THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]

Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than

the Lower Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand

by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,

seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not

understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be

said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less

universal.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known

than what is known generically; because to know anything generically

is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,

the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it

follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the

lower; which is not befitting.

Obj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if

the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which

the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the

higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.

Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;

which seems unbecoming.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher

angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in _De

Causis_ it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

_I answer that,_ For this reason are some things of a more exalted

nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which

is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is

contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by

which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in

created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it

is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what

God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the

intellect is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be

able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore

his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were,

extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be

observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an

intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and

detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are

others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from

particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its

knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not

derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will

not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing

to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal

ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of

nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.

Reply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two

senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only

the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is

something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge

of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the

part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect

to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one

universal medium can know each of the things which are properly

contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of

several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the

proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a

universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which

can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which

in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of

wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of

Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each

thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to

its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in

the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many

things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 357 / 722 题