Whether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially."
Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body
has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other
substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part
must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved
(Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything
that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there
must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.
Obj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to
primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some
beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial
form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most
imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
Obj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does
not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere
corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a
mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human
body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
_On the contrary,_ Of one thing there is but one substantial being.
But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one
thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the
substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be
in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
_I answer that,_ If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not
united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the
Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there
is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its
being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be
united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above
(A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the
intellectual soul to be found in man.
In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial
form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental
form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat
does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by
the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or
generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular
condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a
thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the
substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing
is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted
simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that
primary matter was some actual being--for instance, fire or air, or
something of that sort--maintained that nothing is generated simply,
or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an
alteration," as we read, _Phys._ i, 4. Therefore, if besides the
intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form
by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would
follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that
it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there
would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,
all of which is clearly false.
Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in
man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually
contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually
contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the
imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the
sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,
and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the
imperfect.
Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a
body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life
potentially"; and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul."
Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul
itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is
hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were
two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light.
In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc.,
because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life
potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the
second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality "does not
reject"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the
form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which
presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that
the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate
body is the part moved.
Reply Obj. 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as
existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is
always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the
first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form
which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the
most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.
Reply Obj. 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the
elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is
made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an
average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the
elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the
distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter
cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be
found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same
place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be
distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture
which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to
sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.
Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their
imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,
and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are
modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from
them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial
being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every
addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated
in _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for
any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less
impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.
Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener.
i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not
actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements
remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary
forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the
substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone,
or of any sort of soul.
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