SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]

Whether Predestination Is Certain?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because

on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy

crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another

will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown

which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.

Therefore predestination cannot be certain.

Obj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible

follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may

sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that

the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not

impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do

now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.

Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore

predestination is not certain.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also

predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and

preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will

most certainly be freed."

_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes

effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its

effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.

1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things

subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from

contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which

divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of

providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also

the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not

destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.

Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will

(Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 19, A. 4) must also be taken into consideration;

since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they

themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply Obj. 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two

ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his

crown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a

certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal

sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he

takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall,

without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in

pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their

stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels;

and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for

another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen

in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has

done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by

himself or by others.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated

considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,

supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence

it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply Obj. 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated

above (A. 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is

necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the

immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so

the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to

say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has

predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely

speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty

of predestination is not destroyed.

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Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars) From the Complete American Edition · 第 186 / 722 题