Whether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something
besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures
are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar
cause.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something
self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above
(A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by
participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all
sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but
also individuating principles added to the principles of the species.
Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for
instance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Obj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species
themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there
is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are
some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.
Obj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.
Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life,
and before self-subsisting wisdom.
_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence." Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.
_I answer that,_ God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In
proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything
an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive
a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the
exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in
the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive
determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the
divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the
order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.
And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of
all things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms
existing in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though
multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart
from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence
can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore
God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things
created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of
its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some
kind of imitation.
Reply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness
to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like
to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.
Reply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man
without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man
is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior
species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other
sensible things.
Reply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only
with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the
same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.
For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from
the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the
universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their
exemplars.
Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing
life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself,
sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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