FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Can Be Moved Locally?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as

the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32, 86) "nothing which is devoid

of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term _wherefrom,_ it

is not moved; nor while it is in the term _whereto,_ for it is then

already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,

while it is being moved, is partly in the term _wherefrom_ and partly

in the term _whereto._ But an angel is without parts. Therefore an

angel cannot be moved locally.

Obj. 2: Further, movement is "the act of an imperfect being," as

the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is

not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

Obj. 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy

angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

_On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be

moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be

said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of

faith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified

angel is moved locally.

_I answer that,_ A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however,

to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so

likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as

it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place.

Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate

with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the

continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude;

and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the

Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place

as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it

is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be

commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the

exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is

a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by

virtual contact, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), it follows

necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else

than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at

once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as

was said above (Q. 52, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts

to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be

found in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1),

there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an

angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is

assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body

successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was

before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so

likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which

he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all

at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself

to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be

continuous.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold

reason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with

what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place

necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which

is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be

said that a thing is moved where it is in the term _wherefrom,_ and

while it is in the term _whereto_: because the very succession of

"wheres," regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence,

in whichever of those "wheres" the thing might be, it could be said

to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because

nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the

line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing

moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being

moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore,

according as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's

demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's

movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while

an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term _wherefrom,_ and

partly in the term _whereto_ (yet so that such partiality be not

referred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the

outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible

place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in

movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part

of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can

occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that

he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does

by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which

is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to

magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to

something which is divisible.

Reply Obj. 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the

act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application

of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the

act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any

need of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our

need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: "They are

all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to

minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation."

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 345 / 722 题