Whether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being
be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can
be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by
God.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because
whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are
many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are
from God.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text
3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient
cause.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and
in Him are all things."
_I answer that,_ It must be said that every being in any way existing
is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must
be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron
becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 4)
when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Q. 11, AA. 3, 4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting,
it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which
are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be
more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses
being most perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.
Reply Obj. 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the
definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on
what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not
enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for
us to find a being uncaused.
Reply Obj. 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are
the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says
(Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have
a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is
required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but
because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this
conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and
consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply Obj. 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though
it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in
reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient
cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of
mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause
is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the
mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
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