THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]

Whether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of

understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and

"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages

of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds."

Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Obj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything

besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which

is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple

form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an

angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been

previously said (Q. 50, A. 2).

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the

angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh

unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler

nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter

is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of

intelligence.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels

are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore

substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power

or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident

thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the

diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account

it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in

every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared

to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been

already said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative

power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not

the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other

created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is

not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its

power of operation.

Reply Obj. 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all

his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is

partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject

of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality

is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking

there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is

compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of

accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for

such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs

to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species,

results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And

such a simple form is an angel.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to

substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards

accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 351 / 722 题