FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]

Whether This Word "Person" Signifies Relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this word "person," as applied to God,

does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.

vii, 6): "When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing

else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to

Himself, and not in regard to the Son."

Obj. 2: Further, the interrogation "What?" refers to essence. But, as

Augustine says: "When we say there are three who bear witness in

heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,

Three what? the answer is, Three persons." Therefore person signifies

essence.

Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a

word is its definition. But the definition of "person" is this: "The

individual substance of the rational nature," as above stated.

Therefore "person" signifies substance.

Obj. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation,

but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation,

it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.

_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that "every word that

refers to the persons signifies relation." But no word belongs to

person more strictly than the very word "person" itself. Therefore

this word "person" signifies relation.

_I answer that,_ A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this

word "person" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally

of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the

essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words

which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word "person" of itself expresses

absolutely the divine essence; as this name "God" and this word

"Wise"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by

conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and

especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing

adjective; as when we say, "Three persons," or, "one is the person of

the Father, another of the Son," etc. Used, however, in the singular,

it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a

satisfactory explanation; for, if this word "person," by force of its

own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that

forasmuch as we speak of "three persons," so far from the heretics

being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,

others maintained that this word "person" in God signifies both the

essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies

directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as "person"

means as it were "by itself one" [per se una]; and unity belongs to

the essence. And what is "by itself" implies relation indirectly; for

the Father is understood to exist "by Himself," as relatively distinct

from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it

signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in

the definition of "person" the term nature is mentioned indirectly;

and these come nearer to the truth.

To determine the question, we must consider that something may be

included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included

in the more common term; as "rational" is included in the meaning of

"man," and not in the meaning of "animal." So that it is one thing to

ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning

when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the

meaning of this word "person" in general; and another to ask the

meaning of "person" as applied to God. For "person" in general

signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The

individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.

Therefore "person" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that

nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and

this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which,

though not belonging to "person" in general, nevertheless do belong to

the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above

(Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in

a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent,

for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so

the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person.

Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this

is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a

hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that

which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus

it is true to say that the name "person" signifies relation directly,

and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as

expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly

the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is

the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed

as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into

the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this

signification of the word "person" was not clearly perceived before it

was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word "person" was used just as

any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express

relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word

"person" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the

first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply Obj. 1: This word "person" is said in respect to itself, not to

another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way

of a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says

that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same

as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are

the same.

Reply Obj. 2: The term "what" refers sometimes to the nature

expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we

answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the

_suppositum,_ as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A

fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.

Reply Obj. 3: In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable

substance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.

Reply Obj. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not

produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass

have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally

in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both.

So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the

signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a

human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though

neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said

univocally of God and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5).

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 221 / 722 题