Whether in God There Is a Power in Respect of the Notional Acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect
of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or
passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God
nothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Q. 25, A.
1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another,
since the divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).
Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.
Obj. 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the
divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary.
Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons
proceed, there cannot be power in God.
Obj. 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept
of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs
to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as
regards intellect and will, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore,
in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): "If God the
Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of
God the Father?" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional
acts.
_I answer that,_ As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be
also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the
principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of
generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of
spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father,
and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power
of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every
generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we
must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power
of spirating.
Reply Obj. 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not
proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts
has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the
person as proceeding.
Reply Obj. 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a
consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence,
in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only
in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in
this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to
be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.
Reply Obj. 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies
distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must
observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real
distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real
distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of
which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct
from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God
the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise
action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to
those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are
distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe
power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to
God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting
and of spirating. But "to understand" and "to will" are not such
actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from
God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to
these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but
only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we
designate by different terms the intellect and the act of
understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His
very essence which has no principle.
_______________________