Whether There Is Will in the Angels?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For
as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), "The will is in the
reason." But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher
than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something
higher than the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is
evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the
appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of
something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no
imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it
seems that there is no will in them.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that
the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible
object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are
incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the
image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory,
understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the
soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable
of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.
_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In
evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow
from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by
appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to
good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and
inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural
appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some
knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they
apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the
sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this
apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again,
have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they
perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This
is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it
were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like
things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as
things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards
good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since
the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness,
it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in
which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to
the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular
objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be
one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite
belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular
good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason
differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by
simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from
one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to
know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.
Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the
part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in
the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher
than the will.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived
from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part
reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;
thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot
[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the
same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira];
though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as
hope, daring, and the rest.
Reply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as
to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there
is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the
angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated
in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
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