Whether Falsity Exists in Things?
Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For
Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it
will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may
appear to the contrary."
Obj. 2: Further, false is derived from _fallere_ (to deceive). But
things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),
they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not
found in things.
Obj. 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to
the divine intellect, as stated above (Q. 16). But everything, in so
far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without
admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a
true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being
unity." But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of
it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.
_I answer that,_ Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites
stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where
primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in
things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the
intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs
to it _per se,_ but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it
accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared
with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared
_per se_ but may be called false relatively as directed to another
intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things
depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.
Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in
themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;
whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short
of the proper operation of his art.
In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as
they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes
place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless
perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their
power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein
consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and
lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do
you love vanity, and seek after lying?" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other
hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient
to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, "He that doth
truth, cometh to the light" (John 3:21).
But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared
thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;
and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and
thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by
word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to
be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should
say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The
true tragedian is a false Hector": even as, on the contrary, anything
can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In
another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a
thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And
whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,
since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and
naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external
accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be
false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and
tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We
call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the
true:" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called
false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what
they are not." In this way a man is called false as delighting in
false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in
this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as
stated in _Metaph._ v, 34.
Reply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true
in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.
Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq.
ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain
non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.
Reply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by
accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they
bear to things which they actually are not.
Reply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the
divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as
compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.
To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective
representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far
as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always
said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when
the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not
in any one case, but in the majority of instances.
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