degree without judgment,

without fortitude, without skill in reading the characters of men or the

signs of the times, without any knowledge, of the principles of

legislation or of political economy, and without any skill in diplomacy

or in the administration of war. Nay, it may well happen that those very

intellectual qualities which give peculiar charm to the speeches of a

public man may be incompatible with the qualities which would fit him to

meet a pressing emergency with promptitude and firmness. It was thus

with Charles Townshend. It was thus with Windham. It was a privilege to

listen to those accomplished and ingenious orators. But in a perilous

crisis they would be found inferior in all the qualities of rulers to

such a man as Oliver Cromwell, who talked nonsense, or as William the

Silent, who did not talk at all."

Nevertheless, it is to be observed that neither Windham nor Townshend

rose to places of highest confidence in the assembly which they served,

and which they charmed by their attractive powers of speech; and that

Cromwell would have been as unfit to rule anything but an autocratic

commonwealth as would have been William the Silent to be anything but a

Dutch governor. The people really had no voice in Cromwell's government.

It was absolute. He would have been as much out of place in a

representative government as a bull in a china shop. We would not have a

Bismarck if we could.

Every species of government has the defects of its own qualities.

Representative government is government by advocacy, by discussion, by

persuasion, and a great, miscellaneous voting population is often misled

by deceitful pleas and swayed by unwise counsels. But if one were to

make a somewhat freer choice of examples than Macaulay permitted

himself, it would be easy to multiply the instances of ruling orators of

our race who have added to their gifts of eloquence conspicuous sagacity

in the administration of affairs. At any rate, the men who have led

popular assemblies have often been, like Hampden, rarely endowed with

judgment, foresight, and steadfastness of purpose; like Walpole,

amazingly quick in "reading the characters of men and the signs of the

times;" like Chatham, masterful in ordering the conquests and the

policies of the world; like Burke, learned in the profoundest principles

of statecraft; like Canning, adroit in diplomacy; like Pitt, safe in

times of revolution; like Peel, sagacious in finance; or, like

Gladstone, skilled in every branch of political knowledge and equal to

any strain of emergency.

It is natural that orators should be the leaders of a self-governing

people. Men may be clever and engaging speakers, such as are to be

found, doubtless, at half the bars of the country, without being

equipped even tolerably for any of the high duties of the statesman; but

men can scarcely be orators without that force of character, that

readiness of resource, that clearness of vision, that grasp of

intellect, that courage of conviction, that earnestness of purpose, and

that instinct and capacity for leadership which are the eight horses

that draw the triumphal chariot of every leader and ruler of free men.

We could not object to being ruled again by such men as Henry and Otis

and Samuel Adams; but they were products of revolution. They were

inspired by the great causes of the time; and the government which they

set up has left us without any ordinary, peaceful means of bringing men

like them into public life. We should like to have more like them, but

the violent exercise of revolution is too big a price to pay for them.

Some less pungent diet is to be desired for the purpose of giving health

to our legislative service. There ought to be some quiet, effective

tonic, some mild stimulant, such as the certain prospect of winning

highest and most honorable office, to infuse the best talent of the

nation into our public life.

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