FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 5]

Whether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault?

[*Pain here means "penalty": such was its original signification,

being derived from "poena." In this sense we say "Pain of death, Pain

of loss, Pain of sense."--Ed.]

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into

pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all

creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own

existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore

evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.

Obj. 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor

pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are

evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.

Obj. 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for

"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion

for the exercise of virtue," as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not

is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain

follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into

pain and fault.

Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that this division is

superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil

"because it hurts." But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil

comes under pain.

_I answer that,_ Evil, as was said above (A. 3), is the privation of

good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,

however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and

integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil

also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,

or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness

is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the

body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due

operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its

due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the

will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way

in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which

comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has

the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all

things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown

above (Q. 22, A. 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be

against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of

the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for

this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect

action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in

voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.

Reply Obj. 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere

negation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore not every defect of

good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due.

For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil

in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So,

likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in

existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one

and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as

regards a creature.

Reply Obj. 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely

considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.

Reply Obj. 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always

an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,

properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change

is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the

agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the

tempter he falls into fault.

Reply Obj. 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said

that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent

in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to

the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as

including the idea of injury.

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