Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the
Number of Bodies?
Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied
in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in
one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but
one intellect in all men.
Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also
removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the
number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number
of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the
distinction of rewards and punishments.
Obj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my
intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are
things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever
is received into anything must be received according to the condition
of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received
individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is
contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.
Obj. 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which
understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what
is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you;
and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be
only potentially something understood; so that the common intention
will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse
something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is
contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would
seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to
follow that there is one intellect in all men.
Obj. 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the
master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets
knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an
active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems,
therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master
is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is
one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the
disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies
to all men.
Obj. 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were
to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself."
But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect.
Therefore there is one intellect of all men.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the
relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of
particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul,
one in species, should belong to animals of different species.
Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul
should belong to several individuals.
_I answer that,_ It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to
belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the
intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are
one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by
something outside the essence of each. The distinction between
Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a
tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,
as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is
the principle of existence.
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but
several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two
hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the
contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we
might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if
there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many
drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and
one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when
the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one
stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or
coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all
the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey
the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two
men to have several intellects and one sense--for instance, if two
men had one eye--there would be several seers, but one sight. But if
there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things
of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it
possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one
understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is
the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the
intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent
and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
that is, of one intelligible object.
However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
from yours by the distinction of the phantasms--that is to say, were
there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you--if the
phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a
form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to
divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of
things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the
phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the
intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now
in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only
one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom
there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only
one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of
a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if
there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which
are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of
intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows,
therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to
maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no
matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain
matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the
division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is
quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.
Reply Obj. 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being;
consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge
of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue
of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the
dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.
In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the
multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies,
the souls retain their multiplied being.
Reply Obj. 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the
species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding
of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent
substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand
universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species
whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as
every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent
acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge
is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows.
Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by
reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.
Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is
material--that is, not abstracted from material conditions--its
likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the
distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of
individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing
in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from
the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the
nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied;
thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter,
as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many;
because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an
individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an
individual species.
Reply Obj. 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is
understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not
according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the
stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, _De
Anima_ iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the
likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on
itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but
only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things,
according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And
since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the
knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen
to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the
senses; for several see the same color, according to different
likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object
understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of
Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is
perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has
outside the soul--that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature
of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode
according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode
according to which it is understood. For the common nature is
understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such
is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the
opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the
same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed
that the natures of things exist separate from matter.
Reply Obj. 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the
master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. 117, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would
involve a plurality of species.
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