FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]

Whether an Angel Knows Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For

Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.

Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.

Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would

not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single

is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge

which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Obj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:

because, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4 understanding is a kind of

passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears

in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel

knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth."

_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been previously said

(Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in

an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the

object or matter into which the action passes is something separate

from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and

the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the

action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as

the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that

sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a

faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the

form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat

is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of

the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object

exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then

there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may

be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be

actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the

species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding

change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the

nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as

knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the

action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something

else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the

less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something

else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be

any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since

an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he

is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself

by his form, which is his substance.

Reply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is

amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is

to say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the

old translation read--"and furthermore they do not know their own

powers." Although even the letter of the old translation might be

kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power

perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine

Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not

because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which

is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any

single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is

nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in

potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not

happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that

he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of

the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes

into some other matter.

_______________________

Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 359 / 722 题