Whether There Are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?
Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things
that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would
follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.
Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.
Obj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,
nor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things
there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of
the divine will are the determining and effective types of things."
Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
Obj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be
no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.
Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but
also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of
these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as
Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are
not ideas in God of all things known by Him.
_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is
clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the
proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas
of all things known by Him.
_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the
knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold
office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the
principle of the making of things, it may be called an "exemplar," and
belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of
knowledge, it is properly called a "type," and may belong to
speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect
to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a
principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even
though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows
according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in
a speculative manner.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but
through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,
neither in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type."
Reply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of
things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with
respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies
an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type."
Reply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not
created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a
concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by
God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not
apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can
neither exist, nor be known.
Reply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species,
in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist
except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents
that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being
along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the
subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through
the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;
whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such
as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other
form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea
than that of species; both because particular things are
individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated
and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature
regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the
species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not
merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22,
A. 3).
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