THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their

natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His

incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds." Afterwards

he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all

knowledge."

Obj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel.

But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears

that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through a

glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." From this it appears

that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen

in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to

face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was

already shown (Q. 12, A. 4), an angel cannot have the former

knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror

belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God

from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii).

Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

_On the contrary,_ The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet

men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom.

1:19: "what is known of God is manifest in them." Therefore much more

so can the angels.

_I answer that,_ The angels can have some knowledge of God by their

own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a

thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence

in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said

that an angel knows himself--secondly, by the presence of its

similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye

from its image being in the eye--thirdly, when the image of the

object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from

something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man

in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He

is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue

to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above

(Q. 12, A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we

know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in

creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are

clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Hence,

too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby

according to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway

between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is

seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is

impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel

knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold

God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent

the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the

specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror

representing the Divine image.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of

comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not

known by any created intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely

remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he

see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on

that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as

God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God

has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has

of Him.

Reply Obj. 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway

between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more

to one of them, as was said above.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 361 / 722 题