Whether Evil Is a Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is
a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x)
that "good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other
things." Therefore evil is a nature.
Obj. 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a
nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;
for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality
from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Obj. 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil
and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,
as the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good
and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to
good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.
Obj. 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it
corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.
Obj. 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe
except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the
perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.
10, 11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all
things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its
place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil
is a nature.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither
a being nor a good."
_I answer that,_ One opposite is known through the other, as darkness
is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the
nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything
appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its
own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection
of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being,
or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil
is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying
that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such,
is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
Reply Obj. 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of
Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and
therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil.
For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward
examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some
philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says
(Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and
privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary
is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to
white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil
are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;
because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as
such, has the nature of evil.
Reply Obj. 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except
in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the
object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has
the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific
differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence
of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself
constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;
just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in
natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore,
the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain
good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by
the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but
the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a
constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is
annexed.
Reply Obj. 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks
there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between
good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something
rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but
also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,
i) that a "prodigal man is foolish, but not evil." And from this evil
in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of
evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although
blindness is an evil.
Reply Obj. 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one
way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that
sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good,
forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In
another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter
makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final
cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.
But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that
is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For
every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as
an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
iv): "Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some
good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside
the scope of our will and intention."
Reply Obj. 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are
ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and
according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was
said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.
Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor
does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that
is, by reason of some good joined to it.
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