EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 8]

Whether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the

Body?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in

the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book _De Spiritu

et Anima_ that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself

sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and

irascibility."

Obj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties.

But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never

separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even

after death.

Obj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not

weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says

(De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he

would see even as well as a young man." But weakness is the road to

corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when

the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the

Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the

separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in

hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy

lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated

soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Obj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which

is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls

grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.

Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.

Obj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the

soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some

things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite

separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the

sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in

the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two

substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the

body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive

powers do not remain.

_I answer that,_ As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the

powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But

some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the

intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul,

after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected

in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive

parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the

subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not

remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their

principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even

after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they

say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul;

because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there

written can be despised with the same facility as it was said;

although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers,

not actually but virtually.

Reply Obj. 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in

the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of

the composite.

Reply Obj. 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body

becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the

virtual principle of these powers.

Reply Obj. 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the

same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the

mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.

Reply Obj. 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the

sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply Obj. 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not

as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said

there (Retrac. ii, 24).

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