Whether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of
things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.
But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.
4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
Obj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar.
But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q.
44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not
diverse.
Obj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end
of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above
(Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God "divided the
light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore
the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many
causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by
itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the
ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,
attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction
of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.
Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of
things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the
intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in
matter.
But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown
above (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we
must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.
Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the
form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their
proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account
of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is
formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.
Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,
as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced
the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own
being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as
will appear later (Q. 50, A. 3). And so the first intelligence,
inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second
intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality
it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as
it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the
heavens.
But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it
was shown above (Q. 45, A. 5) that to create belongs to God alone,
and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God
alone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and
corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the
universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the
first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such
an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,
the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of
things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come
from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought
things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to
creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many
and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the
representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.
For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is
manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together
participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it
better than any single creature whatever.
And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of
things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word
of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read
in Gen. 1:3, 4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the
light from the darkness."
Reply Obj. 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes
it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its
effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was
shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since,
therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand
many things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that,
although He is one, He can make many things.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason would apply to the representation
which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by
reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is
only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,
which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by
many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the
plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of
things.
Reply Obj. 3: In speculative things the medium of
demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one
only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when
operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the
end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to
its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is
necessary.
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