Whether the More Universal Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?
Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in
our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its
own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.
But universals come first as regards their nature, because "that is
first which does not involve the existence of its correlative"
(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as
regards our intellect.
Obj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to
us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known
secondarily by us.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object
defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition.
But the more universal is part of the definition of the less
universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore
the universals are secondarily known by us.
Obj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But
universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known
by us.
_On the contrary,_ "We must proceed from the universal to the
singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1)
_I answer that,_ In our knowledge there are two things to be
considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises
from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and
individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for
its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before
our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our
intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of
actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to
actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium
between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect
act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the
object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete
act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly,
and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known
partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher
says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us
at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its
principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object
that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing
contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can
have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts
potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be
known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know
distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the
less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal";
whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as "rational" or
"irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our
intellect knows "animal" before it knows man; and the same reason
holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.
Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to
act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense
we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both
to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar
off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to
be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it
seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time,
for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes
this man from that, and therefore "children at first call men fathers,
and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The
reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is
in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as
he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards
"difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway
between potentiality and act.
We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and
individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal;
as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both
sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the
knowledge of the less common.
Reply Obj. 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First,
the universal nature may be considered together with the intention
of universality. And since the intention of universality--viz. the
relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual
abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary
consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal
animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to
Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal
considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter,
according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent
universals which he called ideas.
Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for
instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And
thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of
generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come
first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature;
as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the
animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the
intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is
naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect:
thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man
comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at
the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.
Reply Obj. 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less
common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that
in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less
universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not
only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less
common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more;
as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore
"animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man"
comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea.
Reply Obj. 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely
considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known
before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known.
Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know
the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we
know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are
known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined
would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are
known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to
distinguish all that belongs to human nature.
Reply Obj. 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of
universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so
far as the intention of universality results from the mode of
understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of
knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato
thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and
substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,
according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of
existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,
13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as
existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a
formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the
result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the
generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the
fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken
from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is
taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken
from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the
intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature
is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because
the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of
the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of
any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through
sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and
sometimes conversely.
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