Whether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled?
Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled.
For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): "God will have all men to be saved,
and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen.
Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Obj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that
of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all
good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might
exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.
Obj. 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does
not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may
be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the
motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore
the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the
secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 113:11): "God hath done all things,
whatsoever He would."
_I answer that,_ The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In
proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to
the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active
causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although
a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of
the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a
man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the
same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the
order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the
universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and
if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the
hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the
order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly
escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this
is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from
producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal
things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred
through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first
heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all
things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its
effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one
order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by
sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls
back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be
saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted
application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De
praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved
that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not
will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of
individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case
they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be
saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not
all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide
Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not
of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as
applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing
antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it
is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and
absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some
additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent
consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should
live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely
considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a
murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live
is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he
wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be
hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved,
but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor
do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in
a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in
themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular
qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it
when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is
meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge
wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he
would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a
qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute
will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;
although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply Obj. 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the
thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is
directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have
the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does
not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but
does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom
all good virtually exists.
Reply Obj. 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by
deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first
cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could
in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as
said above.
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