Whether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
the intellect. For we read in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that "when we wish
to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers.
Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason.
Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from
intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.
Obj. 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from
others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; but that
intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that
which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is
called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man,
examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,
wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly
internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the
tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
false." But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.
_I answer that,_ This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call
angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that
such substances are always actually understanding. But in works
translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds."
Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from
power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized
even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four
intellects--namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the
intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the
active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all
things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of
these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which
is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;
sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is
called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act,
which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or
actual intellect.
Reply Obj. 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means
the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as
act against power.
Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the
intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also
says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence
alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things
without any investigation.
Reply Obj. 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one
power--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all
only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence."
Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something
else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when
it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention."
When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what
it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to
"phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge,"
as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained
something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the
means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of
"interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every
difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what
cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
(Q. 78, A. 4).
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