Whether an Angel Knows Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the
Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): "The sense has for its object
singulars, but the intellect, universals." Now, in the angels there is
no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident
from what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not
know singulars.
Obj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of
the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any
assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so
far as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2),
an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.
Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.
Obj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by
singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;
because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of
species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not
the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because
singular things are not known in the universal except potentially.
Therefore the angel does not know singulars.
_On the contrary,_ No one can guard what he does not know. But angels
guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: "He hath given His
angels charge over Thee." Consequently the angels know singulars.
_I answer that,_ Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of
singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,
which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,
according to Heb. 1:14: "They are all ministering spirits." Now, if
they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision
over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:
and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: "Say not before the
angel: There is no providence." Secondly, it is also contrary to the
teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to
be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to
their knowledge and will.
Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of
singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular
effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming
eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know
a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things
singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his
one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that
the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and
far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common
sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one
faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses,
and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the
difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in
other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of
nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his
powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,
namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it
ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be
unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; _Metaph._ text. 15).
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,
but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of
individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the
thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He
causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as
was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which
He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows
all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to
their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the
angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but
likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the
manifold representations of that one simple essence.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which
apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction
from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal.
Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of
the angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and
consequently there is no comparison.
Reply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels
are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by
agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears
resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way
there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and
form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever
is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the
angel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence,
are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to
their matter.
Reply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which
nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and
as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by
the same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3).
_______________________