FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]

Whether All Things Are Subject to Fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For

Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven

and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them

by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born

into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of

offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from

the domain of fate.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is

something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the

Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says

(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a

disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are

changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above

(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things

subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of

second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is

subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is

done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,

neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification

of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says

(De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a

state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence

it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the

more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it

is bound up with second causes.

Reply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by

God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in

the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as

stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as

to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever

is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as

already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet

some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And

these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

_______________________

Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 710 / 722 题