Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]

Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his

rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the

goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through

a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any

selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to

predestination.

Obj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination

from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,

some are predestined without election.

Obj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills

all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which

ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 1:4): "He chose us in Him before

the foundation of the world."

_I answer that,_ Predestination presupposes election in the order of

reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that

predestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now

providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect

directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved

above (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless

the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of

some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that

God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and

love:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of

eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated

above (Q. 20, AA. 2 ,3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to

some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated

above (A. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in

God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not

cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already

exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in

us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will,

by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that

good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that

love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes

predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election

and love.

Reply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general

be considered, God communicates His goodness without election;

inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His

goodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the

communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it

without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He

does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory

election is implied.

Reply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make

a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the

choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens

in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A.

2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are

chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice."

Reply Obj. 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will,

which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent

will, which is to will simply.

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