FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 1]

Whether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.

For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation

to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide

Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as

regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.

Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher

says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that

"an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance." Therefore an

angel is a corporeal substance.

Obj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature

is limited within its own nature." But to be limited belongs to

bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's

creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His

angels"; and, farther on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were

made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore angels are

corporeal.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels

spirits."

_I answer that,_ There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what

is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this

consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation

of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the

cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as

heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and

will (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe

requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now

intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal

faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the

perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal

creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of

intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense

and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what

could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies

alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed

except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57).

Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit

(Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof

that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect

alone.

Reply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal

creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the

other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold;

and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and

corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is

applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an

ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and

not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we

are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies

only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all

creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.

Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in

corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their

substance."

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 331 / 722 题