Whether God Loves All Things?
Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover
outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object
of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed
outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is
inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.
Obj. 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from
God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love
anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it
is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other
than Himself.
Obj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and
the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures
with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.
Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship
with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).
Therefore God does not love all things.
Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): "Thou hatest all the
workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and
loved. Therefore God does not love all things.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): "Thou lovest all things
that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."
_I answer that,_ God loves all existing things. For all existing
things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a
thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it
possesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that God's will
is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing
has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by
God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since
to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it
is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we
love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of
things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we
will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but
conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our
love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and
receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our
actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass
into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the
beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works
for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of
the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the
cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed
outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."
Reply Obj. 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity,
except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God
has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason
has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know
things existing in themselves.
Reply Obj. 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational
creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one
with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or
ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to
them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational
creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the
intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking,
therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of
friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He
orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is
not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His
goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a
thing for others as well as for ourselves.
Reply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved
under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners
in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and
have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not
existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from
God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
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