FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]

Whether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their

substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,

according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are

happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence.

Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;

_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the

intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object

understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that

whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as

the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very

substance of the one understanding it.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there

according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an

intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an

intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower

orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are

in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all.

Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are

enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms

of things, and not by their own substance.

_I answer that,_ The medium through which the intellect understands,

is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it

is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may

be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to

which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is

that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly

complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of

the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or

that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to

understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is

universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however,

does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence

restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine

essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all

things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His

essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his

intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according

to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the

medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the

thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the

angel of his own nature.

Reply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated

in _De Anima_ ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the

sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one

thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the

intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that

the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it

understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is

precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,

the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say

that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a

thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which

are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed

perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the

angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own

formality from other things--but according to some common formality.

Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in

God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from

which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore

God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this

the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 355 / 722 题