Whether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.
For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice
with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after
taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of
inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.
Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
Obj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.
But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such
indifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5),
their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally
intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their
appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Obj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them
according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels
the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the
free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will
in them.
_On the contrary,_ Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the
angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will
is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
_I answer that,_ Some things there are which act, not from any
previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others;
just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others
act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as
irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of
judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a
judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent
endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in
so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it
can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever
there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that
just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and
in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man.
As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in
this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so
need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the
angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by
the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected
by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of
imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should
naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his
nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he
can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of
this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the
perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is
inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore
it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not
determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue
imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher
angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the
intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of
compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less
degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor
increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or
through the addition of some qualification.
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