SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]

Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For

those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a

like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of

animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is

alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing

more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as

the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the

condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are

corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to

nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But

as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true,

not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is

concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had

not been," even as to our soul.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the

operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a

phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands

nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body

as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot

survive the dissolution of the body.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe

to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have

"an incorruptible substantial life."

_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellectual principle which

we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted

in two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any

substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the

generation or corruption of something else. For generation and

corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which

is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever

has existence _per se_ cannot be generated or corrupted except "per

se"; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and

material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation

or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3)

that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human

soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies

are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it

were corrupted _per se._ This, indeed, is impossible, not only as

regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that

is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by

virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a

form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires

actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so

far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form

to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a

subsistent form to cease to exist.

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some

pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is

incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is

contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and

into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no

matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no

contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to

the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are

without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not

themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge.

Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be

corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that

everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now,

in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The

senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of

"here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence

absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an

intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire

cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is

incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as

expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and

animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for

all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul.

For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body;

whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is

written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the living

soul" (Gen. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen. 2:7) that "He

breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last

chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: "(Before) the dust

return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to

God Who gave it." Again the process of life is alike as to the body,

concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): "All things breathe

alike," and (Wis. 2:2), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But

the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas

animals are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than

beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to

the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive

potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who

can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can

be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality

to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain

existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in

it a potentiality to non-existence.

Reply Obj. 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper

operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After

separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding,

similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear

later on (Q. 89, A. 1).

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 461 / 722 题