Whether There Is Justice in God?
Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is
divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:
neither therefore does justice.
Obj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does
not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh
all things according to the counsel of His will" (Eph. 1:11).
Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.
Obj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But
God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice
cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards
the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to
God.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): "The Lord is just, and hath
loved justice."
_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in
mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds
of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls
commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of
business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says:
"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?" (Rom.
11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive
justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank
deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any
kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the
order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in
effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in
seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the
condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and
with the powers that properly belong to it."
Reply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the
passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and
daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only
metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. 20,
A. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which
is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those
virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with
works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and
magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in
the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these
virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as
are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,
8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of
the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His
wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in
accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does
according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do
according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,
God is a law unto Himself.
Reply Obj. 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is
directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the
servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause.
In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or
necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order
has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is
directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to
substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby
all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations
debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to
creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God
that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom
require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's
justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself
what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it
should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have
hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God
exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by
its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the
former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it
according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays
each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not
directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice,
therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment
of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on
either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): "When Thou dost punish the
wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou
dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness."
Reply Obj. 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its
being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of
a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always
regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to
act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason
it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the
general to the special.
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